Judgment R.M. Lodha, J.-This special appeal is by the unsuccessful petitioner in challenging the notification dated 20.01.1992 issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act and the declaration dated 09.03.1992 made under Section 6 for the compulsory acquisition of land bearing Khasra No. 1468 situate at village Chak Nasrabad Tehsil Khairthal District Alwar. 2. The controversy arises in the facts and the circumstances which may be briefly noticed by us immediately here-in-after. (a) The petitioner is said to have purchased the share of Sapianath in the agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 1468 on 12.06.1989. Immediately after purchase, he claims to have made an application for correction of the revenue record. (b) The State Government issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 29.03.1990 for compulsory acquisition of the agricultural land mentioned therein including the agricultural land of Khasra No. 1468 situate in Village Chak Nasrabad for the construction of Krishi Upaj Mandi Yard. (c) Pursuant to the publication of the notification dated 29.03.1990, the petitioner filed objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The owners of the other land proposed to be acquired pursuant to the said notification also filed their objections. (d) The Land Acquisition Officer upon consideration of the diverse objections raised by the petitioner for compulsory acquisition of the land bearing Khasra No. 1468, in his report to the State Government, stated that the acquisition of the said land was not justified as it would result in demolition of residential houses existing therein. In his report, the Land Acquisition Officer stated that the land bearing Khasra No. 1468 must be kept free from acquisition. In respect of few other khasra numbers; namely, 2296, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218 and 2255 also the Land Acquisition Officer was of the view that the aforesaid khasra numbers be kept free from the acquisition as many houses were existing thereon. With regard to the necessity of new Mandi Yard, the Land Acquisition Officer suggested that the construction of new Mandi Yard be treated in the urgent category and acquisition be proceeded accordingly. The report of the Land Acquisition Officer sent to the State Government is dated 05.01.1991. With regard to the necessity of new Mandi Yard, the Land Acquisition Officer suggested that the construction of new Mandi Yard be treated in the urgent category and acquisition be proceeded accordingly. The report of the Land Acquisition Officer sent to the State Government is dated 05.01.1991. (e) TheState Government issued a fresh notification dated 20.01.1992 proposing acquisition of the agricultural land mentioned therein including Khasra No. 1468 under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. By the said notification, the State Government dispensed with the inquiry under Section 5-A. (f) The State Government then issued declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 09.03.1992. .3. The petitioner has challenged the legality and validity of the notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) and the declaration made under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act inter-alia on the grounds, namely- .(i) That the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was not made within one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1); .(ii) That the combined notification under Section 6 read with Section 17(4) was bad in law; .(iii) That without withdrawing the previous notification under Section 4(1) dated 29.03.1990, the subsequent notification dated 20.01.1992 could not have been issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4); .(iv) That the invocation of the provisions of Section 17(4) was illegal, arbitrary and malafide. 4. According to the petitioner, there was no urgency at all so as to invoke Section 17(4), more so when pursuant to the earlier notification dated 29.03.1990 under Section 4(1), the inquiry under Section 5-A was already conducted by the Land Acquisition Officer and the petitioners land bearing Khasra No. 1468 was not found fit for the acquisition. 5. The State Government responded to the writ petition by filing reply affidavit. The State Government set-up a plea that the acquisition proceedings pursuant to the notification dated 29.03.1990 issued under Section 4(1) was not pursued after the receipt of the report from the Land Acquisition Officer. Instead the State Government issued fresh notification under Section 4(1) on 20.01.1992 which it was free and competent to do so. The notification dated 20.01.1992 issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, according to the State Government, was published in the State Gazette on 23.04.1992. Instead the State Government issued fresh notification under Section 4(1) on 20.01.1992 which it was free and competent to do so. The notification dated 20.01.1992 issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, according to the State Government, was published in the State Gazette on 23.04.1992. It was also published in the Daily News Paper "Jharokha" on 07.05.1992. The declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on 09.03.1992 and published in the Official Gazette on 16.03.1993. The said declaration was also published in the newspaper "Jharokha" on 01.05.1993. Thus, according to the State Government, the declaration under Section 6 was made within one year of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The State Government denied that the combined notification under Section 6 read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued. With regard to the urgency clause, the State Government set-up the plea that it is for the State Government to decide whether it is appropriate to invoke the urgency clause in the facts and circumstances of the case and the decision of the State Government in this regard cannot be challenged by the Khatedar and the Court is not required to interfere in such decision taken by the State Government in extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It also stated in the reply that spacious market yard is dire necessity of the business community of Khairthmal town and Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti is only the agency of Khairthmal which can make available such market yard to the business community and, therefore, at the request of the Krishi Upaj Mandi, Khairthal the acquisition proceedings were initiated. 6. After hearing the parties, the Single Judge along with other connected matters (11 writ petitions in all) dismissed the entire group of writ petitions on 02.09.1996. .7. At this stage, we may notice the submission of Mr. R.K. Mathur, Counsel for the Respondent No. 2 that from the decision of the Single Judge dated 02.09.1996, 11 special appeals were filed. 