JUDGMENT By the Court.—The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 9.12.1989, Annexure-5 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 3 and order dated 19.5.1999, Annexure-6 to the writ petition passed by respondent No. 1. Further prayer is to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service on the post of Constable in U.P. Police and pay him regular salary including seniority, promotion due to the petitioner. 2. The facts arising out of the writ petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a constable in the year 1965 and was subsequently confirmed on the said post. All of a sudden a show cause notice was given to the petitioner-dated 20.8.1980 by respondent No. 3. The petitioner submitted a reply on 2.9.1980. The petitioner was under the impression that the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the petitioner has been dropped and shortly the petitioner will be reinstated. In the year 1986 when the petitioner was on medical leave, a wireless message was received on 7.7.1986 from the office of respondent No. 4 requiring the petitioner to join the duties forthwith under respondent No. 5 but when the petitioner went to join his duties, he was declined to join the duties. As the petitioner was not permitted to join the duties therefore, he filed a claim petition before the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal which was numbered as Claim Petition No. 205/V/1989. A counter affidavit in that claim petition was filed and in para 11 of the said counter affidavit it has been stated that the services of the petitioner have already been terminated on 9.12.1981 and the petitioner has been removed from the service by respondent No. 3. It has further been submitted that till date, no material has been placed by the respondent to justify regarding the service of order-dated 9.12.1981. When they first time came to know regarding the aforesaid order an amendment application was made on 7.4.1997 which was allowed by respondent No. 1 i.e. Tribunal but the respondents No. 2 to 5 did not file any additional counter/written statement to the said amendment. The Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 19.5.1999 has rejected the petition of the Tribunal in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 3. The Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 19.5.1999 has rejected the petition of the Tribunal in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. 3. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the order dated 9.12.1981 has been passed by the respondent in a wholly arbitrary, discriminatory and with malafide intentions and the principles of natural justice has not been followed. While passing the order-dated 9.12.1981, the respondents have not considered the reply of the petitioner dated 2.9.1980. The Tribunal has also failed to take into consideration the fact that as the amendment application was allowed and no counter affidavit to that amendment application was filed and there is no proof regarding the service of the order dated 9.12.1981, therefore, the order impugned is bad and has resulted in substantial failure and miscarriage of justice. It is apparent from the record that there is no latches on the part of the petitioner in filing the claim petition. The wireless message dated 6.6.1986 clearly goes to show that the respondents have directed the petitioner to join. The reasoning and finding of respondent No. 1 contained in the impugned order bad in law and without jurisdiction. As such the orders passed by the Tribunal is liable to be quashed. 4. Notices were issued and as the counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavits have been exchanged, therefore, with the consent of the parties the writ petition is being disposed of finally. 5. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri Umesh Narain Sharma, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Kamla Singh has submitted that at no point of time the copy of the inquiry report has been given to the petitioner and no full-fledged inquiry has been done, therefore, order of removal is bad in law and is liable to be quashed. It is well settled in law that without following the proper procedure if the disciplinary authority passes an order, that is not sustainable in law. It is clear from the record that only a show cause notice was given to the petitioner and the petitioner has submitted a reply and the order of removal has never been communicated to the petitioner, no preliminary inquiry as well as the final inquiry has been done and the copy of the inquiry report has never been given to the petitioner, therefore, the total action of the respondent is bad in law. The petitioner has tried his level best to join his duties but he was not permitted to join. Therefore, the respondents were obliged to hold an inquiry as provided under law. It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has taken leave and he was being treated in the hospital and he has sent applications and medical certificate and in case if it is admitted that the petitioner was absent without sanction of leave in spite of the aforesaid fact, the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated or he cannot be removed from service unless and until an inquiry and opportunity to that effect is given to the petitioner. 6. The petitioner has placed reliance upon various judgments of the Apex Court rendered in the cases Union of India and others v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 ; Jai Shankar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 492 ; Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 541 ; Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and others, AIR 2002 SC 3030 ; State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 and State of U.P. and others v. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, (2002) 3 SCC 443 . 7. In support of the aforesaid contention, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the delinquent employee is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer to the disciplinary authority. Non-furnishing a copy of the report to the delinquent would be violative to principles of natural justice. In case of overstaying on leave the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated without holding a full-fledged inquiry and from the record it is clear that no copy of the inquiry report or that the petitioner has been afforded any opportunity before the Inquiry Officer. Therefore, the order is bad and liable to be quashed. 8. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner on 15.8.1976 has reported the police line for his treatment. From there the petitioner was transferred to SPG Hospital Varanasi and the petitioner was admitted for 45 days and he was recommended for 45 days medical leave which was duly sanctioned by the S.S.P., Varanasi. On 20.9.1976, he reported to the police line, Varanasi and he was sent to Government Hospital, Kabir Chaura for obtaining fitness certificate. From there the petitioner was transferred to SPG Hospital Varanasi and the petitioner was admitted for 45 days and he was recommended for 45 days medical leave which was duly sanctioned by the S.S.P., Varanasi. On 20.9.1976, he reported to the police line, Varanasi and he was sent to Government Hospital, Kabir Chaura for obtaining fitness certificate. It has further been submitted that after sanction of initial leave as the petitioner did not reported the police hospital and since then he remained absent unauthorisedly without any sanction of leave or permission as such a departmental inquiry under Section 7 of Police Act was initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 22.12.1979 directing the petitioner to appear before him for his statement on the charges on 9.1.1980 and to submit his reply to the charge-sheet. The petitioner did not appear before the Inquiry Officer so the inquiry was proceeded against him and during the inquiry statement of prosecution witnesses has taken place. Inquiry report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer on 1.4.1980 and held him guilty of the charges levelled against him. Then the petitioner was served with a show cause notice dated 28.8.1980 with a copy of the inquiry report of which the petitioner submitted a reply-dated 2.9.1980. The Punishing officer after considering the entire material on record along with the reply of the show cause notice passed the impugned order dated 9.12.1981 and the said impugned order of removal was sent through special messenger to the permanent residential address to the petitioner and obtained a receipt from the petitioner. It has further been submitted that it appears by mistake wireless No. 41 dated 23.6.1986 was sent to the petitioner. In fact it was for the purpose of surrendering the uniform kit but by mistake it has been mentioned that he shell resume the duty at once. The petitioner cannot take the advantage of the mistake committed by the department. It has further been submitted that the claim petition was highly barred by time. 9. The contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted in view of the fact that a criminal case as Criminal Case No. 249 of 1979 under Section 409, IPC and under Section 29 of the Police Act was registered against the petitioner for not returning the uniform kit. 9. The contention of the petitioner cannot be accepted in view of the fact that a criminal case as Criminal Case No. 249 of 1979 under Section 409, IPC and under Section 29 of the Police Act was registered against the petitioner for not returning the uniform kit. The petitioner has obtained a bail in the aforesaid case; therefore, the contention of the petitioner to the effect that he was not having any knowledge is not correct. It has further been submitted that the petitioner was given full opportunity of hearing and the inquiry officer has directed the petitioner to appear on 9.1.1980 but the petitioner has neither submitted his reply nor appeared before the Inquiry Officer for making the statement. As the petitioner has not availed any opportunity therefore, as the entire material was before the Inquiry Officer, the order of removal has been passed, as the petitioner was absent without sanction of any leave or without any permission. It has further been submitted on behalf of the respondents that the notice, which was sent that was received by the petitioner and that bears the signature of the petitioner. A copy of the same has been annexed with the counter affidavit. In such a situation it has been submitted that the petitioner was having knowledge regarding the pendency of the inquiry against the petitioner and the petitioner was aware that he is absent without leave for a very very long time. The Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim petition on the ground of limitation as well as on the ground that as the petitioner deliberately has not joined the duties after expiry of the sanctioned leave and the petitioner was aware regarding disciplinary proceedings and the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding of 1981 and the claim petition was filed in the year 1989, therefore, the claim petition is barred by time, as provided in the Act and has rightly dismissed the same. 10. We have heard Sri Umesh Narain Sharma, Senior Advocate assisted by Smt. Kamla Singh, Advocate for the petitioner and Standing Counsel for the respondents. 11. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties. From the record it is clear that 45 days leave was sanctioned to the petitioner on 16.8.1976 and after that the petitioner has never joined to his post. 11. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties. From the record it is clear that 45 days leave was sanctioned to the petitioner on 16.8.1976 and after that the petitioner has never joined to his post. The contention of the petitioner is not acceptable to this effect that he has tried to join the post but as the petitioner was directed to submit the fitness certificate and fitness certificate was not given by the Doctor concerned, therefore, he has not been permitted to join. When the respondent came to know regarding the unauthorized absence of the petitioner, the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was initiated and the Inquiry Officer has sent a notice which has been received by the petitioner which is on record to show that the same was received by the petitioner but the petitioner deliberately has not appeared before the Inquiry Officer. No cogent reason has been disclosed by the petitioner for not appearing before the Inquiry Officer. In spite of the aforesaid fact the show cause notice was given to the petitioner with copy of the inquiry report to submit a reply and the petitioner has submitted a reply on 2.9.1980. If the contention of the petitioner is treated to be correct, then in spite of this fact from 1980 when the show cause notice was received and the petitioner submitted a reply, the petitioner has not made any effort to join the service or to submit an explanation before the authorities or to approach any Court of law for his grievance. He waited up to 1989 and then filed a claim petition before the Claims Tribunal. This clearly goes to show the conduct of the petitioner. 