JUDGMENT Hon’ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.—The present writ petition has been preferred against the impugned award rendered by the Labour Court, where the Labour Court had not acceded the petitioners’ claim that they have continued in service more than 240 days. Their services were dispensed with without following the provisions contained in Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. On arising of the dispute the controversy was referred to Labour Court by the government in. pursuance to power conferred by Section 4-K of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2. The brief fact of the case is that, petitioners were employed in the year 1976 and worked continuously up to 15.11.1984. On 15.11.1984 their services were dispensed with. During the course of proceeding before the Labour Court the petitioners workmen had filed 48 documents to stall their claim relating to continuity of service right from 1976 to November, 1984. During the course of employment the workmen were required to perform duties within and outside the factory premises. They were required to check the quality of cane and take the weighment of cane in the mill premises. Sometimes they were required to work on different cane purchase centre situated at various places. 3. According to petitioner’s counsel petitioners were also required to supply seeds and fertilizers and release the requisite charges for the farmers. It has also been submitted that during the course of employment the services of the petitioners were terminated on 19th September, 1984 but when matter was brought before the consolidation Court they were again engaged. However, later on their services were finally dispensed with on 15.11.1984. 4. While deciding the present controversy the Labour Court had not discussed entire documentary evidence filed by the petitioners in appropriate manner. Before the Labour Court it was submitted by the management that , petitioners were casual labour and they have not discharged duty in the factory or Sugar Mill and they were engaged from time to time to discharge duty at cane purchase centre or at the place outside the factory. Wages were paid to the petitioner on the basis of their work days. 5. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Lucknow had relied upon a case set up by the manager and held that petitioners had not worked within the factory premises and they had discharged duty at Cane Centre on the basis of casual employee. Wages were paid to the petitioner on the basis of their work days. 5. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Lucknow had relied upon a case set up by the manager and held that petitioners had not worked within the factory premises and they had discharged duty at Cane Centre on the basis of casual employee. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court had recorded a finding after perusal of documents filed by the workmen. A finding has been recorded that petitioners were engaged as casual labour and they were not the permanent employee of the factory or Cane Purchase Centre. The oral statement made by the petitioners were disbelieved by the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. The continuous engagement of the workmen was not believed by the Labour Court. Learned Labour Court had recorded a finding that engagement of petitioners were stop gap appointment to meet out the exigencies of services. 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. From the perusal of impugned award, it appears that the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was of the view that since petitioners were engaged for checking the quality of cane and distribution of seeds and fertilizers to farmers they can not be treated to be employed within the premises of factory as they have not worked in the factory. Relevant portion form the judgement of Labour Court is reproduced as under : “They were paid their wages on the basis of their attendance through vouchers. Their employment positively was for checking the quality of cane and distribution of seeds and fertilizers to the farmers. From the perusal of the documents filed by the workmen it appears that they were actually doing the above work. They did not work at the factory or at the cane purchase centres.” 7, From the finding recorded by the Presiding Officer Labour Court reproduced hereinabove, it appears that Presiding Officer was impressed by the alleged fact that employment was only for checking the quality of cane and distribution of seeds and fertilizers. Engagement was not to discharge duty within the factory premises. I afraid to approve the reasoning given by the Labour Court. Whether the petitioner were appointed to discharge duty outside the factory or within the factory premises shall not make any difference. Employment ordinarily do not co-relate to the places of posting. 8. Engagement was not to discharge duty within the factory premises. I afraid to approve the reasoning given by the Labour Court. Whether the petitioner were appointed to discharge duty outside the factory or within the factory premises shall not make any difference. Employment ordinarily do not co-relate to the places of posting. 8. During the course of proceeding before the Labour Court, the representative of employee moved an application for summoning of relevant records from the employer to establish their case relating to continuous service for the period in question. The Labour Court had directed the employers to produce the relevant payment sheets of one year and attendance register of the same period. The order was served on the management on 20.8.1987. The cane manager had filed affidavit on 20.11.1987 stating therein that for casual employees attendance register were not maintained and pay sheets are also not traceable for the period in question. Since, documents relating to the payment of wages to workmen and maintenance of the attendance register was in custody of employer, hence, non-production of such document may create a ground to drawn adverse presumption against the employer. The Avadh Sugar Mill Limited is a factory registered under Companies Act. Under