Roopali Vijaykumar Padhye v. Government of Karnataka
2007-12-19
JAWAD RAHIM, V.G.SABHAHIT
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT :- Jawad Rahim, J. Smt. Roopali Vijaykumar Padhye, the petitioner herein, has invoked Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the legality of detention of her husband, Vijaykumar Padhye, aide Order No. HD 7 SCF 2007, dated 5-7-2007 issued by the Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Karnataka, assailing it on several grounds, seeking issuance of writ in the nature of habeaus corpus. 2. We have heard the learned Senior Counsel Mr. B.V. Kumar, and Mr. Javali appearing for the petitioner. After hearing for some time, considering the serious nature of questions raised, we had requested the learned Advocate General to represent the State rather than the learned Government Advocate. We have heard both sides in supplementation to the material on record. 3. The following factual matrix as manifest from the case papers needs reference: (a) M/s. Uplus Batteries Private Limited is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, and has its business place at No.164/2, Huskur Gate, Electronics City Post, Hebbagodi, Bangalore, and it is engaged in the import of sealed maintenance-free lead acid batteries, of which Sri Vijaykumar alias V.D. Padhye, detenue, is the Managing Director. (b) The Intelligence Bureau, having received credible information that the said industrial unit had evaded payment of Anti-Dumping Duty (Add' for short) on the imports of lead acid batteries of Chinese origin prior to January 2005, conducted a search on 29-8-2006. The officers of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) conducted the raid and recovered certain incriminating documents, correspondence and records revealing malpractice in the matter relating to ADD. The search and seizure was authenticated and recorded under various mahazars. Seizure of certain records and computers containing correspondence were subsequently scrutinised which, the officials of the DRI felt, substantiates import of lead acid batteries by the industrial unit mostly through Mts. I.C.B., Bangalore, for the period July 2002 to 4-1-2005 which was misdeclared as of Malaysian origin instead of the actual country of origin, that is, China. This was done by the industrial unit to escape the incidence of ADD on the imports. (c) E-mails and other correspondence seized during the raid also revealed that the unit had devised a modus operandi in collusion with overseas Chinese suppliers, Shenzhen Leoch Battery Technology Company Limited, Shenzhen, China, by exporting lead acid batteries by generating documents in the name of another company namely, MSB Battery Manufacturing (MSB), SBM, Malaysia, Mts.
(c) E-mails and other correspondence seized during the raid also revealed that the unit had devised a modus operandi in collusion with overseas Chinese suppliers, Shenzhen Leoch Battery Technology Company Limited, Shenzhen, China, by exporting lead acid batteries by generating documents in the name of another company namely, MSB Battery Manufacturing (MSB), SBM, Malaysia, Mts. Wheels and Axis, Malaysia, and thereafter getting the lead acid batteries into India, as if these batteries had originated in Malaysia, so that no ADD was payable. (c) Subsequent to such search and seizure by the DRI, the detenue was questioned and his statement was recorded, as permissible under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, on various dates which is particularised in Relied Upon Documents (RUD). It is alleged that the detenue had admitted in his statements, misdeclaration of the country of origin of the batteries imported during the period July 2002 to 4-1-2005. When confronted with e-mails seized during the raid which showed collusion by the detenue with overseas Chinese and Malaysian suppliers to defraud the Government of Revenue by adopting dubious methods, the detenue is alleged to have admitted to various provisional duty work sheets showing ADD liability of Rupees 17 Crores arrived at on the basis of incriminating evidence. By such statements, the detenue is alleged to have admitted that the import price of the batteries was split into two components namely, D/P (Documents against payments) and T/T (Telegraphic Transfer). While D/P amounts alone were reflected in the import invoices and submitted to the customs, the T/T amounts were stated separately to overseas Chinese manufacturers for which custom duty was not charged. Such act of splitting up import invoice value was deliberate and done intentionally and consciously even after search of the premises by the DRI on 29-8-2006. (d) The detenue continued to import lead acid batteries from China even after 4-1-2005, resorting to splitting under the provisions of the invoice value, thereby undervaluing the batteries to the tune of Rupees 1.49 Crores, thus evading substantial customs duty. (e) Statements of other Directors of Mts. Uplus Batteries Private Limited, Bangalore, inter cilia revealed that the person in-charge of the day-to-day affairs and functioning of the company for payment of customs duty was the detenue.
