Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. This order shall dispose of SAO No. 20 of 2004 titled Gurmit Kaur V/s. Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, SAO No. 21 of 2004 titled Saudagar Singh V/s. Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange and SAO Nb.22 of 2004 titled Major Manjit Singh Dhillon V/s. Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange. For the sake of brevity, facts are taken from SAO No. 20 of 2004. 2. The present appellants raised the following questions of law for determination by this Court: 1. Whether the statement of an accused taken while he is in custody and which subsequently stands retracted can be the basis for imposing penalty? 2. Whether the statement of persons recorded under Section 40 of the FERA Act and not produced for cross-examination could be taken into consideration for imposing penalty under the provisions of FERA ? . 3. Whether the present case is based on no evidence arid, therefore, finding recorded are based on no evidence and, therefore, liable to be set aside ? 3. The appellants were issued show cause notice for contravening the provisions of Section 9(1); 9(b) & 9(l)(d) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as FERA, 1973). 4. On the basis of an information, the residential premises as well as business premises of Smt. Gurmeet Kaur Dhillion W/o Major Manjit Singh Dhillon r/o 596 Model Town, Jalandhar were searched under Section 37 of FERA, 1973 on 17-10-1995. The search resulted in seizure of incriminating documents and Indian Currency of Rs. 70,500.00 . Nothing incriminating was recovered and seized from the business premises. Major Manjit Singh Dhillon was not present during the course of search. 5. During the course of search of the said premises Saudagar Singh son of Sh. Joginder Singh of village Dhirowal, Tehsil & District Jalandhar was searched under Section 34 of FERA which resulted in seizure of three chits indicating distribution of payments. 6. Major Manjit Singh Dhillon was not present during the course of search. 5. During the course of search of the said premises Saudagar Singh son of Sh. Joginder Singh of village Dhirowal, Tehsil & District Jalandhar was searched under Section 34 of FERA which resulted in seizure of three chits indicating distribution of payments. 6. Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon in a statement dated 17-10-1995 recorded under Section 40 of FERA inter alia stated that she was doing business of hawala payments along with her husband; that her husband is said to have received message from En-gland from one Shri Hukumat Rai Sharma whose telephone number was disclosed as 00441753863487 for making payments in India to those persons whose relations were residing abroad; that Shri Hakumat Rai Sharma collected payments in U.K. and other countries in foreign exchange and sent payments to her and her husband through some unknown persons. It was also claimed that they are doing this business for the last 1 1/2 years. It was claimed that during this period they had distributed payments in India on order of non-resident persons total-ling to Rs. 5 crores. It was claimed that documents seized from her residential premises also showed that they had distributed payments approximately totalling Rs. 5 crorers. Some of the documents were written in her hand and she explained the codes used by her in the said documents to indicate the payments to be made by her and Shri Manjit Singh Dhillon, her husband. The loose sheets No. 2 & 3 seized from Shri Saudagar Singh their driver were written by her and that the amount which was delivered to the persons whose name and addresses were written on these chits were also given by her to Shri Saudagar Singh for distribution. Out of seized Indian currency of Rs. 70,500.00 Rs. 30,000.00 was stated to be her saving and rest belonged to her husband. 7. Shri Saudagar Singh in his statement on 17-10-1995 recorded under Section 40 of FERA inter alia stated that he was an Indian citizen and was looking after the farms of Shri Manjit Singh Dhillon. He claimed to have distributed payments of Rs. 1,50,000.00 and Rs. 1,00,000.00 respectively to Shri Malkiat Singh Gullu of Village Sandhwan and to Shri Mangal Singh of village Bhinder Khurd of Distt. Ferozepur. He claimed to have distributed payments of Rs. 1,50,000.00 and Rs. 1,00,000.00 respectively to Shri Malkiat Singh Gullu of Village Sandhwan and to Shri Mangal Singh of village Bhinder Khurd of Distt. Ferozepur. The names of both the persons were mentioned on chit No. 2 and chit No. 3 recovered and seized from his person on 17-10-1995, He claimed that these chits were given to him along with amount by Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon for making payments to the aforesaid two persons and accordingly he made the payments. He further stated that he had been accompanying Major Manjit Singh Dhillon during the last 4 months for distribution of payments to the persons residing in the village on the Instructions of their relatives residing abroad. He also disclosed all the places where he had said to have visited. He has also said to have identified the persons and locate the premises where he had made payments. The persons named by him were also examined under the FERA and their respective statements were recorded under Section 39 of the Act. They admitted to have received compensatory payments under instructions of persons residing abroad. The names of the persons and amount received by them reads as under: ---------------------------------------------------------------- Sr. Name of Amount No. Party received ---------------------------------------------------------------- 1. D.V. Arora, R/o 278, Lajpat Nagar Rs. 50,000 Jalandhar, 2. Shri Pakhar Ram S/o Nand Ram, Rs. 2,00,000/- V.P.O. Bhupa Rai, Distt. Jalandhar 3. Smt. Harbans Kaur w/o Shri Gajjan Rs. 50,000/- Singh Village Prempur, Distt. Hoshiarpur. 