Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2007 DIGILAW 827 (ALL)

Manish Tyagi v. State of U. P

2007-03-31

VINOD PRASAD

body2007
( 1 ) THE neat legal question which is involved in this application is as to whether Sessions Judge had got the power of Juvenile Justice Board in consonance with Section 6 (2) of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2000, (Act no. 56 of 2000) or not? The contention of sri V. P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel for the applicant, Manish Tyagi is that under the aforesaid sub-section. Sessions judge as well as the High Court has been statutorily conferred with such power visa-vis Juvenile Justice Board. The submission is that in view of the provision of Section 6 (2) of the Act there cannot be another inquiry by Juvenile Justice Board for determining as to whether the accused is a Juvenile of not once the inquiry conducted by the Additional Sessions Judge has declared him to be such. Before determining the proposition of law harangued by the applicant a thumb nail description of the facts seems to be indispensable which is sketched below. ( 2 ) THE applicant, as is perceptible from the pleading made in the affidavit appended along with this Criminal Misc. Application, under Section 482 Cr. P. C, invoking the inherent power of this Court, are that the applicant is a socio criminals for an offence under Section 302 I. P. C. vide Crime No. 83 of 2005. FIR was lodged by Sri Om in respect of said incident alleged to have taken place on 11-4-2005 at 6. 30 p. m. Investigation into the crime charge sheeted the applicant as accused for the said offence and the applicant start facing trial before Additional Sessions Judge, court No. 3, Mathura in S. T. No. 574 of 2005. ( 3 ) DURING the course of the trial the applicant Manish Tyagi moved an application oh 11-4-2005 that he was below 18 years Of age and hence he was a juvenile, Resultantly he prayed that he should be declared a juvenile and be ordered to be dealt with as such in accordance with the provisions of juvenile Justice Act 2000. Additional Sessions Judge. Additional Sessions Judge. Court No. 3 Meerut who is seized of the aforesaid S. T. No. 574 of 2005 conducted an inquiry and examined jugneshwar father of the applicant as C. W. 1, Pandit Chitranjan Sharma (who had prepared the horoscope of the applicant) as C. W. 2 and Surendra Kumar as C. W. 3 (who is principal of Janta Inter-College, Kethwari where the applicant had studied from 6 standard up to intermediate ). According to the Statement of C. W. 3, the date of birth of the applicant was recorded in the school register as 23-9-1987. ( 4 ) ADDITIONAL Sessions Judge after critically appreciating the evidence led by the aforesaid witnesses came to the conclusion that the applicant Manish Tyagi was less than 18 years of age at the time of the incident and hence was a juvenile. He conste quently referred the case of the applicant to juvenile Justice Board, Meerut to be dealt with in consonance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. ( 5 ) BEFORE the Board the applicant moved his bail application in the aforesaid crime for the aforesaid offence on which Juvenile justice Board vide its impugned order dated 1-3-2007 held that the Sessions Judge had no power to declare applicant to be a juvenile as that power is vested with the board which is functioning since last many years and hence it ordered to conduct a fresh inquiry for determination of the age of the applicant to judge whether the applicant is a juvenile or not? Hence, this Criminal Misc. Application challenging the said order by the board. ( 6 ) I have heard Sri V. P. Srivastava, learned Senior Counsel in support of this application and learned A. G. A. in opposition and have gone though the impugned order and material place on the record, of this application. ( 7 ) SINCE the controversy involved in this application centres around Section 6 of juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of children) Act 2000, (Act No. 5. 6 of 2000), hereinafter referred to as the Act the said section is quoted below :- "6. ( 7 ) SINCE the controversy involved in this application centres around Section 6 of juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of children) Act 2000, (Act No. 5. 6 of 2000), hereinafter referred to as the Act the said section is quoted below :- "6. Power of Juvenile Justice Board- (1)Where a Board has been constituted for any district or a group of districts, such Board shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, have power to deal exclusively with all proceedings under this Act relating to juvenile in conflict with law. (2) The powers conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Section. when the proceeding conies before them in appeal, revision or otherwise. " ( 8 ) A perusal of Section 6 of the Act clearly indicates that Board under the Act had got the power to deal with Juvenile ; offenders notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force but save as "otherwise expressly provided under this Act. " thus even though Board under the Apt has got superintendence over any other law for the time being in force but its powers are subject to other express provision under the Act. Power of the Board thus is not absolute but it is subject to other express provision under the Act. Sub section (2) of Section 6 of the Act thus assumes much importance as it provides that High court or Court of Session