(e) Statements of other Directors of Mts. Uplus Batteries Private Limited, Bangalore, inter cilia revealed that the person in-charge of the day-to-day affairs and functioning of the company for payment of customs duty was the detenue. (f) Based on the material as indicted above, prima facie a case was made out against the detenue and on 6-12-2006, he was arrested under the Customs Act, and subsequently released on conditional bail by the Presiding Officer of Special Court for Economic Offences, Bangalore. During this period, the company paid Rupees 1.89 Crores against the total ADD liability of Rupees 17 Crores and the detenue furnished a payment schedule on 20-12-2006 for Rupees 6.5 Crores within 31-3-2007. On such undertaking given voluntarily by the detenue, the Special Court for Economic Offences relaxed the conditions of bail. But the detenue defaulted and by misleading the Investigating Officers and the Court, continued to indulge in such illegality. (g) The detenue had, in the month of December 2006, directly and through his Counsel, addressed letters to the DRI, Bangalore, which are referred to in RUD, attempting to retract the statements given by him and recorded under the provision of Section 108 of the Customs Act, on the plea that he was put `under duress' to make such statements under Section 108. The authorities rejected the contention of the detenue that such statements were made by him under duress and made the contents of those statements as revealing criminality in his conduct. (h) Considering the various circumstances and factual position surfacing from the RUD, the authorities formed an opinion that the detenue had master-minded smuggling of lead acid batteries which is directly injurious to the economic security of the State and that the under-valuation of the goods in collusion with the Chinese suppliers, had caused great injury to the collection of Government Revenue and the nature of illegality and ingenuity in perpetrating the act of smuggling by a highly qualified person like him was likely to adversely affect the economy of the country.
(i) In the resultant position, the DRI, Bangalore, which is the sponsoring authority under the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, (‘COFEPOSA Act’ for short) prepared a reference for preventive detention of the detenue and placed it before the Screening Committee comprising the Inspector General of Police (COD) as Chairman, Commissioner of Central Excise, Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime), and Additional Law Secretary (Opinion), Government of Karnataka for consideration and to recommend the detention of the detenue, to the ‘detaining authority’ under the Act, as notified by the State Government. The sponsoring authority's reference was considered by the Screening Committee and the Screening Committee having unanimously resolved to accept the proposal, recommended to the detaining authority, the detention of the detenue. 4. The detaining authority, viz., Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Smt. Vatsala Watsa, considering such proposals and recommendations, passed the order impugned on 5-7-2007 as per Annexure-A in Order No. HD 7 SCF 2007, and ordered detention of the detenue. 5. A copy of the order of detention vide Annexure-A and the grounds of detention vide Annexure-B were served upon the detenue, by virtue of which the detenue is under preventive detention with effect from 5-7-2007 under the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of COFEPOSA Act. It is that order which is assailed in this petition on the following grounds: (a) That the order of detention at Annexure-A and grounds of detention at Annexure-B are manifestly erroneous and illegal as it shows non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority to all facts and circumstances and RUD which, if had been examined in detail and considered, would have made out no case for detention of the detenue. (b) The subjective satisfaction derived by the detaining authority as disclosed in the grounds of detention at page 1 is said to be based on ‘seized records and computers containing correspondence revealing import of acid batteries by the unit through ICD, Bangalore, during the period July 2002 to 4-1-2005, by misdeclaring it as of Malaysian origin, instead of the actual country of origin, i.e., China, to escape the incidence of ADD on the imports’. The material relied upon by the authorities was irrelevant and would not reveal incidents of evasion of ADD on the imports.
