Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has filed the present revision application against the order dated 29.11.2006, passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhojpur in Misc. Case No. 280 of 1997/1 of 2005, by which he has directed the petitioner to pay maintenance of Rs. 2000/- per month to his wife-opposite party no. 1 and at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per month to his minor daughter, Babli Kumari with effect from the date of application, i.e., 21.7.1997 with a further direction to pay the arrears within three months of the order after deducting the ad-interim maintenance amount already paid. 3. The aforesaid application was filed by opposite party no. 1 claiming maintenance of Rs. 500/- per month for herself and Rs. 500/- for maintenance of her minor daughter Babli Kumari. According to her case, opposite party no. 1 was married to the petitioner about 32 years ago and after marriage six daughters and three sons born to them. All the other daughters, except said Babli Kumari, who was aged about 12 years at the time of filing of the petition, were married and said Babli Kumari, during that time, was living with her mother, the opposite party. The admitted position is that the petitioner was employed in the State Bank of India and at the time of filing the petition, he was the record keeper. Subsequently, he has retired in January, 2006, at which time he was functioning as Cashier in the Bank. The statement with respect to the salary of the petitioner was called for from the State Bank of India, Branch, Bihta and vide letter dated 14.8.2004, it was stated that full salary of the petitioner was Rs. 18,508.96/- and after deduction was Rs. 9831.76. After retirement, by letter dated 5.10.2006, the Bank informed the court that the petitioner was getting pension at Rs. 7,808/- and after deduction of house loan he received Rs. 5,308/- per month. It was also the admitted position that the opposite party and the minor daughter were living in the house of the petitioner at village Patkhulia. Apart from the said income, it has come in the evidence of Babli Kumari that the petitioner has constructed three houses at Bihta from which he receives rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month. The said witness was not cross-examined by the petitioner. Apart from the said income, it has come in the evidence of Babli Kumari that the petitioner has constructed three houses at Bihta from which he receives rent of Rs. 10,000/- per month. The said witness was not cross-examined by the petitioner. Apart from the above, it had also come in evidence that the petitioner had ancestral lands of about 12 bighas, out of which 4 bighas had already been sold and remaining 8 bighas of land remained with the family. 4. The contention of the petitioner was that the said land being at the ancestral village where the opposite party was residing was as a matter of fact, being cultivated by the opposite party through one Bhubneshwar Singh on Batai. With respect to opposite party no. 1, she admitted in her cross-examination that her father had no son and he had left behind him only two daughters, including the petitioner and 7 bighas of land and two houses, out of which she received her half share, but she had stated that her eldest son grabbed the property and she was not getting any income of matrimonial village. On a conspectus of the aforesaid facts, the court below came to the conclusion that the opposite party had no income of her own whereas the petitioner was having a very large income and thus, the aforesaid amount of maintenance was ordered by the court. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the court below has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction by allowing the maintenance amount from the date of the application. It is submitted that the said order is wholly uncalled for as it is evident from the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure that the maintenance should be normally paid from the date of the order and only in exceptional circumstances, it is made from the date of application. It is submitted that no such exception has been pointed out on behalf of the opposite party in the present matter. It is further submitted that as a matter of fact, an order of interim maintenance had been passed on 20.11.1998 at the rate of Rs. 300/- to each opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and the same was being paid to them. It is, thus, submitted that there was no occasion for the grant of maintenance under sec. It is further submitted that as a matter of fact, an order of interim maintenance had been passed on 20.11.1998 at the rate of Rs. 300/- to each opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and the same was being paid to them. It is, thus, submitted that there was no occasion for the grant of maintenance under sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) is to prevent vagrancy and destitution and it provides to take care of the same during the pendency of the litigation through interim maintenance. 6. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the decision of this court in the case of Bijay Kapri vs. Smt. Kanishta Devi and Anr.: 2000(2) PLJR 241 , in which the order for grant of maintenance from the date of filing of the application was modified and it was directed that the maintenance should be paid from the date of the impugned order. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the provisions of sec. 125 of the Code have been amended with effect from 24.9.2001 by Act 50 of 2001 and prior to the said date there was a. ceiling of Rs. 500/- per month fixed by the Act as the maximum maintenance that could be granted to any person. For the said reasons also, it is submitted that the court below has seriously erred in granting the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- and Rs. 1,000/- per month respectively with effect from 21.7.1997 whereas the same amount could not have been granted prior to 24.9.2001. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also contends that the entire order and proceeding of the court below are contrary to the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984, in Section 9 of which it has been provided that it is the duty of the Family Court to make efforts for settlement by persisting and persuading the parties to arrive at the same, but no such step.was taken by the Family Court, although the petitioner at all stages and even now has shown his willingness in maintaining the opposite party, who lives at his house. It is submitted that for the said reason also, the proceeding of the court below is vitiated and the impugned order needs to be set aside. 9. It is submitted that for the said reason also, the proceeding of the court below is vitiated and the impugned order needs to be set aside. 