10 special appeals were disposed of on 112.2005. According to him, in view of the said decision, the merits of the case in the present appeal need not be gone into by use. .8. The order of the Division Bench dated 112.2005 disposing of 10 special appeals read thus : "Heard. 10 special appeals were disposed of on 112.2005. According to him, in view of the said decision, the merits of the case in the present appeal need not be gone into by use. .8. The order of the Division Bench dated 112.2005 disposing of 10 special appeals read thus : "Heard. In view of the subsequent events narrated before us, we grant liberty to the appellants to make representations before the concerned authority in regard to their grievance. The concerned authority is directed to dispose of the representations after providing opportunity of hearing to the appellants as expeditiously as possible, 15 days time is granted to the appellants to submit representations. Till the representations are decided, the parties are directed to maintain status quo in regard to the land in question. The appeals stand disposed of as indicated above". 9. At the first blush, we thought of disposing of this appeal by asking the appellant to make representation to the State Government with regard to his grievance as was done in respect of 10 other special appeals. But in view of the information given by Mr. R.K. Mathur that representations made by those appellants have been rejected by the State Government, the course of asking the acquisition was not found appropriate by us. We find ourselves unable to agree with the submission of Mr. R.K. Mathur that by the order dated 112.2005 that we have reproduced above the Division Bench has upheld the decisions of the Single Judge. A perusal of the order dated 112.2005 would show that the Division Bench did not consider those appeals on merit at all. The said order came to be passed in view of the events that were brought to the notice of the Division Bench and keeping those events in mind, the Bench granted liberty to those appellants to make representations before the concerned authority with regard to their grievance. Surely, the order dated 112.2005 cannot be read to fore-close the consideration of this appeal on merits. 10. Mr. Shiv Charan Gupta, the Counsel for the appellant would submit that the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 09.03.1992 being beyond one year from the notification dated 20.01.1992 issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) is bad in law in view of the time limit prescribed in proviso (2) of Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 11. 11. The contention seems to have been made by the Counsel for the appellant oblivious of the relevant dates of publication of the notifications issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The notification issued under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) dated 20.01.1992 was published in the official gazette as well as in the local news paper. In the official gazette, the said notification was published on 23.04.1992 while in the daily news paper, the said notification was published on 07.05.1992. That the last date of publication of such notification is the date of publication is the statutory legal position provided in the Land Acquisition Act itself . Obviously, therefore, the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) has to taken to be 07.05.1992. In so far as declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is concerned, it was published in the official gazette on 16.03.1992 and in the news paper Jharokha on 01.05.1993. The date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is last of these dates i.e. 01.05.1993 which is apparently within one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. 12. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the declaration under Section 6 has been made within one year of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In other words, the declaration under Section 6 is within the time prescribed in proviso (2) thereof . 13. There is also no merit in the contention of the Counsel for the appellant that the combined notification issued under Section 6 read with Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act is bad in law. As a matter of fact, the declaration made under Section 6 is not a combined notification at all. It is the notification under Section 4(1) which is a combined notification invoking urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. 14. Now we come to the crucial question of invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. 15. Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act reads thus : "17(4). It is the notification under Section 4(1) which is a combined notification invoking urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. 14. Now we come to the crucial question of invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act. 15. Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act reads thus : "17(4). In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of Sub-section (1), or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time (after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1)." 16. The matters relating to invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17(4) and the dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A have come up for consideration before the Courts from time to time. There are long line of decided cases by the Supreme Court on this aspect. We need not advert to all of them, reference to some of the said decisions shall suffice. 17. In the case of Narayan Govind Govate etc. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 183 , the Supreme Court considered the power of the State Government in invocation of Section 17, the formation of its opinion in given fact situation and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. The Supreme Court considered the matter thus : "We think that Section 17(4) cannot be read in isolation from Sections 4(1) and 5-A of the Act. The immediate purpose of a notification under Section 4(1) of the Act is to enable those who may have any objections to make to lodge them for purposes of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is true that, although, only 30 days from the notification under Section 4(1) are given for the filing of these objections under Section 5-A of the Act, yet, sometimes the proceedings under Section 5-A are unduly prolonged. But, considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under Section 5-A, it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously. But, considering the nature of the objections which are capable of being successfully taken under Section 5-A, it is difficult to see why the