The material relied upon by the authorities was irrelevant and would not reveal incidents of evasion of ADD on the imports. (c) The order of detention reveals that the detaining authority was not alive and not adverted to the letter dated 20-12-2006 of the detenue which is self-explanatory, showing falsity in the accusation. (d) Had the authority considered the contents of the letter, it would have noticed that ADD was no longer in existence with effect from 31-12-2004 and hence, the possibility of the detenue indulging in avoidance of ADD did not exist at all. Consequently,, the order of detention is vitiated for the reason of non-application of mind and thus, liable to be quashed. (e) The detaining authority hasfailed to consider the letter of Sri B.V. Kumar, Advocate of the detenue, wherein it was clearly spelled out that ADD which was being levied, was provisional and subsequently had been withdrawn and ADD ceased to exist after 31-12-2004, and consequently the order of detention based on such charge was untenable. (f) The authority has also failed to consider the letter addressed by the detenue on 12-12-2006 (copy seen at pages 265 to 268 of RUD) by which the detenue had informed the Department that the entire imports were from Malaysia and that the Malaysian company had the manufacturing facility. This factum was not taken note of, nor the detaining authority was alive to such contention. (g) Notification No.1/02 CUS dated 2-1-2002 regarding lead acid batteries falling under heading 8507 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975, originating in or exported from the Republic of China, South Korea, Japan, Bangladesh was subject to ADD of 3.192 USD per kilogram. AS provided under ADD rules, Yuasa Batteries (Guangdong) and another company by name CSB Batteries, both of China, represented against ADD imposed. Thereafter, by Notification No.14/30/2003, the Government recommended only making provisional assessment and to release the goods subject to securities pending finalisation of ADD. The notification was issued to the above effect in No.110/02 CUS dated 10-10-2002. Review of the representation from Yuasa Batteries made under Notification No.78/2004 CUS dated 26-7-2004 was issued, under which no ADD is to be imposed on batteries imported from Yuasa Batteries of China. (h) The entire process of the order of detention has proceeded on a wrong premise, ignoring the notification, removing ADD on batteries imported from Yuasa Batteries.
Review of the representation from Yuasa Batteries made under Notification No.78/2004 CUS dated 26-7-2004 was issued, under which no ADD is to be imposed on batteries imported from Yuasa Batteries of China. (h) The entire process of the order of detention has proceeded on a wrong premise, ignoring the notification, removing ADD on batteries imported from Yuasa Batteries. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the detaining authority is by a wrong assumption of law and facts, thus vitiating subjective satisfaction. (i) The letters addressed by the Counsel for the detenue on 20-12-2006 spelled out specifically and brought to the attention of the concerned authorities, issuance of the notification regarding withdrawal of ADD and invoices were enclosed to show how ADD is payable. That was not at all considered by the concerned authorities and even by the detaining authority. Thus, non-application of mind to this important circumstance whereby ADD was not attracted in respect of lead batteries, has resulted in injustice. In the order of detention, there is no mention that the letter addressed by the Counsel for the detenue had been considered by the authority. Had the contents of the letter been considered, the detaining authority could not have derived even subjective satisfaction regarding contravention of the provisions relating to payment of ADD. (j) The allegation that there has been under-valuation of the imported batteries from January 2005 to August 2006 is also untenable and against the Customs Act and Rules made thereunder. Even if it is presumed that e-mails and other correspondence between the detenue and Yuasa Batteries disclosed there was certain manipulation in the invoice price of the batteries, still the conclusion in the grounds of detention that there was evasion of customs duty is patently erroneous. The detaining authority has ignored the manner and mode of evaluation of goods under Customs Evaluation Rules, 1986, under which even if the transaction value is validly to be rejected, still Customs Authorities are required to clarify the value by sequentially following Rules 4 to 8. Since that was not done, there is contravention of the said rules and straightaway resorting to Rule 8 and claiming that there was under-valuation is wholly unsustainable.
Since that was not done, there is contravention of the said rules and straightaway resorting to Rule 8 and claiming that there was under-valuation is wholly unsustainable. (k) By reference to various circumstances referred to above, it was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is total non-application of mind by the detaining authority regarding existence of even a prima facie case requiring preventive detention of the petitioner. (1) The sponsoring authority had failed to place before the detaining authority relevant notifications referred to above which establishes Kar. L.J.I ROOPALI V. PADIIYE v GOVT. OF KARNATAKA (DB) 703 withdrawal of ADD in respect of import of lead acid batteries from countries like China. Thus, even presuming that initially there was any such embargo, such embargo became extinct by virtue of the notifications issued by the Government referred to above. Therefore, the very basis on which the sponsoring authority had sought detention of the detenue was lost and the allegation that the detenue had indulged in smuggling activity is without basis. 6. From the various contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner, it can be noticed that the core contention is that the relevant and material documents on the basis of which the case was built up against the detenue was not made available to the detaining authority for its perusal, and even the statements of the detenue recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act have been ignored by the detaining authority, and simply reference is made that the statements were only a retraction of the alleged admission. 7. The sole basis to seek quashing of the order impugned is non-application of mind by the detaining authority. In the circumstances, we had directed the State Government and the detaining authority to produce relevant records for ascertainment as to whether RUD on the basis of which the impugned order has been passed, is considered by the detaining authority, and whether there is application of mind to derive subjective satisfaction as proclaimed by the detaining authority. 8. The learned Advocate General has taken us through the records of the sponsoring authority, detaining authority and Advisory Board constituted under the Act. 9.