may also exercise power conferred on the Board in Appeal. Revision or otherwise. Thus the power which has been conferred on Juvenile Justice board though Section 6 (1) of the Act has also been conferred on the High Court and court of session through Section 6 (2) of the Act. ( 9 ) SUBJECTION (2) of Section 6 of the Act has got a salutary purpose. Revision or otherwise. Thus the power which has been conferred on Juvenile Justice board though Section 6 (1) of the Act has also been conferred on the High Court and court of session through Section 6 (2) of the Act. ( 9 ) SUBJECTION (2) of Section 6 of the Act has got a salutary purpose. The Act was incorporated for the benefit of juvenile offenders providing for proper care, protection, treatment and rehabilitation for them, The purpose of enactment is "an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to Juveniles in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection, by providing for proper care, protection and treatment by catering to their development needs, and by adopting a child - friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters in the best interest of childern and for their ultimate rehabilitation through various institutions established under this enactment. " ( 10 ) WITH Such an avowed object, the provisions of the Act has to be construed in such a manner that its object is projected glaringly and the provisions has to be interpreted keeping the purpose of enactment in fore-front. It is because of this reason that subsection (2) has been incorporated so that at any stage of the trial up to the High Court on Juvenile is denied benefit of the Act. The intention of legislature for enacting such a provision seems to be that in a long drawn procedure of trial and finality of Judgment and order delay in raising plea of being a juvenile up to the stage of High Court should always be available with a juvenile offender and he should not be denied benefit of the same merely on the reason of lapse of time and advance stage of trial. It should not be forgotten that the Act is a beneficial Legislation for the most veranable section of our society who are by and large dependant on some body else generally on their parents. Thus a narrow construction, as has been done In this case by the Board, of Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Act will probably frustrate the very object of the Act which can not be sanctified. ( 11 ) FURTHER the words of section 6 as a whole are clear, unambiguous and does not admit any exception. Thus a narrow construction, as has been done In this case by the Board, of Section 6 (1) and (2) of the Act will probably frustrate the very object of the Act which can not be sanctified. ( 11 ) FURTHER the words of section 6 as a whole are clear, unambiguous and does not admit any exception. Section 6 conspicuously provides that power of the Board can be exercised by the High Court or Sessions court in appeal, revisions or otherwise. Here i may point out that cardinal principle of interpretation of Statute is that the words of the statute be Interpreted as they are keeping in mind the stage, object, purpose and Intention of legislature. If the words Of a statute are clear, unambiguous and capable of direct interpretation then no ambiguity should be attached with it and the statute must be interpreted in such a manner that it brings forth or countenance most natural, plain and direct meaning without falling into any sort of unskillful and illogical absurdities. I can do no better than to refer the judgment of the Apex court rendered in AIR 1966 SC 1987 Chandra Mohan v. State of U. P. Wherein Honble The Chief justice Subba Rao, J. speaking for the bench has observed that in construing the provisions of the Constitution or the Act of Parliament, the Court will have to find out the express intention from the words of the constitution or the Act, as they may be. . " thus the Court should eschew such a construction which leads to absurdity and brings forth practical difficulties and inconvenience or makes the provision nugatory. ( 12 ) IN the present contest, the words of the statute are plain and simple. High Court and Sessions Court always possess power of Juvenile Justice Board as the words "appeal, revision or otherwise" In sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act is not capable of a limited Interpretation but is of unfathomnable circumscription. (Emphasis mine) I am fortified in my this view by a decision our own Court rendered in Pankaj v. State : 2005 (2) JIC 537 : (2005 All LJ 2736)and another decision in Jal Pal v. State of h. P. 2002 (1) Crimes 385. (Emphasis mine) I am fortified in my this view by a decision our own Court rendered in Pankaj v. State : 2005 (2) JIC 537 : (2005 All LJ 2736)and another decision in Jal Pal v. State of h. P. 2002 (1) Crimes 385. ( 13 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter and that is that under Section 52 of the Act sessions Judge is the appellate authority of any order passed by the Board. Thus in an appeal a Sessions Court has got the power to set aside the order of the Board. With such a power conferred on the Sessions Court it surpasses all suppositions that Board can sit over the order passed by its appellate court, when every order is passed by the sections Court is binding on the Board. The act or the Rules framed thereunder no where provides that if a plea of being a juvenile is raised by an accused before the