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2007 DIGILAW 843 (AP)

E. Vijayachandra Reddy v. Dr. Prasad and others

2007-09-06

T.CH.SURYA RAO

body2007
ORDER Inasmuch as these revision petitions are directed against a common judgment dated 05-06-2006 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in 9.A.Nos.214, 215 and 216 of 2003, they can be disposed of together. 2. The unsuccessful landlord is the revision petitioner. He filed R.C.C.Nos.122, 124 and 125 of 2000 against the respondents herein seeking eviction. He is now seeking to assail the concurrent findings of both the fora. 3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The demised premises bearing Nos.3-4-468/6 and 2A, 3-4-468/3 and 3-4-468/5 situate at Lingampally, Barkatpura, Hyderabad, were owned originally by Smt.R.Radha Datar. She let out those premises under an oral lease to Dr.A.Prasad, M/s.Prabhu Stores represented by M.Visweshwara Rao and Mr.G.Nagaiah the respondents in the above referred eviction petitions respectively. The quantum of rent agreed upon by them was Rs.4001-, RS.300/and Rs.300/- respectively, exclusive of electricity charges to be paid on or before fifth of every succeeding month. The petitioner purchased the said premises under a registered sale deed dated 10-02-2000 from the said Radha Datar. The tenancy was attorned in favour of the petitioner by all the respondents. While so, the respondents paid rents up to October, 1999 and thereafter committed default. The petitioner has been running the business in STD, ISD, PCO, Fax etc., under the name and style of EVC Reddy Communications in rented premises taken for that purpose. He does not own any property in the twin cities except the mulgies purchased by him. On the premises that the respondents committed default and he require them for his personal occupation he sought eviction of the tenants. 4. It is the case of the respondents that the previous landlady Radha Datar collected rents for the period ending February, 2000 when sent by money orders and there were no dues payable and that on the first date of appearance before the Rent Controller they tendered rent to the petitioner for the months of March and April 2000, but the petitioner and his counsel refused to receive the said amount and that thereafter they sent rents from March 2000 onwards by money order, which were returned with endorsement 'returned' and therefore there was no default. It is their further case that the eviction petitions having been filed within three months from the date of sale and as the petitioner secured an alternative accommodation they are not maintainable 5. It is their further case that the eviction petitions having been filed within three months from the date of sale and as the petitioner secured an alternative accommodation they are not maintainable 5. The learned Rent Controller framed common points for consideration in all the three cases as under: (i) Whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction of the respondent on the ground of wilful default in payment of rents.' (ii) Whether the eviction petition is not maintainable as alleged by the respondent? (iii) Whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction of the respondent on the ground of personal requirement? 6. Evidence was adduced on either side, both oral and documentary. At the culmination of enquiry, the learned Rent Controller having reached the conclusion that since there had been no assignment of the right to collect arrears under the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner for the period in between October, 1999 to February, 2000 it was not a case of default and that the eviction petitions were not maintainable having been filed within three months from the date of purchase and that the alleged requirement of the petitioner for personal occupation was not genuine and bona fide eventually by separate orders of even date viz., 30-06-2003 dismissed the eviction petitions. The appellate court concurred with the said findings and under the impugned common judgment dismissed all the three appeals. 7. The eviction of the tenants was sought on twin grounds of bona fide personal requirement and wilful default. Admittedly, the premises in question are non-residential mulgies. The respondents resisted the petitions mainly on the ground of maintainability as stated herein above while denying the allegation of wilful default. 8. Either on the ground that the petitioner secured an alternative accommodation of his own, or on the ground that the eviction petitions having been filed within three months from the date of purchase in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Section 10 (3) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (for short 'the Act'), the petitioner cannot seek eviction. 9. The provisions germane in the context for consideration are Section 10 subsections (2) and (3) which in so far as relevant for the present purposes may be extracted hereunder thus: "10. 