1. By this petition, under section 482, Cr.PC 1973 or under article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners 6 (six) in numbers are praying for quashing the criminal proceeding of FIR No. 15(2) 2005 Lamphel P.S. under section 17/21 UA(P) Act, 2004 and the section 4037 424/120-B/121/121-A, IPC so far as the petitioners are concerned. 2. The facts in nutshell which would be sufficient for deciding the present case are that on 4.1.2005 Shri D. Champoudai, Assistant Inspector of Schools, ZEO, Tamenglong and Shri N. Ranglung, Assistant Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong submitted a report to the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong that they had placed indent of MDM rice with the District Manager, FCI, Imphal for the required quantity of 842.58 quintals for the month of January 2005 for ZEO and CEO, Tamenglong. Accordingly, the release order had. been issued on 17.1.2005 but when they went to the FCI Godown on 30.1.2005 for lifting the said 842.58 quintals of rice, it had been intimated that some underground organizations had deducted 10% of the total quantity of MDM rice to be lifted and accordingly the concerned officials of the FCI for the Godown Shed Nos. 5 and 6 of the FCI had deducted 10% of the said MDM rice, i.e., amount deducted was 84 quintals. 3. On receipt of the said report dated 4.1.2005, the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong submitted a report to the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District, Manipur that when the said two officers, i.e., Shri D. Champoudai, Assistant Inspector of Schools, ZEO, Tamenglong and Shri N. Ranglung, Assistant Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong went to collect 842.58 quintals of MDM rice from the shed Nos. 5 and 6 of the FCI Godown, Imphal, the officials of the FCI who were in-charge of shed Nos. 5 and 6 of the FCI Godown had deducted 10% of the said quantity of MDM rice. For ready reference the said report dated 4.1.2005 submitted by the said two (2) Assistant Inspector of Schools and the said the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong dated 4,1.2005 are quoted hereunder : - The Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong. Sub : Report on Mid-day meal lifting for the month of January, 2005. Sir, We, the undersigned have the honour to report the following facts for your information and necessary action. Sub : Report on Mid-day meal lifting for the month of January, 2005. Sir, We, the undersigned have the honour to report the following facts for your information and necessary action. That, we have placed indent of MDM rice with District Manager, FCI, Imphal with the required quantity of 842.58 quintals for the month of January 2005 for both the ZEO and CEO, Tamenglong and accordingly release order has been issued on 17.1.2005. However, due to closure/ban of FCI of FCI Godown by some organization 19-30th January, 2005, we ware constrained to lift the rise on 31.1.2005. As such while lifting at Godown, some U.G. Organisation has intimated us not to lift the rice unless 10% of the total quantity is deducted for them. The quota for the month of January, 2005 is too lapsable after 31.1.2005. As these circumstances arises all the District in-charge of MDM converged together discussed for any way out. But as the matter could not be negotiated we were forced to deduct 10% of the total quantity (84 quintals) shed Nos. 5 and 6, FCI Godown, Sangaiprou, Imphal. Therefore, this report is submitted for your information and necessary action. Yours faithfully Dated 4th January, 2005 1. Sd- D. Champoudai Assistant Inspector of Schools, ZEO, Tamenglong. 2. Sd/- N. Ranglung Assistant Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong. NO.DC/TML/11/135-MDM/2000 GOVERNMENT OF MANIPUR OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER: TAMENGLONG Tamenglong, the 4th January, 2005. To The Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District, Manipur. Sub : Deduction of 10 percentage of Mid-day meal rice quota at FCI Godown Sangaiprou Imphal, on behalf of underground Organisation. Sir, With reference to the above subject I am to state that 842.58 qtls of rice under Mid-day Meal Scheme was allotted for the month of January, 2005 in respect of Tamenglong District for Zonal Education Officer and Chief Executive Officer (Tamenglong District Council). On the day of lifting of the above quantity of rice from FCI godown Sangaiprou, Imphal by authorized officials, viz., namely, I.D. Champoudai Asstt. Inspector of Schools, ZEO, Tamenglong and 2. N. Ranglung, Asstt. Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong, 10 p.c. of the total quantity, i.e., 84 qtls was deducted at shed No. 5 and 6 FCI godown, Sangaiprou Imphal on the alleged instruction issued by the underground outfits (enclosed a copy of their complaint letter). Inspector of Schools, ZEO, Tamenglong and 2. N. Ranglung, Asstt. Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong, 10 p.c. of the total quantity, i.e., 84 qtls was deducted at shed No. 5 and 6 FCI godown, Sangaiprou Imphal on the alleged instruction issued by the underground outfits (enclosed a copy of their complaint letter). Therefore, I am lodging this complaint against the responsible persons/officials of FCI godown Sangaiprou with the request to take stern action on those who were responsible for the deduction. Furthermore, this district face a let of problem while lifting SGRY/Mid-Day Meal/Food for work rice from FCI godown as the officials of the Food Corporation of India were acting on behalf of the underground outfits and forcing to part with the certain percentages of rice at source. This may be treated as most serious and urgent in public Interest. Yours faithfully, Sd- Deputy Commissioner, Tamenglong. 4. Mr. A. Bimol Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that on plain perusal of the said report dated 4.1.2005 submitted by the said two (2) Assistant Inspector of Schools and the said report of the Deputy Commissioner dated 4.1.2005, it is crystal clear that any sort of allegations had not been made against the present petitioners inasmuch as the present petitioners are neither official of the FCI nor the Contractor in-charge of the said shed Nos.5 and 6 of the FCI Godown. Mr. Bimol also further asserted that even if the said reports are accepted to be true for the time being, no offence have been make out against the present petitioners. About one (1) year after the registration of the said criminal case, i.e., FIR Case No. 15(2)/2005, Lamphel P.S., the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West, Manipur had submitted the detail report of the FIR No. 15(2)/2005 Lamphel P.S. under section 403/424/120-B/121/121-A, IPC and 17/21 UA(P) Act, 2004 to the Executive Director (Vigilance) - CVO, Food Corporation of India, Government of India, New Delhi that the present petitioners were not at all concerned with the said shed Nos. 5 and 6 of the FCI Godown at Sangaiprou and on further investigation and from counter evidence an examination of the PS it was also ascertained that Shri Maibam Bhorot Singh, petitioner No.2 did not deduct 10% of MDM rice from the district quota, but it was kept by them due to shortage of vehicle, overloading problem of labours being late hour and last day of lifting the rice on 31.1.2005. Godown in-charge was directed by them to collect the rice with understanding of lifting the left out quota on a suitable date. It is also stated in the said detail report that the petitioner No. 2 Shri Maibam Bhorot Singh was in-charge of the shed Nos. 9 and 10 of the FCI Godown. The copy of the said detail report dated 31.1.2005 submitted by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West District, Manipur is available at Annexure-4 to the present petition. 5. Ultimately, on 27.9.2006, Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Lamphel, Imphal West who was the concerned SDPO of the said FIR, i.e., FIR Case No. 15(2)72005, Lamphel P.S. under section 403/424/120-B/121/121-A, IPC and section 17/21 UA(P) Act 2004 submitted a report to the concerned Magistrate, i.e., Chief Judicial Magistrate, Imphal West for discharging the present petitioners from the liability of the case and their PR bond may be treated as cancelled. For ready reference the said report dated 27.9.2006 submitted by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Lamphel is quoted hereunder : - IN THE COURT OF CHIEF JUDICAL MAGISTRATE Imphal West District, Manipur Sub : Prayer of discharing the following 6 (six) accused persons in C/W FIR Case No. 15(2)/05 LPS under section 403/424/120/120-B/121/121-A, IPC & a 7/21 UA(P) Act, 2004. Hon'ble Sir, I have the honour to submit herewith discharge report of the following accused persons as follows : - That on 5.2.2005 at 3 PM. Thaithuilung Pamei, Deputy Commissioner Tamenglong lodged a written report with Supdt. of Police, Imphal West District and endorsed to OC, Lamphel P.S. stating that 842.58 quintals of rice under mid-day meal scheme were allotted for the month of January 2005 in respect of Tamenglong District for Zonal Education Office and Chief Executive Officer, Tamenglong Autonomous District and on the day 31.1.2005 of lifting the above quantity of rice from FCI godown, Sangaiprou, Imphal by the authorized officials, viz. (1) D. Champoudai, Asst. Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong and (2) N. Ranglung, Asst. (1) D. Champoudai, Asst. Inspector of Schools, TADC, Tamenglong and (2) N. Ranglung, Asst. Inspector of Schools, TADC Tamenglong 10% of the total quantity, i.e., 84 quintals were deducted at the shed Nos. 5 and 6 FCI godown, Sangaiprou on the alleged instructions issued by the underground outfits. Further, he requested to take stern action against those who were responsible persons/officials of FCI godown, Sangaiprou, Imphal for deduction of the said rice. On receipt of the report, a case being FIR No. 15(2)705 IPS under section 403/424/120-B/121/121-A, IPC & 17/21 UA(P) Act, 2004 has been registered and investigated into. That, 108 quintals of rice in 216 bags and 160 quintals of rice in 320 bags were seized on 5.2.2005 at 8.30 p.m. and on 5.2.2005 at 10.30 a.m. on production by Namelrakpam Dhirendra Singh, 58 years, S/O (L) N. Boraojao of Haobam Marak I/O of Shed Nos. 3 and 4 and Maibam Bhorot Singh 56 years S/O (L) M. Chaoba Singh of Singjamei Chingamakha Maianam Leirak I/C of shed Nos. 9 and 10 of FCI godown Sangaiprou in C/W the investigations of the present case. That, the present accused persons namely N. Dhiren Singh of Haobam Marak and M. Bhorot of Singjamei Mekha Nelsnam Leikal were arrested on 5.2.2005 and remanded judicial