JUDGMENT 1. - Whether to quash a criminal proceeding on the ground of a compromise struck between the accused and the complainant/victim or not is the legal issue before this Court. Some times, this Court has quashed the proceedings on the ground of such compromise. Other times, this Court and the Apex Court have refused to do so on the ground that the offence in non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (henceforth to be referred to as 'the Code', for short). While hearing the arguments in the above cases the counsels for the petitioners relied on the case of (1) Abdul Nadim & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.(2001 (1) RCC 387) , and on (2) Banwari & Ors.Vs. State of Rajasthan (2002 (2) RCC 754) to buttress their contention that even in the case of offense falling under Section 308 or under Section 326 Indian Penal Code, this Court has quashed the trial on the ground of compromise between the parties. Similarly they have relied on the case of (3) B.S. Joshi and Ors.Vs. State of Haryana and Anr. ( (2003) 4 SCC 675 ) to show that even the Apex Court had quashed the criminal proceeding for offence under Section 498-A and 406 Indian Penal Code, although the offenses were non-compoundable under Section 320 of the Code. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor has relied on the case of (4) Mohan Singh and Ors.Vs. State of Rajasthan 1992 (1) RLR 1 = 1993 Cri. L.J. 3193) , a Full Bench decision of this Court and on the case of (5) Bankat and Anr. V. State of Maharashtra ( (2005) 1 SCC 343 ) to argue that a case cannot be compounded when the offense is not covered under Section 320 of the Code. Since the contentions were equally weighty, since the case law was equally divided, it was felt necessary to invite the learned members of the Bar to assist the Court in deciding the following legal issues:- 1. While Section 320 of the Code permits "compounding of cases", many of the courts are quashing the criminal trials on the ground of compromise reached between the parties. What is the difference between the Compounding and the quashing of cases on the basis of compromise? 2. While Section 320 of the Code permits "compounding of cases", many of the courts are quashing the criminal trials on the ground of compromise reached between the parties. What is the difference between the Compounding and the quashing of cases on the basis of compromise? 2. Can the power under Section 482 of the Code be invoked to quash a trial in those cases which are not covered by Section 320 of the Code? 3. What is the scope of this inherent power? 4. Can such a power be invoked despite the clear ban on the use of power to compound the case? 5. What guidelines should be laid down for the exercise of this power? 2. Without first entering into the factual matrix of the individual cases, initially this Court will deal with the respective contentions of the parties, it would then discuss the legal issues, and subsequently deal with the individual petitions. 3. Mr. S.R. Bajwa, Senior Advocate, has raised plethora of contentions before this Court; firstly, a distinction has to be made between compromising of a case, compounding of a case and withdrawal of a case. Secondly, Section 320 of the Code bestows a limited power on the court to compound the offences enumerated therein. Section 482 of the Code, on the other hand, does not confer a new power, but merely saves the inherent power which the court possessed before the enactment of the Code. Thus, the power under Section 482 is vast, is unlimited although a guided one. The section begins with a non-obstante clause, it unequivocally proclaims that "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court..." Hence, the bar contained in Section 320(9) of the Code does not hamper the power of the Court to quash a criminal proceeding on the ground of parties having compromised. Thirdly, the cardinal function of the court is to do substantial justice between the parties. In case the parties have compromised between themselves, the continuation of the trial would be a futile exercise. In fact, it would have two adverse consequences, Firstly, the witnesses would be motivated to change their stand before the trial court, they would turn hostile. Secondly, it would lead to a fruitless protracted trial, which would only end in acquittal of the accused. This would tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. In fact, it would have two adverse consequences, Firstly, the witnesses would be motivated to change their stand before the trial court, they would turn hostile. Secondly, it would lead to a fruitless protracted trial, which would only end in acquittal of the accused. This would tantamount to abuse of the process of the court. Power under Section 482 of the Code is meant to curb the abuse of the process of the court. Fourthly, a futile trial would waste the valuable time of the court. An over-burdended judiciary would be forced to carry the weight of "dead cases". Instead of reducing the burden on the judiciary, the burden would continue. Such a course would be good neither for the concerned parties, nor for the legal system. Lastly, one of the aims of the legal system is to ensure peace and harmony in the society. By dragging a case, the animosity between the parties would continue. The endeavor should be to wrinkle out the differences, to defuse the tension between the parties. The sooner the trial ends, the sooner the parties can live in peace. In order to buttress his contentions, the learned counsel has relied on the case of (6) Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v. Mrs. Kaushalya Sawhney and Ors.( (1980) 1 SCC 63 ) , B.S. Joshi (supra), and to the case of (7) Popular Muthiah V. State ( (2006) 7 SCC 296 . 4. Mr. Biri Singh Sinsinwar, also reiterated the crucial function of the Court is to do justice to the parties. According to the learned counsel the ends of justice are higher than the ends of law. In order to buttress this contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the case of (8) State of Karnataka V. L. Muniswamy and Ors.( (1977) 2 SCC 699 ) . However, according to the learned counsel, the power under Section 482 of the Code is not a unbridled power. It, being a vast power, has to be used with care and caution. Thus, it should be exercised under certain circumstances. It must be controlled and channelled by certain guidelines. 