JUDGMENT M.R. Verma, J. Chairman.—The applicant herein prays for quashing and setting aside the penalty of compulsory retirement of the applicant vide Annexures-P/3 and P/6 and for his reinstatement with retrospective effect with all consequential benefits and for directing the respondents to pay the arrears of the suspension allowance of the applicant right from the date of his suspension till reinstatement. 2. It is not in dispute that the applicant was departmentally charge-sheeted for driving a bus under the influence of liquor and thereby causing accident amounting to misconduct, dereliction of duty and un-authorisedly taking away the bus from its terminus and in all causing financial loss to the H.R.T.C. to the tune of Rs. 2,21,856/-. 3. The Inquiry Officer held the charge of driving the bus by the applicant under the influence of liquor as partly proved. After the due formalities the disciplinary authority held the applicant guilty of the charges leveled against him and imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement from service with immediate effect vide order Annexure-P/4. The applicant preferred the appeal (Annexure-P/5) assailing the order of the disciplinary authority on various grounds but the said appeal was rejected by the appellate authority vide Annexure-P/6. Hence the applicant has instituted the present original application claiming the aforesaid reliefs on the grounds that the enquiry proceedings were not carried out in accordance with law and the impugned orders have been passed by the authorities in a cryptic manner without assigning any reason and that the grounds taken by him in his appeal were not considered by the appellate authority at all rending the order highly laconic, capricious, arbitrary, slip shod and thus, liable for being quashed. It is also claimed that the punishment is contrary to the stand taken by the respondents before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal wherein it was not their case that the applicant was rash or negligent in driving the vehicle but it was claimed that the accident occurred due to sudden failure of mechanical system and that the applicant should not have been held guilty in view of his acquittal on similar charges by a Court of Law vide Annexure-P/1. 4. 4. The respondents contested the claim on the grounds that the acquittal of the applicant was based on benefit of doubt, therefore, "does not absolve the applicant from the offence under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC" and that there is no legal or constitutional bar to departmental enquiry being conducted against the applicant even in view of the said acquittal. The other grounds of assailing the impugned order of penalty have been denied and it is claimed that the departmental proceedings against the applicant were carried out without any violation of mandatory provisions of the rules and thus the authorities legally imposed the penalty after due compliance of the rules. 5. The applicant filed rejoinder wherein he has denied the grounds of defence taken by the respondents in their reply and has reaffirmed the claim as in the original application. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 7. On a bare perusal of the departmental appeal preferred by the applicant (Annexure-P/5) it is evident that he has assailed the order of penalty passed by the disciplinary authority on the grounds (i) that there has been serious violation of Rules 15 (1-A), 15 (1-B) and sub-rule (4) of CCS. (CCA) Rules resulting in "loss of fair trial", (ii) that effect of the acquittal of the applicant in the criminal case has not been properly appreciated though it was held that the prosecution had failed to prove that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving by the accused whereas on the contrary evidence led by the prosecution supports the defence that accident took place due to mechanical defect i.e. because of locking of steering system, (iii) that B.S. Dogra Manager (Technical) was also the Regional Manager Sarkaghat at the relevant time and opted to appear as a departmental witness in support of the charges, therefore "he ought to have refrained from himself initiating disciplinary proceedings against the applicant" in view of the decision of Government of India below Rule 13 of CCS. (CCA) Rules, 1965 which requires that where the officer who is the disciplinary authority is/will be the complainant and/ or the witness (or say material witness) in a disciplinary proceedings, another officer should be specified as a disciplinary authority by a special order, but it was not done and the disciplinary proceedings for a major penalty were initiated against the applicant by the then Regional Manager Sarkaghat and he also appeared as a witness in support of the charges, (iv) that what is concluded vide Annexure-P/2 on the basis of enquiry report is that "the charge that driving the bus under the influence of liquor has been proved partially" on the sole testimony of B.S. Dogra which is not a clear conclusion because such an Article of charge cannot be partially proved that is to say that a person was driving a vehicle under the influence of liquor can never be said to have been partially proved and (v) that innocence of the applicant is proved even in view of the conduct and statement of those departmental witnesses who were traveling in the bus. 8. The appellate authority vide its order Annexure-P/6 disposed pf the appeal based on the aforesaid grounds in view of the contents of para 4 of the said order which reads as follows:— "AND WHEREAS, the undersigned has gone through the appeal of the said Shri Kanshi Ram, comments of D.M. Mandi and the connected documents/ record-pertaining to the case including judgment dated 11-6-1997 of Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Mandi. After going through the whole case, the undersigned is of the considered opinion that the plea taken by delinquent official in his appeal that he has been acquitted by the Court is not tenable. Criminal proceedings are different from the departmental proceedings and in the departmental enquiry, he has been held guilty and has accordingly been punished under the CCS. (CCA) Rules, 1965." 9. A bare reading of the aforesaid relevant part of the order of appellate authority shows that such authority has not applied its mind to any of the aforesaid grounds raised by the applicant in his memorandum of appeal except the effect of the judgment of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate. (CCA) Rules, 1965." 9. A bare reading of the aforesaid relevant part of the order of appellate authority shows that such authority has not applied its mind to any of the aforesaid grounds raised by the applicant in his memorandum of appeal except the effect of the judgment of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate. He has not considered and said anything about the alleged violation of the relevant rules by the Inquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority, the person initiating the disciplinary proceedings being a witness himself the conclusion vide Annexure-P/2 that the charge of driving the bus under the influence of liquor had been proved partially on the basis of which show-cause notice was issued to the applicant but in the final order he is being held guilty of charges leveled against him. The appellate authority has not at all considered these grounds/ aspects of the matter. It appears that certain claim petitions were preferred by certain aggrieved persons before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and before such Tribunal stand taken by the respondents was that the applicant was not .rash and negligent in driving the vehicle. No reason whatsoever appears to have been assigned in the impugned order as to how the department has wriggled out of its own stand which it had taken before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal. Thus it is clear that the appeal has been disposed of by the appellate authority without due application of mind to the points/grounds raised therein whereas the departmental proceedings are quasi- judicial proceedings wherein the conclusion(s) has to be arrived at by a speaking, reasoned and self contained order. Evidently the order passed by the appellate authority is cryptic and does not deal with the material grounds raised in the appeal and decides the appeal in a slip shod manner therefore, such an order cannot be sustained. As a result this original application is allowed to the extent that order Annexure-P/6 is set aside and the appellate authority is directed to rehear/ re-consider the appeal Annexure-P/5 and dispose it of afresh in accordance with law and the observations made herein above within three months hereof. No order as to costs. O.A. allowed. -