Judgment :- The trial Court convicted A1 and A2 under Sections 448 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under section 448 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months each for the offence under section 326 of IPC. A3 was also convicted under section 448 and 326 r/w. 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under section 448 r/w. 34 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months for the offence under section 326 r/w. 34 IPC. The sentences had to run concurrently. In appeal the convictions and sentences passed against A2 and A3 were set aside and they were acquitted. However, the convictions under sections 448 and 326 IPC passed against A1 were upheld and the sentence under Section 448 IPC was also upheld, but the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment passed by the trial court for the offence under Section 326 IPC was reduced to one year and the sentence of six months' rigorous imprisonment in default of payment of fine was also reduced to three months' simple imprisonment. Hence this revision by A1. The case of the prosecution was that on 4.3.1999 at about 11.00 P.M. A1 to A3 along with five unidentified offenders formed themselves into a group, armed with sticks and sickles and proceeded in a jeep to the house of B. Parandhamaiah with the common object of taking away B. Indrani who was the wife of A1. A1 used criminal force on Indrani and dragged her in order to take away from the house. Parents and brother of Indrani witnessed the incident and they tried to rescue Indrani, but A1 became angry and beat B. Parandamaiah with a stick on his right hand due to which he suffered deformity and swelling in his right hand. Certain overt acts were also attributed to A2 and A3. In the present revision as this Court is not concerned with A2 and A3 who were acquitted, therefore that evidence may not be discussed. Neighbours came to the scene of occurrence and accused left the place in a jeep. Certain overt acts were also attributed to A2 and A3. In the present revision as this Court is not concerned with A2 and A3 who were acquitted, therefore that evidence may not be discussed. Neighbours came to the scene of occurrence and accused left the place in a jeep. A complaint was given by B. Parandhamaiah orally to Assistant Sub-Inspector of police who recorded his statement, registered a case in Cr.No. 13 of 1999 under Sections 448 and 324 IPC and arrested the accused. Charges were framed against the accused. The accused pleaded not guilty. Prosecution examined nine witnesses and the trial Court, considering the evidence, convicted the accused persons. Since A2 and A3 have already been acquitted and A1 has been convicted under sections 448 and 326 IPC, this Court will have to see what was the evidence against him. P.W.1 is father of Indrani who is the wife of A1. He stated that he received a fracture on his right hand and his son Purushotam also received injuries. His daughter also received injuries on her right leg. The incident took place a year back at 11.00 P.M. at his house. On that day, he, his wife, daughter and son were in the house. After they took meals, they were watching television. At that time A1 called them and A2 and A3 were along with him. All the accused trespassed into his house and they tried to drag his daughter. When he intervened to rescue her, A1 beat him with a stick on his right hand and he received fracture. A2 beat his son with a stick on his left hand ring finger. They raised cries hearing which neighbours came to the scene of occurrence. The accused threatened them with sickles that were brought in a taxi. They came in the taxi bearing No. KA-25-2699. Five other persons also accompanied the accused. He did not know their names. A1 beat his daughter with a stick on her right leg. On seeing the neighbours, the accused ran away in their taxi. On the same day night at 12.00 mid night he gave a report to the police. There is nothing in the cross-examination of P.W.1 which could discredit his evidence. P.W.2 is Indrani who is the daughter of P.W.1 and wife of A1. She also corroborated what had been stated by P.W.1. On the same day night at 12.00 mid night he gave a report to the police. There is nothing in the cross-examination of P.W.1 which could discredit his evidence. P.W.2 is Indrani who is the daughter of P.W.1 and wife of A1. She also corroborated what had been stated by P.W.1. P.W.3 is the wife of P.W.1 and P.W.4 is the son of P.W.1. They also corroborated the evidence of PW 1. P.W.5 is the doctor who examined P.W.4 and found mild swelling over the left ring finger bone, and according to the doctor, the injury was grievous in nature caused by blunt force. He exhibited Ex.P3 as x-ray film and Ex.P2 as his certificate. P.W.6 is also doctor who examined P.W.1 and found deformity on right fore arm with swelling of 3" length occupying right lower 1/3rd upto wrist and the movement of the wrist point was restricted by fracture of right fore arm bone. X-ray was taken and fracture of ulna of right fore arm. According to his opinion, the injury was