JUDGMENT The appellant-Patibanda Soma Sundara Rao questions the correctness of the judgment rendered by I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, who allowed the appeal filed under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the Code). 2. The appellant was the plaintiff in O.S. No.1220 of 1990 on the file of Principal District Munsif, Vijayawada. He filed the suit against Chilakamarthi Mohana Rao, respondent herein, and his son Chilakamarthi Ravi Kumar being minor represented by his mother-Valli Mohan for cancellation of the sale deeds dated 21.12.1981 executed by late Patibanda Sunder Rao in favour of Chilakamarthi Mohana Rao-1st defendant in respect of item No.1 and Chilakamarthi Ravi Kumar in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule properties. He also sought for consequential relief of possession of the suit schedule item Nos.1 and 2, and for costs in the suit. 3. The plaint averments, in brief, are : Late Patibanda Sunder Rao was an Advocate of Vijayawada Bar. His wife predeceased him. He died on 20.9.1989 at the age of 84 years. He was survived by two married daughters, one living at Guntur and the other at Hyderabad, and one son i.e. the plaintiff in the suit. He made certain bequeaths under a Will dated 1.12.1982 in favour of his daughters and daughter-in-law etc. He left major portion of his property to the plaintiff. The said Will was probated in O.P. No.11 of 1990 on the file of Additional District Court, Vijayawada. During the lifetime of Patibanda Sunder Rao, he provided food and shelter to Chilakamarthi Mohan Rao 1st defendant. He allowed 1st defendant to stay in his house and 1st defendant used to attend to his needs. Late Patibanda Sunder Rao was fond of language especially English. 1st defendant by dint of his merit came close to Patibanda Sunder Rao and thereby Patibanda Sunder Rao reposed lot of confidence on him. The conduct and behaviour of 1st defendant was such that even the members of the family did not grudge his stay in the house. 1st defendant secured a job in Glaxo Laboratories with the goodwill of late Patibanda Sunder Rao. Despite employment 1st defendant used to spend most of his spare time with Patibanda Sunder Rao attending on him. Late Patibanda Sunder Rao developed much fascination to English language and he started Shaw Society in Vijayawada to propogate literature. 1st defendant secured a job in Glaxo Laboratories with the goodwill of late Patibanda Sunder Rao. Despite employment 1st defendant used to spend most of his spare time with Patibanda Sunder Rao attending on him. Late Patibanda Sunder Rao developed much fascination to English language and he started Shaw Society in Vijayawada to propogate literature. In the year 1979 1st defendant introduced Mansuri Venkateswar Rao to late Patibanda Sunder Rao and his elder brother Appa Rao and made them to execute a lease deed in respect of lands situated in Muthyalapadu. When the tenant refused to vacate the lands, 1st defendant made Patibanda Sunder Rao and his brother Appa Rao to part with Ac.2.00 of land in favour of wife of the tenant under a sale deed dated 6.5.1981 and got the rest of the land released. After the land being released from the leasehold rights, 1st defendant made Patibanda Sunder Rao entered into a sale agreement in respect of Ac.7.00 of land out of Ac.9-83 cents in favour of Babu Rao. The said agreement came to be cancelled because of the default committed by the said Potuluri Babu Rao. 1st defendant made Patibanda Sunder Rao to execute two registered sale deeds nominally without consideration; one in his favour and the other in favour of his son for Ac.0.25 cents each. 1st defendant pretending to help the plaintiff subsequent to the death of Patibanda Sunder Rao took away the original title deed dated 21.1 0.1981. On coming to know the ill-intention of 1st defendant in securing the nominal registered sale deeds and retaining original sale deeds with him, the plaintiff issued a registered notice dated 17.8.1990. 1st defendant issued a reply dated 27.8.1990 whereunder the 1st defendant took the plea of oral purchase of Ac.0.83 cents from late Patibanda Sunder Rao in 1979 for Rs.20,000/ followed by registered sale deeds on 21.12.1981 in respect of 0.50 cents. He also asserted in the reply notice that balance extent of Ac.0.23 cents is yet to be conveyed to him in pursuance of the oral purchase from late Patibanda Sunder Rao. 4. 