Judgment 1. This application under section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed to quash the order dated 18.11.2005 passed by C.J.M., Gaya in G.R. Case No. 2482 of 2005 arising out of Tekari P.S. Case No. 185 of 2005 as well as entire criminal prosecution which is now pending in the Court of Shri S.B.P. Singh, Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Gaya bearing Trial No. 1266 of 2005. The learned C.J.M. has taken cognizance under sections 188, 171-H and 171-F of the I.P.C. as well as under section 30 of the Arms Act. 2. In the month of October, 2005, there was assembly election. The petitioner no. 1, Surendra Prasad Yadav was one of the candidates from Belaganj Constituency in Gaya District. As precautionary measure the District Magistrate, Gaya promalgamated (sicpromulgated?) prohibitory order under section 144 Cr.P.C. in the entire District of Gaya vide order dated 25.9.2005 thereby persons were prohibited from carrying of any arms in public places. 3. On 20.10.2005, the petitioner no. 1 alongwith supporters including other two petitioners were found moving in public places alongwith firearms within the area of his constituency. At about 11.00 A.M. the petitioners were apprehended by B.S.F. Personnel alongwith arms near Belhari Panchdevta. The police of Tekari P.S. was informed. The S.I., Sri D.N. Mandal came, seize arms and on his self statement registered the aforesaid Tekari P.S. Case No. 185 of 2005 against all the petitioners. After investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet under the above sections. 4. Counter as well as supplementary affidavit have been filed by the parties. 5. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. 6. It is submitted that the prosecution of the petitioners is manifestly illegal and bad in law. It is simple case of violation of prohibitory order amalgamated (s/cpromulgated?) under section 144 Cr.P.C. Therefore, no prosecution against the petitioners could be lodged except under the procedure laid down in Section 195 Cr.P.C. Only the District Magistrate of Gaya or his superior officer was competent authority to file the complaint case for violation of prohibitory order amalgamated (sicpromulgated?) under section 144 Cr.P.C. No other person was legally competent to lodge case nor the court was empowered to take cognizance upon such complaint or charge-sheet submitted by the police. Therefore, prosecution of the petitioners on the basis of the fardbeyan lodged by S.I., Tekari P.S. and cognizance taken on the basis of charge-sheet submitted by the police is wholly illegal and bad in law. It is further submitted that except Section 188 Cr.P.C., no other section of the I.P.C. or Arms Act is applicable in this case. All Arms recovered from possession of the petitioners were licenced Arms. The learned counsel for the petitioners referred catena of decisions of different High Court including the Apex Court on the point of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. 7. This Court fully agree with the legal proposition of Section 195 Cr.P.C. For violation of prohibitory order amalgamated (sicpromulgated?) under section 144 Cr.P.C. only the concerned public servant or public servant to which he is administratively subordinate alone is competent to file complaint. No other person or police is authorised to lodge case for that nor any court can take cognizance upon such complaint. 8. However, in this case, petitioners have not only been prosecuted under section 188 of the I.P.C. (violation of prohibitory order). They have also been charged under section 171-F and H of the I.P.C. and Section 30 of the Arms Act. For prosecution under above provisions Section 195 Cr.P.C. does not come to play any role. 9. The admitted fact is that there was assembly election and the petitioner was one of the candidates and other petitioners were his supporters and associates. Due to promalgamation (sicpromulgation?) of prohibitory order under section 144 Cr.P.C. they were banned from carrying or displaying any arms in public places. The purpose of prohibitory order was to maintain peace and to prevent intimidation and to exert undue influence upon the voters. Carrying and displaying arms in public places clearly goes to show that it was for intimidation of voters and exerting undue influence upon them. Therefore Section 171-F is also attracted in this case for which compliance of Section 195 Cr.P.C. is not required. However, allegations contained in fardbeyan do not attract Section 171-H I.P.C. There is no allegation of illegal payment to any voter. 10. The other provision under which the petitioners have also been prosecuted is Section 30 of the Arms Act. Section 30 provides punishment for contravention of licence or rule. Annexure-2 series go to show that all the petitioners had licence in Form III of the Arms Rule, 1962. 10. The other provision under which the petitioners have also been prosecuted is Section 30 of the Arms Act. Section 30 provides punishment for contravention of licence or rule. Annexure-2 series go to show that all the petitioners had licence in Form III of the Arms Rule, 1962. In Form-Ill licence for arms is granted for possession and carrying of arms or ammunition for sport or protection. However, it is subject to condition appended in Form-Ill. As many as 14 conditions have been mentioned. However, we are concerned with condition no. 5 only. Condition No. 5 runs as follows: "5. The licensee or any retainer acting under this licence shall not carry any arms covered there by other wise than in good faith for the purpose of sport/ protection/display and, save where he is specially authorised in this behalf by the District Magistrate concerned, he shall not take any such arms to a fair, religious procession or other public assemblage (or within the campus or precincts of any educational institution)." 11. On the date, these petitioners were arrested alongwith arms in public place, there was prohibitory order and the public in general were barred from carrying or displaying arms in public places or assemblage. There is no case that these petitioners were specially authorised by the District Magistrate to carry arms in public places or assemblage. There is also nothing on the record to show that the arms were being displayed or carried in public places in good faith. Apparently, it was for intimidation or influencing the voters. Therefore, the learned court below has rightly taken cognizance under section 30 of the Arms Act. 12. Thus, from the above discussion, it is quite clear that the cognizance taken against the petitioners under section 171-F of the I.P.C. and 30 of the Arms Act is-quite legal and justified. 13. In the result, this application is rejected. However, the court below shall take into account the above observation with regard to applicability of Sections 188 and 171-H of the I.P.C. at the time of framing of the charge.