8. The learned Advocate General has taken us through the records of the sponsoring authority, detaining authority and Advisory Board constituted under the Act. 9. The sum and substance of the defence put up by the State Government can be noticed from the counter filed wherein there is merely reiteration of the grounds of detention, and support is sought to such grounds, making reference to the records of the sponsoring authority. The note sheet of the records maintained by the detaining authority reveals the placement of the proposal and recommendation of the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority. Since it was difficult to decipher as to when the detaining authority had considered the material placed before her and passed the impugned order, we had requested the learned Advocate General to clarify the position and to indicate as to when the detaining authority had considered the material and passed the impugned order dated 5-7-2007. 10. In response to this, the learned Advocate General has filed the affidavit of Smt. Vatsala Watsa, Principal Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Karnataka, who is the detaining authority constituted under the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of COFEPOSA Act. In the affidavit, there is narration about the details furnished to her by the sponsoring authority, seeking detention of the detenue which, we have noticed, reveals that the relevant records and reports were placed for the first time before the detaining authority on 20-6-2007. It is her say that she felt the need to seek further clarification in relation to the matter and therefore, requested the Deputy Secretary (Law and Order) to speak to her and discuss. She endorsed the same on the file and sent it back to the Deputy Secretary. The Deputy Secretary was not available and thus, the Under Secretary met her and discussed the details. She requested him to put up the order of detention and grounds of detention after constitution of the COFEPOSA Advisory Board, since there was vacancy in the office of the Chairman of the Board. After reconstitution of such Board, the order of detention as well as grounds of detention were prepared by the office, as directed by her during her discussion with the Under Secretary.
After reconstitution of such Board, the order of detention as well as grounds of detention were prepared by the office, as directed by her during her discussion with the Under Secretary. The relevant categorical statement made by her is: "(Part of paragraph 1 of the affidavit) When the concerned file pertaining to Sri Vijaykumar Damodar Padhye alias V.D. Padhye was placed before me on 20-6-2007, after going through the entire file, I felt the need to have some more clarification in relation to the matter and therefore, requested the Deputy Secretary (Law and Order) to "speak to me and discuss with me". I made this endorsement in the file on 20-6-2007 and sent it to the Deputy Secretary. Since Deputy Secretary was not available, the Under Secretary met me with the file and discussed with me in detail. I requested him to put up the detention order and ' grounds of detention after constitution of the COFEPOSA Advisory Board since there was vacancy in the office of the Chairman of the COFEPOSA Advisory Board. After reconstitution of the COFEPOSA Advisory Board, the detention order as well as the grounds of detention were prepared by my office as directed by me during my discussion with the Under Secretary as aforementioned and the concerned papers and files were put up before me for approval on 4-7-2007. 2. On 4-7-2007, when the detention order, grounds of detention, the files and relied upon materials were placed before me, I went through the entire papers including the detention order, grounds of detention and after due application of mind and deriving subjective satisfaction, I approved the detention of Sri Vijaykumar Damodar Padhye alias V.D. Padhye and made an endorsement approving the draft detention order and the grounds of detention. Based on the said approval of mine, on 5-7-2007, the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention was prepared in terms of the draft approved by me and I signed the original of the same. Thereafter, the same was issued to the detenue as per the office procedure”. From the extracted deposition of the detaining authority, it is clear that undisputably the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention were prepared by the subordinate officers in office, and not by her personally.
