Judgment :- The petitioners are women employees in the office of the Accountant General (A & E) Kerala, the 5th respondent herein. In this writ petition the petitioners challenge initiation of disciplinary proceedings against them as evidenced by Ext.P7 to P16 under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). They also contend that Ext.P5 which is a communication issued from the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, evidencing a disinclination to conduct further enquiry into Ext.P1 complaint lodged by the petitioners before the Chair person, Committee for Redressal of Sexual Harassment on Working Women, Officer of the Accountant General, is illegal and requires interference by this court inter alia for the reason that it is in contravention of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vishaka and others vs. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1997 (SC) 3011). The petitioners also seek a writ of mandamus to the Union of India to appoint a lady IPC Officer to enquire into Ext.P1 complaint of sexual harassment, lodged by the petitioners against the 5th respondent (who is eo nominee impleaded as the 4th respondent) 2. When the writ petition came up for admission, I felt a doubt as to the maintainability of the writ petition before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia on the premise that the petitioners and the 5th respondent are employees having the status of Central Government Employees and the dispute between the petitioners and the 5th respondent would otherwise be cognizable by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) functioning under the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985. I requested the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, on whom notice of the writ petition had been served, to address this court on this issue. Accordingly, Sri. G. Janardhana Kurup, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Sri. K.R.B. Kaimal learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents essentially addressed this court on the question as to whether the writ petition is maintainable before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. Accordingly, Sri. G. Janardhana Kurup, learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners and Sri. K.R.B. Kaimal learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents essentially addressed this court on the question as to whether the writ petition is maintainable before this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3. Since I am dealing with the question of jurisdiction in the first instance, I deem it unnecessary to embark upon a detailed appreciation of the facts or the rival contentions of the parties as regards the correctness of the proceedings, which are impugned in this writ petition. The petitioners who are employees in the office of the Accountant General contend that the entire employees at the office of the Accountant General were aggrieved by his move to outsource the work relating to ‘one rank one pension’ scheme and this had led to the situation where disciplinary action was apparently initiated by the 5th respondent against one Santhose Kumar, an employee of the office of the Accountant General. This led to a dhama in the portico of the Accountant General’s office on 19.12.2006. The Accountant General on his return to the office after lunch allegedly created an embarrassing scene by cutting across the lines maintained by the women employees sitting at the northern end of varandha in the portico, that he crossed over their legs and stamped with his booted feet on the clothes of a lady and several others. There is also an allegation that he took out a mobile phone and started taking photographs of the lady employees from different angles while he was still in their midst. The conduct of the 5th respondent was outrageous to the modesty and dignity of women and it constituted sexual harassment as has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Vishaka’s case. Ext.P1 complaint was lodged before the Chair person of the Committee for Redressal of Sexual Harassment on Working Women functioning in the office of the 5th respondent. Apparently, the complaint was forwarded to the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, New Delhi. The contention is that the Committee for Redressal of Sexual Harassment on Working Women, which is the body constituted in terms of the directions of the Supreme Court should have looked into the correctness of the complaint and then take further action on the same. The contention is that the Committee for Redressal of Sexual Harassment on Working Women, which is the body constituted in terms of the directions of the Supreme Court should have looked into the correctness of the complaint and then take further action on the same. But in the instant case it was forwarded to the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General, from where it was apparently rejected as evidenced by Ext.P5 holding that Ext.P1 complaint does not come within the purview of sexual harassment of working women at their work place. Ext.P5 is one of the communications challenged in this writ petition. 4. According to the petitioners, disciplinary proceedings later came to be initiated against the petitioners as evidenced by Ext.P7 to P16 essentially on the allegation that petitioners had preferred a joint complaint against the Accountant General and the said complaint was a false one and the action on the part of the petitioners is liable to be treated as subversive of discipline as contemplated by Rule 3 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules. It is at this juncture that the petitioners have approached this court with the instant writ petition for the reliefs already mentioned above. 5. As mentioned supra I heard the learned senior counsel on both sides essentially on the question of jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution, to entertain a writ petition which fundamentally involves a service dispute relating to Central Government servants or disputes raised by the Government servants having the status of Central Government servants as in the case of the petitioners. The show cause and charge memos have been issued under the CCS (Conduct) Rules and obviously the petitioners are treated as Central Government servants. The validity of the show cause notices Ext.P7 to P16 issued under the CCS (Conduct) Rules or for that matter any action taken in pursuance thereof are obviously matters that come within the purview of section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunal Act. Obviously the validity of a disciplinary action initiated against the petitioners would be comprehended by sub clause (v) of section 3(q) of the Act. Obviously the validity of a disciplinary action initiated against the petitioners would be comprehended by sub clause (v) of section 3(q) of the Act. A reading of section 14 and 19(1) of the Act makes it clear that the Central Administrative Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to entertain and decide upon a complaint raising a question of validity (or the absence of it) of a notice in the nature of Exts.P7 to P16 which are issued under the CCS (Conduct) Rules. In other words, the main grievance raised in this writ petition is one which is cognizable by the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Tribunal obviously has the competence and the jurisdiction to deal with the complaint in all respect. It also has jurisdiction to grant any relief that is deemed proper and fit in the circumstances of the case. 6. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that even if the validity of Exts.P7 to P16 notice under which disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the petitioners are cognizable by the CAT, nevertheless this court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition and adjudicate the same for two reasons. Firstly, it is contended that apart from the validity of the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings, the instant case also involves the validity and correctness of the stand taken by the second respondent, vide Ext.P5 expressing a view that Ext.P1 complaint does not relate to any allegation to sexual harassment, against the 5th respondent. The contention is that the question as to whether the complaint discloses allegation of sexual harassment and if so, the action that should be appropriately taken against the offender are matters which could be decided only by a committee constituted specifically for that purpose in terms of the directions in Vishaka’s case. Secondly, it is contended that assuming that the CAT had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitioner like the instant writ petition, there is no rule of law interdicting this court from entertaining a writ petition merely because there is an efficacious alternative remedy available to them. Mr. Secondly, it is contended that assuming that the CAT had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitioner like the instant writ petition, there is no rule of law interdicting this court from entertaining a writ petition merely because there is an efficacious alternative remedy available to them. Mr. Kurup contends that going by the very nature of the plea made by the petitioners for appointment of a senior IPC lady officer to enquire into the conduct of the 5th respondent, the writ petition must be decided by this court under Article 226 of the Constitution and not by a Tribunal like the CAT which has limited jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act as such. Mr. Kurup refers to a judgment of the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Devi vs. Union of India and others reported in (2006 (3) All India Services Law Journal 225). 