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2007 DIGILAW 882 (PAT)

Vishwanath Singh v. Bihar State Electricity Board

2007-05-03

AJAY KUMAR TRIPATHI

body2007
Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned senior counsel on behalf of the Electricity Board. 2. This is the fourth attempt being made on behalf of the petitioner to get rid of the millstone round his neck of a punishment of dismissal which was passed against him on 1.5.1996. The punishment was culmination of a finding of guilt which was recorded in a departmental proceeding. On every occasion the petitioner came before this High Court he did manage to reduce the size of the millstone i.e. the quantum of punishment. From perusal of all the orders one thing is apparent that petitioner has never been absolved of his guilt. The last of the orders in this regard came to be passed on 31.7.2003 in C.W.J.C. No. 3679 of 2000. In this order a learned Single Judge interfered with the order of punishment of compulsory retirement on the ground that the said punishment is not part and parcel of the penalties which have been provided for in the Certified Standing Order of the Board. Matter, therefore, again went back to the competent authority i.e. the Chairman of the Board. During pendency of the present writ application an order dated 19.7.2004 (Annexure-12) came to be passed against the petitioner. This order is order of discharge. Petitioner has brought the above order by filing an LA. No. 4901 of 2004. He has also prayed for suitable amendments to the writ application with regard to the relief as well. This interlocutory application accordingly stands allowed. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has a few submissions to make against the impugned order contained in Annexure-12. His first contention is that as early as on 17.1.1997 a Bench of this Court had set aside his dismissal order and directed the authorities to reimpose another punishment because the punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to the charge. This order of the Single Judge was challenged in L.P.A. and the L.P.A. Bench permitted the authorities to impose the punishment upon the petitioner. Subsequent punishments came to be imposed and as already noticed above they were interfered on technical grounds on good three occasions. The present impugned order has finally come to be passed against the petitioner, which according to the respondents is in consonance with the Standing Order and full compliance of the direction of the Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3679 of 2000 dated 31.7.2003. The present impugned order has finally come to be passed against the petitioner, which according to the respondents is in consonance with the Standing Order and full compliance of the direction of the Court passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3679 of 2000 dated 31.7.2003. Petitioner has thrown challenge to this order of punishment on two grounds that he has not been given a second show-cause before imposition of the present punishment and secondly that the order of discharge relates back to the date of his dismissal which is 1.5.1996. 4. The factual position is that after the order of dismissal was passed against the petitioner, petitioner was never allowed to join the respondent Electricity Board. Various orders kept being passed against him and the High Court kept entertaining the petitioner but only to a limited extent. By virtue of intervention of this High Court on various stages the issue never attained finality and it is only now that the order of discharge has come to be passed from the date of dismissal in this background. 5. The contention of the petitioner is that he should have been given a second show-cause before the order of punishment was passed. This Court can only observe that the impugned order of punishment passed against the petitioner has come to be issued after a judicial intervention and the Court had directed the authorities to impose a punishment in consonance with the Standing Order. If it was in this background that the Court had directed the authorities to pass this order then it is not the case that the order of punishment was passed against him at the first instance. The question of issuance of second show-cause may arise when the disciplinary authority in its wisdom decides to impose punishment after finding of guilt is recorded in enquiry held against a delinquent on the first count. Since the present order of punishment has come to be passed on the direction of the High Court, therefore, this Court does not feel that the question of issuance of second show-cause at this stage is required. 6. Since the present order of punishment has come to be passed on the direction of the High Court, therefore, this Court does not feel that the question of issuance of second show-cause at this stage is required. 6. For the second contention of the petitioner that the order of discharge should be from the date of issuance and not relate back to the date of his dismissal, this Court can only observe that because of the insistence of the petitioner in approaching this court time and again no finality on the issue was arrived at. In the given fact he was not allowed to join the Board at any point of time. By limiting the order of discharge from the date of issuance the petitioner would be entitled to claim back wages and other benefits from the date of dismissal till the date of discharge. Petitioner cannot be allowed to go back to the job from the date of his dismissal because there is a finding of guilt recorded against him which was never interfered on any occasion by this High Court. It will be giving him a premium of his own act by permitting him to be discharged from the date of the order and not from the date of his dismissal. In the given facts and peculiarity of the case this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed against the petitioner. 7. This writ application is accordingly dismissed.