Judgment :- Aggrieved over the dismissal of the Interlocutory Application filed by the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 claiming that the Plaint is barred by limitation, this CRP has been filed. .2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:- .The revision petitioner/defendant filed the I.A.No: 91 of 2006 contending that the respondent/plaintiffs promissory suit has to be filed within three years from the date of the promissory note i.e., within 16. 2005. Though the plaintiff filed the suit on 13. 2005 within the period of limitation, yet filed the same with deficit court fee and for that purpose, the plaint was returned with a direction to represent the same within 23. 2005 with proper court fee. However, the plaintiff represented the plaint with full court fees on 12. 2006 without affording any reason. Even in the I.A.No.15 of 2006 taken out to condone the delay in representing the petition, no explanation has been offered for payment of court fee belatedly. Since there is no specific application under Section 149 CPC to pay the deficit court fee belatedly and there being no order under Section 149 CPC permitting the plaintiff to pay the deficit court fee, the Plaint is barred by time and liable to be rejected. 3. The respondent/plaintiff contested the said I.A., stating that though the plaint has been initially returned for deficit court fee, the same has been taken on file on representation of the Plaint with proper court fee, after condoning the delay of 312 days in representing the plaint. The defendant has not even filed any counter to the condone delay application filed by the plaintiff and having kept silent, he cannot now contend that the plaint is barred by limitation. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam, dismissed the application holding that the delay has been condoned in I.A.No:15 of 2006 and therefore the plaint does not suffer from bar of limitation. Aggrieved over the said decision, this CRP has been filed by the defendant. .5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner/defendant relied on the judgment of this court in S.V. Arjunaraja Vs. Aggrieved over the said decision, this CRP has been filed by the defendant. .5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner/defendant relied on the judgment of this court in S.V. Arjunaraja Vs. P. Vasantha, reported in 2005 (5) CTC 401 , wherein a learned Judge of this Court held that in the absence of specific application invoking Section 149 CPC and in the absence of any specific order passed by the court granting or extending time for payment or enlargement the plaintiff is not protected and the suit is liable to be rejected. Learned counsel contended that the above decision squarely applies on all fours and prayed for rejection of the plaint. 6. Section 148 CPC is for enlargement of time for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code and the court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period not exceeding thirty days in total even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. 7. Section 149 CPC deals with the power to make up deficiency of court fees and the Section provides that the Court in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable shall have the same force and effect as it such fee had been paid in the first instance. 8. Section 151 CPC deals with inherent powers of the Court which enables the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. 9. It is seen, the plaintiff has not filed any application under Section 149 CPC, seeking time to pay the deficit Court Fee and the Court has also not recorded any reason, for granting extension of time, that too, for payment of deficit Court Fee. Because of the slackness and failure of duty, by the Court, after the period of limitation is over for filing the suit, Court Fee came to be paid on 12. Because of the slackness and failure of duty, by the Court, after the period of limitation is over for filing the suit, Court Fee came to be paid on 12. 2006, thereby, compelling the defendant to take a stand, that on the date of payment of entire Court Fee, the suit was barred by limitation and the deficit Court Fee paid will not save the limitation, since, admittedly, on the date of filing of the suit, entire Court Fee has not been paid. In this view alone, as stated above, invoking Order VII Rule 11(c) C.P.C., petition was filed by the defendant, not accepted by the trial Court. In this context, we have to see certain provisions, which are to be followed, while admitting the plaint, especially when sufficient Court Fees was not paid. 10. Section 148 of Code of Civil Procedure, empowers the Court to grant time or enlargement of time, wherein also, the period is restricted, viz., not exceeding 30 days, in total. Therefore, the Court has no power to grant extension of time, under Section 148 CPC, for the payment of Court Fee and in fact, this provision may not be applicable for extending the time for payment of Court Fee and the appropriate provision must be Section 149 CPC. Section 149 of the Code reads: "Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fee has not been paid, the Court, may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance". (emphasis supplied) Under