( 1 ) LANDLADY filed an eviction petition in terms of Section 10 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 being RC No. 219 of 2001. The application was dismissed by order dt. 29. 12. 2003. The landlady thereafter preferred an appeal being RA No. 59 of 2004 which has been allowed by the appellate court on 7. 10. 2006 and the tenant has filed this revision petition. The parties shall be referred to as tenant and landlady. ( 2 ) THE landlady claimed that she was the owner of the petition schedule mulgi. She stated that she was minor, when the tenant had obtained the mulgi from her father and guardian Mohammad Mohiuddin by a lease deed on 1. 4. 1983 on a monthly rent of Rs. 600/- for carrying on business of jewellary. Originally the mulgee was let out to the tenant for a period of 11 months and after expiry of the said period, the tenancy became month to month and continued on the same terms and conditions except the rate of rent which was increased gradually. The tenant paid the rent to the landlady upto January, 2002 and therafter stopped paying the rent and deliberately withheld the same despite repeated demands of the landlady. The tenant was due five months' rent when the application was filed which amounted to Rs. 3750/- for period from February to June, 2002. Thus the tenant was a willful defaulter and was liable to be evicted. The landlady also contended that she had come to know that the tenant had sublet the mulgi to his brother, but in terms of the tenancy, the tenant could not have sublet the mulgi to any other person. She also contended that she wanted the property for the purpose of her proposed business and adjacent shop belonging to the landlady was vacant, but she needed both the shops to run iron business. ( 3 ) THE tenant admitted that the landlady was the owner of the property and he had obtained the mulgi on lease from 1. 4. 1983. According to him, the lease was only 11 months, but thereafter the tenancy continued on the same terms and conditions orally agreed upon between the parties. ( 3 ) THE tenant admitted that the landlady was the owner of the property and he had obtained the mulgi on lease from 1. 4. 1983. According to him, the lease was only 11 months, but thereafter the tenancy continued on the same terms and conditions orally agreed upon between the parties. It was denied that the rent was payable on or before 4th day of each calendar month in advance and it was stated that since inception of the tenancy it was the practice that father of the landlady who was residing in a house located on rear side of the mulgi used to collect the rent either personally or by sending his agent at his convenience at irregular intervals of three or four months and the month wise receipts for the payments were sent subsequently. This practice was followed consistently without any deviation, in spite of the landlady attaining majority and getting married. ( 4 ) IT was denied that any willful default in payment of rents had been made and as per the practice, they would wait for the landlord to come and collect the rent. Uncle of the tenant was seriously ill and hospitalized in the month of April, may, 2002 and finally he died on 28. 5. 2002 and the tenant had to attend the hospital and he could not contact the landlady and pay the rents. The tenant also sent the rents for the months of February to June, 2002 amounting to rs. 3750/- through a money order on 25. 6. 2002, which was received by the landlady. Subsequently the rent for July, 2002 was also sent through money order on 13. 7. 2002 and it was received by the landlady. He denied that he sublet the mulgi to his brother and that he was not doing himself any business. He contended that he was a member of joint family consisting of his father and four brothers and the business they were doing was the business of joint family. On the personal requirement, the tenant contended that the landlady was in occupation of an independent shop which was lying vacant for two years and she could start her business from that shop and additional bonafide requirement could only arise after commencing the business if the shop in her occupation was found insufficient. On the personal requirement, the tenant contended that the landlady was in occupation of an independent shop which was lying vacant for two years and she could start her business from that shop and additional bonafide requirement could only arise after commencing the business if the shop in her occupation was found insufficient. On the basis of these pleadings, the following issues were framed, 1]. Whether the respondent committed willful default in payment of rents from february, 2002 to June, 2002? 2]. Whether the respondent has sublet the premises to his brother as alleged by the petitioner? 3]. Whether the petitioner bonafidely requires the petition schedule premises for food business for additional accommodation? 