custody on 14.2.2005. That, during the investigations examined all the important PWs regarding seized of MDM rice and responsible persons and ascertained that N. Dhiren Singh and M. Bhorot did not deduct 10% of MDM rice from the District quota, but was kept by them due to shortage of vehicle, over loading problem of labours being late hour and last day of lifting the rice on 31.1.2005 with an understanding of lifting the left out quota on a suitable day. The authorized persons also received the full quota of rice on the released order on 31.1,2005. When they came to collect the rice, it was learnt that the left out rice were seized by Lamphel P.S. Hence, they moved in the court for releasing the seized left out rice in their zima on the ground that they had left out the seized rice MDM rice and it was not deducted by the godown by the godown in-charge. Considered the zima matter of the petitioner. Being satisfied the seized MDM rice is released in the zima of the petition on 19.9.2006 by an order of H/CJM/Imphal. Considered the zima matter of the petitioner. Being satisfied the seized MDM rice is released in the zima of the petition on 19.9.2006 by an order of H/CJM/Imphal. Further, the four arrest accused person namely, T. Jayenta of Thambalkha Sabal Leikai, Y. Sanjoy Singh of Melom Tullihan Bajar, Dh. Ibomcha Singh of Sagolband Tara Lukram Leirak and Ch. Rajen of dowere also arrested on 9.2.2005 at 6,30 a.m. and remanded in Judicial Custody. But they are not at all related in the deduction of the 10% MDM rice of otherwise. More over, they are not dealing with the MDM rice. Ch. Rajen and Ch. Ibomcha are engaged in the shifting of rice from FCS goilown to FCI whereas Jayanta and Sanjoy are the Sub-Contractor who received the hiring charge. Moreover, no separate cases were registered against them. Hence, no prima facie cases were made out against them. It is, therefore, prayed that hon'ble Magistrate would be pleased kindly to discharge them from the liability of the case and their PR and bail bond may kindly be treated as cancelled. Particulars of the accused persons : - (1) Nameirakpam Dairen Singh (58), S/O (L) N. Borajao Singh of Haobam Merk, I/C of shed Nos. 3 and 4. (2) Maibam Bhorot Singh (56) S/O (L) M. Chaoba Singh of Singjamei Chinga Makha Malsnam Leikal. (3) Toijam Jayenta Singh (36) S/O T. Tomba Singh of Thambalkhong Sabal Leikai. (4) Yendranbam Sanjoy Singh (43) S/O Y. Chaobhal Singh of Malom Tuliyaima Bazar. (5) Chungkham Ibomcha Singh (37) S/O Ch. Ibopishak Singh of Sagolband Tera Lukhram Leirak and (6) Chunngkhani Rajen Singh (49) S/O Ch. Ibpishak Pishak of -do- Yours faithfully, Sd/- M.A.Mil, MPS Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Lamphel, Imphal West District, Manipur. 6. Mr. A. Bimol, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in order to bolster up the case of the petitioners has referred to the following decisions of the Apex Court:- (1) Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5 SCC 749 . (2) Ashok Chaturuedi and Others v. Shitual H. Chanchani and Another, (1998) 7 SCC 698 . (3) G. Sagar Sun and Another v. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 . (4) K. Ramakrishna and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) S SCC 547. (5) State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another. (2002) 3 SCC 39 . (3) G. Sagar Sun and Another v. State of U.P. and Others, (2000) 2 SCC 636 . (4) K. Ramakrishna and Others v. State of Bihar and Another, (2000) S SCC 547. (5) State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and Another. (2002) 3 SCC 39 . (6) Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. and Others, (2003) 3 SCC 11 . (7) Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Hague and Another, (2005) 1 SCC 122 (8) India Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 . (9) Popular Muthiah v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296 . 7. Under section 482, Cr.PC, this court has the inherent power, nothwithstanding anything contained in the Cr.PC, to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to an order of this court, Cr.PC or to prevent the abuse of process of law by any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Apex Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another (supra) held that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters and the High Courts also have the extraordinary power under article 226 of the Constitution of India and also the inherent power under section 482, Cr.PC either to prevent the abuse of the process of law by any other court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. The Apex Court further held that the exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case but with the sole purpose to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Under article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. The power of the High Court under section 482 of the Code has no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. 8. Para Nos. 22, 26 and 27 of SCC in Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra) reads as follows : - 22. The power of the High Court under section 482 of the Code has no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. 