summary enquiry should not be concluded quite expeditiously. In view of the authorities of this Court, the existence of what are prima facie public purpose, such as the one present in the case before us, cannot be successfully challenged at all by objectors. It is rare to find a case in which objections to the validity of a public purpose of an acquisition can even be stated ion the form in which the challenge could succeed. Indeed, questions relating to validity of the notification on the ground of malafides do not seem to us to be ordinarily open in a summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Hence, there seems to us to be little difficulty in completing enquiries contemplated by Section 5-A of the Act very expeditiously. Now, the purpose of Section 17(4) of the Act is, obviously, not merely to confine action under it to waste and arable land but also to situations in which an inquiry under Section 5-A will serve notification useful purpose, or, for some overriding reason, it should be dispensed with. The mind of the Officer or authority concerned has to be applied to the question whether there is an urgency of such a nature that even the summary proceedings under Section 5-A which has to be considered. Section 17(2) deals with a case in which an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act could not possibly serve any useful purpose. Sudden change of the course of a river would leave notification option if essential communications have to be maintained. It results in more or less indicating, by an operation of natural physical forces beyond human control, what land should be urgently taken possession of . Hence, it offers notification difficulty in applying Section 17(4) in public interest. Hence, it offers notification difficulty in applying Section 17(4) in public interest. And, the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is question in a Court of justice. Other cases may raise questions involving consideration of facts which are especially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned. Hence, it offers notification difficulty in applying Section 17(4) in public interest. And, the particulars of what is obviously to be done in public interest need not be concealed when its validity is question in a Court of justice. Other cases may raise questions involving consideration of facts which are especially within the knowledge of the authorities concerned. And, if they do not discharge their special burden, imposed by Section 106, Evidence Act, without even disclosing a sufficient reason for their abstention from disclosure, they have to take the consequences which flow from the non-production of the best evidence which could be produced on behalf of the State if its stand was correct. In the case before us, the public purpose indicating is the development of an area for industrial residential purposes. This, in itself , on the face of it, does not call for any such action, barring exceptional circumstances, as to make immediate possession, without holding even a summary enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, imperative. On the other hand, such schemes generally take sufficient period of time to enable to least summary inquiries under Section 5-A of the act to be completed without any impediment whatsoever to the execution of the scheme. Therefore, the very statement of the public purpose for which the land was to be acquired indicated the absence of such urgency, on the apparent facts of the case, as to require the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. Again, the uniform and set recital of a formula, like a ritual or mantra, apparently applied mechanically to every case, itself indicated that the mind of the Commissioner concerned was only applied to the question whether the land was waste or arable and whether its acquisition is urgently needed. Nothing beyond that seems to have been considered. The recital itself shows that the mind of the Commissioner was not applied at all to the question whether the urgency is of such a nature as to require elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. If it was, at least the notifications gave notification inkling of it at all. On the other hand, its literal meaning was that nothing beyond matters stated there were considered. If it was, at least the notifications gave notification inkling of it at all. On the other hand, its literal meaning was that nothing beyond matters stated there were considered. All schemes relating to development of industrial and residential areas must be urgent in the context of the countrys need for areas must be urgent in the context of the countrys need for increased production and more residential accommodation. Yet, the very nature of such schemes of development does not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary enquiries under Section 5-A of the Act. There is notification indication whatsoever in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the mind of the Commissioner was applied at all to the question whether it was a case necessitating the elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The recitals in the notifications, on the other hand, indicate that elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was treated as an automatic consequence of the opinion formed on other matters. The recital does not say at all that any opinion was formed on the need to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is certainly a case in which the recital was at least defective. The burden, therefore, rested upon the State to remove the defect, if possible, by evidence to show that some exceptional circumstances which necessitated the elimination of an enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act and that the mind of the Commissioner was applied to this essential question. It seems to us that the High Court correctly applied the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act to place the burden upon the State to prove those special circumstances although it also appears to us that the High Court was not quite correct in stating its view in such a manner as to make it appear that some part of the initial burden of the petitioners under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act had been displaced by the failure of the State to discharge its duty under Section 106 of the Act. The correct way of putting it would have been to say that the failure of the State to produce the evidence of facts especially within the knowledge of its officials, which rested upon it under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, taken together with the attendant facts and circumstances, including the contents of recitals, had enabled the petitioners to discharge their burdens under Sections 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act. We may also observe that if , instead of prolonging litigation by appealing to this Court, the State Government had ordered expeditious enquiries under Section 5-A of the Act or even afforded the petitioners some opportunity of being heard before acting under Section 17(4) of the Act, asking them to show cause why no enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act should take place at all, the acquisition proceedings need not have been held up so long. In fact, we hope that the acquisition proceedings have not actually been held up". 