7. Mr. Kaimal, learned counsel for the respondents submits that in so far as the matters cognizable by the Central Administrative Tribunals are concerned, the jurisdiction of the High Court would essentially be of a supervisory character under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore the jurisdiction could be exercised only in relation to orders passed by the CAT and not by this court as the court of first instance as such. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the Supreme Court in L. Chandrakumar vs. Union of India reported in (1997 (3) SCC 261). 8. Having heard learned counsel on both sides, I am of the view that in cases where complaint/issues/grievance as such is cognizable by a Central Administrative Tribunal, it would not only be improper for this court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the court of first instance but it can be a case where this court would be acting without jurisdiction if such a petition is entertained and adjudicated upon without the parties exhausting their remedy under the Administrative Tribunals Act. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Chandrakumar is clear on this aspect. 9. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of the constitution. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Chandrakumar is clear on this aspect. 9. The Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of the constitution. Thus section 28 of the Act, which provides for exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other court in relation to matters, which are cognizable under the Act, would therefore be unconstitutional. The Supreme Court adopted a similar line of reasoning in relation to clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323 B on the premises that the power of judicial review available to the High Court under Article 226 and 227 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution forms part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution. 10. After having held so, the Supreme Court further went on to rule that the other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the power conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution of India and therefore such specialized Tribunals are even possessed of competence to test the constitutional validity of the Rules. The Supreme Court categorically held that the Tribunals will continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas for which they have been constituted. 11. As part of the basic structure of the constitution, the orders passed by the Tribunals would be subject to scrutiny by the High Court. But it is not open to the litigants to approach the High Court as the court of first instance. It is necessary for the litigants to approach the Tribunal, which would exercise powers as a court of first instance. Obviously any person aggrieved by an order of the CAT would have a right to seek a judicial review of the order by approaching this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, it is obvious that the petitioners are required to approach the CAT where the instant petition involves a challenge against the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against them. In that view of the matter, it is obvious that the petitioners are required to approach the CAT where the instant petition involves a challenge against the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings against them. Thus, this writ petition cannot be maintained not only because there is an efficacious alternate remedy but because the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised, in relation to matters which are otherwise cognizable by the CAT, only as a supervisory jurisdiction, comprehending a power of judicial review in relation to orders passed by the CAT and not in relation to an original cause of action. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners Sri. Kurup then relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Devi and others vs. Union of India where the learned single judge of the Delhi High Court went on to hold that even in service matters otherwise cognizable by the Central Administrative Tribunal, the appropriate remedy available to an aggrieved person would be the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution in cases where there are allegations of sexual harassment, otherwise comprehended by the directions of the Supreme Court in Vishaka. The judgment and declaration of law, in Vishaka, to that extent adds a new dimension, which was never in the contemplation of parliament, when it defined service matters and conferred specified jurisdiction, upon Tribunals under the Act. The learned Judge further held that hence the appropriate forum for determining disputes and controversies, of the kind raised in these proceedings, is the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the proposition. There is no doubt that Vishaka brought a new dimension in service jurisprudence essentially holding that the right of women employee in her work place and the right available to women employee to carry on their profession free of bias and sexual harassment is eligible to be treated as part of the fundamental right guaranteed to such persons under Article 226 of the Constitution. The direction in Vishaka that they must evolve a special mechanism to deal with the sexual harassment at the work place therefore constitutes a valuable right to any woman Government employee. The direction in Vishaka that they must evolve a special mechanism to deal with the sexual harassment at the work place therefore constitutes a valuable right to any woman Government employee. But why it should be presumed that a Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be incompetent to consider a complaint raised by a Central Government employee against an employer, involving sexual harassment as the term is amplified in Vishaka?. In Chandrakumar the Supreme Court held in clear terms that the Tribunal constituted under Article 323 A of the Constitution would have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint involving challenge to the validity of even a statutory provision. If that be the content of the jurisdiction exercisable and exercised by he CAT, can it be said that it would be incompetent to effectively adjudicate upon a complaint raised by a Central Government Employee against an employer, involving allegations of sexual harassment?. A dispute so raised would be comprehended by “any other matter as contained in sub clause (v) of section 3(q) of the Act and in my opinion the complaint as in the instant case would obviously be comprehended by the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances the Tribunal alone can act as a court of first instance. The power of judicial review available of this court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, would be the power of judicial review in relation to an order passed by the CAT acting as the court of first instance. 14. With great respect, I am unable to agree with the proposition laid down by the Delhi High Court in Samridhi Devi’s case. It is also note worthy that Chandrakumar’s case does not seem to be specifically noted by the Delhi High Court while deciding the case. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the issue raised in this writ petition is cognizable by the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunals, 1985 and consequently this court would be bereft of jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition as a court of first instance. In the circumstances, the writ petition is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.