5. According to Mr. S.K. Gupta on the basis of a compromise between the parties, although a criminal proceeding of a non-compoundable offence cannot be quashed under Section 320 of the Code, but it can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. Thus, it should be exercised under certain circumstances. It must be controlled and channelled by certain guidelines. 5. According to Mr. S.K. Gupta on the basis of a compromise between the parties, although a criminal proceeding of a non-compoundable offence cannot be quashed under Section 320 of the Code, but it can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. According to him, no strait-jacket formula can be laid down for the exercise of the power. It depends on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 6. According to Mr. Bipin Gupta a criminal proceeding can be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the parties. However, certain guidelines should be prescribed for the exercise of such a vast power. According to him, the nature of the offence, the circumstances under which the offence was committed, the relationship between the parties, the antecedents of the accused, and the stage of the trial has to be considered while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code. 7. Mr. Ravi Yadav, on the other hand, emphasised the practical aspect of criminal trial". According to him, the backlogs of criminal cases, the sky-roketing criminal trials can be lessened if criminal cases are quashed on the basis of compromise. Thus, the power under Section 482 of the Code should be used to lighten the works in the trial courts. According to the learned counsel, no fruitful purpose is served if the trial court is asked to complete a trial which has lost its very purpose and validity. To keep the form of the trial, without its content is an exercise in futility. 8. On the contrary Mr. Arun Sharma, the learned Public Prosecutor, has vehemently argued that a crime is an act against the State. It is the State which prosecutes the accused. Therefore, a compromise entered between the accused and the complainant/victim is immaterial for the purpose of quashing the trial. Secondly, the Code is a self-contained code about criminal procedural law. In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be used in face of a clear bar contained in the Code. Secondly, the Code is a self-contained code about criminal procedural law. In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be used in face of a clear bar contained in the Code. Since Section 320(9) of the Code prohibits the court from compounding an offence not mentioned in Section 320(1) and (2), the power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be used to overstep the said embargo. According to the learned counsel there is no difference between compounding and quashing a trial on the basis of compromise. Thirdly, justice has to be done within the four corners of law. In case the procedural law does not permit the quashing of trial in non-compoundable offences, the same cannot be done under the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. The learned Counsel has relied on the following cases to support his contentions. (9) Talab Haji Hussain v. Madhukar Purshotatam Mondkar and Anr. ( AIR 1958 SC 376 ) ; (10) Kurkshetra University & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. ( AIR 1977 SC 2229 ) ; (11) Biahwabahan Das V. Gopen Chandra Hazarika & Ors.( AIR 1967 SC 895 ) , (12) Ramesh Chandra J. Thakur V. A.P. Jhaveri & Anr. ( AIR 1973 SC 84 ) , (13) [ Jalaluddin V. State of Utter Pradesh (2001 Cri. L.J. 4944 (SC), 1993 Cri. L.J. 3139 (Raj.) (FB) ] 9. Mr. Anshuman Saxena has likewise argued that the distinction between a criminal act and a civil wrong has to be maintained. If criminal cases were quashed on the basis of a compromise reached between two private individuals, the distinction between the criminal act and a civil wrong would be obliterated. Secondly, in case of a compromise, it is difficult to decipher the reason or the circumstances under which the compromise has been reached. Therefore, by letting off the criminal, the society may be exposed to anti-social element. Considering the rise in the criminal graph, the criminal court should deal harshly with the accused, rather than leniently. 10. We have not only listened to the learned members of the Bar, but are also grateful to them for their erudite expounding of the law, and for their assistance on the legal issues. 11. The reason for the creation of the State has taxed the imagination of the Political thinkers. 10. We have not only listened to the learned members of the Bar, but are also grateful to them for their erudite expounding of the law, and for their assistance on the legal issues. 11. The reason for the creation of the State has taxed the imagination of the Political thinkers. The function of the courts has, likewise engaged the attention of the Jurists. According to Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, Man entered into a social contract to protect himself. While surrendering some of his freedoms, he entered into a covenant to form a political entity called the State. This is clearly stated in the Constitution of India, which begins with the words, "We, the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Secular Democratic Republic...." The State is, thus, legally bound to protect and promote a person's physical mental, and financial existence. In order to protect the rights, fundamental or otherwise, of the people, the courts were created. The courts have myriad functions to perform; the cardinal function of the court is to do justice to the people. This power would include the power to punish in criminal cases, the power to undo the civil wrong in civil cases, and the power to protect the people from the wrongs committed by the State. The other functions are to balance the conflicting interests of the people or of individual, to maintain social harmony in the society and to act as a catalyst for economic growth of the nation. But the common denominator of all these different functions the very raison d'etre of the courts-is ex debito justitiae-to do justice. In short, the courts are justice-centric in their aim, purpose and existence. 