4. Shri Raghubir Singh S/o Shri Sarvran Rs. 40,000/- Singh, Viilage Aujla Manjki Distt. Jalandhar. 5. Smt. Baldev Kaur w/o Santokh Singh Rs. 54,000/- VPO Dhaliwal, Tehsii Nakodar, Distt. Jalandhar. 6. Shri Sucha Ram s/o Pargasna Ram Rs. 50,000/- VPO Dharamkot, Distt, Jalandhar. 7. Dass Ram s/o Sunder Ram, H. No. Rs. 1,00,000/- 146 Hargobind Nagar, Phagwara. B) Kultham Dashion Mela, Phagwara Rs. 5,44,000/- 8. Malkiat Singh Gullu s/o Shri Didar Rs. 1,50,000/- Singh, VPO Sandhwan Via, Pharala, Distt. Jalandhar. 9. Mangal Singh s/o Shri Natha Singh Rs. 1,00,000/- Vill Bhinder Khurd, P.O. Bhinder Kalan, Tehsii. Zira, Distt. Ferozepur. ------------------- Total: Rs. 7,94,000/- ------------------- 8 The persons mentioned at Sr. Nos. 8 & 9 were also said to have been examined. 9. It is also the case of respondent No. 2 that these persons were arrested on 17-10-1995 and produced before the learned CJM on 18-10-1995. 1,00,000/- Vill Bhinder Khurd, P.O. Bhinder Kalan, Tehsii. Zira, Distt. Ferozepur. ------------------- Total: Rs. 7,94,000/- ------------------- 8 The persons mentioned at Sr. Nos. 8 & 9 were also said to have been examined. 9. It is also the case of respondent No. 2 that these persons were arrested on 17-10-1995 and produced before the learned CJM on 18-10-1995. They were granted bail by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge on 7-12-1995. Thus, it is apparent that the statement referred to above, were recorded when these persons were in custody. 10. Shri Manjit Singh Dhillon was granted anticipatory bail and thereafter his statement was recorded on 18-1-1996 and 22-1-1996 where he denied his involvement in making hawala payments. He is said to have admitted two payments i.e. Rs. 1,50,000.00 and Rs. 1,00,000.00 having been made to two persons. The currency recovered was put in fixed deposit. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon was charged for making payment to the tune of Rs. 5,60,76,700.00 and Saudagar Singh was charged for making payment Rs. 5,44,04,000.00 respectively to the persons residing outside India without any general or special exemption from the Reserve Bank of India and thereby they were charged for the contravention of the provisions of Sections 9(l)(b) & 9(l)(d) of FERA and Manjit Singh Dhillon was charged for abetting in making the payments to the tune of Rs. 90,19,060.00 and thereby were charged for contravention of provisions of Section 9(l)(d) read with Section 64(2) of FERA, 1973. These persons thereafter were given personal hearing. The written submissions were also filed. It was claimed by Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon that she had not committed, any offence, as alleged, in the show cause notice, she denied having contravened any of the provisions of FERA. It was claimed by her that she was forcibly taken to the Enforcement Office, Jalandhar where she was beaten mercilessly by the Officers, where no woman officer was present. It was further claimed that she was subjected to a great physical and mental harassment till late in the night as is evident from the Arrest Memo which showed the time of her arrest as 23.00 hours. It was further claimed that she was not allowed to sleep throughout the night. She further claimed that the statement was dictated to her and her signatures were got under pressure and duress. It was claimed that said statement was not admissible against her. It was further claimed that she was not allowed to sleep throughout the night. She further claimed that the statement was dictated to her and her signatures were got under pressure and duress. It was claimed that said statement was not admissible against her. It was further claimed that she was tortured to such an extent that she had to undergo treatment from a Neuro Surgeon, Civil Hospital, Jalandhar. It was further claimed by her that in her bail application dated 19-10-1995, she had made it clear that her statement was recorded under stress, strain and duress and a representation in this regard was also sent to the President of India with a copy to the Director of Enforcement, New Delhi. It was also claimed that in the absence of any independent corroborative statement, her statement being not voluntary cannot be relied upon. Shri Saudagar Singh also retracted her statement. Except the statement of Shri Saudagar Singh there is no corroborative evidence. It was claimed that