4]. To what relief? ( 5 ) THE Rent Controller came to the conclusion on the basis of the material on record that the petition was filed in June, 2002 and the landlady had received the rents from February, 2002 to June, 2002 in the month of June, 2002 itself. Therefore he held that it was not a case of willful default in payment of rents from February, 2002 to June, 2002. The first issue was decided against the landlady. ( 6 ) ON second issue whether the respondent had sublet the premises to his brother, the Rent Controller again agreed with the tenant and found that the landlady had failed to establish that the tenant had sublet the premises to his brother. ( 7 ) ON third issue of bonafide requirement again the Rent Controller found that it was admitted case of the landlady that she was doing partnership business under the name and style of "m/s. Fortune Fashions" in the adjacent shop which belonged to her. The contention of the landlady that she required the premises as additional accommodation was not accepted, as, according to the Rent controller, the landlady as P. W. 1 herself had admitted that she was not responsible for any loss in the partnership business, but she was entitled to 20% profit. P. W. 3 had stated that as per the Company Rules they required minimum 500 sq. ft. for running their business. In appeal the appellate court framed the following points, 1]. Whether the tenant committed default in payment of rent @ Rs. P. W. 3 had stated that as per the Company Rules they required minimum 500 sq. ft. for running their business. In appeal the appellate court framed the following points, 1]. Whether the tenant committed default in payment of rent @ Rs. 750/- per month for the period from February, 2002 till end of June, 2002, if so does it willful and the tenant is liable to be evicted from the schedule premises under Section 10 (2) (i) of the Act? 2]. Whether carrying on joint family business in the schedule premises, when premises was obtained on lease by the tenant in individual capacity to carry on business amounts to parting with possession of schedule property by the tenant and does it amounts to sub-letting affording a ground to order eviction under section 10 (2) (ii) (a) of the Act? 3]. Whether the requirement of schedule premises pleaded by the landlady for her occupation to carry on food business is real, honest or bonafide if so the tenant is liable to be evicted from the schedule premises under Section 10 (3) (a) (iii) (b) of the Act? ( 8 ) ON point No. 1 relating to default, the appellate court reversed the finding of the Rent Controller and found on the basis of record that the tenant had taken a plea that father of the landlady used to collect the rent personally and some times he was collecting the rents through agent, once in three or four months, but when the tenant came before the court as a witness being R. W. 1, he stated, "the rents were paid every month regularly, but the receipts for payment of rent were sent to me once in three or four months, which were month wise receipts. " obviously this admission by the tenant proves that his plea in the counter that the landlady's father used to get the rents once in a three or four months was false. As per the agreement, the tenant was under the obligation to pay the rent every month during or before expiry of succeeding month, which would mean that he had to pay the rent in advance for every month. As per the agreement, the tenant was under the obligation to pay the rent every month during or before expiry of succeeding month, which would mean that he had to pay the rent in advance for every month. The appellate court held that even if it is assumed that the rent had to be paid on or before 4th day of every month as contended by the landlady, the tenant had to pay the rent in any case before expiry of succeeding month, but the tenant did not pay the rent for the default period. The appellate court also did not accept the explanation for not paying the rent by the tenant, as his uncle was hospitalized during the months of April and May, 2002 who died in May, 2002 and the tenant was not able to produce any evidence to substantiate the said contention. Even if it was accepted that he had to attend the uncle in the hospital, that could not prevent him to send the money order as he did later on. Another contention which was raised before the appellate court and which is raised before this Court was that the rent for the default period had been deposited before receiving notice of demand and as such the ground of willful default did not survive. This ground was accepted by the Rent Controller, but there is a clear finding of the Rent controller that the rents were received by the landlady in June, 2002 by way of money order which has not at all been discussed by the appellate court. The Rent controller found that the petition was filed on 10. 6. 2002 and P. W. 1 had stated in her statement that she had received the money order for Rs. 3750/-representing the rents from February, 2002 to June, 2002 in the month of June, 2002. The petition was also filed in June, 2002 and the tenant received the summons of the court on 1. 7. 2002. Therefore before receiving the summons the tenant had cleared the rent of the alleged default period. No notice is required under the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 and no notice had been given in the present case. Therefore, in my view, if the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Dakaya Vs. 7. 