12. Since justice is supreme, "to otherwise do justice" has always been an inherent power of the court. Even if the Code did not contain Section 482, the courts still would be legally bound to do justice. It is in this sense that the Apex Court has repeatedly held that Section 482 of the Code does not bestow a new power on the High Court. It merely recognizes an inherent power of the High Court. In the case of (14) Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Ors.Vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr. It is in this sense that the Apex Court has repeatedly held that Section 482 of the Code does not bestow a new power on the High Court. It merely recognizes an inherent power of the High Court. In the case of (14) Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. and Ors.Vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque and Anr. ( (2005) 1 SCC 122 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under : The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative, enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (where the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. 13. While discussing the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code, in the case of Popular Muthiah (supra) the Apex Court has held as under : The High Court has inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to correct errors of the courts below and pass such orders as may be necessary to do justice to the parties and/or to prevent the abuse of process of court. Inherent power of the High Court can be exercised, it is trite, both in relation to substantive as also procedural matters. In respect of the incidental or supplemental power, evidently, the High Court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction irrespective of the nature of the proceedings. It is not trammelled by procedural restrictions in that (i) Power can be exercised suo motu in the interest of justice. If such power is not conceded, it may even lead to injustice to an accused. (ii) Such a power can be exercised concurrently with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction and no formal application is required to be filed therefor. (iii) It is, however, beyond any doubt that the power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not unlimited. It can inter alia be exercised where the Code is silent, where the power of the court is not treated as exhaustive, or there is a specific provision in the Code, or the statute does not fall within the purview of the Code because it involves application of a special law. It acts ex debito justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice for which alone it exists. 14. It acts ex debito justitiae. It can, thus, do real and substantial justice for which alone it exists. 14. In order to preserve the inherent powers, Section 482 of the Code begins with a non-obstante clause. It clearly proclaims, "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit to affect the inherent powers of the High Court..." While interpreting the inter-relationship between Section 482 and Section 320 of the Code, one cannot lose sight of the non-obstante clause. According to the Golden Rule of interpretation, these words should be read literally and should be given effect to. In fact, in the case of (15) State V. Navjot Sandhu ( (2003) 6 SCC 641 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "that apart, Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code starts with the words "Nothing in this Code". Thus the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 can be exercised even when there is a bar under Section 397 or some other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, this power cannot be exercised if there is a statutory bar in other enactment." 15. Section 320 of the Code is as under:- 320. Compounding of offences- (1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 specified in the first two columns of the Table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that Table Offence Section of the Indian Penal Code applicable Person by whom offence may be compounded 1 2 3 Uttering words etc. with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person 298 The person whose religious feelings are intended to be wounded. Causing hurt. 323, 334 The person to whom the hurt is caused. Wrongfully restraining or confining any person 341, 342 The person restrained or confined. Assault or use of criminal force 352, 355, 358 The person assaulted or to whom criminal force is used. Mischief, when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person 426, 427 The person to whom the loss or damage is caused. Criminal trespass 447 The person is possession of the property trespassed upon. House trespass 448 Ditto. Criminal breach of contract of service 491 The person with whom the offender has contracted. Adultery. 497 The husband of the woman. Criminal trespass 447 The person is possession of the property trespassed upon. House trespass 448 Ditto. Criminal breach of contract of service 491 The person with whom the offender has contracted. Adultery. 497 The husband of the woman. Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman 498 Ditto. 1[Defamation, except such case as are specified against section 500 of the Indian Penal Code in column 1 of the Table under sub-section (2).] 500 The person defamed. Printing or engraving matter, knowing it to be defamatory 501 Ditto. Sale of printed or engraved substance containing defamatory matter, knowing it to contain such matter 502 Ditto. Insult intended to provoke a breach of the peace 504 The person insulted. Criminal intimidation except when the offence is punishable with imprisonment for seven years. 506 The person intimidated. Act caused by making a person believe that he will be an object of divine displeasure 508 The person against whom the offence was committed. (2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 specified in the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table: Offence Section of the Indian Penal Code applicable Person by whom offence may be compounded 1 2 3 Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means 324 The person to whom hurt is caused. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt 324 Ditto. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation 335 Ditto. Causing hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others 337 Ditto. Causing grievous hurt by doing an act so rashly and negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others 338 Ditto. Wrongfully confining a person for three days or more 343 The person confined. Wrongfully confining for ten or more days 344 Ditto. Wrongfully confining a person in secret 346 Ditto. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty 354 The woman assaulted to whom the criminal force was used. Assault or criminal force in attempting wrongfully to confine a person 357 The person assaulted or to whom the force was used. Wrongfully confining a person in secret 346 Ditto. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty 354 The woman assaulted to whom the criminal force was used. Assault or criminal force in attempting wrongfully to confine a person 357 The person assaulted or to whom the force was used. Theft where the value of property stolen does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees 379 The owner of the property stolen. Theft by clerk or servant of property in possession of master, where the value of the property stolen does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees. 381 Ditto. Dishonest misappropriation of property 403 The owner of the property misappropriation Criminal breach of trust, where the value of the property does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees 406 The owner of the property in respect of which the breach of trust has been committed. Criminal breach of trust by a carrier, wharfinger, etc., where the value of the property does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees. 407 Ditto. Criminal breach of trust by a clerk or servant where the value of the property does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees. 408 Ditto. Dishonestly receiving stolen property, knowing it to be stolen, when the value of the stolen property does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees 411 The owner of the property stolen. Assisting in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, knowing to be stolen, where the value of the stolen property does not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees 414 The owner of the property stolen. Cheating 417 The person cheated. Cheating a person whose interest the offender was bound, either by law or by legal contract, to protect 418 Ditto. Cheating by personation 419 Ditto. Cheating and dishonesty inducing delivery of property or the making alteration or destruction of a valuable security. 420 Ditto. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property etc. to prevent distribution among creditors. 421 The creditors who are affected thereby. Fraudulently preventing from being made available for his creditors a debt or demand due to the offender. 422 Ditto. Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration. 423 The person affected thereby. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property 424 Ditto. Mischief by killing or maiming animal of the value of ten rupees or Upwards 428 The owner of the animal. 422 Ditto. Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration. 423 The person affected thereby. Fraudulent removal or concealment of property 424 Ditto. Mischief by killing or maiming animal of the value of ten rupees or Upwards 428 The owner of the animal. Mischief by killing or maiming cattle, etc., of any value or of any other animal of the value of fifty rupees or Upwards 429 The owner of the cattle or animal. Mischief by injury to work of irrigation by wrongfully diverting water when the only loss or damage caused is loss or damage to a private person. 430 The person to whom the loss or damage is caused. House-trespass to commit an offence (other than theft) punishable with imprisonment. 451 The person in possession of the house trespassed upon. Using a false trade or property mark. 482 The person to whom loss or injury is caused by such use. Counterfeiting a trade or property mark used by another 483 The person whose trade or property mark is counterfeited. Knowingly selling or exposing or possessing for sale or for manufacturing purpose, goods marked with a counterfeit property mark 486 Ditto. Marrying again during the lifetime of a husband or wife 494 The husband or wife of the person so marrying. Defamation against the President or the Vice-President or the Governor of a State or the Administrator of a Union territory or a Minister in respect of his conduct in the discharging of his public functions when instituted upon a complaint made by the Public Prosecutor 500 The person defamed. Uttering words or sounds or making gestures or exhibiting any object intending to insult the modesty of a woman or intruding upon the privacy of a woman. 509 The woman whom it was intended to insult or whose privacy was intruded upon. (3) When any offence is compoundable under this Section, the abetment of such offence or an attempt of such offence or an attempt to commit such offence (when such attempt is itself an offence) may be compounded in like manner. (4)(a) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf, may, with the permission of the Court compound such offence. (4)(a) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is under the age of eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to contract on his behalf, may, with the permission of the Court compound such offence. (b) When the person who would otherwise be competent to compound an offence under this section is dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such person may, with the consent of the Court compound such offence. (5) When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard. (6) A High Court or Court of Sessions acting in the exercise of its powers of revision under Section 401 may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under this section. (7) No offence shall be compounded if the accused is by reason of a previous conviction, liable either to enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for such offence. (8) The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the offence has been compounded. (9) No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section. 