9. The provisions germane in the context for consideration are Section 10 subsections (2) and (3) which in so far as relevant for the present purposes may be extracted hereunder thus: "10. Eviction of tenants:- (1) A tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of this Section or Sections 12 and 13: (2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied- (i) that the tenant not Raid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable: or (ii) .......................................... (iii) .......................................... (iv) .......................................... (v) ........................................... (vi) ........................................... The Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and if the Controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application: (3) (a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- (i) in case it is a residential building- (a) if the landlord is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation; (b) if the landlord who has more buildings than one in the city, town or village concerned is in occupation of one such building and he bona fide requires another building instead, for his own occupation; (ii) ................................. (iii) in case it is any other nonresidential building, if the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise: (a) for the purpose of a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application; or (b) for the purpose of a business which in the opinion of the Controller, the landlord bona fide proposes to commence: Provided that a person who becomes a landlord after the commencement of the tenancy by an instrument inter vivos shall not be entitled to apply under this clause before the expiry of three months from the date on which the instrument was registered: Provided further that, where a landlord has obtained possession of a building under this clause he shall not be entitled to apply again under this Clause, - (i) in case he has obtained possession of a residential building, for possession of another residential building of his own; (ii) in case he has obtained possession of a non-residential building, for possession of another non-residential building of his own." [Emphasis is mine] 10. From a perusal of the above excerpted provision it is obvious that the effect of infraction of the provisions of Section 10 (3) of the Act applies only when the eviction is sought for by the subsequent purchaser of the demised premises on the ground of personal requirement. It has no application when the eviction is sought on the ground of wilful default under Section 10 (2) of the Act. The legal position is clear on bare perusal of the Sections 10 (2) and 10 (3) of the Act. Sri M.V.Suresh Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner, fairly concedes that the petitioner cannot succeed on the ground of bona fide personal requirement and seeks to contend that there has been default on the part of the tenants at least for a period of two months. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in two sets represent that there has been no default on the part of the tenant. 12. Before adverting to the contentious issue of default, it is expedient to notice certain facts which are discernible from the record for an effective adjudication. The tenancy in this case was admittedly oral. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in two sets represent that there has been no default on the part of the tenant. 12. Before adverting to the contentious issue of default, it is expedient to notice certain facts which are discernible from the record for an effective adjudication. The tenancy in this case was admittedly oral. The quantum of rent payable is not in dispute. The petitioner is the subsequent purchaser. The sale deed was registered on 16-02-2000, although it was executed on 10-02-2000. The erstwhile landlady sent a letter dated 08-02-2000 to the tenants separately. EX.P-1 is the copy of the letter dated 08-02-2000 sent by her to the respondents by post. A copy thereof was also marked to the petitioner. The tenants were informed inter alia in the said notice that she sold away the demised mulgies to the petitioner and asked them to pay monthly rents to the purchaser and that they paid rents upto September/ October, 1999 and thereafter committed default and as such they were requested to pay arrears of rent to the petitioner. Admittedly EX.P-1 notice was received by all the three tenants under separate acknowledgments. It is averred inter alia in the sale deed executed in favour of the petitioner in Para 2 that the tenants in the schedule property were not paying rents regularly and had committed wilful default and the vendee shall be at liberty to initiate eviction proceedings on the ground of wilful default for the period preceding the sale deed. Obviously, the document does not contain any covenant assigning the right to recover the arrears while giving symbolical possession of the premises to the petitioner. The quantum of arrears too has not been mentioned therein. When the sale deed was executed on 10-02-2000, EX.P-1'notice was addressed on 08-02-2000, a couple of days earlier thereto. 13. The petitioner in his evidence in R.C.C. No.122/2000 produced Exs.P-3 and P-4 M.O. Acknowledgments containing the space for communication. While under EX.P-3 the rents for the months of June, July and August, 1999 were sent by the respondent, under EX.P-4 he sent the money order towards the rent for the month of September, 1999. Exs.P-3 and P-4 acknowledgments buttress clearly the statement of fact made inter alia in Ex. P-1 intimation that the rents were paid till September, 1999. While under EX.P-3 the rents for the months of June, July and August, 1999 were sent by the respondent, under EX.P-4 he sent the money order towards the rent for the month of September, 1999. Exs.P-3 and P-4 acknowledgments buttress clearly the statement of fact made inter alia in Ex. P-1 intimation that the rents were paid till September, 1999. His evidence is well neigh the same in the other two eviction petitions. 