Thereafter, the same was issued to the detenue as per the office procedure”. From the extracted deposition of the detaining authority, it is clear that undisputably the order of detention as well as the grounds of detention were prepared by the subordinate officers in office, and not by her personally. It is also clear from the above statement of facts revealed by her that the Under Secretary working under her had prepared the draft of the order of detention and the grounds of detention and placed it on 4-7-2007 for her approval. 11. We have also noticed the endorsement made on 4-7-2007 which reads thus: ‘Anumodisiddene’ The English meaning of the Kannada Word ‘Anumodisiddene' would only mean ‘approval’. It therefore, shows that the order of detention and the grounds of detention prepared by the Under Secretary, Home Department, has been simply ‘approved’ by the detaining authority. In this regard, the learned Counsel on behalf of the detenue urged that such ‘approval’ does not meet the requirement of law because it is the detaining authority who had to apply her mind and derive subjective satisfaction; the subjective satisfaction derived by the Under Secretary cannot be termed as subjective satisfaction to be derived by the detaining authority as required under the law. 12. Per contra, the learned Advocate General would contend that there is no such infirmity in the said order, nor there is any non-compliance to the requirement of the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act. In this regard, he submits that in the Government, when a decision is to be taken, there is file movement, the file passes at various stages and the decision-making process involves the opinion of more than one officer working in the Department. Therefore, preparation of the draft of the order of detention and grounds of detention are on the basis of discussion by the detaining authority with the concerned official(s). That shows that after discussing the matter, the detaining authority had instructed the subordinate officers to prepare the draft and as per instruction, such draft was prepared. The decision-making process even under the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act does not exclude preparation of the draft and putting it up for approval of the detaining authority. Once the detaining authority approves, it presupposes examination of the draft and approval by application of mind. 13.
The decision-making process even under the provisions of Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA Act does not exclude preparation of the draft and putting it up for approval of the detaining authority. Once the detaining authority approves, it presupposes examination of the draft and approval by application of mind. 13. The learned Advocate General has filed a list of citations, but has placed reliance mainly on two decisions which we shall refer to in the following paragraphs. 14. In the case of Ahamed Nassar v State of Tamil Nadu and Others (1999)8 SCC 473 : 1999 SCC (Cri.) 1469, the Apex Court while considering the contention of the detenue that all materials, which includes the letters addressed by the detenue and his Advocate were not placed before the detaining authority, in paragraphs 20 to 25 as follows. "20. So far as the stand of the respondent with reference to the Advocate's letter dated 19-4-1999 is concerned it cannot be held to be a justifiable stand. These technical objections must be shunned where a detenu is being dealt with under the preventive detention law. A man is to be detained in the prison based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Every conceivable material which is relevant and vital which may have a bearing on the issue should be placed before the detaining authority. The sponsoring authority should not keep it back, based on his interpretation that it would not be of any help to a prospective detenu. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. The law on this subject is well-settled; a detention order vitiates if any relevant document is not placed before the detaining authority which reasonably could affect his decision. 21. In Ashadevi v K. Shivraj, AIR 1979 SC 447 : (1979)1 SCC 222 , the Court held (SCC headnote): "If material or vital facts which would influence the mind of the detaining authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the detention order are not placed before or are not considered by the detaining authority, it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal”. 22. This is a case of preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, where the confessional statement retracted by the detenu was not placed before the detaining authority. 23.
22. This is a case of preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, where the confessional statement retracted by the detenu was not placed before the detaining authority. 23. In Ayya alias Ayub v State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, AIR 1989 SC 364 : (1989)1 SCC 374, the Court held: "There would be vitiation of the detention on grounds, of non-application of mind if a piece of evidence, which as relevant though not binding, had not been considered at all. If a piece of evidence which might reasonably have affected the decision whether or not to pass an order of detention is excluded from consideration, there would be a failure of' application of mind which, in turn, vitiates the detention. The detaining authority might very well have come to the same conclusion after considering this material; but in the facts of the case the omission to consider the material assumes materiality”. 24. In Sita Ram Somani v State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1986 SC 1072 : (1986)2 SCC 86 , the Court held: "It appears to be clear to us that the documents mentioned by the appellant in his petition were not placed before the detaining authority and therefore, were not considered by the detaining authority. It is possible that they were placed before the Screening Committee in the first instance, but that is immaterial. It was the detaining authority that had to consider the relevant material before taking a decision whether it was necessary to detain the appellant under COFEPOSA. That was not done and there was therefore, a clear non-application of mind by the detaining authority to relevant material". 15. In the instant case, the contention of the detenue is that the sponsoring authority (DRI) had during the course of investigation called for and obtained the copies of all the bills of entry filed by the company after August 2006 till 30th March, 2007 from the Customs House Agent (clearing agent) M/s. Vijay Logistics. These bills of entry obtained from M/s. Vijay Logistics were not placed by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority. Non-production of those bills, vital documents, which were capable of affecting the derival of subjective satisfaction one way or the other, has vitiated the order of detention for non-placing of all the documents.