this provision, the Court has every power, to allow the plaintiff to pay the court-fee in whole or in part at any stage, and on payment of such court-fee, it will have the same force and effect, as if, such fee had been paid in the first instance. (emphasis supplied) Under this provision, the Court has every power, to allow the plaintiff to pay the court-fee in whole or in part at any stage, and on payment of such court-fee, it will have the same force and effect, as if, such fee had been paid in the first instance. In this view, if the Court had granted time, invoking Section 149 of the Code, then, the defendant cannot have any grievance, the position being, on payment of the deficit court-fee, it will have the same force and effect, as if, such fee had been paid in the first instance itself, though on the date of payment of the court-fee, the suit might have been barred by limitation, thereby, saving the limitation itself. 11. Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code, catalogue the grounds, on which a plaint could be rejected and one of the grounds i.e. (c), reads: "where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; By introducing a proviso by Act 104 of 1976, a duty is cast upon the Court to record reasons, while granting the time and the proviso reads: "Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-papers shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp papers, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff". (emphasis supplied) Thus, it is implied, when the plaintiff was unable to pay the requisite court-fee, he should invoke Section 149 of the CPC and upon invoking that section, the Court may extend the time, for the reasons to be recorded, not otherwise. (emphasis supplied) Thus, it is implied, when the plaintiff was unable to pay the requisite court-fee, he should invoke Section 149 of the CPC and upon invoking that section, the Court may extend the time, for the reasons to be recorded, not otherwise. It is stated in the proviso, the Court shall not extend the time, without assigning and recording the reasons, thereby showing, if time has been granted, without any application or without recording the reasons, it is not valid, under law, since it would offend and infringe, not only Section 149 of the Code, but also the above said proviso. In this view, if the Court had extended time, without recording reason, without the plaintiff seeking time to pay court-fee, assigning reason, then, that extension, itself, should be held illegal and if it is so, if any court-fee is paid later on, that will not have the effect as if, such court-fee had been paid in the first instance, as saved in Section 149 of the Code. 12. In the case on hand, admittedly, as disclosed by the records, at least, no application has been filed, at any point of time, though nearly 10 months had been extended, without seeking time for payment of court-fee, assigning reasons and the Court also has not extended the time for payment of court-fee, recording the reason, as contemplated under the proviso to Rule 11 of Order VII of the Code. 13. For non-payment of court fees, generally, one occasion alone, time should be given and if the plaintiff is unable to pay the required court fees, even after the first return, then, it is incumbent upon him to make an application and seek time and the Court, satisfying itself, should grant time for payment of the deficit court fees. The court should not extend the time, mechanically, for payment of deficit court fees. After giving an opportunity, if the plaintiff has not paid the court fee, as observed by the Apex Court, if there was failure to comply with the direction of the Court, the memorandum of the appeal should be dismissed, which procedure should have alone been followed in this case, which was also not followed. After giving an opportunity, if the plaintiff has not paid the court fee, as observed by the Apex Court, if there was failure to comply with the direction of the Court, the memorandum of the appeal should be dismissed, which procedure should have alone been followed in this case, which was also not followed. In this view also, in my opinion, the subsequent extension of time by the trial Court, blindly, is not a valid extension of time and therefore, even if the Court fees is paid, on the alleged invalid extension of time, certainly, that will not save the limitation, as provided under Section 149 CPC, which can be seen from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in K. NATARAJAN vs. P.K. RAJASEKARAN [ (2003) 2 M.L.J. 305 ]. 14. In the said decision, the Division Bench of this Court has considered the effect of non-payment of deficit court fee, within the period of limitation, as well as, how the extension of time should be given, if the deficit court fee has to be paid, after the period of limitation is over. Analysing the previous rulings, including the Full Bench decision of this Court (in (1909) Volume XXXII ILR 305), relied on by the respondent/plaintiff, this Court has framed various guidelines and the relevant guidelines for the purpose of this case, are: "(1) .... .(2) .... .(3) Whenever a plaint is received, the same shall be verified and if found to be not in order, the same shall be returned at least on the third day (excluding the date of presentation so also the intervening holidays). .