14. R.W.1 deposed in his evidence that he sent rents for the months of December, 1999 to February, 2000 by money order to Smt.R.Radha Datar. EX.R-1 is the postal receipt filed in proof thereof and EX.R-2 is the M.O. acknowledgment under which she received the amount towards rent for the months of December, 1999 and January and February, 2000. There is no other evidence on record to show that the rents for the months of October and November are paid either in cash or by money order. It is obvious therefore that there has been non-payment of rents for these two months and the consequent default apart from the case of the petitioner that Exs.R-1 and R-2 are brought up for the purpose and his vendor did not receive the rents. 15. The respondent in R.C.C. NO.124 of 2000 received Ex. P-1 notice dated 08-02-2000 under EX.P-2 acknowledgment on 29-02-2000. In EX.P-1 it was specifically mentioned that he paid rents at the rate of Rs.300/- per month exclusive of electricity charges till October, 1999. Under Exs.P-3 to P-6 M.O. acknowledgments he paid rents to the former owner for the months of June to October 1999. This evidence is in conformity with the specific averment made inter alia in EX.P-1 in regard thereto. However, he received the original of EX.P-1 on 29-02-2000. Obviously, by the date of EX.P-1 notice dated 08-02-2000, the respondent did not pay the rent for the months of November & December, 1999 and January, 2000. According to the evidence of R.W.1, he paid rents up to February, 2000 to the former owner by M.O. and sent the rent for the month of March, 2000 by M.O. to the petitioner who refused the same. His evidence further shows that he sent rent by money order on 16-12-1999 as per•Ex.R-1 M.O. acknowledgment which was returned with endorsement as 'payee out of station'. His evidence further shows that he sent rent by money order on 16-12-1999 as per•Ex.R-1 M.O. acknowledgment which was returned with endorsement as 'payee out of station'. Again when he sent rent on 31-12-1999 which too was returned with the endorsement as 'payee out of station'; as per EX.R-3. EX.R-4 money order coupon containing space for communication shows that for the months of November & December, 1999 and January, 2000 the rent is being sent with a request to accept the same by any responsible person. EX.R-5 shows that rents for the months of November & December, 1999 and January & February, 2000 were sent on 18-02-2000, and received by the former owner. The petitioner denied the same. It has been suggested in the cross-examination of R.W.1 that Exs.R-1 to R5 were created for the purpose of the case and the former owner never received the money orders. As can be seen from Ex. R-S the rents for the months of November & December, 1999 and January & February, 2000 were clearly received under Ex.R-5-acknowledgment on 22-02-2000 by Smt. Radha Datar. Therefore, there has been no default. 16. The respondent in R.C.C.No.12S of 2000 was shown to have paid the rents till October, 1999 at the rate of Rs.300/- per month and thereafter committed default as per EX.P-1 notice. EX.P-1 was received by him on 28-02-2000. Exs.P-3, P-4 and P-S, M.O. acknowledgments show that the rents were sent by money order for the months of August, September, and October, 1999. They are in conformity with the recital in Ex. P-1 However, R.W.1 in his evidence stated that vendor of the petitioner received rents up to February, 2000 when sent by M.O. According to his evidence when he sent rents as per EX.R-1 postal receipt and EX.R-2 acknowledgment and as per EX.R-3 M.O. acknowledgment and EX.R-4 relevant postal receipt they were returned with endorsement as 'payee absent' and that when he sent rent by Money Order to the former owner she received it under EX.R-S M.O acknowledgment. The amount sent under this document was Rs.300/- on 29-02-2000. On the right side top of this document underneath the date, it has been written with a separate ink as under: "the rent for the month of February Rs.300/- only and paid rent for the months of November & December, 1999 and January, 2000 in cash send receipt." 17. The amount sent under this document was Rs.300/- on 29-02-2000. On the right side top of this document underneath the date, it has been written with a separate ink as under: "the rent for the month of February Rs.300/- only and paid rent for the months of November & December, 1999 and January, 2000 in cash send receipt." 17. Ex.R-6 is the postal receipt for M.O. for Rs.300/-.and Ex.R-7 is the M.O. acknowledgement dated 09-11-1999 for Rs.300/- received by the former owner towards rent for the month of October, 1999. Insofar as Exs.R-6 and R-7 are concerned, since it is an admitted case that rents were paid up to the month of October, 1999 they need no further proof. R.W.1 in his evidence stated that the vendor of the petitioner collected rents up to February, 2000 through money order, which appears to be not correct as per Ex.R-5. In the cross-examination of R.W.1 it was suggested that Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-7 were created for the purpose of the case. In view of the denial, it becomes the plain obligation of the tenant to prove the payment of rents by examining the former owner of the premises particularly Ex.R-5 having regard to the doubtful nature of the writings made on the right side top of it. At least for the months of November & December, 1999 and January, 2000 the tenant failed to prove before the Rent Controller that he paid the rent in cash. Therefore, there is a clear default for those three months. 