These bills of entry obtained from M/s. Vijay Logistics were not placed by the sponsoring authority before the detaining authority. Non-production of those bills, vital documents, which were capable of affecting the derival of subjective satisfaction one way or the other, has vitiated the order of detention for non-placing of all the documents. Further, that the bills of entry procured from the CHA till 30th March, 2007 revealed that there existed no material to sustain the allegations that after August 2006 there continued to be undervaluation in imports. The documents are vital in nature and non-placement of documents by the sponsoring authority has resulted in non-consideration of such an important material by the detaining authority, which violates both the facets of Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. 16. The Notification No.1/02 CUS dated 2-1-2002 issued by ADD were also not placed before the detaining authority. Those materials were withheld by the sponsoring authority, has not been controverted by the State or the detaining authority. 17. Applying the ratio decidendi in the decision of Apex Court referred to above, we are satisfied that sponsoring authority has been choosy and has with-held these documents. It appears that sponsoring authority considered those documents as not important and has not produced the same before the detaining authority for consideration. As observed by the Apex Court the worth of the documents or what credence could be attached to those documents, cannot be decided by the sponsoring authority. Sponsoring authority is required to place all documents relating to the accused for consideration by the detaining authority and it is the detaining authority, which has to weigh the contents of those documents either to accept or reject it. Since those documents are not placed before the detaining authority, the detaining authority obviously had not considered it. 18. At this state the learned Advocate General refuting the contentions of the detenue urged that as the process of decision-making involves several officers at several stages, it is a continuous process and thus the proposal of the sponsoring authority which has already referred to those documents, was sufficient indication that the detaining authority was aware of those documents and had applied her mind to it. Contending that preparation of the draft by one subordinate officer and approval by the detaining authority would not vitiate the order impugned in this writ petition.
Contending that preparation of the draft by one subordinate officer and approval by the detaining authority would not vitiate the order impugned in this writ petition. The learned Advocate General relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sheetal Manoj Gore v State of Maharashtra and Others (2006)7 SCC 560 : 2006 AIR SCW 4361: (2006)3 SCC (Cri.) 314. The following is the observation: "11. We are not impressed by the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner. The order of detention was not prepared overnight. As explained by the detaining authority it is a continuous process. The proposal of the subjective satisfaction is first examined by the Screening Committee and thereafter by the officer of the Home Department at various levels. The material collected is then placed before the detaining authority for its consideration. In his case the sponsoring authority had made a proposal much earlier, but from time to time further generated documents were being dispatched to the detaining authority which were considered by the detaining authority. There is really no basis for the assertion that the detaining authority without applying her mind passed the order of detention. 12. Learned Counsel submitted that the detaining authority in all probability, had signed the grounds of detention which had earlier been prepared by her predecessor. The submission is based on the fact in paragraph 28 of the grounds it is stated as follows: "While scrutinising the proposal and relied upon documents I received further generated documents on 12-9-2005, 18-11-2005, 13-12-2005, 23-12-2005 and 20-1-2006. I also received representations dated 24-11-2005, 25-11-2005 and 20-1-2006 made by Mrs. Sheetal Manoj Gore on behalf of you. Before passing the detention order I have considered all documents and all representations”. 13. The submission is that the documents referred to therein except those dated January 20, 2006 were received before the detaining authority was empowered to act in that capacity. The averment is so worded as to give the impression that the detaining authority had herself received the documents generated between the months of September and December 2005. It was submitted that in all likelihood this paragraph was simply copied from the earlier draft grounds of detention which may have been prepared by the then detaining authority. We find no substance in the submission. A mere reading of the paragraph discloses that it also refers to documents received on January 20, 2006.
