JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. This is, to say that least, a bizarre case. One could shudder to think that the type of allegations made by the Appellant was actually happening in the temple of justice. I have been told that the concerned judicial officer has since then retired from service. On the undisputed facts on record, nothing short of dismissal and criminal proceeding could have done justice to the Appellant. I only hope that this is merely a stray case as otherwise the very confidence of the litigant public in the judiciary would be shaken or destroyed beyond repair. 2. The case of the Appellant, in a nutshell, is that late J.G. Hannan, an ex-serviceman, who is the husband of the Appellant, was the tenant of the Respondents in respect of a portion of the building known as Shillong Muslim Union Guest House, located at Quinton Road, Shillong. The said J.G. Hannan was during his lifetime running a hotel under the name and style of "Hotel Seven Sisters". Originally, the tenancy was in respect of one portion in the second floor of the building under an unregistered tenancy agreement dated 25.7.1989 for a period of 72 months at a monthly rent of Rs. 6,000/- but renewable for a period to be mutually agreed upon the by the parties at an enhanced rent. At the commencement of the tenancy, this tenant paid an advanced rent of Rs. 2,16,000/- to be adjusted against the monthly rent of Rs. 6,000/-, which was enhanced from time to time the last rent whereof came to be fixed at Rs. 9,000/- per month. When the hotel was doing a flourishing business and cordial relationship between the parties established, the Respondent is said to have agreed to let out the top floor of the same building as well with some additional space to tile original tenant. For this, the husband of the Appellant is said to have paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) only in advance to the Respondent for construction of the top floor, this advance payment being adjusted against the monthly rent so payable, which was fixed at Rs. 8,000/-. In these circumstances, the entire second floor and the top floor came to be under the occupation and use of the husband of the Appellant as a tenant for running the hotel in question with a total house rent of Rs. 8,000/-. In these circumstances, the entire second floor and the top floor came to be under the occupation and use of the husband of the Appellant as a tenant for running the hotel in question with a total house rent of Rs. 17,000/- per month. According to the Appellant, all monthly rents had been regularly paid by her husband during his lifetime, and receipts had also been issued therefor. 3. It is also the case of the Appellant that no fresh tenancy agreement was executed by the parties after the expiry of the initial period of 72 months of the original tenancy agreement, but the tenancy was continued on verbal understanding with some new terms and conditions. One of the new terms and conditions was that the rent was payable as per the convenience of the tenant, which was monthly or quarterly or two/three monthly at a time as accepted by the Respondent, such payment being accepted by the landlord from time to time by issuing rent receipts thereof According to the Appellant, some vested interests levelled false allegations to tarnish the image of the Hotel Seven Sisters with the ulterior motive of forcibly evicting her husband from the said premises and stage-managed some telecast through PCN on 2.5.2004. In furtherance of their intention, some persons including a woman under the instigation of vested interests including the Respondent came to the hotel on 3.5.2004 and threatened the staff and her husband with forcible closure of the hotel. The matter was reported to the police, which proved to be unhelpful whereupon the husband of the Appellant was compelled to file Title Suit No. 3(H) of 2004 against the Respondents for declaration and permanent injunction. In the miscellaneous application being Misc. Case No. 5(H) of 2004 filed by her husband, the learned Assistant District Judge, Shillong, issued ad-interim injunction against the Respondent ex-parte on 5.5.2004, which was subsequently made absolute on 29.7.2004. It is also pleaded by the Appellant that when the Respondents refused to accept the rent for the premises tendered by her husband, her husband deposited the same in Court regularly. The Respondents contested the suit by filing their written statement on 24.6.2004, a copy whereof was furnished to and was duly received by the counsel of the Appellant. It is also pleaded by the Appellant that when the Respondents refused to accept the rent for the premises tendered by her husband, her husband deposited the same in Court regularly. The Respondents contested the suit by filing their written statement on 24.6.2004, a copy whereof was furnished to and was duly received by the counsel of the Appellant. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, seven issues were framed by the trial court whereafter the case was fixed for evidence. 4. The further case of the Appellant is that her husband died on 9.2.2005 at Appollo Hospital, Chennai, leaving behind him herself and their two sons to inherit all his properties and that she accordingly inherited the hotel business and thereby stepped into the shoes of her husband as the tenant under the Respondents. The Appellant thereafter filed an application in the trial court for substituting her husband by her as his legal representative. The Respondents filed their written objection against her application. The trial court by the order dated 20.5.2005 rejected the application for substitution and thereafter disposed of the suit purportedly on abatement. Taking advantage of this order, the Respondents, just two days after the death of the husband of the Appellant, managed to seal the hotel through the authorities of the Municipal Board, Shillong in order to throw the Appellant out of the premises and close down the hotel business. This led the Appellant to approach this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 1106 of 2005, which is still pending. It is claimed by the Appellant that she was never aware of the date feed for hearing of the suit or of the passing of the order dated 20.5.2005 as she was never intimated by her counsel. Subsequently, when