Virendra Kumar, Bipin Bihari Shrivastava, Anurag Kumar v. State Of Bihar
2007-04-19
AFTAB ALAM, REKHA KUMARI
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Aftab Alam, J. 1. These three appeals are directed against a common order, dated 25.8.2005 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Court, dismissing three writ petitions filed by the appellants challenging the order of their removal from service as Personal Assistants/Reporters in the Bihar Legislative Assembly. 2. This is the third and hopefully the final phase of the cleansing operation in regard to a large number of illegal appointments made in the Assembly on different Class-Ill and Class-IV posts during the tenure of one Mr. Ghulam Sarwar as its Speaker. Before Mr. Sarwar, the staff strength in the office of the Assembly was about 600. During his term, it was increased by over 75% by appointment of around 460 people. Almost all those appointments were made in complete disregard of the right to equality guaranteed under Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and in total violation of the statutory rules for making appointments in the Assembly Secretariat. But it is a matter of some satisfaction that the rule of law asserted itself and the illegal appointees were finally removed, though after protracted litigations in three phases spread over seventeen years. 3. The matter first came to the Court in CWJC No. 7995 of 1990 at the instance of four unsuccessful candidates who questioned the validity of the appointments of a large number of people on different posts, e.g., Assistants, Typists, Hindi Research Assistants, Hindi Experts, Security, Darban, Daftari, Sweepers, Peons etc. made by the Speaker during the period June 15 to November 1, 1990. (It was ascertained later that the total number of appointments made during the period was 185). A learned Single Judge of the Court by judgment and order, dated 23.12.1994 (reported as Harendra Kumar Pandey vs. The State of Bihar and Others, 1995(1) PLJR 254) allowed the writ petition, declared the appointments in question as void ab initio and quashed the orders under which the appointments were made. 4. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, appeals were filed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and some of the affected employees. The appeals were first heard by a Division Bench but there was a difference of opinion between the two Judges constituting the Bench.
4. Against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, appeals were filed by the Bihar Legislative Assembly and some of the affected employees. The appeals were first heard by a Division Bench but there was a difference of opinion between the two Judges constituting the Bench. As a result, the appeals came to be heard before a third Judge who dismissed them by judgment and order, dated 8.11.1996 reported as Bihar Legislative Assembly vs. Harendra Kumar Pandey, 1997(1) PLJR 1 . The matter was then taken to the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 22747, 22869 and 23379 of 1996. All the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed on 2.12.1996. This concluded the first phase in which 185 people appointed during the period June 15 to November 1, 1990 were finally removed from the service of the Assembly. 5. In course of the contentious litigation, it also came to light that those kinds of appointments had not stopped but were continued to be made long after November, 1990. Then by order, dated 15.9.1997, another batch of 183 employees were removed from service on the ground that their appointments were made exactly in the same way as those who were removed as a result of orders passed by the Courts. The removal order, dated 15.9.1997 came to be challenged before the Court in a batch of writ petitions that were heard and dismissed by a Bench of this Court by judgment and order, dated 8.10.1999 (reported as Amrendra Singh & Others vs. State of Bihar & Others, 1999(3) PLJR 984). One of the grounds on which the removal order of the petitioners in Amrendra Singh was assailed before the Court was that it was arbitrary and against Article 14 of the Constitution because similarly appointed persons were allowed to continue in service [see paragraph 12(vi) of the decision]. It appears that confronted with the objection raised by the petitioners in Amrendra Singh, Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, Counsel for the Assembly wrote a letter to the Secretary, Assembly Secretariat on 17.6.1999 expressing his views in regard to retaining in service 16 P.As., 6 drivers, 2 Khalashi and 3 Reporters (in all, 27 employees) while removing the other 183 by the order coming under challenge. He asked that a final decision in regard to the 27 employees who were similarly appointed without any newspaper advertisement during the tenure of Mr.
He asked that a final decision in regard to the 27 employees who were similarly appointed without any newspaper advertisement during the tenure of Mr. Sarwar should be taken by 22.6.1999 so that an affidavit could be filed in the case that was due to come up for hearing on 25.6.1999. In accordance with the advice of the Counsel, the Speaker made a detailed review of the manner of appointment of the 27 people and by order, dated 24.6.1999 directed that they too should be removed from service. This fact is noted in paragraphs 32 and 33 of the decision in Amrendra Singh. The decision in Amrendra Singh concluded the second phase and finally led to the removal from service of 183 people. 6. Following the direction of the Speaker, notifications were issued on 28.6.1999 removing from service 26 people who were appointed as P.As., Reporters and on similar other posts. Thus commenced the third phase of the elimination process that has culminated in the present appeals. Three writ petitions (giving rise to the present appeals) were filed challenging the notifications dated 28.6.1999. A learned Single Judgt of the Court dismissed the writ petitions and affirmed the impugned orders of removal. The learned Single Judge also noticed that following the removal notifications, dated 28.6.1999 an advertisement was issued for filling-up the resultant vacancies and all the vacancies were since filled-up on the basis of proper selection of candidates. As a matter of fact, it is one of the grounds on which the learned Single Judge declined to interfere in the matter. 7. What is discussed above should have sufficed to dismiss the appeals but in fairness to the appellants, I must record the submissions advanced on their behalf. Mr. Kanth learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants in LPA No. 1086 of 2005 submitted that though the advertisement for the 17 posts of Personal Assistants and some posts of Reporters was put up only on the Assembly Notice Board, 525 applications were received in response to it. The Candidates were issued admit cards on May 15 & 16, 1991 and written test and test of shorthand & typing were held from May 29 to June 1, 1991. The answer sheets were evaluated on 16.6.1991 and a merit list of 16 candidates was issued on 4.9.1991.
