R.S. Chauhan, J.—Aggrieved by the Order dt. 14.10.2005 passed by the District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, two different petitions, namely, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and the Civil Writ Petition have been filed before this Court. Since both the parties are aggrieved by the same Order, both the petitions are being decided by this common judgment. 2. The brief facts of the case are that vide letter dt. 31.01.1991, the Jaipur Development Authority (henceforth to be referred as ‘the JDA’, for short) had granted the work of providing and fixing street light on Tonk Road from Gopalpura Junction to Durgapura and upto Jawahar Circle, Jaipur within a period of four months to the Goyal Buitumins India (henceforth to be referred as ‘the appellant’, for short). According to the work-order, the work was to begin on 15.02.1991 and was to be completed by 14.06.1991. However, due to certain reasons beyond the control of the appellant; the work could not be completed till 15.10.1993. However, the work was completed to the satisfaction of the JDA. However, because certain differences and dispute did arise between the parties, on 23.08.1995, the appellant sent a notice to the JDA for appointment of an Arbitrator in accordance with Clause-23 of the Agreement. On 23.01.1996, Mr. K.B.L. Seth (retired S.E. of PWD) was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator. However, after Mr. Seth shifted from Jaipur, Mr. Hariom Prakash (Chief Engineer of PWD) was appointed as the Sole Arbitrator vide letter dt. 02.02.2001. Before the learned Arbitrator, the appellant raised seven claims. The JDA filed its reply to the claims. After the pleadings were complete, the Arbitrator framed five issues. After going through the oral and documentary evidence, vide award dt. 02.08.2001, the learned Arbitrator awarded a compensation of Rs. 2,81,840/- along with 15% interest from 05.05.1995 till 02.08.1995. The interest was calculated as Rs. 2,64,225/-. He further directed that in case the compensation amount is not paid within a period of three months, the compensation, shall be paid @ 15% interest per annum till date of actual payment or date of decree whichever is earlier. Thus, a total compensation of Rs. 5,54,065/- was granted to the appellant. While the appellant moved an application for making the said award a rule of the Court, the JDA filed its objection against the said award before the District Judge, Jaipur. After hearing both the parties, vide Order dt. Thus, a total compensation of Rs. 5,54,065/- was granted to the appellant. While the appellant moved an application for making the said award a rule of the Court, the JDA filed its objection against the said award before the District Judge, Jaipur. After hearing both the parties, vide Order dt. 14.10.2005, the learned District Judge partly allowed the objections. Although, he rejected most of the objections, he reduced the interest from 15% to 9% per annum and made the interest effective from 02.08.2001 the date of the award, instead of from 05.05.1995. Since both the parties were aggrieved by the said order, while the appellant has filed the appeal before this Court, the JDA has filed the writ petition before this Court. During the course of argument in the appeal, Mr. J.M. Saxena, the learned counsel for the JDA, pointed out that the JDA has filed a writ petition against the same impugned order. Therefore, vide order dt. 18.10.2006, this Court directed that both the appeal and the writ petition be clubbed together. As stated above, since both the cases emanate from the challenge the same impugned order, it is in the interest of justice to decide both the cases by this common judgment. 3. Mr. J.M. Saxena has raised a preliminary objection. According to him, Clause-23 of the Agreement clearly states, “subject as aforesaid the provisions of the Act of 1940 or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause”. Since the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (henceforth to be referred to as ‘the Act of 1996’, for short) had come into force during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the learned Arbitrator ought to have proceeded under the Act of 1996 instead of under the Arbitration Act; 1940 (henceforth to be referred to as ‘the Act of 1940’, for short). However, he failed to do so. Therefore, the entire arbitration proceedings stand vitiated. The same argument was raised by Mr. Saxena as the cardinal contention in the writ petition. 4. On the other hand, Mr. However, he failed to do so. Therefore, the entire arbitration proceedings stand vitiated. The same argument was raised by Mr. Saxena as the cardinal contention in the writ petition. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Arvind Gupta, the learned counsel for the appellant, has vehemently argued that although Sec. 85 of the Act of 1996 clearly repeals the Act of 1940, but Sub-Sec. (2) states that, “notwithstanding such repeal the provisions of the said Act shall apply in relation to the arbitration proceedings which commended before this Act came into force unless otherwise agreed by the parties but this Act shall apply in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after this Act comes into force”. Therefore, the pertinent date is “the date for commencement of arbitration proceedings”. According to Sec. 21 of the Act of 1996, “unless and otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for the dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent”. In the present case, the said notice was sent on 23.08.1995, i.e. a date much before the coming into effect of the Act of 1996. Hence, according to Sec. 85(2), the Act of 1940 would govern the arbitration proceedings. 5. He has further argued that under the agreement between the parties, there is no prohibition regarding the grant of interest for the pre-reference period to the claimant. Therefore, the Arbitrator was within his jurisdiction to grant the interest for the pre-reference period. Hence, the learned Judge has erroneously directed that the interest be paid from the date of award and no interest needs to be paid for the pre-reference period. In order to buttress his contention, he has relied upon the case of Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa vs. N.C. Budhraj (died) by LRs., (2001) 2 SCC 721 . 