Judgment ( 1. ) THIS is defendants second appeal against the reversing judgment and decree passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Dhar in Regular civil Appeal No. 39-A/79 decided on 11-8-1980. This appeal was admitted for final hearing on the following substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the impugned judgment can be allowed to stand although it runs contrary to section 74 of the Dhar State Land Revenue and tenancy Act (No. 1) of 1940-41 inasmuch as the suit land, on the showing of the plaintiff which belonged to the husband of Radhibai and was not self acquired property or property inherited from her father or mother? 2. Whether the learned A. D. J. has acted in accordance with law in holding that the plaintiff-respondents have acquired Bhumiswami rights by virtue of adverse possession? 3. Whether the impugned judgment can be treated as good in law although it fails to discuss the entire evidence oral and documentary on record? ( 2. ) BRIEF facts which are relevant for the disposal of this appeal are as under.-Following facts are undisputed. Original plaintiffs and the defendants were close relatives. In fact, plaintiffs Kalu and Heera were the first cousin of original defendants, Mainabai and her sister Jadibai, who were the main contesting party to the litigation. They were daughters of Bhera and Radhibai. Bhera died in 1928. During his lifetime agriculture lands admeasuring 63. 4 bigha (suit land) was allotted to Bhera and his name was recorded as raiyat pattedar in the revenue records. After his death Radhibai succeeded to the suit land and her name too was recorded as female raiyat pattedar in the Revenue Records under the Dhar state Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (No. 1) of 1940-41 (for short the Act ). Plaintiffs Kalu and Heera were the sons of Deva, real brother of Bhera. There were long drawn revenue proceedings between plaintiffs and defendants and ultimately, plaintiffs who were in possession of suit land had to hand over possession to defendants in late seventies by virtue of orders of Revenue authorities hence they filed the suit for declaration, possession and mesne profits. The case of the plaintiffs, in nutshell, was that upon death of Radhibai, they being the male descendants had inherited the suit property and Jadibai who alone contested the suit had no share in the suit land. The case of the plaintiffs, in nutshell, was that upon death of Radhibai, they being the male descendants had inherited the suit property and Jadibai who alone contested the suit had no share in the suit land. In the alternative, appellants claimed that after the death of Radhibai, they came into possession of the suit land and when they were declared Paccka Krishak by order dated 3-12-1956, from that point of time their open possession over the suit land became hostile possession and they acquired title by way of adverse possession. Defendants jadibai contested the suit and denied the plaint allegations. With these pleadings, parties went to trial and adduced evidence. Learned trial Judge dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to succeed to the suit land upon death of Radhibai. The trial Court also negatived the plea of adverse possession. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, one of the plaintiffs, viz, Kalu preferred an appeal and the legal heirs of co-plaintiff Heera, who died during the pendency of the suit, were impleaded as respondents before the first Appellate Court. First Appellate Court after appreciating the evidence found in favour of the plaintiffs and thus decreed the suit for declaration and rnesne profit and also ordered delivery of possession which was obtained by jadibai by virtue of orders passed by the revenue authorities somewhere in the year 1970, prior to institution of the suit, hence, this appeal by one of the legal representatives of deceased Jadibai. Other legal representatives of deceased jadibai have been impleaded as respondents in this appeal. ( 3. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that the impugned judgment and decree runs contrary to section 74 of the Dhar State Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (No. 1) of 1940-41. According to him, Radhibai had become the full owner of the suit land when she got it by way of succession upon death of her husband Bheraji. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the suit land was the self acquired property of Bheraji and upon his death, Radhibai succeeded as a full owner thereof. Upon death of Radhibai, according to learned counsel for the appellants, Jadibai and Mainabai being daughters of Radhibai would succeed to the estate and not the plaintiffs being sons of Bherajis brother deva. Upon death of Radhibai, according to learned counsel for the appellants, Jadibai and Mainabai being daughters of Radhibai would succeed to the estate and not the plaintiffs being sons of Bherajis brother deva. Learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment and decree, therefore, runs contrary to the provisions contained in section 74 of the Act. In order to appreciate the contentions, section 74 of the Act is reproduced herein below for ready reference. 74. The right of a female raiyat pattedar tenant in her holding, shall, devolve in the following order; provided the holding is herself acquired property, or inherited from her father or mother :- (i) on her male lineal descendants in the male line up to the 3rd degree; (ii) on her daughter; (iii) (iv) on her daughters son; but a daughter or daughters son shall not be entitled to inherit unless she or he was living with the tenant and shared in the cultivation at the time of the tenants death. ( 4. ) FROM a bare perusal of provisions contained in section 74 would reveal that right of a female Raiyat Pattedar tenant would devolve in the order mentioned in the section subject to the condition that the holding of female raiyat Pattedar was a self acquired property or inherited from father or mother. There was a further restriction so far as daughter or daughters son was concerned. They were entitled to the holding of a female Raiyat Pattedar provided they were living with the female tenant and