18. The burden obviously was wrongly placed on the petitioner by the learned Rent Controller. It is for the tenant to show the payment of rents when denied by the landlord or the subsequent purchaser of the landlord. The learned Rent Controller seems to have written the judgment in R.C.C.No.122 of 2000 in the first instance and the said judgment has been copied in the other two cases. All the three judgments are verbatim the same. The approach of the learned Rent Controller in having not discussed the three cases separately particularly when there is slight difference in the alleged payment of rents and copying the judgment written in one case in the remaining two cases is not expected of and such an approach is not correct. All the three judgments are verbatim the same. The approach of the learned Rent Controller in having not discussed the three cases separately particularly when there is slight difference in the alleged payment of rents and copying the judgment written in one case in the remaining two cases is not expected of and such an approach is not correct. As discussed hereinabove in R.C.C. No.122 of 2000, there appears to be a clear default for a period of two months. In R.C.C. No.125 of 2000 there appears to be a clear default for three months. Rents for the above periods were not shown to have been paid as discussed herein above either to the erstwhile landlady or to the present landlord. 19. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in N.M. Engineering and another v. Narender and Noor v. Sheikh G.S.lbrahim, the learned appellate Court was of the view that the landlord could not initiate proceedings against the respondents for recovery of arrears of rent and therefore the eviction petitions on the ground of wilful default for the period prior to the sale was not maintainable. The appellate Court which is the final Court of fact also has not considered the individual cases of the respondents to see whether there has been any default or not. Both the Courts ignored Ex.P-1 notices where under conspicuously and eminently the tenants were asked to pay the arrears to the petitioner. 20. Thus there has been a clear default in payment of rents by the respondents in R.C.C. Nos.122 and 125 of 2000 for some period preceding the sale. That default on the part of the tenants would enure to the benefit of the petitioner or not is a moot question. 21. In Appa Rao v. Salimunnisa Bibi it was pointed out that there was nothing in the wording of Section 7 (2) (i) of the Madras Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act compels the view that the arrears should have been the rents due to the landlord who applies for eviction after his purchase from the previous landlord and that the Section does not insist or require that the arrears should have been due to the applicant and it is sufficient that the rent had not been paid or tendered by the tenant within fifteen days of the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy. It has been further pointed out that the right to evict an erring tenant was not a personal right peculiar to landlord so as to be unavailable to his heir or legatee or a purchaser from him. In the process the learned Judge sought to place reliance upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Kamte Mullick v. Jyotish Mukherjee" and had taken the view that a default by a tenant in payment of rent was not limited in its effect so as to be available only to a person who at the time of the default was the landlord. 22. In Charu Bala Das v. Madhusudhan the Court held thus: "It may be that the rent for the first half of March, 1951 was really payable to the plaintiff's transferor Sahajadi Begum, who was the previous landlord but that, as held by me in the recent case of 'Manmatha Nath Joardar v. Sasanka Mohan Guha (96 Cal. L.J.53 (A), would not make any difference and that default also would be available to the transferee landlord, namely, the present plaintiff" 23. Although a divergent view has been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Daya Debi v. Chapala Debi eventually by placing reliance upon an unreported judgment of the Apex Court in Ramachander Narsey & Co. v. Waman Rao v. Shenoy this Court in Satti Krishna Reddy v. Nallamilli Venkata Reddy and another was of the eventual view that the petition for eviction was maintainable at the instance of the purchaser. 24. The Apex Court in Satti Krishna Reddy v. Nallamilli Venkata Reddy and another did not approve the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Daya Debi's case supra and it was held thus: "It does appear to me that this view is not correct because it is difficult to see how a claim for arrears of rent ceases to be such when it is assigned by the owner when he transfers his properties to another. So far as the tenant is concerned, the amount remains payable by him to the successor landlord as arrears of rent because that is his own liability and it does not acquire any other character. So far as the tenant is concerned, the amount remains payable by him to the successor landlord as arrears of rent because that is his own liability and it does not acquire any other character. And so also when the successor landlord claims the amount assigned to him his cause of action against the tenant would be for arrears of rent because there is no other basis on which he found his cause of action against the tenant." 