12. In our opinion, it will amount to abandonment of service by the petitioner. From 1976 till 1989 the petitioner is not able to prove from the record or by any document to show that he was diligent to join his duties. The contention of the petitioner regarding the petitioner that in spite of the fact that the petitioner was absent without sanction of leave, a full-fledged inquiry and opportunity no orders can be passed. The aforesaid contention of the petitioner is not acceptable to this effect that from the record it is clear that the petitioner was having knowledge regarding pendency of the disciplinary inquiry. 13. The aforesaid contention of the petitioner is not acceptable to this effect that from the record it is clear that the petitioner was having knowledge regarding pendency of the disciplinary inquiry. 13. Regarding the abandonment of service the Apex Court in a judgment reported in (2005) 5 SCC 337 , Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J & K Bank Limited and others, the Apex Court has held that the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be in a staightjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is trite, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted and inquiry would be an empty formality. 14. In Dr. Gurjeewan Garewal (Mrs.) v. Dr. Sumitra Dash (Mrs.) and others, (2004) 5 SCC 263 the Apex Court while taking into consideration regarding abandonment of service has held that non-joining after expiry of the sanctioned leave period will amount to abandonment of service if in spite of the notice given by the employer the employee does not join. The similar controversy regarding abandonment of service has also been taken consideration by this Court in a Division Bench case reported in 2003 (2) UPLBEC 1351 , Dr. Lakhate Mustaffa Kazmi v. State of U.P. and others. In the aforesaid case the Division Bench was considering the fact that a temporary employee challenging the order of termination after a period of 18 years whether it will amount to abandonment of service or not, the Court has held that non-joining the duty and remaining absent for a long will amount to abandonment of service. The absence from duty in the beginning may be misconduct but when absence is for very long period, it may amount to voluntarily abandonment of service and in that eventuality, the bonds of service come to an end automatically without requiring any order passed by the employer. 15. The petitioner has not disclosed that what was the reasons for absence of a long period. There is no proper pleadings, therefore, issue does not require to be considered for want of proper pleadings. 15. The petitioner has not disclosed that what was the reasons for absence of a long period. There is no proper pleadings, therefore, issue does not require to be considered for want of proper pleadings. Admittedly the petitioner without any sanction of leave was absent from 1976 to 1980 and in spite of the termination of his service, the said order was challenged by the petitioner in the year 1989 before the Tribunal. Nothing has been disclosed in the writ petition or in the pleadings that what was the reason. The reason disclosed by the petitioner that he was not permitted to join only on the basis of fitness certificate cannot be believed. 16. In M/s Jeevan Lal (1929) Ltd. Calcutta v. Its Workman, AIR 1961 SC 1567 the Apex Court has held as under : “22. ….if an employee continues to be absent from duty without obtaining leave and in an unauthorized manner for such a long period of time that an inference may reasonably be drawn from such absence that by his absence he has abandoned service, then such long unauthorized absence may legitimately be held to cast a break in continuity of service….We would like to make it clear that ….There would be the class of cases where long unauthorized absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee. 23. Similarly, in Shahoodul Haque v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar and another, AIR 1974 SC 1896 , the Apex Court observed as under: “The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post or duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient ground for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admits, could serve no useful purpose. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him. It would prolong his agony. On the view we have adopted on the facts of this case, it is not necessary to consider the further question whether any notice for termination of service was necessary or duly given on the assumption that he was not punished. We do not think that there is any question involved in this case which could justify an interference by us.” 17. We do not think that there is any question involved in this case which could justify an interference by us.” 17. It is settled law that the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable for enforcing the statutory or legal rights or when there is a complaint by the petitioner that there is breach of statutory duty on the part of respondent. Therefore, there must be judicial enforceable right for the enforcement of which the writ petition can be resorted to. The Court can enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public bodies through its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person provided such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. 18. The learned Counsel for the petitioner could not point out as to what is the legal right of the petitioner to claim the service after a lapse of 25 years from the date of dismissal. Admittedly the petitioner was absent without leave and he was fully aware regarding the order of dismissal in the year 1981 but he has not approach the Court within time and filed a belated claim petition in the year 1989, therefore, we are of view that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted. The absence of the petitioner without sanction of leave amounts to abandonment of service. It is also made clear that if an employee is not vigilant regarding his right and approached the Court after a very long time, he is not entitled for any relief while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Admittedly the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary power. It will be exercised only in furtherance of justice. The similar view has been taken in Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1997 SC 1236 . 19. In view of the aforesaid fact we find no merit in the present writ petition. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ————