JUDGMENT A.K. Sikri, J.-Two municipal authorities in Delhi, namely, Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) and New Delhi Municipal Committee (NDMC) are in legal imbroglio since 1976. Disputes started when MCD levied electricity tax under Section 113(2)(d) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (in short the DMC Act) on the supplies of electricity made to NDMC from 1.7.1959. Suit No. 506/76 was filed in which Arbitrator was appointed and the aforesaid dispute with the following three propositions was referred to the arbitration of Justice J.N. Bhat (Retd.): "(1) Whether the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is empowered under various provisions of the D.M.C. Act, 1957 to levy the tax on the supplies of electricity made to the New Delhi Municipal Committee with effect from 1st July. 1959. (2) Whether the said tax has been validly levied by the Delhi Municipal Corporation and is binding on the New Delhi Municipal Committee. (3) The amount, if any, payable by the New Delhi Municipal Committee to the Delhi Municipal Corporation or refundable by the Delhi Municipal Corporation to the New Delhi Municipal Committee as the case may be." 2. The learned Arbitrator entered upon reference and decided the above issues vide his award dated 5.5.1976. In this award the learned Arbitrator, inter alia, directed NDMC to pay to MCD immediately a sum of Rs.2, 15,86, I 25.30 plus interest at the rate of5% per annum from 15.9.1975 lip to the date of decree on Rs. 5,15,86,125.30 Balance amount of Rs. 3 crores was to be paid in instalments of Rs. 1 crore each. Since the award was under the provisions of Arbitration Act, 1940, it was required to be made rule of the Court. For this purpose award was filed in this Court. No objections were filed. On the contrary, the parties filed a joint application under Order 23 Rule 5 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and order dated 30. 11.1976 was passed thereon. Operative portion of this order reads as under: "xxxxx It is now agreed that the amount awarded be paid in the following manner: That the N.D.M.C. has agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 2 crores in two equated installments of Rs. 1 crore each. The first instalment has been agreed to be paid by N.D.M.C. by 30th November, 1976. Operative portion of this order reads as under: "xxxxx It is now agreed that the amount awarded be paid in the following manner: That the N.D.M.C. has agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 2 crores in two equated installments of Rs. 1 crore each. The first instalment has been agreed to be paid by N.D.M.C. by 30th November, 1976. Second instalment of Rs.l crore has been agreed to be paid by N.D.M.C. by 27th February, 1977. That the parties have agreed that interest on the awarded amount of Rs. 5,15,86,125.30 at 5% calculated from 15.9.75 to 30.9.76 will also be paid by the N.D.M.C. alongwith the first instalment of Rs.1 crore, failing which the amount of overdue interest for the period from 15.9.75 to 30.11.76 shall constitute the part of the payment due to the M.C.D. as on 1.12.1976 and shall be chargeable at the rate of interest of 7.5. per annum. It has further been agreed that the interest on the amount of Rs. 4,15,86,125.30 (after deducting the first instalment of Rs.1 crore agreed to be paid by 30th Nov. 1976) plus unpaid interest upto 30.11.76, if any, will be payable and paid at the rate fixed by the Government, i.e. 7.75% per annum w.e.f. 1st December, 1976. That it has further been agreed between the parties that N.D.M.C. will pay Rs. 3,15,86,125.30 remaining due after the payment of the second instalment on 28th Feb. 1977 and the interest due thereon as per the terms mentioned hereinabove in Clauses (ii) and (iii) in eight equated annual instalments payable on or before 31st March, 1978, 31st March, 1979, 31st March, 1980, 31st March, 1981, 31st March, 1982, 31st March, 1983, 31st March, 1984, and 31st March, 1985. It has further been agreed that in the event of the N.O.M.C. failing to pay any of the installments due as per this agreement, the Corporation will be entitled to execute the decree through a Court of law, for recovery of the overdue principal, overdue interest as well as interest thereon at the rate of 7.75% per annum." 3. As is clear from the above, the NDMC admitted the liability. Only the modalities for payment were re-scheduled. A sum of Rs.1 crore by way of principal amount and Rs. As is clear from the above, the NDMC admitted the liability. Only the modalities for payment were re-scheduled. A sum of Rs.1 crore by way of principal amount and Rs. 31,23,434/- by way of interest up to 30.11.1976 was paid by the NOMC to the MCO at the time of passing the aforesaid order and making the decree in terms of agreement between the parties. Balance amount was to be paid on different dates as indicated in the order. 4. Since balance amount was not paid as undertaken by the NOMC, MCO filed the instant execution petition. On receiving the notice, NOMC filed objections to this execution petition with which we are concerned at present. 