Sessions court or the High Court then for determination of such a plea the matter has to be referred to the Board or that the matter should be transferred to the Board for its adjudication. If the Statute does not provide such a course, the Board while interpreting the Act can not legislate such a duty on High court or Court of Session. Further the power conferred under section 6 (2) of the Act is concurrent both for Sessions Court and High court. Therefore if the impugned order is allowed to stand it will mean that High Court also does not possess power to determine juvenility of an accused, which to me seems to be, to say the least, will be a codswallop interpretation. ( 14 ) TURNING to the impugned order once again Additional Sessions Judge, when once has decided that the applicant is a juvenile there was no scope for Juvenile Justice board, Meerut to hold otherwise. Juvenile justice Board, Meerut has not cared to look into the relevant provisions while passing the impugned order. Section 12 of the Act, which provides for consideration of bail of juvenile offenders has to be interpreted in conjunction with section 6 thereof in consonance with the Principles of harmonious construction of Statutes. Section 12 no where provides that only Board can conduct an enquiry regarding determination of age of an accused. The words used under that section are ". . . Section 12 no where provides that only Board can conduct an enquiry regarding determination of age of an accused. The words used under that section are ". . . . . . . is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Board. . . . . . . . ". These words means that a already declared juvenile may also, appear or sent before a board for consideration of his bail prayer. There cannot be any narrow interpretation of these words to restrict them in their scope. Under section 12 of the Act the power which has been conferred on the Board is only to decide ball application of a Juvenile offender if he is already declared to be juvenile or if not so declared earlier by a competent Court then determine whether he is a juvenile or not and then decide his bail prayer and no more. ( 15 ) NOW a few words regarding the rulings referred to by the Board in the impugned judgment. So far as the decision of this Court in Pankaj v. State 2005 (2) ACC 880 : (2005 all LJ 2736) is concerned the same applied with full force on the facts of the present case and Board has wrongly distinguished it on facts. The principle of law laid down in that judgment applied with full force on the facts of the present case that under section 6 Sessions judge has got the power to determine the plea whether an accused is a juvenile or not? It has been observed in that judgment as follows (Para 2) :- "it is also relevant to point out that section 6 sub-section (2) of the Act provides that the power conferred on the Board by or under this Act may also be exercised by the high Court and the Court of Session, when the proceedings comes before them in appeal revision or otherwise. In the present case this application was moved before the learned Sessions Judge, Baghpat and, therefore, he was bound to make preliminary inquiry and come to a conclusion, instead of relegating the applicant to approach the Board. . . . . . . " ( 16 ) THE above quoted passage was the law declared and was binding on the Board in the present case which has been illegally ignored by the Board. . . . . . . . " ( 16 ) THE above quoted passage was the law declared and was binding on the Board in the present case which has been illegally ignored by the Board. . Now coming to the second ruling cited by the Board in the impugned order i. e. Achal Singh v. State 2003 (46) ACC 719. In this judgment there is nothing as been observed by the Board in respect of this judgment. On the contrary it has been held in the said judgment as follows (Para 3) :- ". . ,----Section 6 (2) of the Act also clear on this point which lays down that the powers conferred on the Board by or under this act may also be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Session when proceeding come before them in appeal revision or otherwise. . . . . . . . . . " ( 17 ) THUS what has been held in this judgement is also the same law which has been held by this Court in Pankajs case (2005 All LJ 2736) (supra) and the view taken by me herein above. The Board is reminded that the judgement of this Court has to be read as it is in what it has said and not in what it could have said or what it has not said. While interpreting a judgment nothing should be added which has not been said in the judgment. ( 18 ) THUS concludingly, the observations by Juvenile Justice Board, Meerut in the impugned order that Sessions Court does not have the right to exercise power under the act because Board is functioning since last many years is against the very statutory provision under Section 6 of the Act as well as the judgments of this Court referred to above and hence is wholly illegal and totally perverse. ( 19 ) IN view of the above discussions, the impugned order passed by Juvenile Justice board, Meerut dated 9-3-2007 in Case No. 56 of 2007 State v. Manish Tyagi under section 302/201 I. P. C. , P. S. Sarurpur, district Meerut cannot be sustained and resultantly is quashed. ( 20 ) THIS Criminal Misc. Application is allowed. Juvenile Justice Board is directed to treat the applicant as juvenile and proceed against him in accordance with law. Application allowed. . .