25. In Giridharilal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Hukam Singh and others the point involved was as to whether transferee is entitled to the rent due before the transfer of the property in his favour. Going by the proviso to Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act the Apex Court was of the view that unless there is a contract to the contrary, the transferee is ordinarily not entitled. 26. In Vinayak Mahadeo Nirgum v. Sadanand Shantaram Bandekar it was held that the transferee landlord was not entitled to recover the rent due prior to the date of transfer as arrears of rent and seek eviction under the Act on that ground and the same would be a debt due and recovered by filing a separate suit. 27. In N. M. Engineer and others v. Narendera Singh Virdi and another in para 22 it was held thus: "In view of the proviso, the appellant assignee is not entitled to rent before the assignment. The rent is merely a debt." Again in para 23 it was held thus: "Therefore, whatever might have been due prior to deed of lease dated 08-06-1967, could not constitute arrears of rent. It was mere actionable claim. " The Apex Court did not consider its earlier judgments in Ramachander Narsey & Co.'s case and Satti Krishna Reddy's case referred to above (7 and 8 supra). 28. In Sheikh Noor and another v. Sheikh G.S. Ibrahim the Apex Court referred all its earlier judgments and sought to explain its earlier judgment in N. M. Engineer's case (12 supra) in para 16 thus: "This Court again held that in the absence of any assignment of the rent in favour of the transferee, the assignee is not entitled to the rent due before the assignment. Negatively, it means that if there was an assignment of the arrears then the same could be recovered as arrears of rent by the subsequent transferee landlord." That was a case where one Mohd. Yahya let out the premises to the appellant in the year 1946.and migrated to Pakistan. He carne to India in the year 1947 and collected the arrears of rent. For future, he directed the appellants to pay the rents to one Fatima Bee. The appellants were paying rents accordingly. In the meanwhile, the Municipal Council, Bhusawal brought the demised premises for sale for recovery of arrears of tax. Fatima Bee purchased the house in the auction on 15.04.1976. Later, she transferred the premises in favour of the respondent on 15.04.1976. On 16.04.1976 she addressed a communication to the appellants informing them about the transfer and directed them to pay the arrears of rent due prior to the transfer. The respondents thereafter issued a notice to the tenants calling upon to pay the rents. The appellants refused to recognize the respondents. On the above matrix, the question arose as to whether the arrears prior to transfer being a debt due could not be recovered. Having regard to the fact that Fatima Bee in her communication to the appellants informed them about the transfer and specifically mentioned therein that the landlord would be entitled to recover the rents due from them, the Apex Court was of the view that there had been assignment of arrears of rent due. It was held following Satti Krishna Reddy's case (8 supra) and Judgments of other High Courts and having regard to the provisions of Bombay Rents Hot6~ and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 in para 18 thus: "In our opinion the correct position of law is that a transferee is not entitled to recover the arrears as rent for the property on transfer unless the right to recover the arrears is also transferred. If right to recover the arrears is assigned, then the transferee landlord can recover those arrears as ren1 and if not paid, maintain a petition for eviction under the rent laws for those arrears as well." [Emphasis is mine] Under the Bombay Act, if the right to recover the arrears is assigned, then the transferee can recover the arrears as rent and if not paid maintain a petition for eviction which is peculiar to that Act. 29. 29. The Act undoubtedly is a self-contained and complete code in itself. It is a beneficial legislation seeking to protect the tenants from unreasonable eviction. Section 10 (1) of the Act mandates that tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions contained therein and Sections 12 and 13. Sub-section (2) thereof enables the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant when he commits default; when he sub-leases the demised premises without the written consent of the landlord; when he uses the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased; when he commits any acts of waste which may likely to impair materially the value or utility of the demised premises; when he is guilty of acts and conduct which are a nuisance to the occupiers of other portions in the same building or in the buildings of the neighborhood; when he secures an alternative building; when he ceases to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause; when he denies the title of the landlord. If the rent Controller is satisfied that the tenant has committed anyone of the above acts enjoined under clauses (i) to (vi) he shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. 