JUDGMENT Hon’ble S.N. Srivastava, J.—This writ petition is directed against the order dated 7.3.1998 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation by which the said authority set aside the order dated 19.3.1994 and remanded the matter to Settlement Officer Consolidation for deciding the appeal afresh after affording opportunity of adducing evidence and of hearing. 2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that in view of finding recorded by the Consolidation officer that the sale deed is not proved by way of adducing any evidence besides being void ab initio the same having been executed without permission from Settlement Officer Consolidation considering that Opp. parties are claiming possession on the basis of sale deed executed by the husband of the petitioner, no right could accrue as according to her no permission was sought and the question of remand of the matter to decide the question of possession and acquisition of any rights on the basis of such possession does not arise. It is further urged that the remand is wholly uncalled for as in either case the Opp. parties will not acquire any right under any provision of law. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the Opp. parties contended that the suit filed for cancellation of sale deed culminated in dismissal. He further contended that Opp. parties would acquire rights on the basis of adverse possession. He further contended that in case sale-deed is declared void, he would acquire right on the basis of adverse possession. He also contended that the order of remand was rightly passed as Settlement Officer Consolidation has not decided question of possession of the parties while dismissing the appeal and in view of the above, he claimed that the remand order was rightly passed. In rejoinder affidavit, learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the suit was dismissed for being presented before the appropriate Court and therefore, by any reckoning, there was no adjudication of the dispute on merits. He further urged that the petitioners had throughout been in actual physical possession but the same was illegally taken in proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C. in which the Sub-Divisional Magistrate held the Opp. Parties in possession and dismissed the application of the petitioner vide his order dated 21.4.1965 although the fact remains that several other proceedings are also going on between the parties and therefore, he urged, the Opp. Parties in possession and dismissed the application of the petitioner vide his order dated 21.4.1965 although the fact remains that several other proceedings are also going on between the parties and therefore, he urged, the Opp. parties cannot acquire any right on the basis of adverse possession. He further urged that the possession claimed on the basis of sale deed may at the most be permissive possession and once sale deed is held to be void no valid title could be bestowed on the respondents on the basis of such document and therefore the possession with the permission of owner cannot confer better rights and he cannot claim any rights by adverse possession. 3. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record as also the case laws cited across the bar. 4. The dispute in the instant case revolves round plot Nos. 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696 admeasuring 4 bigha 5 bisw and 17 Biswansi. In the basic year, respondents figured in the revenue record as Bhumidhar of the land in dispute. It is alleged that on 16.8.1961, the husband of the petitioner executed sale deed in favour of contesting Opp. parties in respect of the plots in question. Subsequently, it transpired to Consolidation order vide his order dated 3.9.67 that permission mandated under Section 5 (c) (ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was not obtained from the Settlement Officer Consolidation and in consequence rejected the mutation application of the Opp. parties. Thereafter the matter was taken to Settlement Officer Consolidation in appeal, which was dismissed by him on the premises that he had no jurisdiction. A suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act was instituted by the Opp. parties which culminated in being decreed on 22.2.69, the appeal preferred against the decision was dismissed but review was allowed and the matter was remitted to Addl. Commissioner for decision afresh. The matter was taken in challenge in second appeal and thereafter writ petition No. 416 of 1977 was preferred. During pendency of the matter, consolidation proceedings commenced a second time. Objection under section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was preferred by the petitioner on the premises that names of petitioners were rightly entered and she (petitioner) be declared Bhumidhar of the plots in question. The contesting Opp. During pendency of the matter, consolidation proceedings commenced a second time. Objection under section 9 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act was preferred by the petitioner on the premises that names of petitioners were rightly entered and she (petitioner) be declared Bhumidhar of the plots in question. The contesting Opp. parties contested the matter on the ground that he was a transferee from the husband of the petitioner and further in case sale deed is declared to be invalid, he would perfect title on the ground of adverse possession. The Consolidation Officer by means of order dated 4.6.1986, allowed the objection of the petitioner holding in substance that sale deed relied upon by the Opp. parties could not confer any right or title in favour of Opp. parties attending with further finding that the sale deed was not proved by the respondents but while adjudicating on issues 1 and 6, the authority held that the respondents had