5. It is clear by now that the question to be determined by the Arbitrator was as to whether MCO was empowered, under various provisions of the OMC Act, to levy the tax on the supplies of electricity made to the NOMC with effect from 1.7.1959 and the tax sought to be imposed was validly imposed. This issue was answered by the learned Arbitrator in favour of MCO holding that MCO had such a power. The learned Arbitrator further calculated the amount payable under this levy and directed NOMC to pay a sum of Rs. 5,15,86,125.30. It is also clear that when the award was to be made rule of the Court, NDMC even accepted its liability to pay the said levy and also accepted the quantum as determined by the learned Arbitrator. Only the modalities for paying this amount and the manner in which interest was to be calculated were agreed between the parties and joint application was filed for this purpose in terms whereof decree was passed on 30.11.1976 by this Court. This is, thus, a decree by consent. 6. Notwithstanding all this, the NOMC has raised objections to the present execution petition denying its liability to pay the amount. It is on the ground that the decree passed by this Court was without jurisdiction and, therefore, nullity and the contention is that the objection of this nature can be taken even in the execution petition and even when the decree is with the consent of the parties in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan, AIR 1954 SC 340 . 7. 7. Therefore, the only question, which is to be determined, is as to whether the award and the consent decree are without jurisdiction and nullity in the eyes of law. The basis for challenging the decree as nullity is that in the instant case award was passed against the NOMC on the plea that NOMC was acting as agent of MCO to collect the electricity levy in the NOMC area. However, this very question came up before the Division Bench in LPA No. 47-D/1963 entitled Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. MCD and vide judgment dated 10.12.1964 the Division Bench held that levy by the MCD was ultra vires. This view was reiterated by the Division Bench of this Court in RSA No. 82-D/66 decided on 3.8.1977 entitled NDMC v. Bhola Nath Brothers, 15 (1979) DLT 234 (DB) and M/s. Clarridges Hotel holding that MCD could not impose electricity levy under the law and collections made by NDMC was illegal. According to the NDMC, therefore, since the provision itself is held to be ultra vires, there would be no liability of NDMC to pay MCD any levy and the proceedings before the Arbitrator as well as this Court, which passed the decree, were without jurisdiction. The NDMC has therefore, pleaded that the amount which is already paid which comes to Rs. 2,29,96,492/- towards principal and Rs. 63,48,392.63 as interest is refundable to the NDMC and there is no question of making any further payment to the MCD. To appreciate this contention of the NDMC, one will have to scan through the judgment of the Division Bench in Bhola Nath (supra) to find as to what that judgment decides. Under Section 113(2)(d) of the DMC Act, MCD is empowered and authorised to levy electricity tax on the sale and supply of electricity. In Bhola Nath (supra) the NDMC was recovering tax from the hotels on the plea that it was collecting impost on behalf of and from the directions from MCD. These hotels, feeling aggrieved by this action on behalf of NDMC challenged the said action. The question, therefore, was as 10 whether NDMC could act as agent of MCD to collect such a tax and whether such a tax could be imposed upon the hotels, who were operating in the NDMC area which fell outside the MCD area. These hotels, feeling aggrieved by this action on behalf of NDMC challenged the said action. The question, therefore, was as 10 whether NDMC could act as agent of MCD to collect such a tax and whether such a tax could be imposed upon the hotels, who were operating in the NDMC area which fell outside the MCD area. The Division Bench held that MCD had no jurisdiction over the area of NDMC under law; MCD cold not ask NDMC to collect a levy on their behalf nor could the NDMC act as the agent of MCD. Tax in question was not imposed by the NDMC. It was recovering the levy in question from the hotels as per the directions of the Commissioner of the Corporation, which it could not do as it was an illegal exaction. The action of the NDMC to collect such tax from the hotels was held to be illegal as it was not within the four corners of the Act, which creates NDMC. The Court, in the process, observed that NDMC was not an arm of the MCD. Following portion of the judgment needs to be quoted, which was relied upon by the NDMC: "The New Delhi Municipal Committee is a creature of the statute. The body was created under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. Section 18 of that Act says that the Committee shall be a body corporate having a perpetual succession and common seal. Now a statutory body, however, powerful cannot do what it likes. It is subject to law. Maxwell says- A corporate body constituted by statute for certain purposes is regarded as so entirely the creature of the statute, that acts done by it without the prescribed formalities or for objects foreign to those for which it was formed would be in general null and void." (Interpretation of statutes 11th ed page 290). The New Delhi Municipal Committee is a corporate body. The capacity of a corporation incorporated by statute is limited by the fact that any act done by the corporation outside its statutory powers is ultra vires and void. Since the corporation has no existence independent of the act of Parliament which creates the corporation or authosied its creation, it follows that its capacity is limited to the exercise of such powers as are actually conferred by or may reasonably be deduced from the language of the statute. Since the corporation has no existence independent of the act of Parliament which creates the corporation or authosied its creation, it follows that its capacity is limited to the exercise of such powers as are actually conferred by or may reasonably be deduced from the language of the statute. In the words of Powen L.J.: What you have to do is to find out what this statutory creature is and what it is meant to do, and to find out what this statutory creature is you must look at the statute only, because there and there only, is found the definition of this new creature." (Baroness Wenlock v. River Dec. Co., 1877 36 Dh. D. 674 (685). Now the arrangement between the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi regarding the supply of electricity is this. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi supplies to the New Delhi Municipal Committee in bulk electricity required by the latter at the actual cost of supply. This is laid down in Sections 284 and 285 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. These Sections read, 284. The Corporation shall be bound to provide bulk supplies of electricity for the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Military Engineer Services. Delhi Cantonment, upto the quantity demanded by each of these authorities, or if the total demand is in excess of the available supply, upto such proportion in the case of each of these authorities as the Corporation may, with the approval of the Central Government, determine. 285. The New Delhi Municipal Committee or as the case may be, the Military Engineer Service, Delhi Cantonment shall pay for the electricity supplied to it the actual cost of supply of such electricity at such rate or rates as may be determined by agreement between the Corporation and the authority concerned: Provided that in the case of any dispute between the corporation and any such authority as to the rate, the dispute shall be referred to the Central Government whose decision shall be final. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi supplies electricity within the territorial limits of Delhi. The territorial limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi are defined in Section 2(10) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. It says: Delhi means the entire area of the Union Territory of Delhi except New Delhi and Delhi Cantonment. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi supplies electricity within the territorial limits of Delhi. The territorial limits of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi are defined in Section 2(10) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. It says: Delhi means the entire area of the Union Territory of Delhi except New Delhi and Delhi Cantonment. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi has no jurisdiction over the area of the New Delhi Municipal Committee. The two territory are independent and distinct. Similarly the two statutory bodies the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the Delhi Municipal Corporation are independent and separate legal authorities. It appears to us that under the law the Municipal Corporation of Delhi cannot ask the New Delhi Municipal Committee to collect a levy on their behalf. Nor can the New Delhi Municipal Committee act as the agent of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Mr. Nayar on behalf of the New Delhi Municipal Committee argued that the committee have power to impose a tax on electricity under Section 61 (2) of the Punjab Municipal Act. Undoubtedly, the committee have been given the power to impose taxes in chapter V of the Act. But in this case the committee have not imposed any tax. Admittedly, they were recovering from the hotel a levy as per directions of the Commissioner of the Corporation. Plainly this they could not do so. It was an illegal exaction. It was a vexatious impost. Even payment without protest will not make it legal. Therefore we must hold the action of the committee as illegal as it is not within the four corners of the Act, which creates it. Levy means to raise money compulsorily e.g. means of a distress or by taxes. No doubt the committee can levy a tax. The Punjab Municipal Act empowers it. But for that the procedure prescribed in the Act has to be followed. In this case what the committee were purporting to do was to collect the levy imposed by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. This is clearly illegal. The committee are not an arm of the Corporation. They have an independent existence and a personality of their own." 8. The submission of the MCO, on the other hand, is that the judgment in the said case would not come to the rescue of the NOMC as the dispute here was entirely different. This is clearly illegal. The committee are not an arm of the Corporation. They have an independent existence and a personality of their own." 8. The submission of the MCO, on the other hand, is that the judgment in the said case would not come to the rescue of the NOMC as the dispute here was entirely different. In the present case NDMC was not collecting such an impost from the consumers at the behest of MCO. Here, the claim of the MCO against NOMC was for sale and supply of electricity to the NOMC, which according to the MCO, was fully recoverable under Section 113(2)(d) of the OMC Act. According to the MCO, it is not a case where NOMC was either acting as the agent of the MCO to collect levy in the NOMC area from the consumers nor was it collecting tax on behalf of the MCO. Levy in question was by the MCO on NOMC in respect of sale and supply of electricity to the NOMC. 9. In order to determine as to whether this fine distinction operates in the present case, one will