30. Under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act a landlord can seek the eviction of the tenant from the demised premises when the building is required, which is either residential or non-residential for personal occupation of the landlord bona fide. Even in such cases, if the landlord has his own nonresidential premises in the town and village in which the demised premises is situate of his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to, in such an event, he cannot seek eviction of the tenant. Under Section 12 of the Act the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant when the demised premises is required for carrying out repairs or alterations or additions or for reconstructions. But, such a right of the landlord is qualified by the condition that he shall furnish an undertaking that the building on completion of repairs, alterations, additions or construction will be offered to the tenant for his occupation before the expiry of the period that may be fixed by the Controller in this behalf. 31. But, such a right of the landlord is qualified by the condition that he shall furnish an undertaking that the building on completion of repairs, alterations, additions or construction will be offered to the tenant for his occupation before the expiry of the period that may be fixed by the Controller in this behalf. 31. Therefore, under the scheme of the Act it seeks to protect the interests of a tenant. At the same time, the Act obligates the tenant to pay rents regularly to the landlord. The tenant shall tender the rent due by him within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy or in the absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month, next following that for which the rent is payable. The obligation to pay the rent is mandatory with a right to insist a receipt from the landlord and in the event of any evasion on the part of the landlord, he is obliged to ask the landlord to name the bank so as to deposit the rents and in situations where the address of the landlord is not known or there is any doubt bona fide as to who is the person who is entitled to receive the rent, he is obliged to follow the procedure envisaged under Section 9 of the Act. 32. While seeking to protect the tenant I from unlawful eviction from the demised premises, the Act thus casts an obligation, upon him to pay the rent regularly as can be seen from the scheme of the Act. When the tenant deviates from this obligation, the protection afforded to him under the Act will cease and he ceases to be a statutory tenant. This situation cannot be altered even when the premises is sold by the former owner to another person, the purchaser thereof. 33. The problem also requires to be examined in different dimensions. Under the A.P. Rent Control Act, the tenant can be sought to be evicted not only on the ground of default or bona fide requirement for personal occupation, but also on anyone of the grounds enjoined under clauses (i) to (vi) of subsection (2). These acts of the tenant obviously give a right to the landlord to file the eviction petition notwithstanding the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. These acts of the tenant obviously give a right to the landlord to file the eviction petition notwithstanding the protection afforded to the tenant under the Act. In my considered view, if the tenant commits anyone of these acts earlier to the transfer, certainly he can file an eviction petition qua the tenant and the Controller has no option except to order eviction on being satisfied. It is not discernable from the Act that these grounds are not available to a subsequent purchaser of the demised premises. I see no reason to isolate the ground of default among the other enjoined under clauses (i) to (vi) of sub-section (2) of Section 10 and deny the subsequent purchaser the right to apply to the Controller for eviction of the tenant who is a chronic defaulter on the ground that there has been no assignment of the right to recover the arears. 34. Taking a hypothetical situation where the tenant commits wilful default in paying rents for a considerable period. The landlord who filed a suit for recovery of the arrears, having been vexed with the supine indifference exhibited by the tenant, sells away the demised premises to another, the conduct exhibited by the tenant will not be wiped out and his status of chronic defaulter remains unaltered notwithstanding the fact that the previous owner has not assigned the right to recover the arrears to the subsequent purchaser. It is true that even if the tenant is a chronic defaulter and fallen due for a considerable period and if rents once paid are received by the landlord without protest, that would constitute a waiver on the part of the landlord, but so long as the previous owner has not waived by accepting the arrears, although the tenant committed default in paying rents earlier, I do not see any reason as to why the subsequent purchaser cannot maintain an action for eviction regardless of the fact that right to collect arrears has not been assigned in his favour. 35. A clear distinction shall have to be drawn in between the right to recover arrears and the right to lay an action for eviction on the ground of wilful default. The former is governed by the common law and the latter is obviously within the realm of Rent legislation. 