grievous and he exhibited Ex.P4 as the certificate and P5 as the x-ray film. These are the material witnesses in this case and even the x-ray technician was also examined. The case of defence is that all the witnesses have stated that the injuries were caused by a stick and therefore the conviction could not be sustained in view of the fact that there was no evidence about the sticks being of lethal type and something like sharp blade or sharp point attached to them and therefore the sticks would not fall within the ambit of any instrument as mentioned in Section 326 IPC. Section 326 IPC lays down, "Whoever, except in the case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and also shall liable to fine". The question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that either it should be an instrument which is used for shooting, stabbing or cutting or it should be an instrument which is used as a weapon of offence and is likely to cause death and the stick, by no stretch of imagination, could be described as an instrument, if used, as a weapon which was likely to cause death. In this case he relies on two judgments, one reported in Jagannath Narayan Nikam Vs. State of Maharashtra (995 CRI.L.J. 795) of Bombay High Court and another judgment reported in In re Nataraja Goundan (AIR 1939 Madras 507) of Madras High Court. The Bombay High Court held, "In my view, the only possible ground of or bringing the act of the appellants within the ambit of this section (Section 326 IPC) can be that sticks would fall within the expression "any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death". Mere use of sticks, in my opinion, would not satisfy the aforesaid requirements. In my view, some evidence should have been adduced that the sticks were of a lethal type and something like a sharp blade or a sharp point etc. was attached to them. Mere use of sticks, in my opinion, would not satisfy the aforesaid requirements. In my view, some evidence should have been adduced that the sticks were of a lethal type and something like a sharp blade or a sharp point etc. was attached to them. In the absence of such evidence forthcoming from the side of the prosecution on the solitary ground that the ticks used in the instant case were about 5 inches in length, it cannot be said that they would fall within the ambit of "any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death." The Madras High Court held, "the appellant cannot be convicted under S. 326, Penal Code, unless the weapon used by him was deadly and the hurt intended or known to be likely to be caused was grievous. The stick used by him is not before the Court nor is there any evidence as to its size or nature. The injury constituting grievous hurt was a simple facture of the radius and it cannot be said for certain that hurt intended or known to be likely to be caused was grievous. The conviction under Sec. 326, Penal Code, is therefore unsustainable and the appellant can be convicted only under Section 323, Penal Code." With respects, I am not myself in agreement with the law laid down by the Bombay and Madras High Courts, because even a stick can be used as an instrument to cause injuries which are likely to cause death. In the present case, the injuries had been caused to PWs 1 and 4 and they had sustained fractures on wrist and hand respectively, but the instrument had the capacity of even causing death, if a blow was given on a vital part like head. Section 326 IPC does not require that injury should have been caused which was likely to cause death, but it only means that the instrument should be such that if it is used as a weapon of offence, it is likely to cause death. There is no doubt that the injuries caused to PWs 1 and 4 were grievous hurt. Grievous hurt is defined under section 320 IPC and while defining the kinds of hurt which are grievous, Section 320 IPC lays down that fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth is a grievous injury. There is no doubt that the injuries caused to PWs 1 and 4 were grievous hurt. Grievous hurt is defined under section 320 IPC and while defining the kinds of hurt which are grievous, Section 320 IPC lays down that fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth is a grievous injury. Since the injuries caused were grievous and the section 326 IPC carries an imprisonment of even life, one year's imprisonment given by the appellate court cannot be interfered with. Reliance was placed on judgments of the Supreme Court reported in Dhanna Chaudhry Vs. State of Bihar ( AIR 1985 SC 1688 ) and Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka, ( AIR 1995 SC 254 ). In Dhanna Chaudhry Vs. State of Bihar (3rd supra) two appellants were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life under section 302 r/w. 149 of the Indian Penal Code and other accused under section 326 r/w. 149 IPC. In a very short judgment, the Supreme Court altered the conviction of the two appellants from Section 302 r/w. 149 IPC to Section 326 r/w. 149 IPC on the ground that there was confused medical evidence as to whether bhala was a sharp cutting weapon or it was a weapon like a lathi. There fore, the learned Public Prosecutor asserts that the Supreme Court presuming the bhala to be a lathi altered the conviction from section 302 r/w. 149 IPC to Section 326 r/w. 149 IPC. Therefore it cannot be said that while lathi is used as a weapon, the conviction under section 326 IPC cannot be sustained. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka, (4th supra) the Supreme Court found that A4 and A5 were armed with sticks and dealt blows only on the legs and on the hands which were not serious. A3 did not participate in the attack. Although they had been convicted under section 302 r/w. 149 IPC, but the Supreme Court convicted A3 to A5 under section 326 r/w. 149 IPC. The learned Public Prosecutor also submits that since the offence took place inside the house, there was no question of examining the neighbours, but the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that according to the statements of PWs 1 to 4, when the altercation took place between the accused and P.Ws. The learned Public Prosecutor also submits that since the offence took place inside the house, there was no question of examining the neighbours, but the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that according to the statements of PWs 1 to 4, when the altercation took place between the accused and P.Ws. 1 to 4, they started crying and neighbours came to the spot and then the accused left the scene of occurrence, therefore it was necessary to examine those neighbours, but the Asst. Sub-Inspector of Police was categorical in his statement that he did not examine any neighbours. In this case the learned Public Prosecutor relies on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Rajinder Vs. State of Haryana ((2006) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 155)to suggest that the presence of neighbours was not necessary, if otherwise the evidence produced was categorical and was natural. The Supreme Court in para-5 held, "Mr. U.R. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing in support of the appeal, submitted that though the occurrence had taken place in broad daylight, the prosecution failed to examine a single independent witness but has examined PWs 2 and 3 who are nobody else than sons of the deceased. These witnesses consistently supported the prosecution case, disclosed in the first information report, in all material particulars, in their statements made before the police as well as substantive evidence in court. The trial court as well as the High Court have placed reliance upon their evidence and were of the view that merely because they were related to the deceased, the same ipso facto could not have been the ground to discard their evidence. In our view, the trial court as well as the High Court were quite justified in placing reliance upon their evidence as they were natural witnesses and consistently supported the prosecution case." Another ground taken is that although P.W.1 stated in his statement that the occurrence took place on 4.3.1999 at about 11.00 P.M. and reported to the police on the same day, but the FIR discloses that it was given on the next day. I have perused the FIR. There is some correction in the FIR. Against the column of "information received at the police station", in the first instance it appears it was written as 4.3.1999 and later it was altered to 5.3.1999. I have perused the FIR. There is some correction in the FIR. Against the column of "information received at the police station", in the first instance it appears it was written as 4.3.1999 and later it was altered to 5.3.1999. But I believe that this was a genuine mistake as there was no correction against the column of time which was written as 11.30 A.M. Had it been an after thought, then there would have been corresponding correction in the time also by changing PM to AM. After the occurrence the injured have been taken to hospital for treatment. Therefore it is not unlikely that P.W.1 gave a report on 5.3.1999 and committed a mistake while making the statement. It is also stated that this report was received by the Magistrate at 10.30 A.M. on 6.3.1999 and therefore it is suggested by the defence that whole FIR was a result of consultations and confabulations. No question was put to the investigating officer as to why the report took 24 hours to reach the Magistrate. But the theory propounded by the defence cannot be accepted on the ground that other evidence is available on record to show that the offence had taken place on 5.3.1999 as the injured persons were treated on 5.3.1999 and in this connection reference can be made to Ex.P3 which is the x-ray taken on 5.3.1999 by P.W.8 and also Ex.P5 which is the certificate of Radiologist-P.W.7 who stated that on 5.3.1999 P.W.1 was referred by P.W.6 for the purpose of x-ray of right fore arm of injured. For these reasons, I do not find merit in this revision which is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are cancelled. The petitioner/accused shall surrender before the trial court to undergo the sentence.