no offence is made out against the accused persons. Similar stand was taken by Shri Saudagar Singh. However, the Special Director, in view of the statement made by Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon and Shri Saudagar Singh read with the statement of other persons came to the conclusion that there has been violation of FERA and accordingly a penalty of Rs. 10,00,000.00 each on Smt. Gurmit Kaur, Mr. Manjit Singh Dhillon and Rs. 25,000.00 was imposed on Saudagar Singh under Section 50 of the FERA, 1973. The money deposited in fixed deposit along with interest was directed to be adjusted against the penalty and it was ordered that the balance be recovered from Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon. The order passed by the Director, Enforcement was challenged by the appellants before the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange, New Delhi. The learned Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the statements of the appellants recorded under Section 40 of the Act were rightly relied upon by the adjudicating officer and the plea of the appellant that the statements were wrongly applied was rejected. The learned Appellate Tribunal came to the conclusion that the statements of the appellants recorded under Section 40 of the Act were rightly relied upon by the adjudicating officer and the plea of the appellant that the statements were wrongly applied was rejected. It was also held that the contents of documents including telephone number of Shri Hakumat Rai Sharma read with the admissions on respective statements of the appellants as also on receipt of payments from persons on instructions of the persons residing abroad and disbursement of amounts to persons residing in India by them, resultantly, proved beyond all reasonable doubt the offence alleged against the appellants. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the statement of Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon was taken under coercion and duress, which was subsequently retracted and, therefore, the same could not be a basis for imposing the penalty. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon ble High Court of Madras in the case of Anil G. Merchant V/s. Director of Revenue Intelligence, Madras , wherein it has been held as under: 3. Section 107 of the Customs Act enables an officer of customs empowered in this behalf during the course of an enquiry in connection with the smuggling of any goods to require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing relevant to the enquiry and to examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. Section 108 gives power to any Gazetted Officer of customs to summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other thing in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. Clause (3) of Section 108 further provides that all persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct and that all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make statements and produced such documents and other things as may be required. These provisions, therefore, enable a customs officer to summon any person to give evidence or for the purpose of interrogation in connection with any enquiry which such officers is making in connection with the smuggling of any goods. Neither these provisions in Section 107 nor Section 108 nor any other provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder restricts the right of the customs officers to require the person to appear only at stated hours. In the nature of things, therefore, it will have to depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and therefore the only thing which we can expect is that the time and place shall be reasonable and fair having regard to the facts in that particular case. Normally, it is expected that such interrogation or examination will be done during the normal office hours or during day time. However, we could not say that in every case it could be done only during day time or during office hours. If the circumstances demand an examination or interrogation immediately or during the nights subject to all other reasonable facilities provided to the person interrogated or examined it could be done at any time. The other thing which is expected is that the examination should be conducted in such a way consistent with human dignity and comfort and not inhuman, unreasonable or unfair. The provisions in the Customs Act do not also enable the customs officers to extract, coerce or use any third degree methods as mentioned by the counsel for the petitioners in the matter of examination or interrogation in exercise of powers under Section 107 or Section 108. The section does not enable the customs officers to take any person to custody. When a person is obliged to attend in pursuance of the summons issued under Section 108 and state the truth he not be considered while he was examined or interrogated as in the custody of the customs officials. In such a situation as he is expected to appear before the officers in obedience to the summons and in compliance with law, he cannot be considered to be a person taken into