35. A clear distinction shall have to be drawn in between the right to recover arrears and the right to lay an action for eviction on the ground of wilful default. The former is governed by the common law and the latter is obviously within the realm of Rent legislation. The provisions of the Transfer of Property Act obviously govern the rights and liabilities in between a landlord and tenant in the absence of any contract to the contrary in between the parties inter se or in the absence of any special legislation which govern the rights and liabilities in between the landlord and tenant. The Act is obviously a special legislation on the point. 36. The arrears of rent due by a tenant to the previous owner even in the absence of any assignment of the right to recover the same in favour of the subsequent purchaser by the former owner, remain unaltered as arrears and cannot metamorphose into a debt or actionable claim. The general law as enjoined under Section 109 of the Transfer of Property Act that the subsequent purchaser has no right to collect the arrears from his vendor in the absence of any assignment of that right which is obviously subject to a contract to the contrary cannot operate in the field where the rent legislation operates. Under the T.P. Act no protection is afforded to a tenant from unlawful eviction unlike under the provisions of the Act. Similarly, the Act has not envisaged any provision for recovery of the arrears of rent which again is a common law right and a suit can be laid for that purpose. It is no doubt true that under Section 11 (4) of the Act the Controller can direct the tenant to deposit the rents for the period preceding the eviction petition and for the period subsequent thereto as well. But such a direction can be given only when an eviction petition is filed by the landlord and its pending adjudication before him. 37. The meaning of the' expressions 'tenant' and 'landlord' is germane to be noticed in this context. Clauses (9) and (6) of Section 2 of the Act define these expressions. The definition of landlord is an inclusive definition. 37. The meaning of the' expressions 'tenant' and 'landlord' is germane to be noticed in this context. Clauses (9) and (6) of Section 2 of the Act define these expressions. The definition of landlord is an inclusive definition. It includes not only the owner of a building, but also a person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of the demised premises, either on his own account, on account of another person, either on behalf of himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or even the tenant who sub-leases the premises to another. The expression 'tenant' means a person by whom or on whose account the rent is payable and includes surviving legal heirs. It is obvious that the definition of landlord is wide and inclusive. A person who is entitled to receive nay authorized to receive for the purposes of the Act is a landlord. Having regard to the definition of 'landlord' enjoined under Section 2 (6) of the Act the petitioner who has been authorized to receive the rents as discussed hereinabove became the landlord on 08-02-2000 itself. 38. Corning to the matrix of the case, under EX.P-1 notice, which was drafted a couple of days earlier to the sale, the respondents were specifically requested to pay the arrears of rent to the petitioner by the erstwhile owner of the building. In other words, the petitioner is authorized to receive the arrears of rent. Further more, under Ex.P-8, the sale deed, while giving symbolic possession of the demised premises the petitioner was given liberty to initiate eviction proceedings on the ground of wilful default committed by the respondents for the period preceding the sale deed. It is, therefore, not only a case where the petitioner was authorized to receive the rents even before the sale in his favour nay he was given opportunity to initiate eviction proceedings against the tenant for the default committed by them. In view of the Judgment of the Apex Court in Sheik Noor's case referred to (2 and 13 supra) the request made by the former owner inter alia in EX.P-1 notices to the respondents tantamount eminently to assignment of the right to recover arrears. 39. As discussed hereinabove, in R.C.C.No.122 of 2000 and R.C.C.No.125 of 2000 obviously there are arrears which remained unpaid to the previous landlord. 39. As discussed hereinabove, in R.C.C.No.122 of 2000 and R.C.C.No.125 of 2000 obviously there are arrears which remained unpaid to the previous landlord. In R.C.C.No.124 of 2000 the arrears seem to have been paid to previous landlord as the tenant did not know about the transfer by the date of such payment by money order. The tenant is not liable to pay again to the subsequent purchaser as per Section 109 of the T.P. Act. Therefore there has been clear default on the part of the respondents in R.C.C.Nos.122 and 125 of 2000, which entitles the consequence of eviction, unlike in the case of the respondent in R.C.C.No.124 of 2000. 40. For the above reasons, the Revision Petition Nos.4304 and 4306 of 2006 are allowed. The Revision Petition No.4305 of 2006 is dismissed, but, under the circumstances, without costs. The respondents are given four months time from the date of this order for eviction.