perfected their right and title by adverse possession by reason of application of Section 210 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. An appeal was preferred against the said decision, which culminated in being allowed, and the petitioner was declared Bhumidhar of the land in dispute. By the impugned order, the matter was remanded to the appellate Court to decide the appeal afresh after affording opportunity of adducing evidence on the question of possession and also whether any right and title over the property had accrued to the respondents by reason of being in possession otherwise than in accordance with law. 5. The question in the present case that begs consideration is whether on the basis of said deed dated 16.8.1961, if sale-deed is void or could not be recognized in law and further if any parties comes in possession, that party would acquire any title by adverse possession. 6. 5. The question in the present case that begs consideration is whether on the basis of said deed dated 16.8.1961, if sale-deed is void or could not be recognized in law and further if any parties comes in possession, that party would acquire any title by adverse possession. 6. In order to give prop to the above propositions, the learned Counsel placed credence on a decision of the Apex Court in Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, 2004 AIR SCW 4103 and urged that even if the defendants are held to be in actual possession, they could not perfect their title on the basis of sale deed which could not be recognized in law and further no right could accrue in favour of a party which is in actual possession by way of adverse possession/possession otherwise than in accordance with law and as such, it is further urged, the question of possession is irrelevant in the context of the present case so far as title in land in dispute is concerned and the remand for decision afresh on the basis of adverse possession is wholly uncalled for. Per contra, relying on a decision in Bharit and others v. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, AIR 1973 All 201 , the learned Counsel for the Opp. parties contended that in case sale deed is declared invalid, the right will accrue on the basis of adverse possession. 7. In the above perspective, the question that begs consideration is whether if a sale deed which cannot be recognized in law, for want of permission under Section 5 (c) (ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act by virtue of Section 45-A of the said Act and further if a person remains in possession, any adverse right could accrue and after prescribed period, such transferee could acquire any right otherwise on the basis of his/her possession and his possession could be recognized in law and he/she could perfect his/her right under Section 210 of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 8. 8. Before embarking on merit, it would be useful to quote Section 5 (c) (ii) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as amended by U.P. Act V of 1954 : “(c) notwithstanding anything contained in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act 1 of 1951), no tenure-holder, except with the permission in writing of the Settlement Officer Consolidation, previously obtained shall— (i) Use his holding or any part thereof for purposes not connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry including pisciculture and poultry farming; or (ii) Transfer by way of sale, gift or exchange any part of his holding in the consolidation area : Provided that a tenure holder may continue to use his holding, or any part thereof for which it was in use prior to the date specified in the notification issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4.” 9. Again what is the effect of a sale deed obtained without permission under section 5 (c) (ii) has been splt out in Section 45-A (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and the same being germane to the controversy involved in this petition is also quoted below : “(2). A transfer made in contravention of the provisions of Section 5 (c )(ii) shall not be valid or recognized; anything contained in any other law for the time being in force to the contrary notwithstanding.” 10. The vital question in seisine of the Apex Court was whether the defendant who endured in possession over the property for a period spanning over 12 years perfected title by adverse possession. In that case, restriction operated on transfer of such land held by a tribal to non-tribal person. The Apex Court, in para 22 has defined the word “adverse possession” and held that the law does not intend to confer any premium on the wrong doing of a person in wrongful possession, it pronounces the penalty of extinction of title on the person who though entitled to assert his right and remove the wrongdoer and re-enter into possession, has defaulted and remained inactive for a period of 12 years which the law considers reasonable for attracting the said penalty. It was further held that such inaction or default in taking care of one’s own rights over the property is also capable of being called a manner of dealing with one’s property which results in extinguishing one’s title in property and vesting the same in the wrongdoer in possession of property the thus amounts to transfer of immovable property in the wider sense assignable in the context of social welfare legislation enacted with the object of protecting a weaker section. The Apex Court further held that as acquisition of title by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession over the immovable property belonging to a tribal is prohibited by law and cannot be countenanced by the Court. What has been held in para 23 of the decision is excerpted below : “The right in the property ought to be one which is alienable and is capable of being acquired by the competitor. Adverse possession operates on an alienable right. The right stands alienated by operation of law, for it was capable of being alienated voluntarily and is sought to be recognized by doctrine of adverse possession as having been alienated involuntarily by default and inaction on the part of the rightful claimant who knows actually or constructively of the wrongful acts of the competitor and yet sits idle. Such inaction or default in taking care of one’s own rights over property is also capable of being called a manner of dealing with one’s property which results in extinguishing one’s title in property and vesting the same in the wrongdoer in possession of property and thus amounts to transfer of immovable property in the wider sense.....” 11. The learned Counsel also relied upon a decision reported in Smt. Kishan Devi v. Joint Director of Consolidation U.P., 1973 RD 196. The learned Counsel for the Opp. Parties to bolster up his case relied upon a decision reported in Bharit and others v. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, AIR 1973 All 201 wherein the quintessence of what was held was that the transferee remains in possession in his own claim based on the terms of the sale. If the document of sale is invalid the transferee gets no title under it. His possession will not be referable to any legal title it would be adverse to the transferor. If the document of sale is invalid the transferee gets no title under it. His possession will not be referable to any legal title it would be adverse to the transferor. In the present case, it lease no manner of doubt that the sale deed was obtained without any permission which was mandatory requirement. Further, the Consolidation officer has recorded a finding that sale-deed is not proved. In case respondent got possession for certain period on the basis of proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C., he cannot be said to be in possession. The question which filters out for being considered is whether possession of transferee whose transfer is void will confer any right on the respondent. In view of law laid down by the Apex Court in 2004 AIR SCW 4103 (supra), the respondent cannot be said to have perfected their title over the land on the basis of adverse possession even if it be assumed that he was in possession for any period. By this reasoning, the title on possession cannot pass on to him on the basis of such possession and law does not permit to alienation without permission at the relevant time and therefore he cannot, claim to be Bhumidhar in possession over plots on the basis of adverse possession. In this view of the matter, the order impugned herein is liable to be quashed. 12. Bharit and others v. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, AIR 1973 All. 201 is a case where the sale deed was executed for the land, which was not transferable. A Division Bench of this Court relying upon the judgment reported in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 469 , and State of West Bengal v. Dalhousie Institute of Society, AIR 1970 SC 1178, held that possession under invalid sale deed is adverse. This case is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 13. The Opp. parties in the present case relied upon the sale deed made by Nanuwa, husband of the petitioner. The Consolidation Officer held that the sale deed is not proved. The Opp. Parties are relying upon the possession under Section 145 Cr.P.C. The proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C . were hotly contested by the petitioner since very beginning. The Opp. parties in the present case relied upon the sale deed made by Nanuwa, husband of the petitioner. The Consolidation Officer held that the sale deed is not proved. The Opp. Parties are relying upon the possession under Section 145 Cr.P.C. The proceedings under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C . were hotly contested by the petitioner since very beginning. In the first consolidation operation proceedings under Section 145, Cr.P.C. and in a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R Act in the second consolidation operations, the execution of the sale deed was denied. The judgment in Bharit and others (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Similarly, the judgment in Collector of Bombay (supra) relied upon by this Court in Bharit and others (supra), which is a Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court is not applicable in the particular facts of the present case. The Government of Bombay in 1865 having decided to construct an Eastern Boulevard, called upon the Corporation of Justices of the Peace for the City of Bombay the predecessor-in-title of the present Corporation and the Government by the resolution dated 5.12.1865 resolved the Architectural Improvement Committee informed the Government that it has no objection. 14. The Government of Bombay on 19.12.1865 resolved in favour of the municipality with further direction that no rent will be charged and the Municipal Corporation had remained in actual possession for more than 70 years. The State of Bombay relating to other authorities always treated the Corporation as the owner on the basis of resolution of the Government and uninterrupted right was never denied for about 70 years. The Apex Court in paragraph 5 the judgment Collector of Bombay (supra) stated as follows : “Therefore, the position of the respondent Corporation and its predecessor in title was that of a person having no legal title but nevertheless holding possession of the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity and free from rent for the purpose of a market. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. Such possession not being referable to any legal title it was prima facie adverse to the legal title of the Government as owner of the land from the very moment the predecessor in title of the respondent Corporation took possession of the land under the invalid grant. This possession has continued openly as of right and uninterruptedly for over 70 years and the respondent Corporation has acquired the limited title and it has and its predecessor in title had been prescribing for during all this period, that is to say, the right to hold the land in perpetuity, free from rent but only for the purpose of a market in terms of the Government Resolution of 1865. The immunity from the liability to pay rent is just as such an integral part or an inseverable incident of the title so acquired as is the obligation to hold the land for the purpose of a market and for no other purpose. There is no question of acquisition by adverse possession of the Government’s prerogative right to levy assessment. What the respondent Corporation has acquired is the legal right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent for the specific purpose of erecting and maintaining a market upon the terms of the Government resolution as if a legal grant had been made to it. The right thus acquired includes, as part of it, an immunity from payment of rent which must necessarily constitute a right in limitation of the Government’s right to assess in excess of the specific limit established and preserved by the Government Resolution within the meaning of Section 8 of the Bombay Act II (2) of 1876.” 15. The other judgment relied upon by the Division Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal (supra), was a case arising out of Land Acquisition Act. The respondents were in continuous and uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of site for 60 years. Paragraph 16 of judgment in State of West Bengal (supra) is quoted below : “There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. Paragraph 16 of judgment in State of West Bengal (supra) is quoted below : “There is no material placed before us to show that the grant has been made in the manner required by law though as a fact a grant of the site has been made in favour of the Institute. The evidence relied on by the Special Land Acquisition Judge and the High Court also clearly establishes that the respondent has been treated as owner of the site not only by the Corporation, but also by the Government. The possession of the respondent must have been on the basis of the grant made by the Government, which, no doubt, is invalid in law. As to what exactly is the legal effect of such possession has been considered by this Court in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, 1952 SCR 43 : ( AIR 1951 SC 469 ).” 16. The Dalhousie Institute was allotted by the State of West Bengal and all the authorities throughout treated the Institute as owner without any objection. Hence this case is also not applicable in the facts of the present case. 17. In the present case, the sale deed was executed on 16.8.1961. The Consolidation Officer rejected the mutation by an order-dated 3.9.1961. The appeal was dismissed by Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 23.1.1964. Thereafter the parties got enmeshed in proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C. The proceedings were hotly contested under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act and the matter went upto the High Court in writ petition No. 416 of 1978 which was contested by the parties. Further dispute erupted on notification of consolidation scheme and it was hotly contested. The defence denied the right, title and possession of the opposite parties. This case is also not applicable in the present case. 18. In all these cases, there was no dispute relating to possession. The transfer was also admitted and the opposite parties treated the present claim title for 60 to 70 years as title holder. In such a situation, the case law relied upon by the petitioner in Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, 2004 AIR SCW 4103 will be applicable in the present case where the Opp. The transfer was also admitted and the opposite parties treated the present claim title for 60 to 70 years as title holder. In such a situation, the case law relied upon by the petitioner in Amrendra Pratap Singh v. Tej Bahadur Prajapati and others, 2004 AIR SCW 4103 will be applicable in the present case where the Opp. Parties accepted that the transfer was made (though it was denied by the petitioner) and the possession was taken in proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. The respondents taken in proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C. The respondents took possession, which also remained throughout under challenge in the said suit and also in the consolidation proceedings. The question arose whether in case the law makes it clear that even if a sale-deed allegedly executed cannot be recognized in law possession and valid alienation of title cannot be made, no right can accrue to opp. parties by reason of remaining in actual possession when it was not accepted by petitioner at any point of time and any possession on the basis of proceeding under Section 145, Cr.P.C. which was denied and was never considered to be uninterrupted and unchallenged by petitioner particularly when Consolidation Officer found sale-deed not proved in accordance with law as the interest in the present case was unalienable. 19. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and in consequence the impugned order passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 7.3.1998 is quashed and the matter is relegated for decision afresh on merits after affording opportunity of hearing on merit after taking into consideration the judgment of the High Court. It needs hardly be said that the case shall be decided on merits by a reasoned and speaking order. ————