2002. Therefore before receiving the summons the tenant had cleared the rent of the alleged default period. No notice is required under the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 and no notice had been given in the present case. Therefore, in my view, if the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Dakaya Vs. Anjani, AIR 1996 SUPREME COURT 383 and K. A. Ramesh vs. Smt. Susheela Bai, AIR 1998 SUPREME COURT 1395are taken into consideration, the notice in the eviction petition should be treated as notice of demand and in case before such notice the rents for default period are paid, the ground vanishes and that would show the intention of the tenant that he was not interested in making a willful default. Default is not a ground for eviction, but willful default is a ground for eviction. Therefore even before receiving notice from the Rent Controller if the tenant pays the rent for the default period, in my opinion, it would not amount to willful default. In K. A. Ramesh vs. Smt. Susheela Bai (2nd supra) the supreme Court found that when there was no litigation between the parties, a bank draft had been sent to landlord, it was accepted and realized. Therefore, there was no willful default on the part of the tenant in paying the rents for the period in question. Therefore, the finding on this issue by the Rent controller is upheld, whereas the finding of the appellate Court is set aside. Coming to the third question of sub tenancy, the tenant did not dispute that his brother was running the business, but he contended that it was a joint family business. The joint family had nowhere taken the premises on lease from the landlord. Whatever there were arrangements within the family would not bind the landlady. The tenancy was created between an individual who is the tenant in this case and the landlady and on the admission of the tenant himself that the business was being run by his brother, it could be presumed that it was a case of sub-tenancy. In this case I refer to the law laid down by the Supreme Court reported in United Bank of India, vs. Cooks and Kelvey Properties (P) Ltd. , AIR 1995 SUPREME COURT 380 It was a case where the premises had been let out to a bank. In this case I refer to the law laid down by the Supreme Court reported in United Bank of India, vs. Cooks and Kelvey Properties (P) Ltd. , AIR 1995 SUPREME COURT 380 It was a case where the premises had been let out to a bank. The bank had inducted the United Bank of India Employees' Association Central Committee, a registered trade union into the premises for carrying on its trade union activities. Membership of the Union was confined to only employees of bank and no monitory consideration was received by bank from Trade Union. The Bank retained its power to call upon Union to vacate premises at any time and maintaining premises at its own expenses and also paying charges for electricity consumed by Trade union. In this factual position, the Supreme Court held that no sub-tenancy was created and the tests of sub-tenancy could be discerned from para-11 of the judgment. One of the foremost tests was that the tenant should have authority and power to control the premises and remove the person who was holding the property on his behalf. ( 9 ) IN the present case although the tenancy is created in favour of the tenant, he now claims that the business is run by a joint family which is altogether a different entity. In case the landlord has to file a suit even on other grounds, she will have to make the joint family a party and not the tenant in whose favour she created the tenancy. Para-11 of the judgment of the Supreme court is reproduced below, "11. From the evidence, it is clear that though the appellant had inducted the trade union into the premises for carrying on the trade union activities, the bank has not received any monetary consideration from the trade union, which was permitted to use and enjoy it for its trade union activities. It is elicited in the cross-examination of the President of the trade union that the bank had retained its power to call upon the union to vacate the premises at any time and they had undertaken to vacate the premises. It is also elicited in the cross-examination that the bank has been maintaining the premises at its own expenses and also paying the electricity charges consumed by the trade union for using the demised premises. It is also elicited in the cross-examination that the bank has been maintaining the premises at its own expenses and also paying the electricity charges consumed by the trade union for using the demised premises. Under these circumstances, the inference that could be drawn is that the appellant had retained its legal control of the possession and let the trade union to occupy the premises for its trade union activities. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, the only conclusion that could be reached is that though exclusive possession of the demised premises was given to the trade union, the possession must be deemed to be constructive possession held by it on behalf of the bank for using the premises for trade union activities so long as the union used the premises for trade union activities. The Bank retains its control over the trade union whose membership is only confined to the employees of the bank. Under these circumstances. The inevitable conclusion is, that there is no transfer of right to enjoy the premises by the trade union exclusively, for consideration. " ( 11 ) THEREFORE the findings on this issue are upheld. Since the finding of the appellate court on sub-tenancy is upheld, the revision petition is dismissed. No costs.