Judgment 1. Petitioner is widow of late Bhriguashram Prasad. Her husband joined service under the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna in 1970 as an Assistant. In ordinary course, he would have retired in the year 2002. While in service, petitioners husband was suspended in July 1976 on account of a criminal case of the year 1976 in which the husband of the petitioner and some other employees of the Bihar School Examination Board were charged with tampering with the marks- sheet in respect of several candidates, who had appeared in the Annual Secondary School Examination in 1976. After being charge-sheeted by the police, the husband of the petitioner and some others were convicted on 7.2.1989 for various offences such as Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the IPC and sentenced to undergo Rl for two years because sentences for various offences were to run concurrently. On account of his conviction, the husband of the petitioner was dismissed from service by order of the competent authority dated 4.8.1992 (Annexure-1). Petitioners husband and others accused persons had preferred appeals against their conviction. Petitioners husband died during the pendency of the appeal on 26.4.2004. The heirs of petitioners husband were allowed to continue with the appeal which has been finally allowed on 29.7.2005 by order contained in Annexure-2. The appellate court has held that extra-judicial confession was an evidence of weak nature and the prosecution had failed to prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubts. 2. On the ground that her husband stood acquitted of all the criminal charges, the petitioner on 30.8.2005 through Annexure-3, filed a representation before the concerned authorities through her lawyer. She prayed that since her husband was no more and, therefore, he could not now pray for being taken back in service but he should be deemed to have remained in service till the date of retirement and on that basis the respondent-Board should pay her all the retiral benefits of her late husband Bhriguashram Prasad. Since the Board did not accept the prayer of the petitioner, this writ petition was filed on 28.11.2005. 3. Since the Board did not accept the prayer of the petitioner, this writ petition was filed on 28.11.2005. 3. When the matter was being heard at the stage of admission on 20.2.2007, learned counsel for the petitioner realized the difficulty in the way of the petitioner on ground of there being no challenge to order of dismissal (Annexure-1) in respect of petitioners husband and hence, he sought adjournment and filed I.A. No. 1256 of 2007 on 26.2.2007 through which the petitioner has prayed for quashing of order of dismissal dated 4.8.1992, contained in Annexure-1. 4. There is no dispute that petitioners husband was dismissed from service without holding any enquiry in any departmental proceeding, on account of his conviction in a criminal case which was in respect of offences allegedly committed in course of official duties. It is also not in dispute that the criminal appeal preferred by petitioners husband has been allowed because the heirs were granted leave to pursue the appeal. It is clear that order of dismissal passed in the year 1992 had not been challenged by the concerned dismissed employee, the husband of the petitioner, till his death, in the year 2004. It was after about 12 years that the appeal was allowed and that is the sole ground on which petitioner has sought reliefs against the respondent-Board and has prayed that the impugned order of dismissal be quashed and her husband be treated to be in service till he would have superannuated in ordinary course in the year 2002 and on that basis retiral benefits be paid to the petitioner. 5. On behalf of the respondents the main defence is that the husband of the petitioner never challenged his dismissal from service during his lifetime and, therefore, such delayed challenge to that order is fit to be dismissed on ground of acquiescence, estoppel and delay. It has also been submitted by learned counsel for the respondent-Board that now when the husband of the petitioner is dead, any interference with the dismissal order on account of order of acquittal passed in criminal appeal would cause great prejudice to the Board because it cannot now initiate a disciplinary proceeding in which the charges could have been established even on the basis of limited evidence and circumstances on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. 6. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the ground of dismissal was conviction in criminal trial, the husband of the petitioner had no option but to wait for judgment in criminal appeal preferred by him and the petitioner also could not have approached the authority concerned or this Court prior to judgment in the criminal appeal whereby her husband was acquitted of the criminal charges. Hence, it has been submitted that there is no delay or inordinate delay in filing representation in August 2005 and preferring the writ petition in November 2005. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ram Sarowar Prasad Singh, 2007(1) PLJR 42 , in which reliance was placed upon judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, (1985)3 SCC 398 and it was held that conviction in a criminal case was sufficient to do away with the requirement of holding a disciplinary proceeding for establishing the guilt of the concerned employee but before deciding the quantum of punishment to be imposed, an opportunity of hearing in respect of proposed penalty was necessary to be given. It was submitted that in 1992 while passing the impugned order of dismissal from service, the authorities had not given any opportunity of hearing in respect of proposed penalty and, therefore, on that account also the impugned order contained in Annexure-1, is fit to be set aside. 7. So far the submission relating to right of the petitioners husband to be heard on the quantum of punishment is concerned, such right could have been invoked by petitioners husband in the year 1992 without waiting for outcome of the criminal appeal and he clearly chose not to challenge the impugned order of dismissal on such a ground. This amounts to waiver of the right of hearing in respect of penalty and further such a right cannot be permitted to be claimed by heirs of the deceased employee after such a long delay. The delay in such a situation cannot be ignored because it will prejudice the respondents, who now cannot remedy such defects by giving pre or post decisional opportunity of hearing to the concerned employee. The delay in such a situation cannot be ignored because it will prejudice the respondents, who now cannot remedy such defects by giving pre or post decisional opportunity of hearing to the concerned employee. It is well established in law that where delay leads to a situation in which interference would prejudice the other party, delay should not be condoned or ignored in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 8. So far as the submission of the petitioner that there is actually no delay in challenging the impugned order of dismissal because the appeal was decided much later in the year 2004 is concerned, it would be relevant to examine as to when the cause of action arose for challenging the order of dismissal contained in Annexure-1. Such cause of action, no doubt, arose on 4.8.1992 when the impugned order was passed and it was required of the husband of the petitioner to challenge that order through representation or writ petition on the grounds available to him on that date. The pendency of the criminal appeal could have acted as a further ground for the concerned authority or the court concerned to keep his challenge pending but that was not done by the husband of the petitioner. The disposal of the criminal appeal in the year 2004 only gave a good ground for challenging the impugned order but it cannot be treated as a new cause of action. Hence, there is clear delay of more than 12 years in challenging the impugned order of dismissal dated 4.8.1992. Delay itself does not oust extraordinary writ jurisdiction and principles of equity have to be kept in mind for deciding whether a writ petition should be dismissed on ground of long delay or not. In this context, the relevant facts have to be kept in mind whether some equitable principles such as creation of third party interest or prejudice to the other side have arisen or not. 9. On going through the judgment of acquittal contained in Annexure-2, it is found that the Secretary of the respondent-Board was the informant and he has deposed in support of his allegation in the FIR that one of the employees had confessed his involvement in tampering of the marks-sheet as well as the involvement of other employees, who were tried with him. The trial court relied upon the evidence of the Secretary and the extrajudicial confession made before him whereas the appellate court held the same to be a weak type of evidence. The appellate court has accepted the case to the extent that tampering of marks was done in the official records and it is not in doubt that the Bihar School Examination Board had initiated criminal proceeding against all such employees, who were involved with the preparation of the concerned records which include the husband of the petitioner. The final opinion of the appellate court in Annexure-2 is that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubts. In view of aforesaid facts, it is found that accused appellants were not accorded honourable acquittal on a finding that they could not have been involved with the offence but only on a finding that there was no reliable and sufficient evidence to prove the charges beyond all reasonable doubts. Such standard of proof is not needed for finding the charges proved in a departmental proceeding. The law is well settled that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away: Corporation of Nagpur vs. Ramchandra G. Modak, AIR 1984 SC 626 . 10. In the facts of this case, it is found that the challenge to Annexure-1 is barred by acquiescence and the appellate order of acquittal could not have stood in the way of respondent-Board in initiating/ continuing a departmental enquiry against the husband of the petitioner. Allowing a belated challenge to the impugned order after so many years at the. instance of heirs of the deceased employee when the employer authority cannot resort to its power of initiating departmental enquiry, would amount to injustice to the respondent authority as they would be prejudiced on account of delay of several years in approaching this Court through a writ proceeding. 11. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that delay in this particular case cannot be ignored and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on that account. It is acccordingly dismissed.