Judgment :- Chitra Venkataraman, J. The petitioner herein is a firm. For the assessment years 1983-84 to 1987-88, it preferred an application under Section 245-C of the Income Tax Act before the first respondent herein for settlement of its liability under the Income Tax Act. By order dated 23. 1993, the first respondent quantified the income and the liability; thus included the interest under Section 139(8), 215/217 and penalty under Section 271(1)(c). The Settlement Commission held that for the assessment year 1983-84, no interest was leviable under Section 139(8). As regards the assessment years 1984 85 and 1985-86, interest would be charged as due and for the year 1986-87, interest would be for a period of six months. However, for 1987-88 the Settlement Commission condoned delay in filing the return and waived the interest under Section 139(8). As regards the penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the Settlement Commission imposed the minimum penalty. 2. As regards the levy or waiver of interest under Section 215/217 of the Act, the petitioner states that there was no finding in the order of the first respondent dated 23. 1993. The petitioner states that in the course of implementing the order of the first respondent, the second respondent determined the tax and interest payable for the relevant assessment years. This included levy of interest under Section 215/217. By order dated 24. 1993, the second respondent determined the interest under Section 215/217 payable for the assessment years 1983-84 to 1987-88. It is stated that the petitioner objected to the said levy. By order dated 10. 1993, the second respondent rejected the claim of the petitioner. He held that when the Settlement Commissions order was silent as regards the levy of interest, the same was attracted as per the provisions of the Act. Thereupon, the writ petitioner challenged the same in W.P.Nos.39375- 79/93 before the Karnataka High Court. .3. By order dated 12. 1999, the Karnataka High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the proper remedy was to approach the Settlement Commission and that the Assistant Commissioner had rightly rejected the appeal. The writ petitioner went on further appeal before the Division Bench in W.A.No.2702-706/99. By order dated 7. 1999, the Division Bench while confirming the order of the single Judge, reserved the liberty to the petitioner herein to approach the Settlement Commission for appropriate orders. The writ petitioner went on further appeal before the Division Bench in W.A.No.2702-706/99. By order dated 7. 1999, the Division Bench while confirming the order of the single Judge, reserved the liberty to the petitioner herein to approach the Settlement Commission for appropriate orders. Thus the writ appeal was dismissed observing that if and when an application was filed, the Settlement Commission will proceed to decide the same in accordance with law. 4. It is stated that the petitioner approached the first respondent through an application dated 17. 1999. The petitioner pointed out that in the order dated 23. 1993 passed by the first respondent, there was no direction as to levy of interest under Section 215/217 and consequently, no levy of interest was quantifiable. The petitioner also pointed out to the power of the Settlement Commission for waiver of interest under Rule 40 of the Income Tax Rules. Accordingly, the petitioner prayed for waiver of interest. The first respondent disposed of the said application vide order dated 11. 2005. It held that in the absence of direction for reduction or waiver of interest in the order passed originally on 23. 1993 and considering the direction in the penultimate paragraph of the order directing the assessing authority to intimate the tax, interest, and penalty payable as a result of the order, it would indicate that interest under Section 215/217 of the Act was leviable. Consequently, the order of the second respondent was not contrary to the order of the first respondent. 5. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition before this Court. Referring to the provisions of Section 245-D(4), the petitioner contends that the first respondent made no specific direction or quantification of levy of interest passed in the order dated 23. 1993 under Section 245-D(4). The petitioner submits that when no interest was levied, the second respondent could not quantify the interest. Consequently, he submitted that the first respondent should have cancelled the interest levied by the second respondent. Referring to the provisions of the waiver power under Rule 40 of the Income Tax Rules, the petitioner submitted that the first respondent failed to consider its prayer. Further, the order was opposed to law and the principles of natural justice. Consequently, he submitted that the first respondent should have cancelled the interest levied by the second respondent. Referring to the provisions of the waiver power under Rule 40 of the Income Tax Rules, the petitioner submitted that the first respondent failed to consider its prayer. Further, the order was opposed to law and the principles of natural justice. In the circumstances, the petitioner has prayed for the issue of a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus to quash the order of the first respondent dated 11. 2005 confirming its earlier order dated 23. 1993 and direct the respondents not to charge or levy interest under Section 215/217 of the Act. .6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner herein submitted that in terms of Section 245-D(6), every order passed under sub section (4) provides for terms of settlement including any demand by way of tax, penalty or interest and the manner in which any sum due under settlement shall be paid. Hence, when the assessing authority gives effect to the Commissions order, income tax must be in terms of what had been quantified by the Settlement Commission. A perusal of the order does not show that it did not contemplate levy of interest under Section 215/217. Consequently, the second respondent herein cannot impose interest which was not contemplated in the order passed under Section 245-D. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that in the absence of any direction, the same could be only treated as amounting to waiver. In any event, the first respondent ought to have considered the case in terms of the direction of the Division Bench to grant waiver. 7. Learned senior standing counsel appearing for the respondent, however, supported the order of the Settlement Commission contending that waiver is a conscious overt act on the part of the authority concerned, that mere omission in the order of the first respondent cannot be construed as an act of waiver. He submitted that if the requisite conditions for attracting chargeability of interest are fulfilled, it is not necessary for the Settlement Commission to pass a formal order to that effect; that the assessing officer only needs to calculate the interest and make a demand for it. Consequently, even in the absence of any such positive dealing in the order of the Tribunal, interest was liable to be paid by the petitioner. 8. Consequently, even in the absence of any such positive dealing in the order of the Tribunal, interest was liable to be paid by the petitioner. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner however pointed out to the decision of the Delhi High Court reported in (2007) 207 CTR (Del) 669 (L.N. Gagodia & Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax), wherein, the Delhi High Court held that when the Settlement Commission has drawn the computation of income in its order under 245-D(4), the Assessing Officer has to strictly follow that order while effecting recovery and that it was not open to the Assessing Officer to charge interest under Section 220(2). It was not indicated in the Settlement Commissions order. In the circumstances, learned senior counsel submitted that it was not open to the Assessing Authority to levy interest. In any event, he submitted that the Settlement Commission should have considered his petition for waiver which it had jurisdiction to consider. In the circumstances, he prayed for setting aside the order of the first respondent and to remand the matter back to the first respondent for consideration of the same for waiver in accordance with law. 9. We agree with the contention of the senior standing counsel for the respondents that waiver of interest has to be by an overt act. Referring to the scope of power of the Settlement Commission with reference to Section 245-D, the Apex Court, in the decision reported in 252 ITR 1 (Cit Vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (S.C.), held that the substantive provision in regard to settlement in Chapter XIX-A is sub section (4) of Section 245-D. Sub Section (6) Section 245-D is only procedural in nature. The Apex Court held "a proper reading of sub section (6) would show that all that it contemplates is that while the Commission makes an order of settlement under sub section (4), it will also have to provide for the terms under which the amount payable by way of tax, penalty or interest shall be paid by the assessee. The Apex Court held "a proper reading of sub section (6) would show that all that it contemplates is that while the Commission makes an order of settlement under sub section (4), it will also have to provide for the terms under which the amount payable by way of tax, penalty or interest shall be paid by the assessee. The expression "terms" used in that sub section does not refer to the power of the Commission to waive or reduce tax, penalty or interest because quantification of the amount payable under each of those expressions is dealt with under separate provisions of the Act like the payment of tax is governed by various provisions of the Act as defined in Section 2(43) of the Act, while penalty is covered by Section 245-H and interest under Sections 234-A, 234-B and 234C of the Act. " 10. Considering the mandatory character of the levy of interest, the claim of the petitioner is rejected. At the same time, it must be noted that in its petition before the Settlement Commission, the petitioner had made a specific plea for waiver of interest and sought for a direction to the Assessing Authority restraining him from levy of interest under Section 215/217 of the Act. 11. A perusal of the order of the Settlement Commission, first respondent herein, shows that except for interest under Section 139(8) and penalty under Section 271(1)(c), which are reduced/waived in express terms, it had not interfered with the levy of interest under 215/217. In the circumstances, it has taken the view that the levy of interest was not contrary to the order of the first respondent. Except for taking the view that the enhancement of interest under Section 215/217 for the Assessment Year 1984-85 was contrary to the decisions of the various High Courts, it had not considered the plea for waiver. As rightly submitted by the Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, when a specific prayer had been made, it stands to reason that the first respondent should have considered the same in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we uphold the prayer of the petitioner herein for a remand of the matter back to the Settlement Commission directing the first respondent herein to consider the plea of waiver in accordance with law. In the circumstances, we uphold the prayer of the petitioner herein for a remand of the matter back to the Settlement Commission directing the first respondent herein to consider the plea of waiver in accordance with law. Except for this, we do not find any justification to interfere with the order of the Settlement Commission. The writ petition is, hence, ordered accordingly. No costs.