custody. Taking them as captive prisoners, coercing them to give false statements or depriving them of elementary facilities are not authorised by the Act. It is needless to expressly prohibit such actions. Taking them as captive prisoners, coercing them to give false statements or depriving them of elementary facilities are not authorised by the Act. It is needless to expressly prohibit such actions. If and when the officers violate any of these principles or coerce them to give false confessions, it would always be open to the person concerned to complain of the same wherever those statements are sought to be used and if the allegations are established, certainly nobody could rely or take note of those statements. In this connection we may note that a Full Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Roshan V/s. Joint Secretary to the Government, Tamil Nadu, Public Dept. etc. in paragraphs 48 observed: If, in a given case, the Customs Official detains any person required or summoned under the provisions of the Customs Act for a prolonged period, even exceeding twenty four hours, or keeps him in closed doors as a captive prisoner surrounded by officials or locks him in a room or confines him to an office premises, he does so at his peril because Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act do not authorise the officer belonging to the Customs Department to detain a person for a prolonged custody and deprive him of the elementary facilities and privileges to which he is entitled. In such a situation, the officer must be held to have overstepped his limits, and any confessional statement obtained from such a person by keeping him in a prolonged custody has to be regarded with grave suspicion, because there is always room for criticism that such a confession might have been obtained from extorted maltreatment or induced by improper means. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Nathu V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh the prolonged custody may stamp the confessional statement so obtained as involuntary one, and the intrinsic value of such a statement may be vitiated. The question whether person has been kept in prolonged custody is a question of fact, which has to be carefully considered against the background of the circumstances disclosed in each case. So, it is neither advisable nor possible to lay down any inflexible standards for the guidance of Courts, though in the ultimate analysis, it is the Court which is called upon to decide the circumstances of a particular case. 12. So, it is neither advisable nor possible to lay down any inflexible standards for the guidance of Courts, though in the ultimate analysis, it is the Court which is called upon to decide the circumstances of a particular case. 12. It is in the light of these principles the constitutional question raised by the learned Counsel shall be considered. 13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that violation of FERA could not only be attributed to the appellants in case there was a corroborative evidence to connect the appellants with the offence. In the present case, the persons summoned under Section 40 for giving statement against the accused were not presented for cross-examination by the prosecution and, therefore, no reliance can be placed on their statement. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon ble Kerala High Court in the case of Central Govt. represented by the Director, Enforcement Directorate, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, New Delhi V/s. Alfred James Femades paras 2, 4 to 6 reads as under: 2. Section 51 of the Act, which deals with the power to adjudicate in respect of the matter provided under Section 50, that is, the imposition of penalty, provides for an enquiry to be conducted in the manner prescribed by rules. The relevant provisions are those which are contained in Rule 3 of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeals Rules, 1974. That rule says that the person proceeded against in an enquiry under Section 51 has to be heard: either personally or through his lawyer or other authorised representative. The rule thus postulates a personal hearing, which implies a right to appear in person and to adduce evidence. This includes a right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. 4. In the present case the respondent was informed of the names of persons who had given statements against him. He was given an opportunity to peruse those statements. He was, however, admittedly not given copies of those statements. Admittedly he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had given the statements, although he had specifically requested for such an opportunity. 5. The Board was impressed by the argument that, in so far as the respondent was not allowed an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had given statements, the enquiry could not be regarded as a fair enquiry. 