have to look into the award. The three questions, which were referred to the learned Arbitrator for determination, have already been reproduced above. It is clear from the very first question formulated and referred that MCO had levied tax on the NOMC in respect of supply of electricity made to the NDMC and the question was as to whether MCO was empowered to do so and the tax had been validly levied. Perusal of the award, which runs into 183 pages, would show that the learned Arbitrator after reproducing the three issues referred to him discussed the case of both the parties, as set up in the statement of claim of the MCD in the first part of the award, replies given to it by the NOMC and rejoinder thereto by the MCO. In part II of the award, the learned Arbitrator formulated the issues, i.e. points for determination. As many as 20 issues were formulated. We need not reproduce all these issues as most of these issues are the various facets of the central issues which can be gathered from issue Nos. I and 2 and. In part II of the award, the learned Arbitrator formulated the issues, i.e. points for determination. As many as 20 issues were formulated. We need not reproduce all these issues as most of these issues are the various facets of the central issues which can be gathered from issue Nos. I and 2 and. therefore, the purpose would be served by taking note of these two issues: (i) Whether the sale/supply of electricity to the Committee has taken place within the area of the Corporation? (ii) Is the Committee not liable to pay the electricity tax because the New Delhi Municipal Committees area is not within taxing limits of the Corporation? 10. It is clear from the above that NOMC had challenged the levy on the ground that sale/supply of electricity to the NOMC had not taken place within the area of MCD and, therefore, it was not within the taxing limits of the MCO. After reproducing the aforesaid issues, which were formulated during the course of proceedings by the learned Arbitrator on 1.11.1975, the learned Arbitrator discussed the evidence produced before him in the form of various documents in part III of the award, touching these issues. In part IV, the learned Arbitrator took note of the arguments advanced by the Counsel on either side. Part V contains the findings arrived at by the learned Arbitrator. It is not necessary to take note of the detailed discussion as we are not considering the issue as to whether the award on merits is valid or not since that stage is long over. What we are trying to decipher from the award is as to the question determined by the learned Arbitrator and consequently the decree passed by this Court is without jurisdiction. 11. Reading of the award makes it abundantly clear that the question before the Arbitrator was as to whether MCD could impose levy upon NOMC for supplies made since supply of electricity was in NOMC area. The learned Arbitrator, referring to various provisions of the DMC Act as well as the Indian Electricity Act, opined that the tax had been properly levied by the MCD. The learned Arbitrator, referring to various provisions of the DMC Act as well as the Indian Electricity Act, opined that the tax had been properly levied by the MCD. In the process, the learned Arbitrator interpreted Clause (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 113 of the DMC Act to determine the point as to whether this tax could be levied by the MCD within its limits only and excluded the NOMC area or the Corporation was empowered to levy this tax outside its limits also. He held that there was no limitation of place of taxation under Section 113, the taxing Section, about the jurisdiction of the taxing power of the Corporation and the only relevant and determinative factor was that the tax levied must be for the purpose of the said Act, as the generation, distribution and maintenance of supply of electricity was one of the duties of the MCO under Chapter 13 of the Act. In the process, he held that the point of supply is the point where electricity is fed into the feeders by the MCO, which was admittedly within the MCD area and, therefore, such a tax could be levied. The learned Arbitrator, thus, decided the issue of levy of tax by the MCO upon the NOMC for sale/supply of the electricity and held that MCO was legally empowered to levy such a tax upon NDMC. 12. Obviously, this was not the issue before the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Bhola Nath (supra). It appears that since MCD had levied tax upon NDMC in respect of the sale/supply made to NOMC area, NOMC in turn started collecting the said tax from the consumers. Whether NOMC could do so or not fell for consideration before the Division Bench and the Division Bench held it in the a negative on the ground that insofar as those consumers were concerned, they did not fall in the MCO area and the tax. levied by MCD was not payable by them and NDMC could not Act as the agent of the MCO to collect this. The division Bench in no uncertain terms opined that if NOMC wanted to levy any such tax upon its consumers, it could do so under the provisions of Punjab Municipal Corporation , Act, which was governing NOMC areas at that time. 13. The division Bench in no uncertain terms opined that if NOMC wanted to levy any such tax upon its consumers, it could do so under the provisions of Punjab Municipal Corporation , Act, which was governing NOMC areas at that time. 13. Thus, the position which emerges from the reading of the award and the judgment in Bhola Nath s case (supra) is as under: (a) In the