(4) If the suit is presented on the last date of limitation affixing less Court-fee, than the one mentioned in the details of valuation in the plaint, an affidavit shall be filed by the plaintiff giving reasons for not paying the requisite Court-fee. .(5) In such cases, the Court shall, before exercising its discretion and granting time to pay the deficit Court-fee, order notice to the defendants and consider their objections, if any. However, such notice is not necessary in cases where the plaintiff has paid almost the entirety of the requisite Court-fee and the Court is satisfied on affidavit by the party that the mistake happened due to some bona fide reasons such as calculation mistake or the alike. However, such notice is not necessary in cases where the plaintiff has paid almost the entirety of the requisite Court-fee and the Court is satisfied on affidavit by the party that the mistake happened due to some bona fide reasons such as calculation mistake or the alike. .(6) The discretion referred to in Sec.149 of Code of Civil Procedure is a judicial discretion and the same has to be exercised in accordance with the well established principles of law. .(7) .... (7A) In case where the plaint is presented well within the period of limitation with deficit Court-fee and the Court returns the plaint to rectify the defect giving some time (2 or 3 weeks), which also falls within the period of limitation, but the plaint is re-presented paying deficit Court-fee after the period of limitation, the Court is bound to hear the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff has paid substantial Court-fee (not almost entirety) at the first instance, before condoning the delay in paying the deficit Court-fee." 15. All the above guidelines in the case on hand were offended, not only by the plaintiff but also infringed by the trial Court, without adopting the procedure prescribed. Further, Order 7 Rule 11 proviso of the CPC also not complied with. In this view, the payment of court fee, after the period of limitation is over, will come within the meaning of Order 7 Rule 11(c). The subsequent grant of time, which is not in accordance with law, cannot be taken advantage of. 16. The language of S.149 Civil Procedure Code, itself seems to imply that in the absence of an order granting time under the section, the presentation of the un-stamped or insufficiently stamped memorandum of appeal will not amount to a valid presentation. This would only indicate that absence of an order, granting time under Section 149 CPC, will not save the limitation, if deficit court-fee has been paid, after the period of limitation, which is squarely applicable to the case on hand. 17. The Apex Court has considered in BUTA SINGH (DEAD) BY L.Rs. This would only indicate that absence of an order, granting time under Section 149 CPC, will not save the limitation, if deficit court-fee has been paid, after the period of limitation, which is squarely applicable to the case on hand. 17. The Apex Court has considered in BUTA SINGH (DEAD) BY L.Rs. vs. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1995 SC 1945 ), under what circumstances, Section 149 CPC could be taken into consideration for payment of Court-fees, wherein it is said: "The aid of Section 149, could be taken only when the party was not able to pay Court-fee in circumstances beyond his control or under unavoidable circumstances and the Court would be justified in and appropriate case to exercise the discretionary power under S.149 after giving due notice to the affected party...." 18. The above dictum would indicate that it is incumbent upon the plaintiff, to invoke Section 149 CPC, cataloguing under what circumstances, he was unable to pay the court fee, then obtain an order, satisfying the Court for extension of time, which is also absent in our case. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, while considering Section 149 and Order 7 Rule 11(d), proviso of CPC, in S.A. KHADEER vs. G.V.R. ANJANEYULU (2003 (4) Civil LJ 917), has come to the conclusion, if no reason is recorded by the trial Court for extension of time, cause of exceptional nature not being shown, the extension of time for payment of court-fees is illegal and the same is liable to be set aside. In our case, no application has been filed, no extension has been granted under Section 149 CPC. 19. On the earlier occasion, this court also considered similar issue in CRP.Nos:657, 658 and 797 of 2006 and passed an order dated 212. 