6. We have heard both the learned counsels and impugned order. 7. This case raises two legal issues before this Court, firstly, where during the pendency of arbitration proceedings, the Act of 1996 came into effect, whether the arbitration proceedings should be conducted under the Act of 1940, or under the Act of 1996? Secondly, whether the District Judge was justified in reducing the interest rate and in reducing the period of interest without assigning any reason or not? 8. Secondly, whether the District Judge was justified in reducing the interest rate and in reducing the period of interest without assigning any reason or not? 8. The first issue is no longer res-integra as the said issue has been settled in the case of Milk Food Ltd. vs. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd., (2004) 7 SCC 288 . The said decision has recently been followed in the case of Neeraj Munjal and Ors. (III) vs. Atul Grover and Anr., (2005) 5 SCC 404 . In the case of Milk Food Ltd. (supra) their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had critically analyzed Secs 85 and 21 of the Act of 1996. The Apex Court clearly held that the service of notice for appointment of an Arbitrator would be the relevant date for the purpose of commencement of the arbitration proceeding. In case the date of the service of notice is prior to the coming into force of the Act of 1996, the Act of 1940 would apply. In the present case, the notice for appointment of Arbitrator was sent on 23.08.1995 and the Arbitrator was appointed on 23.01.1996, whereas the Act of 1996 came into force on 25.01.1996. Therefore, the arbitration proceeding had commenced prior to the coming into force of the Act of 1996. Thus, clearly the Act of 1940 would apply to the present case. 9. Moreover, the objection about the non-applicability of the Act of 1940 was neither taken before the Arbitrator nor before the learned Judge. Hence, a new plea cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage. In the case of Milk Food Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a new plea or an additional plea not raised before the Arbitrator or the High Court cannot be raised before the Supreme Court. Similarly, a plea not raised before the Arbitrator or before the District Judge cannot be raised before this Court for the first time. 10. Further, once a party has participated in the arbitration proceeding without raising the objection about the non-applicability of the Act of 1940, it is deemed to have waived the said objection (refer to State of Rajasthan vs. Nav Bharal Construction Co., (2005) 11 SCC 197 . Therefore, the contention of Mr. Saxena about the applicability of Act of 1996 is unsustainable. 11. Therefore, the contention of Mr. Saxena about the applicability of Act of 1996 is unsustainable. 11. As far as the second issue is concerned, in the case of Executive Engineer, Dhenkanal Minor Irrigation Division, Orissa (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held as under: As long as there is nothing in the arbitration agreement to exclude the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain a claim for interest on the amounts due under the contract, or any prohibition to claim interest on the amounts due and become payable under the contract, the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to consider and award interest in respect of all period subject only to Sec. 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and that too the powers of the Court thereunder, has to be upheld. The submission that the arbitrator cannot have jurisdiction to award interest for the period prior to the date of his appointment or entering into reference which alone confers upon him power, is too stale and technical to be countenanced for the simple reason that in every case the appointment of an arbitrator or even resort to Court to vindicate rights could be only after disputes have cropped up between the parties and continue to subsist unresolved, and that if the arbitrator has the power to deal with and decide disputes which dropped up at a point of time and for the period prior to the appointment of an arbitrator, it is beyond comprehension as to why and for what reason and with what justification the arbitrator should be denied only the power to award interest for the pre-reference period. 12. Thus, according to the Apex Court, the arbitrator has the jurisdiction to award interest, on the sums found due and payable, for the pre-reference period, in the absence of any specific stipulation or prohibition in the contract to claim or grant any such interest. In the present case, there is no such stipulation or prohibition in the contract for denying pre-reference interest to the claimant. The arbitrator had given valid reasons for granting the pre-reference and pendent lite interest to the appellant. The learned Judge, on the other hand, has not assigned any reason both for reducing the interest from 15% to 9% and for directing the payment of the interest from the date of the award. The arbitrator had given valid reasons for granting the pre-reference and pendent lite interest to the appellant. The learned Judge, on the other hand, has not assigned any reason both for reducing the interest from 15% to 9% and for directing the payment of the interest from the date of the award. Hence, this Court has no option but to set aside the said directions of the learned Judge. 13. In the result the appeal is allowed and the direction reducing the interest from 15% to 9% and of permitting the interest only from 02.08.2001, vide Order dt. 14.10.2005, is quashed and set-aside. It is directed that the compensation sum shall be paid at the rate of 15% from 05.05.1995 till the date of actual payment. Moreover, the writ petition, being without merit, is dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost. * * * * *