JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. The appellants have preferred the instant application against the judgment of conviction dated 26.05.2003 and its corresponding order of sentence dated 29.05.2003, whereby both the appellants were convicted for the offence under Sections 376(2)(g) and under Section 448 of the I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years for the offence under Section 376(2)(g) and further for a period of six months under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The case against the appellants was registered on the basis of the Fard Beyan of the informant/prosecutrix (P.W. 2) at 11:00 hours on 09.04.2000. The allegations in the F.I.R. are that on 28.03.2000, while the prosecutrix was at her house at about 6 P.M., both the present appellants, who happen to be her husbands cousins came to her house. At that time, she was alone in the house, her husband had gone to the forest for hunting while her mother was grazing cattle in the open field behind the house. The prosecutrix has alleged that after entering into her room, the appellant, Munshi Tudu made her lie down on the ground and forcibly committed rape on her. The act was followed by the co- appellant, Shyamlal Tudu. After having ravished her, they took away a sum of Rs. 4,000/- kept in the shelf. The money was withdrawn by the informant from the Bank two days earlier for household expenses. It is further alleged that before leaving the house, both the appellants issued threats of dire consequences to the prosecutrix and had also assaulted her with Lathi. Thereafter, she went to her mother and reported the matter. She also reported the matter to her husband on his return home. The matter thereafter was reported by her husband to the Village head for convening a Panchayati but the Panchayati could not be convened on account of the failure of the accused persons to attend the Panchayat meeting and thereafter ultimately the matter was reported by the prosecutrix to the Police on 09.04.2000. 3. The appellants were charged for the offences under Sections 376(2)(g), 448 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Both of them have denied the charges and had preferred to be tried. At the trial as many as five witnesses were examined by the Prosecution including the prosecutrix, her husband and her mother. 3. The appellants were charged for the offences under Sections 376(2)(g), 448 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. Both of them have denied the charges and had preferred to be tried. At the trial as many as five witnesses were examined by the Prosecution including the prosecutrix, her husband and her mother. Significantly, neither the Investigating Officer, nor the Doctor has been examined nor any Medical Report been adduced in evidence. 4. Out of the five witnesses examined by the prosecution, P.W. 1, Shani Ram Marandi, P.W. 2, Talamai Hembram, P.W. 3, Sardar Mimimli, P.W. 4, Sangram Tuilu as well as P.W. 5 Barki Tudu, who is the mother of the prosecutrix, have failed to support the prosecutions case. The husband of the prosecutrix. Sangram Tudu (P.W.4), had though not been declared hostile but his evidence lends only partial support by way of hearsay evidence to the testimony of the prosecutrix. 5. The learned court below relied entirely on the testimony of the prosecutrix (P.W. 2) and by drawing certain inferences from the testimony of the hostile witnesses as well as from the testimony of the husband of the prosecutrix, recorded its finding of guilt against the appellants for the offences under Section 376(2)(g) and under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the appellants were acquitted for the offence under Section 379/380 of the I.P.C on account of lack of sufficient evidence. The appellants have assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence primarily on the ground that the learned trial court has recorded the finding of guilt against the appellants without proper application of judicial mind and without proper appreciation of the evidences on record. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellants argues that the learned trial court has seriously erred in placing implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone, ignoring the fact that none of the other witnesses including her own husband and mother have offered support to her testimony in respect of the allegation of rape against the appellants. Learned Counsel argues further that there is a delay of more than 12 days in lodging the F.I.R. and the explanation offered by the prosecution for the delay is thoroughly unconvincing. Furthermore, the prosecution has not examined the Investigating officer of the case causing thereby serious prejudice to the defence. Learned Counsel argues further that there is a delay of more than 12 days in lodging the F.I.R. and the explanation offered by the prosecution for the delay is thoroughly unconvincing. Furthermore, the prosecution has not examined the Investigating officer of the case causing thereby serious prejudice to the defence. Besides this, there is no Medical Report to offer corroborative evidence in support of the case relating to the commission of the alleged gang rape. 7. Learned Counsel for the State on the other hand relies entirely upon the impugned judgment and the findings recorded, therein. Learned Counsel would argue that the statement of the prosecutrix at the trial is fully consistent with her statements in her Fard Beyan and support to her statement is available from the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, both of whom have affirmed that the present appellants had visited the house of the prosecutrix and had assaulted her. Learned Counsel adds further that the statement of the prosecutrix in detail contains specific allegations against both the present appellants and her statement alone is sufficient to sustain conviction of the appellants for the offence of the rape even without the support of any Medical evidence or even the evidence of the Investigating Officer. 