Judgment ( 1. ) HEARD. ( 2. ) THIS order shall govern the disposal of mano. 374/07, MANo. 370/07,mano. 373/07, m. A. No. 368/07, M. A. No. 369/07, M. A. No. 365/07, M. A. No. 367/07, M. A. No. 366/07, m. A. No. 491/07, M. A. No. 488/07, M. A. No. 489/07, M. A. No. 490/07, M. A. No. 495/07, m. A. No. 496/07, M. A. No. 497/07, M. A. No. 498/07, M. A. No. 499/07, as they arise out of an accident dated 9th June, 2005 and out of the common award dated 9th January, 2007 passed by Member, Motor Accident Claims tribunal, Jaura District Morena in Claim Case nos. 52/06,53/06,55/06 56/06,58/06,59/06, 60/06 and 61/06. ( 3. ) IN the appeals filed by the Insurance company, driver and owner are represented through their Counsel. As per office noting, claimants were served but only in Appeal nos. 366/2007 and 376/2007, they are represented through their Counsel. In the appeal of owner and driver, parties are same and at the request of the learned Counsel, their appeals are listed along with these appeals. ( 4. ) FOR the sake of convenience, I state that fact occurring in Misc. Appeal No. 376/07 arising out of Claim Case No. 53/06, Gajadhar v. K. P. Singh Bhadouriya and two others. On 9th June, 2005, deceased Baijanti (age 38 years), Ku. Gudiya (age-2 years), mahila Rama (age-19 years), Mahila Vimla (age-30 years), Amrsingh (age-17 years), mahila Vasanti (age-45 years), Mahila Prembai (age-45 years), Mahila Ramkunwar (age-55 years) and Mahila Kanchan (age-45 years)were travelling in Dumperbearing Registration no. M. P. 07g/5849 along with other persons. As per F. I. R. 36 persons were travelling in the dumper. When Dumper reached Rajapur malka Marg of Village Malka, it overturned and accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the driver/respondent No. 2 Lajjaram kushwaha. Nine persons died on the spot and other received severe injuries. The matter was reported at Police Station Godhan, District datia by respondent No. 1 Gangadhar, whose wife Baijanti and two-year old daughter ku. Gudiya died in the said accident. As per f. I. R. (Exp-1)60 persons hadgone to Gwalior. From Gwalior, they went to Sajapur and from sajapur, 35-40 persons had gone to Arohi Site where the work of respondent No. 3 was going on. Gudiya died in the said accident. As per f. I. R. (Exp-1)60 persons hadgone to Gwalior. From Gwalior, they went to Sajapur and from sajapur, 35-40 persons had gone to Arohi Site where the work of respondent No. 3 was going on. When the vehicle was going from Malka to arohi, Dumper was overturned due to rash and negligent driving by the driver. The dumper was loaded with Metal (Gitti) and all the persons who were travelling in the dumper were sitting on the metal. The dumper was owned by respondent No. 3 and insured with the appellant. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 their written statement denied all the allegations made in the claim petition and have stated that no accident occurred with the said Dumper. It is not the case of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that all the deceased were travelling as labourers and deployed by him. Policy is ext. D-1. As perthe policy, no premium to any passenger was paid. Additional premium of rs. 150 was paid to two drivers, two cleaners and two labourers for loading and unloading of dumper. ( 5. ) THE Tribunal after considering the oral and documentary evidence gave a finding that deceased are not the employees of respondent no. 3 It is also held that claimants in theirclaim petition and respondents in their written statements have not stated that deceased are employees of respondent No. 3. The Tribunal further gave a finding that deceased are passengers and travelling in the Dumper contrary to the terms and conditions of the policies and, therefore, Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured but, directed that as per Section 149 (2) of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as amended on 14th november, 2004, the primary liability is of the insurance Company and on relying the decision of the Apex Court in the case of national Insurance Company Limited v. V. Chinnamma directed the Insurance company to pay the amount and recover from respondent No. 3 who is owner of the vehicle. It is this part of the award which Insurance company aggrieved and filed these appeals. ( 6. ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the deceased were travelling in the Dumperas passengers and the driver was driving the Dumper contrary to the terms and conditions of the Policy Ext. It is this part of the award which Insurance company aggrieved and filed these appeals. ( 6. ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the deceased were travelling in the Dumperas passengers and the driver was driving the Dumper contrary to the terms and conditions of the Policy Ext. D-1 and, therefore, insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation as the liability is not covered under the policy and moreso, present case is not a case of third party risk as the deceased were not third party and, therefore, the direction issued by the learned Tribunal is based in law and contrary to the decisions of the Apex court in the case of New India Assurance company Limited v. Ramanand and others; national Insurance Company Limited v. Ajit kumar and others, National Insurance company Limited v. Bommithi Subhayamma and others; M. B. Jaya Devappa and others v. Oriental Fire General Insurance; New India assurance Company Limited v. Vedwati and others, and Oriental Insurance Company limited v. Meena Variyal and others,. It is further submitted that recently the Division bench of this Court in the case of Rajabai and others v. New India Assurance Company limited and others decided the question involved in these appeals vide judgment dated 3rd July, 2007 and has held that the Insurance company is not liable to pay any compensation as the liability is not covered under the policy and upheld the finding of the Tribunal and directed to proceed against the owner and driver of the offending vehicle for recovering the amount of compensation awarded and for disbursement of the same to the claimants in accordance with law. ( 7. ) GANGADHAR (A. W. 1) in his statement has not denied the fact of lodging of F. I. R. and the facts stated therein and, therefore, it cannot be said that the deceased were not travelling in the offending vehicle and they are third party. ( 8. ) MR. R. P. Gupta, Advocate, who is appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3/driver and owner of the Dumper has submitted that claimants in para 4 of the claim petition very categorically stated that the deceased were working as labourers. He drew my attention to the F. I. R. (Ext. P-1) lodged by respondent no. ( 8. ) MR. R. P. Gupta, Advocate, who is appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3/driver and owner of the Dumper has submitted that claimants in para 4 of the claim petition very categorically stated that the deceased were working as labourers. He drew my attention to the F. I. R. (Ext. P-1) lodged by respondent no. 1 also his Court statement recorded before the Tribunal and submitted that though in the f. I. R. lodged by this witness has stated that all the persons were travelling in the Dumper but in the Court statement, this fact was denied by the claimants and, therefore, learned tribunal has not committed any error in directing the appellant to pay the amount of compensation and recover the same from respondent No. 3. His second submission is that as pre policy Ext. D-1, additional premium of Rs. 150 was paid for two drivers, two cleaners and two labourers. As per evidence came on record at the time of accident, only driver was deployed by the owner of the vehicle and no cleaner was there and deceased were labourers of respondent No. 3 and, therefore, riskof the deceased is covered and insurance Company is liable to indemnify the insured. Hefurther submitted that F. I. R. is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used only for the purpose of corroboration or contradiction of maker only and, therefore, while deciding the claim petition, the facts mentioned in the F. I. R. cannot be relied upon when the evidence of the lodger of the F. I. R. iscontrary to the F. I. R. and his Court statement should have been accepted by the learned tribunal. Hefurther submitted that premium of rs. 3,580 was paid to the third party and in evidence, all the claim witnesses have stated that deceased were nottravelling in the vehicle but they were walking in the road and when the dumper was overturned, they received severe injuries and died and, therefore, risk is covered and Insurance Company is liable to pay the amount. ( 9. ) MR. R. P. Gupta, Advocate, who is appearing in M. A. No. 496/07 filed by the vehicle owner, arising out of the award passed in Claim Case No. 56/06 filed by the claimants parimal and Mahila Bai Kunthi submitted that claimants are not the legal representatives of the deceased. ( 9. ) MR. R. P. Gupta, Advocate, who is appearing in M. A. No. 496/07 filed by the vehicle owner, arising out of the award passed in Claim Case No. 56/06 filed by the claimants parimal and Mahila Bai Kunthi submitted that claimants are not the legal representatives of the deceased. Mahila Kanchan who died in the accident was aunt of Parimal and Bai kunthi is wife of Parimal. The learned Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000 to them whereas they are not the legal representatives of the deceased Kanchan and, therefore, on this ground, this award is liable to be set aside. ( 10. ) AS per para 18 of the claim petition (Claim Case No. 56/06) husband of the deceased died much prior to accident dated 9th June, 2005. The deceased Kanchan died issueless and claimant No. 1 Parimal being nephew of the deceased is the only person entitled to the estate of the deceased, he represents the estate of the deceased and is a legal representative of the deceased kanchan. The learned Tribunal has not committed any error in awarding the compensation to the claimants. ( 11. ) HIS next, submission is that M. A. No. 491/07, M. A. No. 488/07, M. A. No. 489/07, m. A. No. 490/07, M. A. No. 495/09, M. A. No. 496/07, M. A. No. 497/07, M. A. No. 498/07 and M. A. No. 499/07, are listed for admission and no notice has been issued to the opposite party and, therefore, this may be heard on admission after issuing notice to the other respondents. On perusal of record, I found that when the case was listed for admission on 18th May, 2007, learned Counsel for the appellant prayed for listing of these appeals along with the record of the appeals filed by the Insurance