8. Para Nos. 22, 26 and 27 of SCC in Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra) reads as follows : - 22. It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan lal this court examined the extraordinary power under article 226 of the Constitution and also the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which it said could be exercised by the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. While laying down certain guidelines where the court will exercise jurisdiction under these provisions, it was also stated that these guidelines could not be inflexible or laying rigid formulate to be followed by the courts. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. One of such guidelines is where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence of make out a case against the accused. Under article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while Invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under article 227 or section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of article 226. When the exercise of powers could be under article 227 or section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of article 226. Some of the decisions of this court laying down principles for the exercise of powers by the High Court under articles 226 and 227 may be referred to. 26. Nomencluature under which petition is filed is not quite relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory. If in a case like the present one the court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under article 226, the court can certainly treat the petition as one under article 227 or section 482 of the Code. It. may not however, be lost sight of that provisions exist in the Code of revision and appeal but some time for immediate relief section 482 of the Code or article 227 may have to be resorted to for correcting some grave errors that might be committed by the subordinate courts. The present petition though filed in the High Court as one under articles 226 and 227 could well be treated under article 227 of the Constitution. 27. We have not been able to understand as to why it was necessary for the appellants to implead the first respondent as a party to the proceedings. There are no allegations of personal bias against the presiding officer. A court is not be equated with a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial powers. We would, therefore, strike out the name of the first respondent from the array of the parties. 9. The court is of the similar view in Ashok Chaturvedi and others (supra). Para 5 of the SCC in Ashok Chaturvedi and others (supra) reads as follows : - 5. But the question that yet remains for consideration is whether the allegations made in the petition of complaint together with statements made by the complaint and the witnesses before the Magistrate taken on their face value, do make the offence for which the Magistrate has taken cognizance of? But the question that yet remains for consideration is whether the allegations made in the petition of complaint together with statements made by the complaint and the witnesses before the Magistrate taken on their face value, do make the offence for which the Magistrate has taken cognizance of? The learned counsel for the respondent in this connection had urged that the accused had a right to put this argument at the time of framing of charges, and therefore, this court should not interfere with the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance, at this stage. This argument, however, does not appeal to us inasmuch as merely because an accused has a right to plead at the time of framing of charges that there is no sufficient material for such framing of charges as provided in section 245 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he is debarred from approaching the court even at an earliest (sic earlier) point of time when the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and summons the accused to appear to , contend that the very issuance of the order of taking cognizance is invalid on the ground that no offence can be said to have been made out on the allegations made in the complaint petition. It has been held in a number of cases that power under section 482 has to be exercised sparingly and in the interest of justice. But allowing the criminal proceeding to continue even where the allegations in the complaint petition do not make out any offence would be tantamount to an abuse of the process of courts, and therefore, there cannot be any dispute that in such case power under section 482 of the Code can be exercised. Bearing in mind the parameters laid down by this court in several decisions for exercise of power under section 482 of the Code, we have examined the allegations made in the complaint petition and the statement of the complainant and the two other witnesses made on oath before the Magistrate. We are clearly of the opinion that the necessary ingredients or any of the offences have not been made out so far as the appellants are concerned. We are clearly of the opinion that the necessary ingredients or any of the offences have not been made out so far as the appellants are concerned. The petition of complaint is a vague one and excepting the bald allegation that the shares of the complainant have been transferred on forged signatures, nothing further has been stated and there is not an iota of material to indicate how all or any of these