Judgment AFTAB ALAM, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 23.1.2004 by which a learned single Judge of the court allowed the writ petition filed by respondent no.1. The matter relates to grant of dealership for the retail out-let of the appellant oil company at Goh in the district of Aurangabad. The writ petitioner-respondent No.1 and respondent no.2 were among the candidates for the dealership. In the panel prepared by the selection committee, respondent no.2 was placed at the first position, another candidate, namely, Sri Krishna Singh was at the second position and the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 was at the third position. Respondent no.1 challenged the select panel in the writ petition making the officials of the company and respondent no.2, the first selected candidate as parties to the case; the second candidate was not impleaded as a party. (As a matter of fact, the non-impleadment of the second selected candidate is one of the grounds on which the maintainability of the writ petition is assailed in this appeal). The learned single Judge on hearing counsel for the parties allowed the writ petition, quashed the select list and directed the oil company to refer the matter to the selection committee with a further direction that the committee should consider afresh the case of the petitioner along with the other candidates. 2. Mr. K.D. Chatterjee, counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the learned Judge allowed the writ petition on a ground that was completely unfounded and non-existent. In support of the submission he produced before the court the evaluation sheet showing the marks allotted to different candidates by members of the selection committee. The evaluation sheet indeed makes it apparent that the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 came to the court with a grievance that was purely imaginary. But it is not possible to fault the writ court on that ground for the simple reason that the evaluation sheet was not before the learned single Judge and it was produced for the first time in appeal. Nevertheless, Mr. Chatterjee argued that the judgment and order coming under appeal was completely unsustainable even on the basis of the materials that were on record. Nevertheless, Mr. Chatterjee argued that the judgment and order coming under appeal was completely unsustainable even on the basis of the materials that were on record. Learned counsel submitted that the single Judge completely misconstrued the issues, committed errors of record and arrived at findings that were not supported by any material and were quite unjust and unkind to the appellant company and the selection committee. 3. The facts of the case are simple and without controversy. The appellant oil company issued a notice on 6.10.2001 inviting applications for dealership of its retail out-lets at different places, including Goh in the district of Aurangabad. The dealership in question was in category A under which the company acquires the land on ownershp or long terms lease basis, develops it, provides storage tank and other facilities and equipments required for a petrol pump and hands over the outlet to the dealer to operate. In view of the nature of the dealership, clause (ka) of the notice required the candidate to give detailed description of the piece of land that tie/she might be able to make available to the company. Clause (kha) stipulated that those candidates would be given preference who would be willing to give to the Company, on ownership or long term lease basis, a piece of land suitable for its purpose from a commercial point of view and from the point of view of utility and at rates and terms acceptable to it. 4. In response to the advertisement the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 filed her application on 6.10.2001 and the second respondent on 16.11.2001. Photostat copies of the two applications are at Annexures 4 and 5 respectively. Column 16 of the application in the prescribed form asked the applicant the following questions: "(i) Do you have a suitable site readily available or can you arrange one in the area advertised within six months, if selected? If yes, please give details." In reply to the above, the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 wrote in her application as follows: "If I am selected, / can arrange a suitable site, within the time." The second respondent made the following statement against that column: "Yes, a suitable site for retail out- let is readily available in village Dardha in road side on Goh-Daudnagar road nearly 2 KM away from Goh (Khata no. 65/323, 310, plot no. 1652 (new), area 0.72 D." 5. 65/323, 310, plot no. 1652 (new), area 0.72 D." 5. The oil company on 12.7.2002 issued another notice, not for any dealership but asking for suitable pieces of land for its retail out-lets at different locations, including Goh. In the notice it was indicated that at Goh the company wanted a piece of land 160 x 110 on Daudnagar-Gaya road, Sh 7. 