Company, therefore, this Court directed to listforadmission along with appeals of Insurance Company for analogous hearing. On 6th August, 2007 also, similar prayer was made. On 6th August, 2007 also, similar prayer was made. On perusing the record of M. A. No. 376/07, m. A. No. 374/07, M. A. No. 370/07, M. A. No. 373/07, M. A. No. 368/07, M. A. No. 369/07, m. A. No. 365/07, M. A. No. 367/07 and M. A. No. 366/07, I found that record of the Claims tribunal is requisitioned in these appeals and appellants/claimants are party in these appeals and they are represented by the same set of counsel in all the appeals in which the dispute is regarding the liability of the Insurance company. ( 12. ) IN support of the said contention, mr. R. P. Gupta, learned Counsel for the owner of the vehicle placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of National insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mam Chand and another. In the case of Mam Chand and another (supra), high Court has held that even if a vehicle was not insured at the relevant time that was a dispute between the Insurance Company and owner of the vehicle and there was no need for issuing notice to claimant. The Apex Court has held that this question is intimately linked with the entitlement of respondent No. 1 (claimant) to receive the amount from the appellant (Insurance Company) and it cannot be said that the respondent No. 1 was not required to be heard and the appeal was to be dismissed so far as he is concerned. Here, in the present case, notices have been served to the claimants in all the appeals filed by the insurance Company and Mr. B. D. Verma, advocate, is appearing in some of the cases on behalf of the claimant and, therefore, the objection raised by Mr. R. P. Gupta, learned counsel forthe owner and driver of the vehicle is not tenable and the decision cited by the learned Counsel will not be applicable in the present facts and circumstances of the case. ( 13. ) MR. B. D. Verma, Advocate, appearing for claimants has submitted that the deceased were not travelling as a passengers in the offending Dumperbut were going ahead of the dumper on the road. Due to rash and negligent driving by the driver, the Dumper was overturned, as a result of which deceased died and claimants are third party, therefore, as per insurance policy Ext. Due to rash and negligent driving by the driver, the Dumper was overturned, as a result of which deceased died and claimants are third party, therefore, as per insurance policy Ext. D-1, the award passed against the Insurance Company is just and proper. No appeal or cross-objection has been filed by the claimants and, therefore, the said contention of the claimant cannot be accepted in these appeals. If the claimants are aggrieved by the sufficiency of the award, they can file an appeal in accordance with the provisions of the Act. He lastly submitted that apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance company Limited v. Brij Mohan and others, has held that the Insurance Company is not liable for payment of compensation but the apex Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and directed the Insurance Company to satisfy the award and realize same from owner of the tractor and trolley. Paras 14 and 15 are relevant which reads as under: ( 14. ) IT is well settled that in a situation of this nature this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the constitution of India read with Article 136 thereof can issue suit direction for doing complete justice to the parties. ( 15. ) IN National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kusum Rai and others, III (2006) SLT 162 = II (2006) ACC 19 (SC) = II (2006)CPJ 8 (SC) = (2006) 4 SCC 250 , this court observed- "19. Thus, although we are of the opinion that the appellant was not liable to pay the claimed amount as the driver was not possessing a valid licence and the high Court was in error in holding otherwise, we decline to interfere with the impugned award, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in exercise of our jurisdiction under article 136 of the Constitution but we direct that the appellant may recover the amount from the owner in the same manner as was directed in Nanjappan. " here in these appeals, no such direction can be made. The Honble Apex Court can issue such direction under Article 142 read with article 136 of the Constitution of India. 14. " here in these appeals, no such direction can be made. The Honble Apex Court can issue such direction under Article 142 read with article 136 of the Constitution of India. 