award made by the learned Arbitrator question determined was imposition of levy by the MCO upon NOMC in respect of sale/ supply of the electricity. (b) The question involved in Bhola Naths case (supra), on the other hand, was collection of levy by the NOMC from its consumers acting as an agent of the MCO. 14. The two questions were, therefore, totally different. Thus, the NOMC was supposed to pay to the MCO the levy of tax on supplies of electricity made to the NOMC. It was open to the NOMC to pass on such a levy upon its customers by taking its own measures under the Punjab Municipal Corporation Act. Instead of doing so, it started collecting the said tax from its customers as an agent of MCO, which was abhorred by this Court. The issues before the learned Arbitrator and before the division Bench in Bhola Nath (supra) were entirely different. The Division Bench nowhere held that MCO could not impose the tax upon the NDMC for the electricity supplies made by the MCO to the NOMC. The objections of the NOMC alleging that the award or the decree is nullity and without jurisdiction based on Bhola Nath s case (supra) is, therefore, clearly misconceived. 15. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the issue determined by the Arbitrator that MCO was empowered under various provisions of the OMC Act to levy tax on the supplies of electricity made to the NOMC was accepted by the NCMC and it agreed to pay the amount for which purpose joint application was moved by the parties under Order 23 Rule 5 read with Section 151, CPC. Such an issue specifically referred to the Arbitrator and the decision of the Arbitrator thereon cannot be treated as without jurisdiction. We are not to consider as to whether this decision was correct in law or not. Such an issue specifically referred to the Arbitrator and the decision of the Arbitrator thereon cannot be treated as without jurisdiction. We are not to consider as to whether this decision was correct in law or not. When the award was filed, NDMC did not even think it fit to contest the proceedings on merits and, therefore, did not file any objection under Section 30 of the Act. On the contrary it categorically accepted the award and agreed to pay the amount by a particular mode. In Bhmvarlal Bhandari v. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, X (1998) SLT 113=1 (1999) CLT 36 (SC)= (1999) 1 SCC 558 , the Supreme Court held that where a party does not deem it necessary to contest the proceedings on merits and does not raise any objection at the appropriate stage under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, at the time when the award is made rule of the Court, it is not permitted to challenge a decree when its already before the executing Court unless it is shown that it was passed by a Court inherently lacking jurisdiction and thus, was a nullity. It cannot be said that this Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing the decree in terms of the award inasmuch as when the award is filed in the Court and is made rule of the Court, in the absence of any objection from either side, it is within the powers of the Court to pass decree in terms thereof. To the same effect is the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vasudev Bhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman and Others, 1970 (1) SCC 670 . In the instant case, the question of law was specifically referred to the learned Arbitrator which the learned Arbitrator decided in a particular manner. When the question of law is raised before the learned Arbitrator he had the necessary jurisdiction to decide the same. There has to be a distinction made between a wrong jurisdiction and inherent lack of jurisdiction to decide a question. When the question of law is raised before the learned Arbitrator he had the necessary jurisdiction to decide the same. There has to be a distinction made between a wrong jurisdiction and inherent lack of jurisdiction to decide a question. The Arbitrator, therefore, did not lack inherent jurisdiction nor did this Court when the matter came up before it for passing decree in terms thereof (See T.N. Electricity Board v. Bridge Tunnel Construction and Others, (1997) 4 SCC 121 and Balvant N. Vishwamitra ami Others v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (Dead) through LRs and Others, V (2004) SLT 136= (2004) 8 SCC 706 . I am also agreeable with the submission of the learned Counsel for the MCO that NOMC, in the facts of the present case, after accepting the award by filing the application under Order 23 Rule 5, CPC is estopped in law from challenging the award or the decree. The issues which it could raise at the appropriate stage were not raised and the objection is nothing but amounts to reopening the case on merits, which is not permissible. The objections of the NOMC are, therefore, without any force and are hereby rejected. The NOMC shall accordingly pay to the MCO the balance amount under the decree, which is for Rs. 5,15,86,125.30 along with interest at the rate of 5% from 15.9.1976. The NOMC has made the following payments: (i) Rs.2,29,96,492/- towards principal. (ii) Rs.63,48,392.63 towards interest. 16. Balance amount of Rs. 2,85,89,633.30 is payable along with interest. This, amount shall be paid by the NOMC to the MCO within six weeks from today along with interest. The execution petition is disposed of in these terms. In case the amount is not paid, it would be open to the MCO to approach this Court with necessary directions for attachment of the bank account of the NDMC. Execution Petition disposed of.