8. On careful scrutiny of the evidences of the witnesses, it appears that P.W. 1, Shani Ram Marandi, who was sought to be examined by the prosecution as a material witness, has totally failed to support the prosecutions case at alt, P.W. 3, Sardar Marandi, gives a hearsay statement suggesting that there was a quarrel between the prosecutrix, and the present appellants on the alleged dale of occurrence, which was Tuesday. He was also declared hostile by the prosecution. P.W. 5, Barki Tudu, who is the mother of the prosecutrix appears to have offered partial support to the case of the prosecutrix but such support is limited only to the extent of alleged quarrel between the prosecutrix and appellants and the assault made by the appellants upon the prosecutrix with Lathis. This witness has also been declared hostile by the prosecution and she refuses to acknowledge to have made any incriminating statements other than what she has stated in her examination-in-chief, before the Police, against the appellants. The evidence of P.W. 4, who is the husband of the prosecutrix is almost identical to the evidence of P.W. 5. This witness has also been declared hostile by the prosecution and she refuses to acknowledge to have made any incriminating statements other than what she has stated in her examination-in-chief, before the Police, against the appellants. The evidence of P.W. 4, who is the husband of the prosecutrix is almost identical to the evidence of P.W. 5. According to him, on the alleged date of occurrence, when he returned home, he found that a number of persons had assembled at his house and his wife told him that the appellants had assaulted her and had snatched away her money from her. He reported the matter to the village Headman on the same day and a Panchayat meeting was called for, 10-12 days thereafter but since the appellants failed to appear, no Panchayat was convened and thereafter the F.I.R. was lodged at the Police Station. 9. It is significant to note from the above evidence of the witnesses, particularly the evidence of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 that neither of them have claimed to have heard from the prosecutrix about any allegation of rape against the present appellants. On the contrary, even on being specifically asked, both these witnesses claimed that the prosecutrix had told them about the assault made by the appellants cm her with Lathis and about the theft of the money belonging to the prosecutrix, which was kept on the shelf within the room of the house. Learned counsel for the State lays much emphasis on the testimony of the prosecutrix and contends that the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is sufficient enough to convict the appellants for the offence of rape. 10. In a case of rape, no doubt conviction can be sustained on the solitary testimony of the prosecutrix even without any supportive medical evidence. However, for placing reliance on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, the quality of the testimony of the prosecutrix is of importance. The testimony of the prosecutrix should have such intrinsic merit as to inspire confidence and reliability. In such cases natural conduct of the victim, if she had suffered sexual assault, enables a reasonable guide to assess the credibility of her evidence. The testimony of the prosecutrix should have such intrinsic merit as to inspire confidence and reliability. In such cases natural conduct of the victim, if she had suffered sexual assault, enables a reasonable guide to assess the credibility of her evidence. The most natural conduct of the victim of rape, which can reasonably be expected is that she informs about the occurrence of rape to the very first person whom she meets after the occurrence and if such persons are her most near and closest relations, then she would expectedly reveal the incident to them. The other conduct, which can reasonably be expected, is that the matter is reported promptly to the Police and if the Police Station is not within near distance then to the Surpanch of the village. 11. In the instant case, both the mother and the husband of the prosecutrix were available to her almost immediately after the alleged occurrence. The relationship of these persons with the prosecutrix was such, that she could certainly repose confidence in them without any hesitation and without any sense of shame. Strangely enough, neither the husband nor the mother acknowledges that the prosecutrix had told them about any rape being committed on her by the appellants. On the other hand there evidence suggests only that both the appellants had visited the house of the prosecutrix and had assaulted also her with Lathis that too in the presence of her mother and had stolen away the money belonging to the prosecutrix. The reason for the delay in the lodging of the F.I.R., has sought to be explained by the prosecution on the ground that the matter was reported to the Village Headman, who instead of taking any prompt action, had called the informants husband after ten days and though a Panchayati was called for but it could not be convened due to the failure of the appellants to appear at the Panchayat meeting. On this issue, there is the statement of the prosecutrix and the husband of the prosecutrix alone. Neither, the village Headman nor any other person of the village has been examined by the prosecution to lead corroborative support. 12. Besides the above aspects, the most important aspect is the failure of the prosecution to examine the Investigating Officer. On this issue, there is the statement of the prosecutrix and the husband of the prosecutrix alone. Neither, the village Headman nor any other person of the village has been examined by the prosecution to lead corroborative support. 12. Besides the above aspects, the most important aspect is the failure of the prosecution to examine the Investigating Officer. The place of occurrence does not appear to have been explained by the witnesses examined by the prosecution in adequate detail. There is no evidence to suggest as to whether the prosecutrix was at all referred for her medical examination. Even from the evidence of the prosecutrix, it is not clear as to whether the act of rape was at all committed on the prosecutrix or whether an attempt only to outrage her modesty was committed. This is evident on reading the testimony of the prosecutrix recorded in Para 1 and at Para 6, wherein, she acknowledges that, prior to the date of occurrence, though both the present appellants used to visit her house but they had never indulged in any lewd remarks or jokes with her nor made any overtures towards her. 13. For the reasons discussed above, I find merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in part. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence as passed by the trial court against the present appellants is hereby set aside. Both the appellants are acquitted from the charges for the offences under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code. However, since witnesses examined by the prosecution do offer ample reliable evidence in respect of the offence under Section 448 of the I.P.C. as discussed by the trial court, the conviction of the appellants for the offence under Section 448 of the I.P.C. is correct and is sustained. The sentence imposed against them for the said offence by the trial court is hereby confirmed. 14. The appellants have remained in custody during the course of trial and continued to remain in custody even after the date of their conviction. The sentence imposed for the offence under Section 448 of the Indian Penal Code is set off against the period of detention already undergone by them. Accordingly, both these appellants are directed to be set forthwith at liberty, unless wanted in connection with any other case.