law, it shall always be incumbent upon the officers of the company to maintain attendance register and accounts books for the payment of wages or salary to workmen whether such workmen have been appointed for short period or on casual basis or regular basis. How the factory can run without maintaining the records relating to discharge of duty by the workmen even on casual basis and payment made thereon. Even casual workmen cannot be paid dues or wages unless their attendance or working period is properly recorded in the attendance register. Whether a workmen had worked for few days or for the months or year to come in the business establishment like factory proper records are maintained indicating the number of days for which an employee had discharged duty and payment made thereon. Under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden was on the employer to proof the tenure of appointment of the workmen and the salary paid thereon on the basis of record lying in their custom to falsify the petitioners’ claim. Under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, the burden was on the employer to proof the tenure of appointment of the workmen and the salary paid thereon on the basis of record lying in their custom to falsify the petitioners’ claim. There may be presumption in favour of workmen that they have discharged duty continuously for more than 240 days under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 9. There is one more reason which supports the contention of petitioner’s counsel that the workmen in question had worked for more than 240 days. It has been admitted by the employer that a conciliation proceeding was drawn under Section 2-A of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947. It was pleaded by workmen that when conciliation proceeding was drawn they were restored in service and order of oral termination of service of September, 1984 was not given effect. No material has been brought on record by the employer during the course of proceeding before the Labour Court to falsity the argument advanced by the workmen before the Labour Court. The management had not . adduced any oral evidence during the pendency of case before the Labour Court to controvert the oral pleading led by workmen as well as pleading on record except filing of affidavits. 10. Dr. R.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents had submitted that since petitioners services were dispensed with in September, 1984, reference under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act to Labour Court was bad in law. 11. Petitioner’s counsel has relied upon a judgement reported in AIR 1979 SC 1356 , Pottery Mazdoor Panchayat v. Perfect Pottery Co. Ltd. and another. There is no dispute over the proposition of law raised by the learned counsel for the respondents. Of course tribunal cannot go beyond the terms of reference. But in the present case the learned Tribunal had recorded a finding keeping in view the pleading of workmen that their services were dispensed with on 15.11.1984. As discussed hereinabove, the petitioner had reasonably discharged their burden to establish that after September, 1984 and after initiation of conciliation proceeding they are restored in service and later on their services were dispensed with on 15.11.1984. The incident of September, 1984 loses its significance after restoration in service. 12. While relying upon Apex Court judgement reported in AIR 1952 SC 179 , Parry and Co. The incident of September, 1984 loses its significance after restoration in service. 12. While relying upon Apex Court judgement reported in AIR 1952 SC 179 , Parry and Co. Ltd. Dare House, Madras v. Commercial Employees Association, Madras and another respondent’s counsel submitted that the writ petition against the impugned award should not be entertained as it did not suffer from substantial illegality. In the case of Parry and Co. Ltd. (supra), Apex Court held that writ of certiorari may be issued “against the order passed by inferior tribunal in case the decision is erroneous effecting its jurisdiction. It has been held that mere erroneous decision may not called for interference under writ jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. 13. In one other judgement relied upon by the respondent’s counsel reported in (2004) 8 SCC 195 , Municipal Corporation, Faridabad v. Siri Niwas, the workmen had worked from 5.8.1994 to 16.5.1995. Since muster roll was not produced before the presiding officer by employer. High Court had drawn adverse presumption and held that workmen had worked for more than 240 days. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the burden of proof was on the workmen. It was further held by the Apex Court that workmen had not adduced any evidence whatsoever in support of his contention that he complied with the requirement of Section 25-F of the Industrial Dispute Act (analogous provision of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act). Apart from examining himself in support of his contention the workmen did not produced or call for any document from the office of employer including the muster roll. He had also not examined any other witnesses in support of his case. However, High Court had drawn adverse presumption against the employer on the ground that it has not produced muster roll in its defence. Hence, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that burden of proof was on the workmen and he himself had not called for any document from the office of employer hence non-production of document by the employer was not fatal and High Court should not have interfered with the tribunal’s judgement. 14. However, facts and circumstances of the present case is entirely different as observed hereinabove. The workmen had adduced oral documentary evidence and on his application labour Court had directed for the production of documents as discussed hereinabove. 14. However, facts and circumstances of the present case is entirely different as observed hereinabove. The workmen had adduced oral documentary evidence and on his application labour Court had directed for the production of documents as discussed hereinabove. The order of tribunal was not complied with for the reasons discussed hereinabove. Accordingly, the case of Municipal Corporation, Faridabad does not seem to applicable under the facts and circumstances of the present case. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents Dr. R.K. Srivastava had relied upon a judgement reported in 2006 (10) SCC 301 , Director Vocational Education and Training and another v. Nashim Shaikh Chand. It also does not seem to applicable under the facts and circumstances of the present case. 16. In the case of Nashim Shaikh Chand (supra) the workmen was employed from 4.12.1998 to 2000 in a school namely Boys Town Public School. A defence was taken that the workmen that he had not worked in school though employment was made in his name and services was discharged by the workmen daughter in proxy. Hon’ble Supreme Court had disapproved the defence taken by the workmen and held that High Court should have not interfered against the. revisional Courts order under Article 226 of the Constitution of,India. Being passed on different facts and circumstances with proposition of law the case of Nashim Shaikh Chand (supra) does not cover the present controversy. 17. So far as the power of this Court under Article 227/226 is concerned their Lordship’s of Apex Court in the cases reported in 2003 (6) SCC 675 , Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chandra Rai and others followed by other judgment reported in 2005 (7) SCC 211 , Atma Ram v. Shakuntala Rani while discussing the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India held that in case subordinate Courts, body or tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or decision rendered by them causes serious miscarriage of justice then this Court shall be very well within power to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), in Para 38, the Hon’ble Apex Court had discussed various conditions and situations when this Court can exercise supervisory jurisdiction or issue a writ of certiorari. In the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra), in Para 38, the Hon’ble Apex Court had discussed various conditions and situations when this Court can exercise supervisory jurisdiction or issue a writ of certiorari. Relevant portion from the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra) is reproduced as under : “38.(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e., when a subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction—by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction—by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules’ of procedure or. acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate Courts within the bounds of ‘their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which is does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.. (6) A patent junior is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning, Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.” 18. (6) A patent junior is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning, Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.” 18. In the case of Atma Ram (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court has again proceeded to held as under : “It was then faintly submitted before us that the High Court, ought not to have exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in view of the fact that the two Courts below had concurrently found in favour of the appellant. The submission is misconceived. This is not a case where the High Court interfered with concurrent findings of fact. The High Court interfered because there was a serious error of law committed by the Courts below and as a consequence thereof, they failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. The exercise of revisional jurisdiction in a case of this nature cannot be faulted.” 19. Keeping in view the Apex Court judgement in the case of Surya Dev Rai (supra) and Atma Ram (supra) this Court while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may interfere with the tribunal’s judgement, in case tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it or the judgement rendered by Tribunal suffers from serious miscarriage of justice. 20. As discussed hereinabove, learned Labour Court had not recorded appropriate finding under the facts and circumstance of the case when the employer failed to produce the attendance register and pay slips in compliance of its own order dated 20.8.1987. On the other hand, the workmen had proved its case by adducing oral evidence as well as documentary evidence. Adverse presumption should have been drawn by the labour Court against the management keeping in view the facts and circumstance of the case discussed hereinabove. Learned labour Court had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. 21. Thus, in case, petitioners were appointed by the opposite party No. 2 to discharge duty and they have continued in service for 240 days their services could not have been dispensed with without following the provisions contained in Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned labour Court had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. 21. Thus, in case, petitioners were appointed by the opposite party No. 2 to discharge duty and they have continued in service for 240 days their services could not have been dispensed with without following the provisions contained in Section 6-N of the Industrial Disputes Act. In the present case, the workmen had proved by sufficient evidence that they have discharged duty for more than 240 days. The learned Labour Court had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it as impugned award seems to be suffer from perversity. Writ petition deserves to be allowed. 22. A writ in the nature of certiorari is issued, quashing the impugned award dated 16.10.1989, passed by the opposite party no, 1, as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ petition, with consequential benefits. Petitioners shall deem to be in service from January, 1984 with all consequential benefits. Writ petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. ———