9. Learned counsel for the opposite party supports the impugned order referring to the various findings with respect to the income of the petitioner as also other findings recorded therein. It is submitted that sec. 125 of the Code permits the grant of maintenance from the date of the application and thus, no illegality has been committed by the court below, if such an order is passed in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is further submitted that in view of the findings regarding the income of the petitioner the amounts of maintenance to the opposite party are not excessive and the same require no interference. 10. On a consideration of the aforesaid arguments of the parties, this court finds that the court below has not considered the present matter in a proper manner and keeping in view the purpose of the provisions of sec. 125 of the Code. As held in a catena of decisions, the purpose of the said provision is to prevent vagrancy and destitution and essentially to financially support the deserted wife or other class of persons to maintain them under the said provision. In the present matter, the court below has taken into consideration the total gross salary that was earlier being received by the petitioner as per the certificate given by the State Bank of India as also the gross amount received as pension. The said consideration does not appear to be correct since what is relevant for the purpose of award of maintenance is the amount received by the party after necessary deductions. The admitted position is that the opposite party was living in the house of the petitioner in village home. Even the deduction is for the purpose of house loan from the pension amount. Thus, only the salary as well as pension which the petitioner brings home, should have been taken into consideration for granting maintenance to the opposite parties. 11. Moreover, the court below has not at all considered the very important admission made by opposite party no. 1 in her cross-examination that she has inherited a house and 3 1/2 bighas of land from her father. 11. Moreover, the court below has not at all considered the very important admission made by opposite party no. 1 in her cross-examination that she has inherited a house and 3 1/2 bighas of land from her father. The mere statement that her elder son has grabbed the property has no relevance in the facts and circumstances of the case, since the property as a matter of fact, belongs to her and it is not open to her to say that her own son has grabbed the property and that she will sit back and will take no steps in the matter. As a matter of fact, under sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure itself, it is the duty of a son to maintain his father and mother, if they are unable to maintain themselves; whereas the court has not even considered the said fact. When the petitioner had raised the issue that the opposite party has income from the land and house of her matrimonial village, the same ought not to have been ignored by the court in the manner which has been done. It raises the strong suspicion that the court below had made up its mind to disbelieve everything that was stated on behalf of the petitioner and believe the contention of the opposite party, which is not the correct way of looking at the evidence that comes in course of the said proceedings. It is for the court, in such matter, to consider the probability of the facts and then to come to a fair conclusion as to what is the real state of affairs. From the impugned order it does not appear that any such attempt has been made by the court below and even the important admission made by the opposite party no. 1 has been lost sight of by the court below. 12. In the aforesaid view of the matter, this court does not find that the court below has rightly looked into the aspect of the matter. The court below has also not considered as to what was the justification for passing an order for maintenance from the date of application which goes back to more than 9 years from the date of the order. The court below has also not considered as to what was the justification for passing an order for maintenance from the date of application which goes back to more than 9 years from the date of the order. As laid down in the decisions of this court such an order may be necessitated if the party shows the dire need of money for the purpose of maintaining herself, for which she had to raise debts, during the period when the application had been pending. There is no such material on the record, rather the opposite party was getting interim maintenance from November, 1998 itself by order dated 20.11.1998 although as a matter of fact the provision for interim maintenance has been brought into existence for the first time by the Amendment Act, 2001 with effect from 24.9.2001. However, since the said order is not under challenge, therefore, this court would not like to go into that issue any further. In any case, it is a relevant fact that right from 1998, opposite party nos. 1 and 2, have been paid interim maintenance, by which they had managed to sustain themselves during that period and thus there is no reason for passing the order to pay maintenance with effect from the date of application going back more than 9 years from the date of passing of the said order. 13. This court also finds that although the court below was aware of the fact that the ceiling on the amount of maintenance has been removed only by the Amendment Act, 2001 with effect from 24.9.2001, yet it has passed an order granting maintenance at the rate of Rs. 2000/- and Rs. 1000/- from the date prior to the said amendment, which is also contrary to the provisions of the Act. 14. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances and the further fact that opposite party no. 1 has inherited 3 1/2 bighas of land and one house from her father and further fact that the ancestral land of the petitioner is only 8 bighas and the same cannot be held to be personally owned by the petitioner alone, rather it is the joint family property of which he is the karta only, this court is of the view that the maintenance of Rs. 750/- per month would be sufficient for the purpose of maintenance of the opposite party no. 750/- per month would be sufficient for the purpose of maintenance of the opposite party no. 1. Similarly, considering the amount being received by the petitioner as pension and other materials which have come on the record, this court is of the view that an amount of Rs. 750/- per month is a reasonable maintenance for opposite party no. 2 also. 15. In the result, this revision application is, accordingly, allowed and the order dated 29.11.2006 is partly set aside and it is directed that the petitioner shall pay as maintenance the amount of Rs. 750/- each to opposite party nos. 1 and 2 and the said payment will be effective from the date of the impugned order dated 29.11.2006.