16. A bare perusal of the Section clearly reveals that it deals only with offences enumerated in the Indian Penal Code (henceforth to be referred to as the Indian Penal Code, for short). It does not deal with offences under other laws. Sub-section (1) permits the complainant to compound the offences mentioned in the Table, which have been committed against him. Sub-section (2) permits the compounding of those offences mentioned in the Table, but with the permission of the Court. Thus, while under sub-section (1) the matter may be compounded between the parties, under sub-section (2), the compounding is done only with the permission of the concerned court. Sub-section (3) permits the compounding of 'abetment or attempt to commit' such compoundable offences. Thus, while under sub-section (1) the matter may be compounded between the parties, under sub-section (2), the compounding is done only with the permission of the concerned court. Sub-section (3) permits the compounding of 'abetment or attempt to commit' such compoundable offences. Sub-section (4)(a) permits compounding to be done by another person who is competent to contract on behalf of a minor, an idiot or a lunatic. Sub-section (4) (b), meanwhile, permits compounding to be done by the legal representatives of the deceased victim or complainant. Under sub-section (5), with the leave of the Court, an offence may be compounded after an accused has been committed for trial or after an appeal has been filed and is pending before the Court. Similarly, under sub-section (6), the High Court or the Sessions Court in its revisional jurisdiction may allow any person to compound any offence which such person is competent to compound under the section. Sub-section (7) imposes a bar and claims that in case the accused is liable, by reason of a previous conviction, for an enhanced punishment or to a punishment of a different kind for the offence, then the offence cannot be compounded. Sub-section (8) lays down the consequence of compounding and states that composition of the offence would have the effect of acquittal of the accused. Sub-section (9) imposes a prohibition and states that "no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section". Thus, Section 320 of the Code bestows a limited power on the court to compound the offences mentioned in the Tables given under sub-sections (1) and (2). 17. Undoubtedly, sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the Code does place an embargo on the power of the court to compound an offence. However, the High Court is not denuded of its power to do justice. The non-obstante clause of Section 482 of the Code clearly states that nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the power of the High Court to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Thus, Section 320(9) cannot limit or affect the power under Section 482 of the-Code. Hence, the High Court has ample power to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a compromise reached between the accused and the complainant. 18. Thus, Section 320(9) cannot limit or affect the power under Section 482 of the-Code. Hence, the High Court has ample power to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a compromise reached between the accused and the complainant. 18. In B.S. Joshi's case (supra) the Apex Court has held that, "If for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing.... Thus, the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code." 19. There are certain similarities and differences between compounding and quashing a case on the basis of compromise. On the first blush there are similarities between the two; both entail the parties entering into a mutual understanding, or resolving their disputes outside the Court, of burying their differences outside the court. Like compromise, compounding for certain offences, enumerated in Section 320 (2) of the Code, require the approval of the court. In both cases, the accused stands acquitted. However, while compounding is permissible only in minor offences, or in non-serious offences, criminal cases can be quashed and set aside even in serious offences. Under Section 320(1) of the Code, no permission is required from the Court, the court has no discretionary power to refuse the compounding of the offence. But, quashing of a criminal proceeding upon a compromise is well within the discretionary power of the Court, Moreover, while the power under Section 320 of the Code is cribbed, cabined and confined, the power under Section 482 is vast, unparalleled and paramount. 20. But such a power is neither unbridled, nor unguided. The more vast the power, the more circumspect its exercise. In B. S. Joshi's Case (supra) the Apex Court has observed that "It is well settled that the powers under Section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. Exercise of such power would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but with the sole purpose to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". Although the power is a vast, it isn't an arbitrary one. While exercising the power for the twin purpose of preventing the abuse of the process of the court and for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, the power has to be exercised according to certain guidelines. Therefore, prior to quashing the criminal proceedings, the court must consider the nature of the offence, the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the relationship between the parties, the antecedents of the accused person, the possibility of the accused repeating the same offence or of relapsing back into a criminal life, and the stage at which the trial has reached. While considering the relationship between the parties, the Court must examine the economic status of the parties, the social relationship and the relationship of the cases as, unfortunately, caste equations in rural area are an important consideration. The Court must ensure that the victim is not being forced, through economic means, or through muscle power, through threats or enticement to enter into the compromise. The victim/complainant should enter into the compromise of his/her own free will and on a voluntary basis. Of course, these guidelines are not exhaustive, but are merely illustrative of the factors which the courts should examine before acting upon the compromise and of quashing the criminal proceedings. If the court so requires, it is free to direct the local police to investigate the circumstances in which the compromise has been entered into. The modus operandi of entering into a compromise cannot be used as subterfuge to escape the criminal liability. While trying to secure the ends of justice, the Court should be cautious that no injustice is caused to the victim/complainant. 21. The invocation of this power is not only limited to the trial, but also extends during the pendency of the appeal, For, the appeal is considered to be a continuation of the trial itself. Moreover, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused- continues even during the appeal. 21. The invocation of this power is not only limited to the trial, but also extends during the pendency of the appeal, For, the appeal is considered to be a continuation of the trial itself. Moreover, the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused- continues even during the appeal. Therefore, it would be in interest of justice to set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused and to acquit him on the basis of the compromise reached between the parties even at the appellate stage. However, the inherent power should be exercised by the High Court only in appropriate cases. 22. Law is stable, but not static. It evolves with the times. In the classical criminal jurisprudence, of course crime is an act not against an individual, but against the State. Thus, it is the State which prosecutes the offender. However, the existence of Section 320 of the Code clearly shows that complainant also has a role to play in the compounding of the offence. Hence, in case criminal proceedings are quashed on the basis of the compromise reached between the parties, the courts are not necessarily obliterating the difference between the criminal act and the civil wrong. 23. The Courts stands for the rule of law, for honesty and integrity, for high moral values. The courts cannot be privy to inducing parties to be dishonest. In case the criminal proceeding is not set aside on the basis of the compromise the complainant and his witnesses would be forced to change their stand before the trial court and to turn hostile. People should not be motivated to turn hostile in the court. Hence, there is a practical aspect for setting the criminal proceedings on the basis of the compromise. 24. That the Courts are over-burdended with backlogs and that they are flooded with new criminal cases are no longer a secret. It is a harsh reality which faces the judiciary. By continuing a futile trial, the precious time of the court is wasted. Once the parties have entered into a compromise, the end result of the case is a forgone conclusion; it is bound to end in acquittal. In such circumstances to further try the case would be an exercise in futility. Thus, the court should take a practical view of the situation, rather than a pedantic view. 25. Once the parties have entered into a compromise, the end result of the case is a forgone conclusion; it is bound to end in acquittal. In such circumstances to further try the case would be an exercise in futility. Thus, the court should take a practical view of the situation, rather than a pedantic view. 25. The existence of Section 320 of the Code, the inclusion of a new Chapter on Plea Bargaining in the Code clearly proves that the Legislature, in its wisdom, is trying to find alternative means to reduce the burden of criminal cases on the trial courts. The exercise of inherent power is another means to achieve the same goal. Hence, the inherent power should be used liberally, but in appropriate cases. The appropriateness of a case is to be tested by the High Court in its inherent power. In the case of Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court had said, "the finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion." Although the said observation was'-made in a civil case involving a dispute between two sisters, but the philosophy should also pervade through the criminal jurisprudence. As the Apex Court observed, in the above case, "the purpose of law and justice (dharma) is.promotion of cohesion and not production of fission". Thus, the purpose of criminal law is harmony and balance in the society, not of cacophony and imbalance. 26. In conclusion, notwithstanding the bar contained in Section 320(9) of the Code, the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised for quashing a criminal proceeding on the basis of the compromise reached between the complainant and the accused. 27. Having discussed the legal principles, let us now take up the individual petitions. Majlis and Ors.Vs. State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 350/05) . 28. The brief facts of the case are that on 24.8.97, one Fajjar had lodged a report at Police Station Sikri against the accused persons. After investigation, the police had filed the charge sheet for offences under Sections 147, 149, 323, 324, 325 and 326 Indian Penal Code against the accused persons. During the pendency of the trial, the parties had entered into a compromise with regard to offences under Section 323, 324 and 325 Indian Penal Code. After investigation, the police had filed the charge sheet for offences under Sections 147, 149, 323, 324, 325 and 326 Indian Penal Code against the accused persons. During the pendency of the trial, the parties had entered into a compromise with regard to offences under Section 323, 324 and 325 Indian Penal Code. Vide order-dated 18.3.2004, the learned trial court had compounded the said offences. Subsequently, an application was moved for compounding the offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, as the parties had also reached a compromise with regard to the said offence. However, the learned trial court, vide Order 15.2.05, had dismissed the application. Hence, this petition before this court. 29. Mr. Bipin Gupta has argued that the parties are residents of the same village. The incident happened without any premeditation. Further, there is no other cases pending against the accused persons. Since the parties have already reached a compromise voluntarily, the criminal proceeding should be quashed. 30. Considering the fact that the parties have reached a compromise amongst themselves, considering the fact that the accused are not involved in any other criminal case, considering the fact that in the case of Banwari & Ors.V. State of Rajasthan, (2002 (2) RCC 754) this Court has already quashed the criminal proceeding for offence under Section 326 of Indian Penal Code, we quash the criminal proceeding in Criminal Cases No. 10/98, State v. Majlas & Ors. , pending before the Court of Civil Judge (JD) Nagar, Dist. Bharatpur. Ramesh Chand & Ors.v. State of Rajasthan S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1474/05) . 31. The brief facts of the case are that complainant non-petitioner had filed a complaint against the accused persons-the petitioners before this court. The learned trial court had sent the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. After a thorough investigation, the police had submitted a negative final report. However vide Order dated 4.9.2003, the learned trial court had rejected the negative final report and had taken cognizance against the petitioners for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B Indian Penal Code. Since the petitioners were aggrieved by the cognizance order, they challenged the same before the District and Sessions Judge, Karauli. During the pendency of the revision petition, the parties entered into a compromise. Since the petitioners were aggrieved by the cognizance order, they challenged the same before the District and Sessions Judge, Karauli. During the pendency of the revision petition, the parties entered into a compromise. Therefore, the parties moved an application before the revisional Court for quashing the criminal proceeding pending before the learned trial court. Vide Order dated 29.9.05 the learned Judge dismissed the application and directed the parties to approach the learned trial Court for acting upon the compromise. Thereafter, the parties appeared before the learned trial court and requested that the case be dropped as the parties had entered into a compromise. But vide Order dated 14.10.05, the learned trial court rejected the application ostensibly on the ground that the offences were non-compoundable under Section 320 (9) of the Code. Hence, this petition before this court. 32. Mr. S.K. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has vehemently argued that the entire case relates to the sale of plot of land by the Pathik Bhawan Nirman Shahkari Samiti Limited, Karauli of which the petitioners are members. On 11-4-98 the petitioners had sold the plot to the complainant non-petitioner and had also handed over the possession to him. However, subsequently, Petitioner No.2 filed a civil suit against the complainant non-petitioner on the basis of the "patta" issued by the Pathik Bhawan Nirman Shahkari Samiti Ltd. During the course of the revisional proceeding, the parties have entered into a compromise. Copy of the compromise has been filed before this court also. Since the complainant does not wish to further prosecute the petitioners, it would be in the interest of justice to quash the criminal proceeding. He has further argued that since the case relates to the sale of plot, it is a case of civil nature. In fact, it was the civil nature of the case which had prompted the investigation agency to submit the negative final report in the first place. 33. Considering the compromise which has been struck between the parties and which is available before this court, this court is inclined to quash the continuation of the criminal proceeding in the shape of Criminal Case No.499/03, State v. Shivram and Ors pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Karauli. Indraj V. The State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1496/05) 34. Indraj V. The State of Rajasthan (S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1496/05) 34. The brief facts of the cause are that on 14.9.99 one Handu lodged a written report at Police Station Masalpur about an incident that took place on the same day. An FIR was registered for offenses under Sections 341 and 323 Indian Penal Code. However, after the investigation, the offence of Section 326 Indian Penal Code was added. Thus, the charge sheet was submitted for the offences of 341, 323 and 326 Indian Penal Code against the present petitioner and against one Mst. Shankri. The learned trial court vide its judgment dated 11.5.02, convicted Mst. Shankari, but granted her the benefit of probation. It convicted the present petitioner for offence under Section 326 Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to one year of R.I. and imposed a fine of Rs. 300/- and to further undergo an imprisonment of two months in default thereof. The petitioner filed and appeal before the learned Sessions Judge. However, during the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise as the parties are residents of the same village. On 22.7.02, the parties moved an application for compounding of the offence. Vide Order dated 7.8.02, the learned appellate court permitted the compounding of offence under Section 323 Indian Penal Code, but not under Section 326 Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, the parties moved an application for quashing of the proceeding on the ground of compromise entered between the parties. The appellate court has not decided the said application. Therefore, the prayer before this Court that the appellate court be directed to decide the said application. 35. Considering the fact that the parties are resident of the same village, considering the fact that the parties have already compromised upon offences under Section 323 Indian Penal Code and upon offence under Section 326 Indian Penal Code, there is no reason for the appellate court to sit over the said application filed by the parties. Therefore, this court directs the Direct and Sessions Judge, Karuali to decide the application pending before him in Criminal Appeal No. 46/02, Indraj v. State within a period of two weeks from the date of the receipt of the certified copy of this judgment. Vimla & Ors.v. The State of Rajasthan & Ano. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Appeal No. 1628/05) 36. Therefore, this court directs the Direct and Sessions Judge, Karuali to decide the application pending before him in Criminal Appeal No. 46/02, Indraj v. State within a period of two weeks from the date of the receipt of the certified copy of this judgment. Vimla & Ors.v. The State of Rajasthan & Ano. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Appeal No. 1628/05) 36. Members of the same family, living as a joint family, had a scuffle on 11.10.05 Cross-cases were lodged by both the sides. The complainant, Sita Ram Gupta, is the brother-in-law of the petitioner No.1 and the uncle of petitioner Nos. 2 and 3. According to the complainant, the petitioners and other family members assaulted him and his family members with "lathis". On the basis of the report, a formal FIR was registered as FIR No. 231/05 for offences under Sections 143, 323, 341 Indian Penal Code. But after the investigation, the police added the offence of Section 326 Indian Penal Code. As injuries were sustained from both the sides, petitioner No.2 also lodged a counter case against the complainant. On the basis of his report, the police had registered a formal FIR, FIR No. 232/05 for offences under Sections 341, 323 and 354 Indian Penal Code. However, after the tempers died down, the parties reached a compromise amongst themselves. However, the police is refusing to close the investigation. Hence, this petition before this Court. 37. Mr. S.K. Gupta, the learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the parties are close relatives who are residing under the same roof. Because of some misunderstanding, a scuffle had taken place. But, after the lodging of the counter cases, reason has prevailed over the family members. They would like to bury the hatchet. Hence, the FIR No. 231/05 be quashed. 38. As stated above, the function of the court is to protect and promote social harmony. The members of the same family have reached a compromise. The bitterness between them has abated. No fruitful purpose would be served if the investigation is continued and the trial commences. Therefore, this Court quashes the FIR No. 231/05 registered at Police Station, Sapotra, District Karauli for offences under Sections 143, 323, 341, 326 Indian Penal Code. Ramji Lal & Ors.v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.(S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 29/06) 39. No fruitful purpose would be served if the investigation is continued and the trial commences. Therefore, this Court quashes the FIR No. 231/05 registered at Police Station, Sapotra, District Karauli for offences under Sections 143, 323, 341, 326 Indian Penal Code. Ramji Lal & Ors.v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.(S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 29/06) 39. The brief facts of the case are that on 20.9.04, the petitioner No.1 filed a criminal compliant before the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) & Judicial Magistrate No. 23, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The learned Magistrate sent the said complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. The said complaint was registered as a formal FIR, FIR No. 297/04, at Police Station Mahesh Nagar, Jaipur wherein the complainant alleged that earlier a number of persons, including the respondent No.2 and 3, had come his house around 8.00 P.M. and asked his tenant, Sanjay for some money for buying liquor. When Sanjay refused to pay them, they assaulted him. He had gone with the tenant to lodge a report against the miscreants, including the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. The police had registered a formal FIR against the assailants. Subsequently, at twelve O'clock at mid-night both the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 came to the petitioner's house. They not only abused him, but also assaulted him and his wife. They also called them certain names with regard to their caste. When the petitioner called the police, they argued with the police also. Later on, they threatened the petitioner and his family members and claimed that since they were police officers, even the police would not take any action against them. But, eventually, the police did submit a charge sheet against the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for offences under Sections 323, 324, 336, 341 and 458 Indian Penal Code and for offences under Section 3(1)(10) and Section 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act. During the course of the trial, the parties have entered into a compromise. Hence, the parties moved an application under Section 320 of the Code. Vide Order dated 13.12.05, while the learned trial court compounded the offenses under Sections 323 and 341 Indian Penal Code, it has refused to do so for the other offenses mentioned above. Hence, this petition before this Court. 40. Mr. Ravi Yadav, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently argued that the parties have compromised. Vide Order dated 13.12.05, while the learned trial court compounded the offenses under Sections 323 and 341 Indian Penal Code, it has refused to do so for the other offenses mentioned above. Hence, this petition before this Court. 40. Mr. Ravi Yadav, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently argued that the parties have compromised. They wish to live in peace. Thus, the criminal proceeding should be quashed. 41. On the other hand, the learned Public Prosecutor, has stressed the fact that the present petition has not been moved by the accused persons, but by the victims. Secondly, the accused persons claim to be police officers. Therefore, the possibility that the petitioners are agreeing to a compromise under duress cannot be ruled out. In such circumstances, the compromis submitted may be under duress or compulsion. 42. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 43. Interestingly, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are police officers. They have already boasted about their "police connections". Curiously, the petition has not been presented by them, but by the victims of the alleged clime. It seems to this court hat the petition has been submitted under pressure of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Considering the fact that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are police officers, considering the fact that the petitioners are ordinary citizens, who can easily be bullied by the police officers, considering the "status" of the parties, considering the fact that the compromise may have been made under duress, this court is not inclined to quash criminal proceeding pending before the Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act & Additional District and Sessions Judge, .Jaipur City, Jaipur. Since there is a strong possibility that the witnesses might be influenced by the accused persons, the learned trial court should ensure the safety of the witnesses during the trial. Since there is no merit in this petition, it is, hereby, dismissed. 44. Thus, these petitions are decided as indicated above.Petition Nos. 350/05, 1474/05, 1628/05, allowed. Petition No. 1496/05 disposed of. Petition No. 29/06 dismissed. *******