she came to learn the rejection of her substitution application, she immediately filed Civil Revision No. 21 (SH) of 2005 before this Court challenging the legality of the order dated 20.5.2005, which was moved on 20.6.2005 by serving an advance copy to the counsel for the Respondents as caveator. However, on 20.6.2005, the counsel for the Respondents/caveators asked for three days time and verbally assured the Court that the Respondents would not take any step for evicting the Appellant, whereupon this Court by the order dated 20.6.2005 directed the parties to maintain the status quo. 5. However, on 20.6.2005, the counsel for the Respondents/caveators asked for three days time and verbally assured the Court that the Respondents would not take any step for evicting the Appellant, whereupon this Court by the order dated 20.6.2005 directed the parties to maintain the status quo. 5. It is claimed by the Appellant that the Respondents in violation of the said order of this Court forcibly-evicted her and her employees from the hotel on 20.6.2005 at around 3.30 PM and put the hotel under lock and key and that the matter was reported to the police, which ultimately put her back into possession of the suit premises. This Court by the order dated 24.6.2005 disposed of the civil revision on the basis of the no objection given by the Respondents and allowed the substitution application of the Appellant. It is asserted by the Appellant that she appointed a new counsel only after the order dated 20.5.2005, and her new counsel immediately applied for inspection of the case record relating to Title Suit No. 3 (H) of 2004, which was not available with the Bench Assistant to the learned Assistant District Judge. In the course of this exercise, the Appellant is stated to have discovered that there was an order dated 2.11.2004 in the case record of TS No. 3(H) of 2004 whereby the learned Assistant District Judge had passed the impugned ex-parte decree in favour of the Respondents for evicting the husband of the Appellant, his employees, purportedly on the basis of the counter-claim filed by die Respondents in that suit. According to the Appellant, neither her nor her counsel were at any point of time aware of or were informed by the Respondents of their filing the counter-claim nor was any copy thereof ever furnished to her or her counsel. The Appellant asserted that the Respondents had only file a plain and simple written statement, a copy whereof was served upon and was duly received by her counsel and that the case record of Title Suit No. 3(H) of 2004 revealed that no ad-valorem court-fees were paid on the so-called counter-claim. It was also pointed out by the Reliant that the Respondents had also filed TS No. 8(H) of 2005 on 2.6.2005 against her husband, but the suit was later withdrawn on 15.5.2005. Thus, aggrieved by the order dated 2.11.2004, this appeal has been preferred by the Appellant. 6. It was also pointed out by the Reliant that the Respondents had also filed TS No. 8(H) of 2005 on 2.6.2005 against her husband, but the suit was later withdrawn on 15.5.2005. Thus, aggrieved by the order dated 2.11.2004, this appeal has been preferred by the Appellant. 6. Mrs. P.D.B. Baruah, the learned Counsel for the Appellant, was heard by me at length. A number of irregularities bordering upon fraud has been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant. I proceed to point out the following disturbing features of immense proportion in the proceedings/record of the learned Assistant District Judge: a) In the written statement filed by the Respondents on 24.6.2004, there was no counterclaim. A copy of this written statement was evidently served upon and was duly received by one R. Jha, the learned counsel for the Appellant's husband on 8.9.2004. However, in this written statement, there is no whisper of statement that a counter-claim was made by the Respondents. Under the provisions of Order VIII, Rule 6-B of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is prescribed that where a Defendant seeks to rely upon any ground as supporting a right of counter-claim, he is required to state specifically in his written statement that he does so by way of counter-claim. No such statement could be found in the written statement received by the Appellant on 8.9.2004. b) In the case record, another written statement purported to be bearing the same date as the above referred written statement is available. Undoubtedly, in this written statement, a counter-claim for eviction of the husband of the Appellant from the suit premises and for delivering vacant possession thereof to the Respondents was made. In this written statement, there is an affidavit mentioning the date of typing the affidavit and the date of affirming thereof. In the two dates, it appears that the figure "4" was imprinted over the figure "5" thereby conveying the impression that the year 2005 was changed to 2004. At this stage, it may also be noted that nowhere in the order sheets of the learned Assistant District Judge was it indicated that two written statement were filed by the Respondents or that the earlier one was subsequently replaced by a new written statement. At this stage, it may also be noted that nowhere in the order sheets of the learned Assistant District Judge was it indicated that two written statement were filed by the Respondents or that the earlier one was subsequently replaced by a new written statement. This certainly raises reasonable ground for suspicion that the second written statement was an after-thought and subsequently planted clandestinely. c) The order sheet dated 13.10.2004 shows that issues were framed by the learned Assistant District Judge on that day and that the Appellant was obviously absent on that day. The issues framed by the trial court on 13.10.2004 is found at page 70 of the lower court record. It is interesting to note that the issues relating to the counter-claim filed by the Respondents are conspicuous by their absence among the seven issues framed by the learned Assistant District Judge. Nay, the order sheet relating to dated 7.9.2004 and 16.9.2004 indicates that 16.9.2004 was fixed by the trial court for framing of issues. However, the entry in the order sheet relating to dated 16.9.2004 shows that no show cause (S/C) or written statement (W/S) to the