JUDGMENT Narinder Thakur, Vice-Chairman.—Maintainability of this Original Application as well as the locus standi of the applicant itself has vehemently been questioned by the respondents as well as the proposed respondent association. Thus, it will be gainful to adduce the facts involved in the present case. 2. The applicant in the present original application is an Association of Lecturer of Government Senior Secondary School of District Solan with its Head Quarter at Government Senior Secondary School, Oachghat, District Solan and the same has been filed through its President, Dr. Narinder Sharma, who has been authorized in this behalf by a resolution dated 13.6.2002 (Annexure-1). As per the submissions made in the original application, the applicant association has called in question the promotions of their counter part promoted Lecturers as Head Master. As per the R&P Rules, the trained graduate teacher (TGT) have two channels of promotion open for them i.e. Head Master and Lecturer. The trained Graduate Teacher who are promoted as a Lecturer are allowed to retain their lien on the post of Trained Graduate Teacher and as and when any post of Head Master fall vacant for promotion they are to be considered for the promotion against the same as per their inter-se seniority as Trained Graduate Teacher. 3. In the present application the applicant association is virtually seeking the relief from this Tribunal to direct the respondent department not to promote their counter part promoted Lecturer as Head Master, 4. Strangely, the applicant association has failed to make out any legal grievance with respect to their above contention viz-a-viz their legal right and in what manner they are going to be affected. Only thing we could find out in the pleadings is that the applicant has pointed out with respect to anomalous situation without laying down any firm legal basis and a case for infringement of their vested legal right. 5. Admittedly, the applicant association represents directly recruited Lecturers to the School Cadre and they are not in the feeder category for the promotion as Headmaster. As such, none of their legal right has been infringed. It is in this context that the respondent vehemently opposed the maintainability of original application. In the above factual position, we gave our deliberate consideration to the point of maintainability of this original application. As such, none of their legal right has been infringed. It is in this context that the respondent vehemently opposed the maintainability of original application. In the above factual position, we gave our deliberate consideration to the point of maintainability of this original application. In this bid, we perused Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, under provision of which the present application has been filed. The very contents of this Section make it amply and abundantly clear that the original application is to be filed by a "person aggrieved" for redressal of his grievances. Now the term "person aggrieved" is to be understood in its legal sense as a person whose legal rights have in any manner been infringed and not the grievances stemming out of prejudice, rivalry, jealousy. No such case has been made out by the applicant association wherein they could have shown or pleaded that in case the promoted Lecturer are considered and promoted for promotion as Headmaster then in what manner their vested legal right is being infringed. In this context with respect to the "person aggrieved" and "locus standi", the Honble Apex Court has held in a case reported in AIR 1982 SC 149 titled as S.P. Gupta and others v. President of India, as under: "14. The traditional rules in regard to locus standi is that judicial redress is available only to a person who has suffered a legal injury by reason of violation of his legal right or legal protected interest by the impugned action of the State or a public authority or any other person or who is likely to suffer a legal injury by reason of threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest by any such action. The basis of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury to property, body, mind or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or legally protected interest of the person seeking such redress. This is a rule of ancient vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and public law had not yet been born. The leading case in which this rule was enunciated and which marks the starting point of almost every discussion on locus standi is ex parte Sidebotham, (1980) 14 Ch D 458. This is a rule of ancient vintage and it arose during an era when private law dominated the legal scene and public law had not yet been born. The leading case in which this rule was enunciated and which marks the starting point of almost every discussion on locus standi is ex parte Sidebotham, (1980) 14 Ch D 458. There the Court was concerned with the question whether the appellant could be said to be a person aggrieved so as to be entitled to maintain the appeal. The Court in a unanimous view held that the appellant was not entitled to maintain the appeal because he was not a person aggrieved by the decision of the lower Court. James, LJ. gave a definition of person aggrieved which, though given in the context of the right to appeal against a decision of a lower Court, has been applied widely in determining the standing of a person to seek judicial redress, with the result that it has stultified the growth of the law in regard to judicial remedies. The learned Lord Justice said that a person aggrieved must be a man "who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something." Thus definition was approved by Lord Esher M.R. in In Re Reed Bowen & Co., (1887) 19 QBD 174, and the learned Master of the Rolls made it clear that when James LJ. said that a person aggrieved must be a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully refused him of something, he obviously meant that the person aggrieved must be a man who has been refused something which he had a right to demand. There have been numerous subsequent decisions of the English Courts where this definition has been applied for the purpose of determining whether the person seeking judicial redress had locus standi to maintain the action. It will be seen that, according to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. It will be seen that, according to this rule, it is only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury by reason of actual or threatened violation of his legal right or legally protected interest who can bring an action for judicial redress. Now obviously where an applicant has a legal right or a legally protected interest, the violation of which would result in legal injury to him, there must be a corresponding duty owed by the other party to the applicant. This rule in regard to locus standi thus postulates a right duty pattern which is commonly to be found in private law litigation. But, narrow and rigid though this rule may be, there are a few exceptions to it which have been evolved by the Courts over the years." 