shared in the cultivation at the time of such female tenants death. Undisputedly, Radhibai was recorded as a female Raiyat Pattedar tenant in the revenue records but it was not the case of the defendants that the suit land was self acquired property of Radhibai or she had inherited it from her father or mother. As has been pointed out hereinabove, it is an admitted position is that Radhibai succeeded to the suit land upon death of her husband. Thus, it is clear that upon death of Radhibai, section 74 was not applicable to govern the succession and the succession would be governed by section 73 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellants had also advanced the contention that Radhibai had died in the year 1954 and not in the year 1944-45 as claimed by the plaintiffs. Thus, it is clear that upon death of Radhibai, section 74 was not applicable to govern the succession and the succession would be governed by section 73 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellants had also advanced the contention that Radhibai had died in the year 1954 and not in the year 1944-45 as claimed by the plaintiffs. In that case, succession would be governed by the madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007. In this connection, suffice it to say that both the Courts below have given a concurrent finding of fact that Radhibai had died in the year 1944-45. In view of the said finding of fact, which is based upon proper appreciation of evidence, the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, which came into force w. e. f. 15-8-1950, would have no application to the present case. Section 73 of the Dhar State Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (No. 1) of 1940-41 provides for succession when a male Raiyat Pattedar tenant dies. According to the provisions of the said Act, interest in the holding would devolve in accordance with the order of succession provided in the section. For ready reference, section 73 of the Act is quoted hereinbelow. 73. When a male raiyat pattedar tenant dies his interest in the holding shall devolve in accordance with the order of succession given below :-rder of Succession. Provided that the heir lives in the same village in which the deceased tenant lived or in which the land is situated unless specially permitted by such revenue authority as may be prescribed by rules under section 81 to live elsewhere; provided further that if there are more heirs than one of the same degree, one who was living with the deceased would be given preference, if such heirs are more than one, all shall share equally. ( 5. ) WIDOW of a male Raiyat Pattedar tenant was described as a Class-II heir, therefore, Radhibai succeeded to her husbands interests till her death or remarriage. Obviously, widow of a male Raiyat Pattedar tenant would acquire only a limited interest, a concept recognized under the Hindu Law. Under the hindu Law, a widow succeeding as a heir only took limited estate in the property inherited by her. Obviously, widow of a male Raiyat Pattedar tenant would acquire only a limited interest, a concept recognized under the Hindu Law. Under the hindu Law, a widow succeeding as a heir only took limited estate in the property inherited by her. The only exception in certain cases was provided under Bombay school of Mitakshara which was applicable to the Western India. The Mitakshara law is sub divided into four minor schools viz, Benares school; Mithila school; maharashtra or. Bombay School (Western India) and Dravida or Madras school (Southern India ). The Benares school covered practically the whole northern india except Punjab where the Mitakshara School had certain points being considerably modified by custom. It is not in dispute that parties in this case are governed by Benares school of Mitakshara. Under the Benares school of mitakshara, a female succeeding as an heir took only a limited estate in the property prior to coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It was also settled that a female heir could not become the "last full owner" and could not become a "fresh stock of descent", therefore, upon her death, the property would revert to the next heir of the last full owner i. e. her husband as is clear from the illustration given under Article 27 of the Mullas Hindu Law (Seventeenth edition), who are technically known as reversioners. This is exactly what has been provided under section 73 of the Act, therefore, upon death of Bheraji, radhibai had only a widows limited estate in the property and after her death, suit land had to revert back to the reversioners and not to the female heirs of radhibai. Thus, it is clear that the impugned judgment and decree does not run counter to section 74 of the Act. In view of the foregoing discussion, the answer to the question No. 1 has to be in negative. ( 6. ) IN this view of the matter, the second question pales into insignificance because plaintiffs were lawfully in possession being the reversioners of Bheraji and they were wrongfully dispossessed by the orders of the revenue authorities. Thus, the lower Appellate Court has rightly allowed the suit and directed delivery of possession of the suit land together with mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 500/-per year from 7-10-1970. ( 7. Thus, the lower Appellate Court has rightly allowed the suit and directed delivery of possession of the suit land together with mesne profit at the rate of Rs. 500/-per year from 7-10-1970. ( 7. ) NOW coming to the 3rd question, it may be stated that, in fact, it is not a substantial question of law as has been clarified by the Supreme Court in Santosh hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965 . That apart, after going through the judgment and the evidence on record, it could not be said that neither it is a case of misreading of evidence nor a case where inadmissible evidence was taken into account leading to miscarriage of justice. This question, therefore, has to be answered in favour of the respondents that the lower Appellate Court considered the material evidence before allowing the appeal in favour of the respondents. ( 8. ) IN the result, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.