JUDGMENT : M.M. Das, J. - The writ Petitioner was an employee under the opp. party - Rourkela Steel Plant of Steel Authority of India Ltd. The case of the Petitioner is that in order to vicitimizing and curb his Trade Union activities, the employer with mala fide intention charge sheeted him on 12.8.2000 for commission of certain alleged misconduct of intimidating an officer of the Company within the work premises by exhibiting indecent behaviour etc. An inquiry was conducted to prove the charges levelled against the Petitioner which, according to the Petitioner was conducted in a perfunctory and arbitrary manner violating the principles of natural justice. The Petitioner alleges that he was not afforded with the opportunity to adduce evidence during the course of inquiry and the Enquiring Officer holding the Petitioner guilty of the charges, submitted a report. The disciplinary authority accepting the said report proposed to dismiss the Petitioner from service and since I.D. Case No. 7 of 1997 relating to Anr. industrial dispute was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela where the Petitioner was a party as the workman, the opp. party- Management filed an application u/s 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for approval of its action as per the proviso to the said Section. The said application was registered as I.D. Misc. Case No. 46 of 2000. The Petitioner, on receiving the notice to show cause in the aforesaid case, filed his show cause. Thereafter, the opp. party filed an application to take up the question of fairness of the domestic inquiry as the preliminary issue, to which the Petitioner filed his objection. The said application u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act was allowed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela by its order dated 11.7.2002. Being aggrieved by the said order annexed as Annexure-6 to the writ petition, the Petitioner has preferred this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 2. Mr. Somanath Mishra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the impugned order under Annexure-6 could not have been passed by the Industrial Tribunal on the application filed by the Management to consider the question of fairness of domestic inquiry as preliminary issue. 2. Mr. Somanath Mishra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended that the impugned order under Annexure-6 could not have been passed by the Industrial Tribunal on the application filed by the Management to consider the question of fairness of domestic inquiry as preliminary issue. He submitted that it is well settled in law that in an industrial adjudication, the industrial adjudicator is to take up all the issues simultaneously and it is not permitted to decide a case in a piece meal manner. He further submitted that if all the issues are not taken up together, delay would be caused in deciding the case which would lead to the misery of the workman and, such, the purpose and intention of enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act would be frustrated. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opp. party being sworn to by the Assistant Manager (Personnel) Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela. In counter affidavit, the opp. party has, inter alia, questioned the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the impugned order is an interlocutory order, which was passed on an application filed by the Management in the original Misc. Case being I.D. Misc. Case No. 46 of 2000 filed u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act seeking approval of the action of the Management in removing the Petitioner from service after conducting the domestic inquiry. In the said application, the opp. party prayed the learned Tribunal to decide the propriety and legality of the domestic inquiry as a preliminary issue before entering into the merit of the case and to allow the Management to lead evidence on merit in the event it is held that the domestic inquiry is not fair and proper. The Petitioner filed an objection to the said application filed by the Management to take up the case on the preliminary issue. After hearing the said application, the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela passed the impugned order under Annexure-6. 4. Mrs. Jena, learned Counsel for the opp. party vehemently argued that since the order has been passed on a preliminary issue as to whether the domestic inquiry was conducted fairly and properly, the same is an interlocutory order and the Petitioner cannot maintain a writ petition against the said order. 5. I have perused the impugned order under Annexure-6 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela. party vehemently argued that since the order has been passed on a preliminary issue as to whether the domestic inquiry was conducted fairly and properly, the same is an interlocutory order and the Petitioner cannot maintain a writ petition against the said order. 5. I have perused the impugned order under Annexure-6 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela. I find from the said order that the Tribunal while considering the application filed by the Management for deciding the preliminary issue has, in fact, minutely gone into the details of the domestic inquiry conducted by the Enquiring Officer against the Petitioner and, as a matter of fact even has gone to the extent of giving a finding on the legality of the said inquiry conducted against the Petitioner and has recorded a finding that the inquiry was properly conducted and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. It has also found that sufficient materials were made available by the Management before the Enquiring Officer for proving the charges framed against the Petitioner. It is, therefore, clear from the impugned order that the learned Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal has, in fact, decided the application of the Management filed u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act in its entirety and after passing of the impugned order, there was no other issue left to be decided by the Tribunal on the application of the Management u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act. 6. Mr. Somanath Mishra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that though the Tribunal conducted a hearing on the application filed by the opp. party - Management to decide the question of fairness of the domestic inquiry as preliminary issue,but the Tribunal without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner to address it on the merit of the petition, illegality entered into the merit of the case. 7. party - Management to decide the question of fairness of the domestic inquiry as preliminary issue,but the Tribunal without affording any opportunity of hearing to the Petitioner to address it on the merit of the petition, illegality entered into the merit of the case. 7. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is necessary to quote Sub-section (2) of Section 33 of the Act, which reads as follows: During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman- (a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer. 8. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act has been elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court in the case of the The Lord Krishna Textile Mills Vs. Its Workmen The Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd. v. D.N. Ganguly and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 7758 and Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Vs. Gobind. It has been consistently held that the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) requires three things, namely, (i) dismissal or discharge, (ii) payment of wages, and, (iii) making of an application for approval, to be simultaneous and to be part of the same transaction. It has been held by the Supreme Court in the above cited decisions that the employer's conduct should show that the three things contemplated under the proviso, are parts of the same transaction. In the case of the Lord Krishna Textile Mills (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: The jurisdiction of the appropriate industrial authority in holding an enquiry u/s 33(2)(b) cannot be wider and is, if at all, more limited, than that permitted u/s 33(1). In the case of the Lord Krishna Textile Mills (supra), the Supreme Court held thus: The jurisdiction of the appropriate industrial authority in holding an enquiry u/s 33(2)(b) cannot be wider and is, if at all, more limited, than that permitted u/s 33(1). In view of the limited nature an extent of the enquiry permissible u/s 33(2)(b) all that the authority can do in dealing with an employer's application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not. If before dismissing an employee the employer has held a proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass impugned order as a result of the said enquiry, all that the authority can do is to enquiry whether the conditions prescribed by Section 33(2)(b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. The approving authority has to consider only (a) whether the standing orders justify the order of dismissal, (b) whether an enquiry has been held as provided by the standing order, (c) whether the wages for the month have been paid as required by the proviso, and (d) whether an application has been made as prescribed by the proviso. And when all these conditions have been fulfilled by the employer the tribunal is not justified in refusing to accord approval to the action taken by the employer. Nor is it justified while holding the enquiry to assume powers of an appellate Court which along is entitled to go into all questions of fact. The question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a Court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate Court which is entitled to consider by an appellate Court which is entitled to consider facts; but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the Court is limited as u/s 33(2)(b). 9. In the case of Lalla Ram Vs. 9. In the case of Lalla Ram Vs. Management of D.C.M. Chemical Works Ltd. and Another the Supreme Court held that in a proceeding u/s 33(2)(b) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal is confined to the enquiry as to (i) whether a proper domestic enquiry in accordance with the relevant rules/Standing Orders and principles of natural justice has been held, (ii) whether a prima facie case for dismissal based on legal evidence adduced before the domestic tribunal is made out, and (iii) whether the employer had come to a bona fide conclusion that the employee was guilty and the dismissal did not amount to unfair labour practice and was not intended to vicitimize the employee. The Supreme Court further held that when deciding the above factors, though it is a settled position that the award of punishment for misconduct under the relevant rules/orders, is a matter for the Management to decide and the Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe, yet an inference of mala fide may in certain cases be drawn from the imposition of unduly harsh, severe, unconscionable or shockingly disproportionate punishment. The Tribunal has to further find out as to whether the employer has paid or offered to pay wages for 6'rre month to the employee. 10. Law is, therefore, clear that if the Tribunal assumes jurisdiction not vested in it by law and consequently either refuses or grants approval under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, the same would be patently an erroneous order. In the present case, as has been discussed earlier, though the tribunal stated in the concluding paragraph of the impugned order that a prima facie case has been made out against the Petitioner, but it has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in entering into the merit of the domestic enquiry conducted by the opp. party-employer and has further committed an error in arriving at specific findings which are substantially question of facts and can only be decided by a Court of appeal. 11. In view of the above, the impugned order under Annexure-6 is not sustainable and is, therefore, quashed. party-employer and has further committed an error in arriving at specific findings which are substantially question of facts and can only be decided by a Court of appeal. 11. In view of the above, the impugned order under Annexure-6 is not sustainable and is, therefore, quashed. The matter is remanded back to the Industrial Tribunal, Rourkela, which shall deal with the application of the employer filed under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the Act in accordance with law keeping the observations made above in view and after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Final Result : Allowed