6. Mr Chatterjee submitted that there was no direct connection between the second notice, dated 12.7.2002 and the notice for dealership issued earlier on 6.10.2001. Learned counsel submitted that by notice, dated 12.7.2002 the company was trying to find lands for its retail out-lets under A category at different places. The second notice was issued to procure lands independently and apart from those that might be offered by the candidates for dealership. Somehow the second notice was taken as a supplement to the first one and in response to the notice the writ petitionerrespondent no.1 filed another application giving details of the land that she would offer to the company in case selected for the dealership. The company took the second application submitted by the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 into consideration and as part of her earlier application for dealership. 7. All the candidates were called for interview before the selection committee pursuant to which a select list was prepared in which, as noted above, respondent no.2 was placed at serial no.1, Sri Krishna Singh at serial no.2 and respondent no.1 at serial no.3. 8. The writ petitlner-respondent no.1 appears to have conceived the notion that respondent no.2 was selected in preference to her becasue she had omitted to give details of the land offered by her to the company in her first application in response to the notice, dated 6.10.2001 while he had given the details of the land that he was willing to offer to the company. Under this belief she came to the court challenging the select list. 9. It was stated on her behalf that she was by far the better candidate in all respects and the selected candidate, respondent no.2 was inferior to her in every way. She even alleged that at the end of the interview she was annonced as the selected candidate but later under political pressure the selection committee made respondent no.2 as the first selected candidate and put her at no.3 in the select panel. She even alleged that at the end of the interview she was annonced as the selected candidate but later under political pressure the selection committee made respondent no.2 as the first selected candidate and put her at no.3 in the select panel. The aforesaid allegation was of course denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the company. 10. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that before the Writ Court the select panel was assailed on the premise that the selection committee had wrongly given peference to respondent no.2 because he had given details of some land (which he was eventually unable to offer to the company) in his application whereas she had omitted to give details in her first application. Buildingup on that premise it was contended that the requirment to give details of the land in the application was only directory and it was open to a candidate to offer land and give its details at the time of interview or even after selection for dealership. It was also alleged on her behalf that the statement made in column 16 of the application of respondent no.2, giving details of the land that he would offer to the company was in fact an interpolation made later with the connivance of the officials of the company. The learned single Judge upheld the submissions made on behalf of the writ petitioner and, accordingly, allowed the writ petition and quashed the select list. 11. From a perusal of the judgment under appeal it appears that it was indeed on the above premises that the writ petitioner respondent no.1 succeeded in her challenge to the panel. In para 8 of the judgment, the learned single Judge noted the submission on behalf of the writ petitioner as follows: "Mr. Prasad, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has contended that the facts of the case clearly demonstrate that respondent no.3 has been shown undue favour so much so that despite he being inferior candidate in all respects and non-compliance of the requirement to furnish relevant papers has been selected for retail outlet arbitrarily on the plea that the petitioner did not mention any details of the land available with her for the proposed dealership in her application form nor did she offer any land for the proposed dealership." 12. In support of the submission reliance was placed on a decision of the Supreme Court in K. Vinod Kumar Vs. S. Palanisamy, 2003 (4) PLJR (SC) 175 which is discussed at some length in the later portion of the paragraph. 13. In para 13 of the judgment the learned single Judge upheld the writ petitioners submission by observing as follows: "The notice, contained in Annexure 1, only requires to express willingness to transfer the ownership/execute long term lease to the Company to make the candidate entitled for preference. In the said advertisement there was no requirement to furnish the details of the lands. This requirement is contained in subsequent advertisement dated 12.7.2002 Annexure 2), which does not show that the same is in addition/clarification of the earlier advertisement. It is true that in the subsequent advertisement, Goh is also included but as against it, it is mentioned that the retail outlet is to be established on Daudnagar-Gaya Road, N.H. 7 besides some other new places such as Dumrighat Chowk in the district of Khagaria, Parsauni Chowk in the district of Sitamarhi, Surajgarh in the district of Lakhisarai etc." 14. The learned single Judge accordingly recorded his findings as follows: "and as such, learned counsel for the respondents are thus not justified in relying upon Annexure 2 to justify the selection of respondent no.3 in preference to petitioner simply because she did not mention about the details of the land available with her for the proposed dealership in her application form." 15. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that apart from being beside the point, the finding record by the writ court is quite unsustainable and it is based on reasons that are patently erroneous. He pointed out that clause (ka) of the dealership notice, dated 6.10.2001 clearly required the candidate to give details of the land that he would be able to make available to the company. To say, therefore, that in the advertisement there was no requirement to furnish the details of the land is clearly error of record. He further pointed out that the other observation of the learned single Judge as extracted above was simply due to failure to appreciate that the two advertisements were issued for different objects and purposes. The first one was for dealership and the second for land for the ompany. 16. Mr. He further pointed out that the other observation of the learned single Judge as extracted above was simply due to failure to appreciate that the two advertisements were issued for different objects and purposes. The first one was for dealership and the second for land for the ompany. 16. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that in any event the finding was quite beside the point because the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 was not selected as the first candidate not because she did not give details of the land in her first application. Her second application giving the details of land submitted after the issuacne of the notice, dated 12.07.2002 was duly taken into consideration and was treated as part of her first application. 17. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the learned single Judge further committed a grave error in upholding the allegation of the writ petitioner that the statement made in the application of respondent no.2 with regard to the details of land were later interpolated with the collusion and connivance of the company officials. From para 13 of the judgment under appeal it would appear that the learned single Judge gave four reasons to accept the petitioners allegation with regard to interpolation in the application of respondent no.2; first, that the allegation made by the writ petitioner in her rejoinder to the counter affidavit was not denied or controverted by the company; the second that the writ petitioner was unable to offer that land to the company and after his selection, he had entered into an agreement with someone else to offer a -different piece of land to the company; the third, because details of the land were furnished in the application, though there was no such requirement under the dealership notice, dated 6.10.2001 and fourth, because in the application he described a piece of land at Daudnagar- Gaya road, SH7, though in the first notice the location of the out-let was mentioned at Goh and it was the second notice in which land was asked for at Daudnagar-Gaya road, Sh 7. 18. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that all the four reasons were completely untenable to support the very grave charge that the application of respondent no.1 was subjected to interpolation in league with the company officials. 19. Mr. 18. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that all the four reasons were completely untenable to support the very grave charge that the application of respondent no.1 was subjected to interpolation in league with the company officials. 19. Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the allegation was made for the first time after the company had filed its counter affidavit in the case and it was so baseless that no need was felt to deny it by filing further affidavits. As regards the second ground learned counsel submitted that respondent no.1 indeed did not offer the land described in his application but in accordance with the decisions of the Supreme Cout it was open to him to give a suitable piece of land within the period specified in the notice after his selection, failing which his selection would be liable to cancellation. He further submitted that that could be no ground to hold that the description of the land given in his application was an interpolation. As to the third ground Mr. Chatterjee submitted that it was based on a patent error of record since clause (ka) of the notice clearly required the candidate to give details of the land. Learned Counsel further submitted that the fourth ground too was equally unreasonable, the location at Goh did not mean a site in the midst of the thickly populated area and a proper site for a petrol pump could will be 3-4 KMs away from the town/Bazar. 20. Mr. Chatterjee further submitted that the writ court ought not to have interfered with the selection process in the absence of any cogent material casting doubt on the fairness of the selection process. In support of the submission, he relied upon the decisions of the Supreme court in (i) National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences Vs. Dr. K. Kalyana Raman and others, AIR 1992 SC 1806 , (ii) M/s. Master Marine Services Private Ltd. Vs. Metcalfe & Hodgkinso Private Limited & Another, 2005(3) PLJR (SC) 97, and (iii) a decision of this court in Dibyendu Mohan Vs. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, 2004 (1) PLJR 498 (para 14). He also submitted that in case, for any reason the selection of respondent no.2 was held to be bad, the dealership would go to the second selected candidate and not to the writ petitioner. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, 2004 (1) PLJR 498 (para 14). He also submitted that in case, for any reason the selection of respondent no.2 was held to be bad, the dealership would go to the second selected candidate and not to the writ petitioner. In support of the submission he relied upon a Supreme Court decision in Anil Kumar Singh Vs. Chairman, Dealers Selection Board, 2004 (1) PLJR (SC) 30 (para 5). In light of this decision Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable due to non-joinder of the second selected candidate. 21. I find great substance in the submissions made by Mr. Chatterjee and I am afraid that the findings recorded by the learned single Judge are quite unsupportable. 22. Having examined and discussed the judgment coming under appeal in the preceding paragraphs, it has to be said that all that has hardly any bearing on the question of non-selection of the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 as the first candidate. As noted above, Mr. Chatterjee submitted that the case of the writ petitioner was presented before the court on entirely wrong and unfounded premises and unfortunately it was allowed by the writ court on those premises. Learned counsel submitted that it was an incorrect assumption that respondent no.2 was selected because he gave description of the land that he would offer to the company while the writ petitioner did not do so in her first application. As a matter of fact, the land offered by the writ petitioner in her application submitted after the issuance of the second notice, dated 12.7.2002 was duly taken into consideration and what is more significant is the fact that under the criterion "capacity to provide infra-structure and facilities" she was given higher marks than the selected candidate, respondent no.2. From the evaluation sheet it appears that the candidates were given marks under five different heads, namely, (i) personality/Busi. ability/Salesmanship, (ii) Capacity to Manage Finance, (iii) Edu. & General Level of Intelligence, (iv) Capacity to provide infra-structure and facilities and (v) General Assessment. The relevant criterion, capacity to provide infrastructure and facilities carried a total of 35 marks. The criterion was divided into the following four sub-heads: (i) Own land offered to company, carring the maximum marks 35. (ii) Has firm offered to Company, the secondbest carrying 25 marks. The relevant criterion, capacity to provide infrastructure and facilities carried a total of 35 marks. The criterion was divided into the following four sub-heads: (i) Own land offered to company, carring the maximum marks 35. (ii) Has firm offered to Company, the secondbest carrying 25 marks. (iii) Own land not offered to Company, carrying 20 marks, and (iv) Has firm not offered to Company, earring 15 marks. 23. The candidates were given separate marks by the three members of the selection committee. From the evaluation sheet it appears that under the head, capacity to provide infra-structure and facilities, the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 was given 25 marks, being the second highest for making a firm offer of land to the company. Respondent no.2 on the other hand was given the lowest 15 marks under the fourth sub-head. But under other heads he was given higher marks by all the three members of the selection committee with the result that his aggregate came to 55.66 as against 46.33 to the writ petitioner and 47.33 to the second candidate. 24. It would, thus, appear that the whole case of the writ petitioner-respondent no.1 was quite unfounded and it was based on a self imagined grievance. 25. In reply to the submissions made by Mr. Chatterjee, Mr. Abhay Umar Singh, Senior Advocate appearing for the writ petitioners respondent no.1 referred to certain affidavit submitted by respondent no.2 along with his application in support of the statement that he would be able to offer the land described in his application to the company. Later the deponent filed another affidavit to the effect that he had neither agreed to give any land to respondent no.2 nor he had sworn any affidavit in that regard. Mr. Singh also referred to certain paras of the counter affidavit filed by respondent no.2 in that regard. 26. The materials referred to by Mr. Singh do not seem to be of any relevance in light of the discussions made above. It is clear that respondent no.2 was seleced fairly and it is now for him to offer a suitable land to the company within the prescribed time. If he fails to do so, his selection would be liable to cancellation in accordance with the rules. 27. It is clear that respondent no.2 was seleced fairly and it is now for him to offer a suitable land to the company within the prescribed time. If he fails to do so, his selection would be liable to cancellation in accordance with the rules. 27. In light of what is stated above, I am constrained to hold that the decision coming under appeal was rendered on erroneous assumption, and it cannot be sustained. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order coming under appeal is set aside and the writ petition filed by respondent no.1 is dismissed.