appellants are involved in the so-called allegation of forgery. The statement of the complainant on oath as well as his witnesses do not improve the position in any manner, and therefore, in our considered opinion, even if the allegations made in the complaint petition and the statement of the complainant and his witnesses are taken on their face value, the offence under sections 406, 420, 467, 468 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code cannot be said to have been made out. This being the position, the impugned order of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence dated 5.2.1996 so far as it relates to the appellants cannot be sustained and the High Court also committed error in not invoking its power under section 482 of the Code. In the aforesaid premises, the impugned order of the High Court as well as the order of the Magistrate dated 5.2.1996 taking cognizance of the offence as against the appellants stand quashed. 10. Para Nos. 3, 4 and 6 of SCC in K. Ramakrishna and Others (supra) reads as follows : - 3. The inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be exercised to quash proceedings, in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily the criminal proceedings which are instituted against the accused must be tried and taken to logical conclusions under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the proceedings at an interlocutory stage. However, them may be cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised. Where there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. However, them may be cases where the inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised. Where there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal proceedings in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. Similarly where the allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value do not constitute the offence alleged, or without appreciating the evidence but only merely by looking at the complaint or the FIR or the accompanying documents, the offence alleged is not disclosed, the person proceeded against in such a frivolous criminal litigation has to be saved. 4. The trial court under section 239 and the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an inquiry as to whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and the documents relief upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As observed by this court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi the High Court or the Magistrate are also not supposed to adopt a strict hyper technical approach to sieve the complaint through a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is charged. Such an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage. 6. On perusal of FIR the final report under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and all other documents accompanying it, we are satisfied that no case is made out against any of the appellants and the pendency of the proceedings against them before the Magistrate is an abuse of the process of court. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court dated 8.4.1997 and Magistrate dated 6.7.1996 are quashed and the appellants discharged in terms of section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. The appeal is allowed and the order of the High Court dated 8.4.1997 and Magistrate dated 6.7.1996 are quashed and the appellants discharged in terms of section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. From the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, it is clear that this court can exercise the inherent power under section 482, Cr.PC either to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. One of the guidelines for exercising the inherent power under section 482, Cr.PC in order to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice is that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken their face value, and accepted in their entirety did not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against accused, therefore, this court can exercise of power under section 482, Cr.PC for quashing the criminal proceeding or/FIR which was registered or initiated on the basis of the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint even if they are taken the face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against accused. For this principle of law, this court is of the considered view that it is not required to discuss the other cases inasmuch as it would unnecessarily burden this court. 12. On plain perusal of the said report, i.e., ejahar of the present FIR, i.e., FIR Case No. 15(2)/05 Lamphel P.S. under section 403/424/120B/121/121A, IPC read with section 17/21 UA(P) Act 2004 keeping in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex court in the cases discussed above it is clear that the allegations made in the said report even if they are taken their face value and accepted in entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out any case against the present petitioners. 13. Accordingly, any proceeding, i.e., Criminal proceeding, etc., of the said FIR, i.e., FIR Case No. 15(2)05. Lamphel P.S. against the petitioners are deserved to be quashed. Accordingly, the proceedings against the present petitioners only are hereby quashed. 14. The writ petition is allowed accordingly.