14. The Apex Court in the case of Vedwati and others (supra) has held that provisions of the Act did not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling in the goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability therefore, Paras 13,14,15 and 16 are relevant which reads as under: 13. The difference in the language of goods vehicle as appear in the old Act and goods carriage in the Act is of significance. A bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that the legislative intent was to prohibit goods vehicle from carrying any passenger. This is clear from the expression in addition to passengers as contained in definition of goods vehicle in the old act. The position becomes further clear because the expression used in goods carriage is solely for the carriage of goods. Carrying of passengers in a goods carriage is not contemplated in the Act. There is no provision similarto Clause (ii)of the proviso appended to Section 95 of the old Act prescribing requirement of insurance policy. Even Section 147 of the Act mandates the compulsory coverage against death of or bodily injury to any passenger of public service vehicle. The proviso makes it further clear that the compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors of public service vehicle and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited to liability under Workmens compensation Act, 1923 (in short the w. C. Act ). There is no reference to any passenger in goods carriage. 14. The inevitableconclusion, therefore, is that provisions of the Act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passengertravelling in a goods carriage and the insurer would have no liability therefor. 15. Our view gets support from a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of this court in New India Assurance Co. , Ltd. v. Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), in which it has been held that Satpal Singhs case,2000 ACJ 1 (SC), was not correctly decided. 15. Our view gets support from a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of this court in New India Assurance Co. , Ltd. v. Asha Rani, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), in which it has been held that Satpal Singhs case,2000 ACJ 1 (SC), was not correctly decided. That being the position, the tribunal and the High Court were not justified in holding that the insurer had the liability to satisfy the award. ( 16. ) THIS position was also highlighted in oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Devireddy konda Reddy, 2003 ACJ 468 : 2003 (1)TAC 481 (SC ). Subsequently also in national Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajit Kumar, 2003 ACJ 1931 : 2003 (3) TAC 273 (SC), in National Insurance Co. Lt d. v. Baljit kaur, 2004 ACJ 428 : 2004 (1) TAC 366 (SC) and in National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Bommithi Subhayamma, 2005 ACJ 721 : 2005 (2) TAC 1 (SC), the view in Asha rani case, 2003 ACJ 1 (SC), was reiterated. 15. Similar view has been taken by the apex Court in the case of Meena Variyal and others (supra) and has held that where a person is not a third party within the meaning of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Insurance company cannot be made automatically liable merely by resorting to Swaran Singhs ratio; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran singh, and others". Deceased being an employee not covered under the Workmens compensation Act, has not to be covered compulsorily under the Motor Vehicles Act and there is no special contract covering such aperson, Insurance Company cannot be made liable to pay the compensation and then to recover it from the insured, even if the case of the claimant that the car was driven by the driver was true, then also the claimant had to establish negligence of the driver before the insurance Company could be asked to indemnify the insured and there is no finding of his negligence. 16. Recently, the Apex Court in the case of oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Premlata Shukla and others considered the question of proof and admissibility of First Information Report and has held that once a part of contents of document admitted in evidence, party cannot be permitted to turn around and contend that othercontents had not been proved. Paras 10 to 16 are relevant which read as under: 10. Ltd. Premlata Shukla and others considered the question of proof and admissibility of First Information Report and has held that once a part of contents of document admitted in evidence, party cannot be permitted to turn around and contend that othercontents had not been proved. Paras 10 to 16 are relevant which read as under: 10. The insurer, however, would be liable to reimburse the insured to the extent of the damages payable by the owner to the claimants subject of course to the limit of its liability as laid down in the Act or the contract of insurance proof of rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the vehicle, is therefore, sine quanonformaintaining an application under Section 166 of the Act. 11. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that first Information Report was brought on record for the purpose of proving the accident and not for fixing the liability on the part of driver of the vehicle involved therein. 12. In Narbada Devi (supra) whereupon reliance has been placed this Court held that contents of a document are not automatically proved only because the same is marked as an Exhibit. There is no dispute with regard to the said legal proposition. 13. However, the factum of an accident could also be proved from the First information Report. It is also to be noted that once a part of the contents of the document is admitted in evidence, the party bringing the same on record cannot be permitted to turn around and contend that the other contents contained in the rest part thereof had not been proved. Both the parties have relied thereupon. It was marked as an Exhibit as both the parties intended to rely upon them. 14. Once a part of it is relied upon by both the parties, the learned Tribunal cannot be said to have committed any illegality in relying upon the part, irrespective of the contents of the document been proved or not. If the contents have been proved, the question of reliance thereupon only upon a part thereof and not upon the rest, on the technical ground that the same had not been proved in accordance with law, would not arise. 15. A party objecting to the admissibility of a document must raise its objection at the appropriate time. If the contents have been proved, the question of reliance thereupon only upon a part thereof and not upon the rest, on the technical ground that the same had not been proved in accordance with law, would not arise. 15. A party objecting to the admissibility of a document must raise its objection at the appropriate time. If the objection is not raised and the document is allowed to be marked and that too at the instance of a party which had proved the same and wherefor consent of the other party has been obtained, the former in our opinion cannot be permitted to turn around and raise an contention that the contents of the documents had not been proved and, thus, should not be relied upon. In Hukam Singh (supra), the law was correctly been laid down by the punjab and Haryana High Court stating-"8. Mr. G. C. Mittal, learned Counsel for the respondent contended that Ram pratap had produced only his former deposition and gave no evidence in Court which could be considered by the additional District Judge. I am afraid there is no merit in this contention. The trial Court had discussed the evidence of Ram Pratap in the light of the report exhibit D-1 produced by him. The additional District Judge while hearing the appeal could have commented on that evidence and held it to be inadmissible if law so permitted. But he did not at all have this evidence before his mind. It was not a case of inadmissible evidence either. No doubt the procedure adopted by thetrial Court in letting in a certified copy of the previous deposition of Ram Pratap made in the criminal proceeding and allowing the same to be p roved by Ram Pratap himself was not correct and he should have been examined again in regard to all that he had stated earlier in the statement, the parties in order to save time did not object to the previous deposition being proved by Ram Pratap himself who was only cross-examined. It is not a consent of parties but the only objection as that the procedure followed in the matter of giving evidence in court was not correct. It is not a consent of parties but the only objection as that the procedure followed in the matter of giving evidence in court was not correct. When the parties themselves have allowed certain statements to be placed on the record as a part of their evidence, it is not open to them to urge later either in the same court or in a Court of Appeal that the evidence produced was inadmissible. To allow them to do so would indeed be permitting them both to approbate and reprobate. " for the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. ( 17. ) IN view of the law laid down by the Apex court in the case of Premlata Shukla and others (supra), it cannot be said at this stage when no defence was taken by the respondents that deceased were nottravelling in the vehicle on the basis of deposition of Gagadhar (A. W. 1)and it cannot be said that the F. I. R. is not a substantive piece of evidence. The contents of F. I. R. is duly proved and findings recorded by the Claims Tribunal is just and proper. ( 18. ) FOR the reasons aforementioned, the findings of the impugned judgment by which learned Tribunal directed the appellant/ insurance Company to pay the amount of compensation and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle cannot be sustained, which is set aside accordingly. I hold that the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured and is also not obliged to satisfy the award of the Claimstribunal and then have recourse to the insured, the owner of the vehicle. The Tribunal was in error in holding so, the award of the Tribunal is modified in that regard. I hold that the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured and is also not obliged to satisfy the award of the Claimstribunal and then have recourse to the insured, the owner of the vehicle. The Tribunal was in error in holding so, the award of the Tribunal is modified in that regard. The appeals filed by the insurance Company vide M. A. No. 376/07, m. A. No. 374/07, M. A. No. 370/07, M. A. No. 373/07, M. A. No. 368/07, M. A. No. 369/07, m. A. No. 365/07, M. A. No. 367/07 and M. A. No. 366/07 and allowed and the appeals filed by the owner and driver of the vehicle vide m. A. No. 491/07, M. A. No. 488/07, M. A. No. 489/07, M. A. No. 490/07, M. A. No. 495/ 07, M. A. No. 496/07, M. A. No. 497/07, M. A. No. 498/07 and M. A. No. 499/07 are hereby dismissed, by holding the ownerand the driver of the offending vehicle are liable to pay the amount of compensation to the claimants as awarded by the Tribunal. Any amount deposited by the Insurance Company shall be payable by the owner of the vehicle within a period of 60 days from today, failing which the Insurance company shall recover the same by filing execution proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.