Judgment 1. These criminal miscellaneous applications relate to similar matter, though the different complaint petitions were filed. The petitioners of these applications have challenged the order of cognizance dated 13.4.2006 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Barh, Patna in Complaint case Nos. 55(G.C) of 2006, 40(G.C.) of 2006, 34(G.C ) of 2006, 44(G.C.) of 2006, 22(G.C.) of 2006 and 52(G.C.) of 2006 thereby and thereunder the Court below has taken cognizance under Section 48 of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Board Act, 1960 against all the petitioners on the basis of complainant lodged by the then Secretary of Agriculture Market Committee, Sri Arya Jairaj Gupta. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the State. 3. it is submitted that the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Board has already been abolished. Therefore no notice is required to be issued to Opposite Party no.2. No post of Secretary, Agriculture Market Committee is in existence. The learned counsel for the State represents the secretary of Agriculture Market Committee. 4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that there is specific provision under Sec. 49 (2) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 that no Court shall take cognizance without prior sanction of the Market Committee. However, in this case the Secretary of the Committee has lodged complaint case at his own initiative without obtaining sanction of the Marke committee. For this the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on a decision of this Court reported in 1986 PLJR (NOC) 77 (M/s Kailash Flour Mills and other vs. The State of Bihar) as well as (1995)3 SCC 276 (Secretary Agricultural Produce Market Committee vs. Varadayana Shenoya and Others). 5. Considered the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners. Perused the provision as contained in Sec. 49(2) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 In sub-clause (2) of Sec. 49 of the Act it has been clearly mentioned that no Court shall take cognizance without prior sanction of the Market Committee. 6. On perusal of the complaint petition lodged by the Secretary of the Market Committee it appears that there is no such averment. Nowhere it has been mentioned that prosecution is launched after sanction under Section 49(2) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960. The order of cognizance also does not disclose about sanction of the committee. 7. 6. On perusal of the complaint petition lodged by the Secretary of the Market Committee it appears that there is no such averment. Nowhere it has been mentioned that prosecution is launched after sanction under Section 49(2) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960. The order of cognizance also does not disclose about sanction of the committee. 7. The above two decisions are directly on this point. The Supreme Court decision is in respect of Kamataka Agricultural Produce Market Committee Act. However, provisions are almost identical. In para 11 of the decision it has been held that Secretary of the committee is not competent to launch prosecution without authorisation of the committee through a resolution. 8. Thus, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the settled principle of law it is quite clear that the Court below has taken cognizance in contravention of Sec. 49(2) of the Bihar Agricultural Produce Markets Board Act, 1960. Accordingly, these applications are allowed and the order of cognizance taken against the petitioners is quashed.