6. However, in the above decision of the Honble Apex Court, the scope of term "person aggrieved" was enlarged, but that was only in context to maintaining the writ petitions. We are sitting in the Administrative Tribunal and within our limited powers by statute and procedural rules, all we have to see whether the OA is within the parameters of the provisions of the law or not. 7. As noted supra the original application has been filed by an Association. In this regard it is worthwhile to look into the provisions respecting maintainability of the original application on behalf of the association. Our intention in this regard was drawn by the Additional Advocate General to the Administrative Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1986. Rule 4 of the said rules reads thus: "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), (2), (3), the Tribunal may permit: (a) xxxx (b) An association representing the person desirous of joining in a single application provided, however, that the application shall disclose the names of all the person on whose behalf it has been filed." 8. The above provision leaves no manner of doubt in our mind that even if an original application has to be filed through an association, in that eventuality, it is a condition sine qua non to mention in that Original Application as to on whose behalf it has been filed and their names must be disclosed in the Original Application. Strangely, there is nothing of the sort. Strangely, there is nothing of the sort. Save and except for making general averments it has not been mentioned anywhere in the body of pleadings that which members of the association are adversely affected and aggrieved and in what manner. There is not even a whisper about the same. As such the original application on behalf of the association alone is not maintainable as the same amounts to public interest litigation. In this regard decision of Honble Apex Court reported in AIR 1999 SC 114 titled as Duryodhan Sahu, Dr. v. Jatinder Kumar Misra, worthwhile to reproduce hereunder: "15. Section 20 provides that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless. it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant rules. Section 21 provides for a period of limitation for approaching the Tribunal. A perusal of the above provisions shows that the Tribunal can be approached only by persons aggrieved by an order as defined. The crucial expression person aggrieved has to be construed in the context of the Act and the facts of the case. 16. In Thammanna v. K. Veera Reddy, (1980) 4 SCC 62: (AIR 1981 SC 116), it was held that although the meaning of the expression person aggrieved may vary according to the context of the statute and the facts of the case, nevertheless normally, a person aggrieved must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. 17. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976} 1 SCC 671: (AIR 1976 SC 578), the Court held that the expression aggrieved person denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. The Court observed (Para 12 of AIR): ".....It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact, and comprehensive definition. A best, its features can be described in a board tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioners interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury-suffered by him." 18. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioners interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury-suffered by him." 18. The constitution of Administrative Tribunals was necessitated because of large pendency of cases relating to service matters in various Courts in the country. It was expected that the setting up of Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively in service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the Courts but also provide to the persons covered by the Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances. The basic idea as evident from the various provisions of the Act is that the Tribunal should quickly redress the grievances in relation of service matters. The definition of service matters found in Section 3(q) shows that in relation to a person .the expression means all service matters relating to the conditions of his service. The significance of the work his cannot be ignored. Section 3(b) defines the word application as an application made under Section 19. The latter Section refers to person aggrieved. In order to bring a matter before the Tribunal, an application has to be made and the same can be made only by a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We have already seen that the work order has been defined in the explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 19 so that all matters referred to in Section 3(q) as service matters could be brought before the Tribunal. If in that context, Sections 14 and 15 are read, there is no doubt that a total stranger to the concerned service cannot make an application before the Tribunal. If public interest litigation to be entertained by the Tribunal the very object of speedy disposal of service matters would get defeated. 19. Our attention has been drawn to a judgment of the Orissa Administrative Tribunal in Smt. Amitarani Khuntia v. State of Orissa, 1996 (1) Orissa LR (CSR) 2. The Tribunal after considering the provisions of the Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no existing right to any post and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not entitled to approach the Tribunal. The Tribunal after considering the provisions of the Act held that a private citizen or a stranger having no existing right to any post and not intrinsically concerned with any service matter is not entitled to approach the Tribunal. The following passage in the judgment is relevant: ".....A reading of the aforesaid provisions would mean that an application for redressal of grievances could be filed only by a person aggrieved within the meaning of the Act. Tribunals are constituted under Article 323-A of the Constitution of India. The above article empowers the Parliament to enact law providing for adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or any Corporation owned and controlled by the Government and such law shall specify the jurisdiction, powers and authority which may be exercised by each of the said Tribunals. Thus, it follows that Administrative Tribunals are constituted for adjudication or trial of the disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts. Its jurisdiction and powers have been well defined in the Act. It does not enjoy any plenary power." We agree with the above reasoning. 