2006, wherein it has been observed as follows:- "7. A perusal of the impugned orders and the typed set of papers would clearly show that the delay condonation applications have not been field under Section 149 CPC or a separate prayer has been included to pay the deficit court fee with such delay. In fact the said applications have been filed under Sections 148 and 151 CPC to condone the delay of representation alone. The decisions in Padmidikkala Sitharamayya and others Vs. Ivaturi Ramayya and another (1938 MLJ 515 DB) and S.V. Arjunaraja Vs. In fact the said applications have been filed under Sections 148 and 151 CPC to condone the delay of representation alone. The decisions in Padmidikkala Sitharamayya and others Vs. Ivaturi Ramayya and another (1938 MLJ 515 DB) and S.V. Arjunaraja Vs. P. Vasantha ( 2005 (5) CTC 401 , this court held that in the absence of specific application invoking Section 149 CPC and in the absence of any order passed by the court granting time for payment or enlargement, the plaintiff is not protected and the suit is liable to be rejected...." xx xx xx xx xx "12. Further, the relief under Section 149 CPC is a discretionary power of the Court to be exercised in a manner known to law. Suppose if a bona fide mistake is crept in, say for instance the plaintiff wrongly valued the suit under a particular provision or where something happened beyond his control, for example, robbery or non availability of stamps, then the court will be more in favour of granting time to the plaintiff to pay deficit court fee. But at the same time, if the plaintiff so acted (a) to harass the defendant, (b) did it expecting a compromise or awaiting result of some litigation or (c) because of contumacy or male fides on his part, courts will not exercise its jurisdiction in his favour. By and large, the position is, the Court must be satisfied about the bona fide mistake or some happenings beyond his control as has been laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in 2003 (2) MLJ 305 (K. Natarajan Vs. P.K. Rajasekaran). But in the present case though once it was alleged that there was non availability of sufficient stamp paper, but on the other occasions when the plaint was represented with deficit court fee, even such a plea has not been raised. But the court has without appreciating the bona fides of the plaintiffs allowed the Interlocutory Applications. In AIR 1995 SC 1945 (Buta Singh Vs. But the court has without appreciating the bona fides of the plaintiffs allowed the Interlocutory Applications. In AIR 1995 SC 1945 (Buta Singh Vs. Union of India) the Honble Supreme Court held that the aid of Section 149 could be taken only when the party was not able to pay the court fee in circumstances beyond control and under unavoidable circumstances and the court would be justified in appropriate cases to exercise the discretionary powers under Section 149 CPC after giving due notice to the affected party and it is not an automatic relief on mere asking. xx xx xx xx xx "16. Under these reasons since there is no invocation of the specific provision of Section 149 CPC and consequential prayer to condone the delay in payment of the deficit court fee while representing the Plaint, the Subordinate Judge has erred in allowing the I.A.Nos:75 and 76 of 2004 by exercising the discretion without analysing the bona fides of the plaintiffs case and without giving notice to the defendant...." 20. In the above case the plaintiffs had filed an application under Section 148 CPC to enlarge the time. But in the present case, no specific application has been filed under Section 149 CPC to pay deficit court fee with condonation of delay instead filed the condonation application under Section 151 CPC seeking to exercise the inherent powers of the court. However, though the court has inherent powers under Section 151 CPC, the failure of the plaintiff in taking out an application under Section 149 CPC for grant of time for payment of deficit court fee will not cure the limitation. Further the I.A.No:15 of 2006 is filed only for condoning the delay in representing the plaint and it is not filed under Section 149 CPC. Even in the I.A.No:15 of 2006 filed Under Section 151 CPC, the reason for 312 days is given as that the plaintiff was suffering from Jaundice and he has been taking the native treatment and therefore could not meet his counsel, which is the usual version stated in all the condone delay petitions and the same cannot be termed as an circumstance of exceptional nature, beyond his control or under unavoidable circumstance. In the present case on hand, though the plaint was returned on 23. 2005 for insufficient stamp, the same has been represented only on 12. In the present case on hand, though the plaint was returned on 23. 2005 for insufficient stamp, the same has been represented only on 12. 2006 with enormous delay which has not been condoned by taking out an application under Section 149 CPC. Under the above circumstances, it should be held, that on the mechanical representation of the plaint, which cannot be said that an order has been passed under Section 149 CPC, extending the time for payment of court fees, would save the limitation, if the Court fees is paid, after the period of limitation prescribed, is lapsed. In this case, admittedly, by the time, the sufficient court fee has been paid by the plaintiff, the suit was out of time. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner/plaintiff, the case on hand squarely comes under Order 7 rule 11(c) CPC and therefore, the plaint should be rejected, as barred by limitation. For the foregoing reasons, the revision deserves acceptance. 21. In the result, this civil revision petition is allowed. The numbering of the suit in O.S.No.17 of 2006 by the Subordinate Judge, Nagapattinam, is set aside, as time barred. Consequently, the trial Court is directed to struck-off the said suit from its file.