18. The two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. vs. Smt. Pista Devi & Ors., etc. etc., AIR 1986 SC 2025 , dealing with the power of the State Government in dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A by invoking Section 17 in the matter relating to acquisition of land for housing schemes in the city of Meerut, held thus : "The main ground on which the High Court set aside the impugned notification and the declaration was that the case of urgency put forward by the State Government for dispensing with the compliance with the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act had been believed by the delay of nearly one year that had ensued between the date of the notification under Section 4 and the date of declaration made under Section 6 of the Act. It, however, rejected the contention of the petitioners based on the delay that had preceded the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The High Court observed that if the Government were satisfied with the urgency it would have certainly issued declaration under Section 6 of the Act immediately after the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. It found that the failure to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act immediately on the part of the State Government was fatal. It found that the failure to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act immediately on the part of the State Government was fatal. That there was delay of nearly one year between the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act containing the direction dispensing with the compliance with Section 5-A of the Act and the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act is not disputed. It is seen from the record before us that after the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the Collector after going through it found that there were some errors in the notification which needed to be corrected by issuing a corrigendum. Accordingly, he wrote a letter to the State Government on 25.08.1980 pointing out the error4s and requesting the State Government to publish a corrigendum and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act were issued on 01.05.1981. It is on account of some error on the part of the officials who were entrusted with the duty of processing of the case at the level of the secretariat there was a delay of nearly one year between the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The question for consideration is whether in the circumstances of the case it could be said that on account of the mere delay of nearly one year in the publication of the declaration it could be said that the order made by the State Government dispensing with the compliance with Section 5-A of the Act at the time of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the act would stand vitiated in the absence of any other material. In this case there is no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the Government or any of the officers, nor do the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of Meerut city during the relevant time. In this case there is no allegation of any kind of mala fides on the part of either the Government or any of the officers, nor do the respondents contend that there was no urgent necessity for providing housing accommodation to a large number of people of Meerut city during the relevant time. The letters and the certificates submitted by the Collector and the Secretary of the Meerut Development Authority to the State Government before the issue of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act clearly demonstrated that at that time there was a great urgency felt by them regarding the provisions of housing accommodation at Meerut. The State Government acted upon the said reports, certificates and other material which were before it. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the decision of the State Government in resorting to Section 17(1) of the Act was unwarranted. The provision of housing accommodation in these days has become a matter of national urgency. We may take judicial notice of this fact. Now it is difficult to hold that in the case of proceedings relating to acquisition of land for providing house sites it is unnecessary to invoke Section 17(1) of the Act and to dispense with the compliance with Section 5-A of the Act. Perhaps, at the time to which the decision on Narayan Govind Gavate vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183 = 1977 (1) SCR 763, related the situation relating to development of residential areas in the urban centres were not so urgent and it was not necessary to eliminate the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The acquisition proceedings which had been challenged in that case related to the year 1963. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it take the view that the schemes of development of residential areas do not "appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary inquiries under Section 5-A of the Act. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it take the view that the schemes of development of residential areas do not "appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary inquiries under Section 5-A of the Act. In Kasireddy Papaiah vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 AP 269 , Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the High Court of Andhra Pradesh dealing with the problem of providing housing accommodation to Harijans has observed thus : "That the housing conditions of Harijans all over the country continue to be miserable even today is a fact of which Courts are bound to take judicial notice. History has made it urgent that, among other problems, the problem of housing Harijans should be solved expeditiously. The greater the delay the more urgent becomes the problem. Therefore, one can never venture to say that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for providing house sites for Harijans is bad merely because the officials entrusted with the task of taking further action in the matter are negligent or tardy in discharging of their duties, unless of course, it can be established that the acquisition itself is made with an oblique