It was submitted that in all likelihood this paragraph was simply copied from the earlier draft grounds of detention which may have been prepared by the then detaining authority. We find no substance in the submission. A mere reading of the paragraph discloses that it also refers to documents received on January 20, 2006. This itself established that the detaining authority must have applied her mind to the documents mentioned therein, because if it had not done so, there could be no reference to the documents dated January 20, 2006 in the grounds of detention, since those did not exist when the earlier detaining authority may have finalised the draft grounds of detention. This completely demolishes the charge of the detaining authority acting mechanically. We entertain no doubt that the detaining authority did apply her mind to the material on record and only on being subjectively satisfied about the compelling necessity to issue the order of detention, issued the order and grounds of detention. It may be that she also considered the draft grounds of detention which may have been prepared by the earlier detaining authority but that by itself will not vitiate her order if she applied her mind to the relevant material on record and recorded an independent subjective satisfaction on the basis thereof. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are satisfied that the detaining authority did not proceed to issue the order of detention mechanically on the basis of the subjective satisfaction of her predecessor, but applied her mind to the material on record and independently reached the subjective satisfaction that it was necessary, in the facts of the case, to issue the order of detention. The second submission urged on behalf of the petitioner is also rejected". 19. From the observations of the Apex Court it is clear that the Apex Court discounted the contentions urged in that case about non-application of mind by the detaining authority taking note of the fact that draft detention order was prepared by the predecessor detaining authority and the successor detaining authority had once again examined the same and recorded the independent subjective satisfaction on the basis thereto.
In the facts and circumstances of that case the Apex Court held that the detaining authority had not proceeded to issue the order of detention mechanically on the basis of the subjective satisfaction of its predecessor but had applied her mind to the material on record and independently reached to the subjective satisfaction and that is necessary in the facts of that case and issued the order of detention. 20. In the instant case, the facts are different. The detention and grounds of detention are not prepared by the detaining authority after independently deriving subjective satisfaction. The detention order and grounds of detention are prepared by the lowest rank officer in the Home Department working as Under Secretary and which draft was admittedly approved by the detaining authority. Therefore, there is absolutely no independent derival of subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority herself. Thus on facts the said decision does not help the petitioner. 21. From the principles emanating from the decision of the Apex Court referred to supra, it is clear that when a person is to be detained in a prison based on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, every conceivable material which is relevant material and factual material, which may have a bearing on the issue is required to be placed before the detaining authority by sponsoring authority and the sponsoring authority cannot with hold any such material on its own assumption that it would not be of any help to the detenue. It is the detaining authority, which has to decide worth of material. It is the detaining authority which while deriving subjective satisfaction is required to consider all such materials. The law on the subject is now well-settled by the Apex Court that the detention order vitiates, if any relevant material documents is not placed before the detaining authority, which could reasonably affect its decision. 22. In the instant case, we are satisfied that there is non-placement of the Government notification referred to above, which amounts to with holding of relevant material pertaining to the accusation made against the detenue, which has become the basis for passing the impugned orders. On this ground also we are satisfied that the order of detention is vitiated. 23.
22. In the instant case, we are satisfied that there is non-placement of the Government notification referred to above, which amounts to with holding of relevant material pertaining to the accusation made against the detenue, which has become the basis for passing the impugned orders. On this ground also we are satisfied that the order of detention is vitiated. 23. More importantly, as discussed in the para supra, we have noticed that the records made available to us clearly indicate that even though the relevant material was forwarded to the detaining authority, the file has been predominantly handled only by the subordinate rank officer working under the detaining authority and it is only on two occasions the file was placed before her (detaining authority). Even on such placement of the file the detaining authority has asked the officers concerned to discuss with her and has made no endorsement of having examined the relevant records and the report of the sponsoring authority. The endorsement made on the note sheet that the issue was discussed has not been made by the detaining authority, it is made by the officer (we are told is of the rank of Under Secretary) and it is he who is the author of the draft of detention order and the grounds of detention. The averments made in the affidavit filed by the Principal Secretary, Home Department - the detaining authority, is an admission of this fact and she has merely approved the draft. 24. The issue has been dealt with as if it was pertaining to ‘Governmental decision’. In Governmental decisions certainly the process of decision-making may involve opinions of various officers at various levels in the hierarchy of administration. But when the decision is to be taken by the authority named in the statute itself, it is that authority which alone is required to take the decision. In such a case the opinion and decision of other subordinate officers cannot be construed as the decision of named authority under statute. 25. The Apex Court in the similar circumstances has held that the Constitutional Scheme, preamble as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons of COFEPOSA justifiability of the acts of every statutory functionary performing statutory obligations under the Act has to be scrutinised and tested.