The Candidates were issued admit cards on May 15 & 16, 1991 and written test and test of shorthand & typing were held from May 29 to June 1, 1991. The answer sheets were evaluated on 16.6.1991 and a merit list of 16 candidates was issued on 4.9.1991. Appointment letters were issued on the basis of the merit list from September 7 to 18, 1991 and on that basis the appellants joined as Personal Assistants. Three of the appellants, namely, Bipin Bihari Srivastava, Ravi Kishore and Uday Kant Sharma was confirmed on 15.10.1993 and the remaining appellants were confirmed on 10.3.1995. Appellants 1 to 7 were promoted as Senior Grade Personal Assistants and appellants 1 & 8 got further promotion as Additional Private Secretaries. But suddenly on 28.6.1999, all the appellants were removed from service by the impugned notifications. Mr. Kanth further stated that earlier while the appointments of others were under scrutiny before the Court, all the appellants were given show cause notices stating that their appointments were made without any newspaper advertisement and proper selection. The appellants filed their reply to show cause, pursuant to which the Speaker on 6.5.1997 constituted a committee comprising one Secretary and two Deputy Secretaries to enquire into the validity of their appointments. The Committee submitted its report on 8.8.1997 holding that the appointment of 185 people was invalid but the appointment of the 16 P.As. and the Reporters (appellants before the Court) were in order. Mr. Kanth further submitted that the report was accepted by the Speaker on 14.9.1997. He further stated that after the acceptance of the report by the Speaker, the annual increments of the appellants that were stopped during the enquiry were also released on 22.10.1997. He also submitted that on 17.6.1995 the hearing in Amrendra Singh was adjourned for a week and the Counsel for the Assembly wrote a letter on the basis of which the Speaker passed the order, dated 28.06.1999 directing for the removal of the appellants as well. Mr. Kanth strongly argued that after the report of the Enquiry Committee, constituted for the purpose, was accepted by the Speaker on 14.9.1997, the matter was closed and it was not open to the Speaker to review the matter, in any event, without giving a fresh notice to the appellants. Mr.
Mr. Kanth strongly argued that after the report of the Enquiry Committee, constituted for the purpose, was accepted by the Speaker on 14.9.1997, the matter was closed and it was not open to the Speaker to review the matter, in any event, without giving a fresh notice to the appellants. Mr. Kanth submitted that the removal of the appellants suffered from the violation of the principles of natural justice. He also submitted that some of the irregularities pointed out in the appointment process were not very significant and in support of the submission relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Sardara Singh vs. State of Punjab & Others, (1991)4 SCC 555 . He further submitted that the appellants pursuant to their appointment in 1991 had been continued in service till June, 1999. In the meanwhile, they were confirmed, they got promotions and also annual increments. On this ground also, he pleaded for a direction for the appellants to be retained in service. 8. I am not impressed by any submissions made on behalf of the appellants. It is noted above that in the earlier two phases, 368 employees who were appointed in exactly the same way as the present appellants were removed from service. The removal of 185 employees in the first phase was on the basis of the direction of the Court. The removal of the next batch of 183 employees also received a firm approval by the Court. In those circumstances, a direction by the Court for the appellants to be continued in service would be totally anomalous and highly unreasonable. 9. The way the appointment of the appellants was made is described in the counter affidavit filed by the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of the Assembly in CWJC No. 6401 of 1999. In paragraphs 31 & 33 of the counter affidavit, some details are given of the selection process from which it appears that even those of the appellants were appointed whose answer books were not even found worth evaluation. From the counter affidavit, it is apparent that appointments were made in complete negation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and in total violation of the statutory rules governing appointment of Class-Ill and Class-IV employees in the Assembly. Moreover, as is also noted by the learned Single Judge after the removal of the appellants, advertisement was issued for filling-up the vacancies.
Moreover, as is also noted by the learned Single Judge after the removal of the appellants, advertisement was issued for filling-up the vacancies. In response to the advertisement, all the appellants, apart from 2 or 3, made their applications and took part in the selection process. Most of them failed miserably. That is an additional ground for not interfering in favour of the appellants. 10. On a careful consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and on going through the materials on record, I am in complete agreement with the view taken by the Writ Court. I find no merit in the appeals, all the appeals are consequently dismissed but with no order as to costs. Rekha Kumari, J. 11 I agree.