counter-claim of the Defendant (Respondent herein obviously) was filed (by the Plaintiff). Yet, the trial court in the impugned judgment recorded that the counter-claim under Order VIII, Rule 6-A of the Code was filed by the Defendants on 16.9.2004. This observation is contrary to the entry made in the order sheet dated 24.6.2004 which says that the Defendant filed W/S and counter-claim under Order VIII, Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure. d) Before Civil Revision No. 21 (SH) of 2005 was filed by the Appellant, the Respondents apparently lodged a caveat and also put in their appearance through their counsel when the revision petition was moved. Till the date of disposal of the revision petition on 24.6.2005, the Respondents never disclosed before this Court that the suit in question had already been decreed on 2.11.2004 on the basis of their counter-claim. In this context, the overwriting on the date of typing and affirmation of the affidavit in respect of the figure "5" by "4" to make die date as "24.6.2004" appears to be more than significant inasmuch as this date is also the date when the revision petition was disposed of by this Court. In this context, the overwriting on the date of typing and affirmation of the affidavit in respect of the figure "5" by "4" to make die date as "24.6.2004" appears to be more than significant inasmuch as this date is also the date when the revision petition was disposed of by this Court. It is thus quite possible that the so-called written statement with counter-affidavit was planted in the case record in collusion with the learned Assistant District Judge on 24.6.2005, but made it appear to have been filed on 24.6.2004. The anomalous position stands revealed by the fact that the learned Assistant District Judge, as noted earlier, recorded in the impugned judgment that the counter-claim of the Defendants was on 16.9.2004. This is apparently the result of intrigue, conspiracy and fraud perpetrated by the Respondents/Defendants in collusion with no less a person than the Presiding Officer of the Court. 7. From the materials found in the foregoing, in my judgment, the inference is irresistible, the deduction inevitable and the conclusion inescapable that the impugned ex-parte judgment and decree was never passed or was never in existence on 2.11.2004 and that the same is a false and manufactured judgment and decree. This view of mind is fortified by the fact that no notice of preparing the draft decree in respect of the impugned decree was ever issued to the parties as required by the High Court Rules, Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree is nothing but a non-est decree, which does not have the force of law and cannot be acted upon. The next question to be determined then is whether the counter-claim is to be remanded or not. At this stage, it must be noted that the suit of the Appellant was never proceeded with ex-parte in accordance with law, and without her knowledge, the suit was dismissed, or to that effect, when the learned Asstt. District Judge decreed the counter-claim of the Respondents. In this view of the matter, there is no difficulty in reviving the suit filed by the Appellant for further proceeding in accordance with the procedures laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure. In so far as the case of the Respondents is concerned, there was never any counter-claim filed by them in the suit as found by me earlier. In so far as the case of the Respondents is concerned, there was never any counter-claim filed by them in the suit as found by me earlier. In terms of Order VIII, Rule 6-A of the Code, it is only when the Defendant files a counter-claim pleading any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to him against the Plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the Defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the same suit. As no counter-claim is found to have been filed by the Respondents, there is no counterclaim to be tried by the trial court. This being the undisputed factual position, the question of remanding the counter-claim of the Respondents cannot and does not arise. 8. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, this appeal is allowed. It is hereby declared that the impugned judgment and decree is void ab initio, inoperative and unenforceable, and is accordingly set aside. T.S. No. 3(H) of 2004 stands restored to the file of the learned Assistant District Judge, Shillong, who shall now proceed with the trial from the stage of adduction of evidence by the parties and thereafter dispose it of in accordance with law, preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this judgment. The Respondents shall pay cost to be quantified at Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only to the Appellant for abuse of process of court, failing which their defence shall stand struck off. Transmit the LC record forthwith. 9. Before parting, I am constrained to observe that the manner in which the then Assistant District Judge conducted the proceedings of the suit does not inspire any confidence, and has apparently acted fraudulently and, that too, in collusion with the Respondents, in manipulating the case record and in manufacturing the impugned judgment and decree. The practice of not obtaining the signatures of the parties or their respective counsel on the order sheet relating to the day to day proceeding has certainly afford an opportunity to an unscrupulous trial Judge like the one herein to manipulate the record as is the case here. The practice of not obtaining the signatures of the parties or their respective counsel on the order sheet relating to the day to day proceeding has certainly afford an opportunity to an unscrupulous trial Judge like the one herein to manipulate the record as is the case here. Therefore, to ensure that this sorry state of affairs does not happen in future, it is hereby ordered that the trial court as well as the appellate courts shall hereafter require the parties or their counsel, except when their applications for adjournment in their absence are allowed, to put their respective signatures in the margin of the order sheet relating to the day to day proceeding. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to all courts in the State for compliance. Appeal allowed