25. The Apex Court in the similar circumstances has held that the Constitutional Scheme, preamble as also the Statement of Objects and Reasons of COFEPOSA justifiability of the acts of every statutory functionary performing statutory obligations under the Act has to be scrutinised and tested. Whenever there are two possible interpretations of a statute, the one that subserves the objective of an enactment is to be accepted. The same principle shall with equal force apply in testing the credibility of the acts of the statutory functionary performing its statutory obligations. Such authorities, while performing their obligations under the preventive detention law, must perform it on one hand with promptness as not to further lengthen the detenu’s detention through their casual conduct, neglect, lethargy, etc.; on the other hand, all what is required to be done by it if it has been done then in construing its conduct, conclusions, etc., if there be two possible interpretations then the one that subserves the objective of the statute should be accepted. 26. Keeping the said principles in mind, the provisions of Section 3 of the Act has to be read: "Power to make orders detaining certain persons.—( 1) The Central Government or the State Government or any officer of the Central Government, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of the State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person (including a foreigner), that, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from.
.(i) smuggling goods; or .(ii) abetting the smuggling of goods; or (iii) engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods; or .(iv) dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods; or .(v) harbouring persons engaged in smuggling goods or in abetting the smuggling of goods, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained: Provided that no order of detention shall be made on any of the grounds specified in this sub-section on which an order of detention may be made under Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 or under Section 3 of the Jammu and kashmir Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Ordinance, 1988 (J and K ordinance 1 of 1988). (2) When any order of detention is made by a State Government or by an officer empowered by a State Government, the State Government shall, within ten days, forward to the Central Government a report in respect of the order. (3) For the purpose of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution, the communication to a person detained in pursuance of a detention order of the grounds on which the order has been made shall be made as soon as may be after the detention, but ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than fifteen days, from the date of detention”. 27. Thus, it is seen that empowerment to pass detention order could be derived only under the said section. It is only such of the officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary of the Government of India or the officer not below the rank of Secretary to the State Government could be specially empowered for the purposes of this section. The statute itself provides that no officer below the rank of Joint Secretary of Union of India or Secretary to the State Government could be empowered with the power of detention and it is only that officer, who has to derive subjective satisfaction. 28.
The statute itself provides that no officer below the rank of Joint Secretary of Union of India or Secretary to the State Government could be empowered with the power of detention and it is only that officer, who has to derive subjective satisfaction. 28. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that there is absolutely no application of mind for derival of subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority, specially empowered under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act and the impugned detention order as also the grounds of detention are not based on her independent opinion. Therefore, the detention order and the grounds of detention impugned at Annexures-A and B are vitiated due to non-application of mind, which is a condition precedent for deriving subjective satisfaction as is required under law. Consequent to which the valuable right of the detenue guaranteed under Article 22 of the Constitution of India has been infringed and his detention wherefore, cannot be sustained. The writ petitioner shall therefore, succeed in her legal pursuits and detention of the detenue is therefore, liable to be quashed as unsustainable, without prejudice to pass fresh orders in accordance with law. We, therefore, proceed to pass the following order. Order The writ petition is allowed. Rule nisi is made absolute. The detention order bearing No. HD 7 SCF 2007, dated 5-7-2007, vide Annexure-A passed on the basis of the grounds of detention bearing No. HD 7 SCF 2007, dated 5-7-2007, vide Annexure-B, is quashed. The respondents are directed to release the detenue - Vijay Kumar Damodar Padhye alias V.D. Padhye, S/o. Late Damodar Waman Padhye, forthwith. To ensure strict compliance of this order, we direct the Registry to communicate the operative portion of the order to the Senior Superintendent, Central Prison, Bangalore-respondent 3, to release the detenue forthwith, unless the detenue is under order of detention in any other case.