5. The Board was impressed by the argument that, in so far as the respondent was not allowed an opportunity to cross-examine the persons who had given statements, the enquiry could not be regarded as a fair enquiry. The order under appeal before it was accordingly set aside by the Board and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration by the concerned officer at first instance after according the parties a proper opportunity of being heard. 6. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the Board exceeded its jurisdiction in quashing the order and remanding the case. We do not agree. The Board was, in the circumstances of this case, justified in concluding that it would be fair if a fresh opportunity was given to the respondent. The Board was impressed by the respondents contention that he was not given an effective opportunity to elicit evidence in his defence by cross-examining witnesses who had given statements against him. We see no reason to interfere with that order. 14. It was further contended by the learned Counsel for the appellants that no enquiry against Shri Hakumat Rai Sharma was held. The learned Counsel for the appellants further contended that confession of the accused persons could be pressed into service only when Court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from the said evidence. Confessional statement can be considered only after the other evidence is considered and found to be satisfactory. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhana Khalpa Bhai Patel V/s. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bulsar, Gujarat wherein it has been held as under: We have already referred to the contentions urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant. We are unable to accept the arguments that the entire case rests on the sole uncorroborated testimony of P.W. 27 who was a co-accused. If It had been factually correct the contention would have been well founded. We are unable to accept the arguments that the entire case rests on the sole uncorroborated testimony of P.W. 27 who was a co-accused. If It had been factually correct the contention would have been well founded. Our attention has been drawn to the judgment in Haricharan Kurmi V/s. State of Bihar in which it is held that though the confession of a co-accused person cannot be treated as substantive evidence and can be pressed into service only when the Court is inclined to accept other evidence and feels the necessity for an assurance in support of its conclusion deducible from the said evidence. The Court observed that the stage to consider such confessional statements arrived only after the other evidence is considered and found to be satisfactory. 15. The learned Counsel for the appellants further contended that the impugned orders passed by respondents No. 1 & 2 are merely based on the confessional statement which cannot be the basis for imposing the penalty and in support of this contention reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Haroom Haji Abdulla V/s. State of Maharashtra , para 10 of the said judgment reads as under: The case of the Judicial Committee dealt with accomplice evidence which was sought to be corroborated by retracted confessions. The case of this Court dealt with retracted confession which was sought to be used without corroboration. Both cases treat the retracted confession an evidence which may be used although not within the definition of evidence. But both cases regard this evidence as very weak, and only to be used with great caution. Although Govinda Menon, J. in Subramanium Goundans case placed a confession on a slightly higher level than accomplish evidence, the observation is intended to convey the difference between the extent of corroboration needed for the one or the other before they can be acted upon. To read more meaning into the observations is not permissible for no such meaning was intended. The confession there considered was also be used against the maker and a co-accused. A confession intended to be used against a co-accused stands on a lower level than accomplish evidence because the latter is at least tested by cross-examination whilst the former is not. The confession there considered was also be used against the maker and a co-accused. A confession intended to be used against a co-accused stands on a lower level than accomplish evidence because the latter is at least tested by cross-examination whilst the former is not. The observations of Govinda Menon J. must not be applied to those cases where the confession is to be used against a co-accused. As pointed out by this Court in Nathu V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh , confessions of co-accused are not evidence but if there is other evidence on which a conviction can be based they can be referred to as lending some assurance to the verdict. 16. The learned Counsel for the appellants finally argued that if for the sake of arguments, allegations levelled by the prosecution are believed that there was proof of transaction to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000.00 (Rupees one lac only) and Rs. 1,50,000.00 (Rupees one lac and fifty thousand only) even then the penalty of Rs. 10,00,000.00 (Rs. Ten lac only) imposed each on two of the appellants and Rs. 25,000.00 (Rs. Twenty five thousand only) imposed on the third appellant is clearly in violation of Section 50 of the FERA, which reads as under: Section 50. Penalty: If any person contravenes any of the provisions of this Act (other than Section 13, Clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 18A and Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 19) or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, he shall be liable to such penalty not exceeding five times the amount or value involved in any such contravention or five thousand rupees, whichever is more, as may be adjudged by the Director of Enforcement or any other officer of Enforcement not below the rank of an Assistant Director of Enforcement specially empowered in this behalf by order of the Central Government (in either case hereinafter referred to as the adjudicating officer). 17. However, Mr. Kamal Sehgal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by referring to Section 54 of the Act contended that appeal under Section 54 can only be filed on the question of law and no such question of law arises for consideration in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal is liable to be rejected on this short ground. However, Mr. Kamal Sehgal, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents by referring to Section 54 of the Act contended that appeal under Section 54 can only be filed on the question of law and no such question of law arises for consideration in this appeal and, therefore, the appeal is liable to be rejected on this short ground. The learned Counsel for the respondent thereafter by placing reliance on the judgment of Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Roshan Beevi V/s. Joint Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu 1984 CLJ 134 contended that when a person is summoned for an enquiry under Section 107 and Section 108 that person is not an accused person and the officer summoning that person is not a police officer. Any confession made by the person summoned under Sections 107 and 108 of FERA before the Custom Officer is admissible in law since it is not hit by Sections 25 & 26 of the Evidence Act. However, this contention cannot be accepted as in this very judgment the Hon ble Full Bench of the Madras High Court has been pleased to hold that if it is shown in a given case that such a confession was obtained by the Custom Officer by extortion or inducement, threat, coercion or duress or extortion or illegally detaining the person in an unauthorized prolonged custody in contravention of the provisions of the Custom Act or obtained by using 3rd degree method that the question of acceptability or viability of such confession would arise. In the present case it is not in dispute that the statement of the appellants Gurmeet Kaur Dhillon and Saudagar Singh were recorded while in custody and, therefore, this judgment has no application. 18. I have considered the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the parties and find force in the pleas raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants. It is not in dispute that the statements of the accused were recorded after taking them into custody and they had admittedly retracted from the said statement. In spite of that, the authorities took no steps to permit the appellants to cross-examine the persons said to have been examined under Section 40 of the FERA and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Kerala High Court in the case of Central Govt. In spite of that, the authorities took no steps to permit the appellants to cross-examine the persons said to have been examined under Section 40 of the FERA and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Kerala High Court in the case of Central Govt. represented by the Director, Enforcement Directorate, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, New Delhi V/s. Alfred James Fernades (supra), said evidence cannot be taken into account. Once the statement of persons examined under Section 40 is taken out of the purview, then the confession of the co-accused is also of no value in view of the law laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhana Khalpa Bhai Patel V/s. Assistant Collector of Customs, Bulsar, Gujarat (supra). Thus, it has to be held that the impugned order is based on no evidence, whatsoever, and, therefore, cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the appeal is being accepted on merit. I am not going into the quantum of penalty to be imposed which prima facie is in violation of Section 50 of the FERA. 19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent that the present appeal is not competent as no question of law arises for consideration is also devoid of any merit as the questions of law arising in this case have been duly framed and answered. 20. In view of what has been stated above, the present appeals are allowed, order passed by the Enforcement Director as well as the Appellate Tribunal for Foreign Exchange are hereby set aside. 21. In view of the facts and circumstances of the appeal, respondent No. 2 is directed to refund the amount deposited in the fixed deposit to Smt. Gurmit Kaur Dhillon-appellant.