20. Learned Counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 SCR 365: (AIR 1982 SC 149), and read out several passages from the judgment dealing with the question of standing. In that case the Court was not concerned with a Tribunal constituted under a Statute. It was discussing the question of standing in a proceeding before the High Court or this Court. That ruling cannot help the respondents in the present case. Out attention is also drawn to a judgment in University of Mysore v. CD. Govinda Rao, the scope of a writ of quo warranto has been discussed. That decision will no apply in the present case as there was no application for issue of writ of quo warranto before the Tribunal. Out attention is also drawn to a judgment in University of Mysore v. CD. Govinda Rao, the scope of a writ of quo warranto has been discussed. That decision will no apply in the present case as there was no application for issue of writ of quo warranto before the Tribunal. Learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the proceedings before the Tribunal is in the nature of quo warranto and it could be filed by any member of the public as he is an aggrieved person in the sense public Interest is affected. We have already pointed out that the applications in the present case have been filed before the appointment of the petitioner as a Lecturer and the relevant prayers are to quash the creation of the post itself and preventing authorities from appointing the petitioner as Lecturer. Hence, the application filed by the respondents cannot be considered to be quo warranto. 21. In the result, we answer the first question in the negative and hold that the Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Act cannot entertain public Interest litigation at the Instance of a total stranger," 9. The above decision of the Honble Apex Court directly prohibits filing of Original Application before the Tribunal which are not filed by a person "aggrieved", vide observation of the Honble Apex Court in para 15 above and which are purely in nature of public interest litigation. Thus, the present original application is prohibited on both accounts as the same has not been filed either by the person aggrieved and the same is in the nature of public interest litigation. We are also constrained to observe here that the applicant association while filing the present application has not even arrayed any person as a necessary party and succeeded in obtaining the ex-parte interim order from this Tribunal on 2.11.2004 which had the effect of adversely affecting other incumbents. Thus, it was incumbent on the part of the applicant association to have impleaded the persons likely to be affected as a party. Notwithstanding, when the association of promoted Lecturer representing the affected parties moved an Misc. Application No. 3671/2004 in December 2004 along with an application for vacation of interim order, the reply to the same was not filed and this Tribunal could give no decision as time was sought for filing the reply on every occasions on one pretext or the other. Application No. 3671/2004 in December 2004 along with an application for vacation of interim order, the reply to the same was not filed and this Tribunal could give no decision as time was sought for filing the reply on every occasions on one pretext or the other. Ample opportunity were granted to the original applicant/ association to file reply to the said M.A. for impleadment. The reply was not filed. Lastly on 20.11.2006 last opportunity was granted to the original applicant association to file reply. Again the reply has not been filed. From the conduct of the original applicant it is amply evident that they were interested in prolonging the litigation on one pretext or the other and take undue advantage of its pendency. 10. However, this Tribunal on 5.1.2005 has modified the interim order by ordering that promotion, if any, shall be subject to the final disposal of the O.A. In the meantime, the original applicant moved another M.A. No. 242/2007 praying for interim order. This Tribunal on the statement of learned Counsel for the applicant made the following interim order on 27.2.2007: "The case has been taken up today on being mentioned by the learned Counsel for the applicant stressing urgency that contrary to the order passed by this Tribunal the respondents had already indulged In giving promotions for which contempt proceedings have already been initiated and they are still proceeding to issue promotion order contrary to the rules and stay granted by this Tribunal and such orders are likely to be issued by an authority other then authority which was initially restrained from Issuing this orders. In given circumstances of the case particularly keeping in view that respondents have failed to file reply within the time granted to them, we are of the view that in case some more time is to be given to the respondents to place their stand before the Tribunal as prayed for, some interim measures are necessary to prohibit the repetition of alleged wrong by the respondents in the interest of fair play and justice, The learned Deputy Advocate General may file reply/affidavit or any other information as may he advised by the respondents for which he has prayed for time, within a week but during this period status quo as of today qua the promotion in question shall be maintained." 11. It is very sorry state of affairs that a false statement was made at a bar to obtain the interim order inasmuch as it was stated that there was already interim order of this Tribunal which is being violated. Truth is to the contrary. The interim order granted on 2.11.2004 stood already modified on 5.1.2005 as noted above. Even the contempt petition has been filed after the interim order stood already modified. This Tribunal was misled which resulted in granting of interim order and stalling the process of promotion of about 270 posts of Headmaster. It is also admitted facts from the pleadings that the order which was modified on 5.1.2005 was never appealed by the applicant. This was certainly abuse of judicial process with a sole motive to harm the rival association and calls for levying of an exemplary cost to avoid such situation in future. The applicant has concealed the material facts regarding the modification of the order dated 5.1.2005. We are of the considered view that a cost of Rs. 5,000/ - be imposed on the applicant association. In the light of above discussion and the law laid down by the Honble Apex Court, we do not find any merit in the present application and the same is dismissed with cost of Rs. 5,000/- as mentioned above. Interim order passed on 27.2.2007 is hereby vacated. Original Application stands finally disposed of accordingly. No Merit in O.A, -