motive. The urgent pressures of history are not to be undone by the inaction of the bureaucracy. I am not trying to make any pontific pronouncements. But I am at great pains to point out that provision for house sites for Harijans is an urgent and pressing necessity and that the invocation of the emergency provisions of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to be improper, in the absence of mala fide, merely because of the delay on the part of some Government officials". What was said by the learned Judge in the context of provision of housing accommodation to Harijans is equally true about the problem of providing housing accommodation to all persons in the country today having regard to the enormous growth of population in the country. The observation made in the above decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is quoted with approval by this Court in Deepak Pahwa vs. Lt. The observation made in the above decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is quoted with approval by this Court in Deepak Pahwa vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi, AIR 1984 SC 1721 = 1985 (1) SCR 588 , even though in the above decision the Court found that it was not necessary to say anything about the post-notification delay. We are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of this case the post-notification delay of nearly one year is not by itself sufficient to hold that the decision taken by the State Government under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the act at the time of the issue of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was either improper or illegal". 19. In the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Muzaffarnagar (U.P.) vs. Ratan Prakash Mangal & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 1459 , the Supreme Court considered the matter in Para 3 of the report thus : "The Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 challenged the Notifications dated 210.1978 and 210.1978 referred to above before the High Court in Writ Petition No. 163 of 1979. The plea raised by them was that there was no urgency and consequently the inquiry contemplated by Section 5-A of the Act could to be dispensed with by invoking Section 17(4) thereof . This plea found favour with the High Court and the two Notifications mentioned above were quashed on 06.06.1979 in so far as Plot No. 289 was concerned. This Judgment of the High Court was challenged by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Muzaffarnagar before this Court in Civil Appeal No. 2970 of 1979. This Court agreed with the High Court in so far as it had held that the urgency clause had been wrongly applied. But it was held that on that ground even though quashing of the Notification under Section 6 of the Act was justified the High Court was not right in quashing the Notification under Section 4(1) in its entirety. On this view the appeal was allowed in part and the Judgment of the High Court was set aside in so far as it quashed the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in its entirety. The rest of the Judgment was, however, maintained with a direction that "copies of the notifications be served personally on Respondents No. 1 and 2 and their transferees so that Respondents Nos. The rest of the Judgment was, however, maintained with a direction that "copies of the notifications be served personally on Respondents No. 1 and 2 and their transferees so that Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and their transferees may have an opportunity to file their objections to the proposed acquisition within three weeks from the date of service of the copy of the notification upon each of them. The appropriation authority will then hold an inquiry into the objections under Section 5-A and proceed with the matter in accordance with law. Since the appellant has obtained possession of the land from Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and their transferees by invoking the urgency clause which has been set aside, the appellant will restore possession of the same to Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and their transferees within a week from today". 20. Subsequent to the direction of the Supreme Court in case for holding inquiry under Section 5-A, dealing with the aspect of post-notification delay, it was observed that delay of nearly one year was not by itself sufficient to hold that the decision taken by the State Government under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act at the time of issue of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was either improper or illegal. 21. In the case of Om Prakash & Anr. etc. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2504 , a matter relating to acquisition of land for planned development of city and dispensation of inquiry under Section 5-A, it was held thus : "As we are concerned only with the applicability of Section 17, Sub-section (4), it will be necessary to find out whether there was any relevant material with the appropriate Government, namely, respondent State of UP herein, to enable it to arrive at its subjective satisfaction about dispensing with the present acquisition. Before we deal with Judgment s of this Court on the point, it will be necessary to quickly glance through the factual backdrop leading to the present proceedings. As we have noted earlier, NOIDA was entrusted with the task of developing areas under its jurisdiction and that development could necessarily be a planned development on a large scale. Before we deal with Judgment s of this Court on the point, it will be necessary to quickly glance through the factual backdrop leading to the present proceedings. As we have noted earlier, NOIDA was entrusted with the task of developing areas under its jurisdiction and that development could necessarily be a planned development on a large scale. Such development could not be confined only to a few pockets of the land but must necessarily encompass in its fold schemes pertaining to large tracts of lands which were lying undeveloped and which had to be developed on a systematic basis. It is not in dispute between the parties that initially in 1976 large tracts of lands in Ghaziabad District in the State of Uttar Pradesh were acquired from the very village from which the present lands also are sought to be acquired. By a notification dated 30.04.1976, the State of Uttar Pradesh exercising powers under Sub-section 1 of Section 4 issued a notification in the name of the Governor of Uttar Pradesh to the effect that various plots of lands mentioned in the notification were needed for public purpose, that is, for the planned industrial development in the district which was then known as Bullandshahr and the said acquisition was through the NOIDA for that purp