1st defendant filed written statement and 2nd defendant filed memo adopting the written statement of 1st defendant. The written statement of 1st defendant, in brief, is that he entered into a sale transaction for Ac.0.83 cents in 1979 with Late Patibanda Sunder Rao. 4. 1st defendant filed written statement and 2nd defendant filed memo adopting the written statement of 1st defendant. The written statement of 1st defendant, in brief, is that he entered into a sale transaction for Ac.0.83 cents in 1979 with Late Patibanda Sunder Rao. Late Patibanda Sunder Rao informed the authorities with regard to the sale of Ac.0.83 cents in favour of the defendant and reported no objection for passbook being issued in favour of the defendants in respect of Ac.0.83 cents. Late Patibanda Sunder Rao confirmed the sale of Ac.0.83 cents in favour of 1st defendant in his Will dated 17.6.1981, since 1981 onwards 1st defendant spent huge amounts for developing the land. Patibanda Sunder Rao executed two registered sale deeds; one in the name of 1st defendant in respect of Ac.0.25 cents and the other in the name of 2nd defendant in respect of Ac.0.25 cents on 21.12.1981. Even though Patibanda Sunder Rao agreed to sell Ac.0.83 cents and put him in possession of the property, he executed registered sale deed only in respect of Ac.0.50 cents. Patibanda Sunder Rao sold Ac.0.83 cents much prior to the alleged agreement in favour of Babu Rao. The defendants have got title, right and possession over Ac.0.83 cents of land. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit. Basing on the respective contentions of the parties, the trial Court formulated the following issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a declaration cancelling the sale deed dated 21.12.1981 executed by the late Patibanda Sundara Rao garu in favour of the 1st defendant for item No.1 of the plaint schedule? (ii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a declaration cancelling the sale deed dated 21.12.1981 executed by the late Patibanda Sundar Rao garu in favour of the 2nd defendant for item No.2 of the plaint schedule? (iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the consequential possession of the schedule premises item Nos. 1 and 2 ? (iv) To what relief? 5. Pending trial of the suit some conciliation proceedings took place before H.T. Muralidhar Rao. The said H. T. Muralidhar Rao conciliated the issue and gave his verdict whereby and whereunder sale in favour of 1st defendant is to be cancelled and the sale in favour of 2nd defendant is to be upheld. (iv) To what relief? 5. Pending trial of the suit some conciliation proceedings took place before H.T. Muralidhar Rao. The said H. T. Muralidhar Rao conciliated the issue and gave his verdict whereby and whereunder sale in favour of 1st defendant is to be cancelled and the sale in favour of 2nd defendant is to be upheld. The plaintiff filed I.A. No.1979 of 1996 under Section 151 read with Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC to record the compromise arrived at between the parties on 19.7.1996 in the presence of H.T. Muralidhara Rao. The learned Principal District Munsif, Vijayawada, dismissed the said application, by an order dated 21.8.1996. The plaintiff assailed the said order by filing CRP No.3242 of 1996. The said revision came to be allowed on 7.10.1996 directing the trial Court to decide the validity of the Memorandum of Compromise providing opportunity to both the parties. In pursuance of the directions given by this Court in CRP No.3242 of 1996, dated 7.10.1996, the learned Principal District Munsif proceeded with the enquiry in I.A. No.1979 of 1996. The plaintiff besides examining himself as PW.2 examined the mediator H. T. Muralidhara Rao as PW.l and one of the attestors viz., S. Sanjiva Rao as PW.3 and marked 8 documents as Exs.A.1 to A8. On behalf of the defendants, RW.1 was examined and no document was marked. 6. The trial Court formulated the following points for determination : (1) Whether EX.A2 is an award or mere decision of P.W.l ? (2) Whether the compromise can be recorded as prayed for ? 7. The learned Principal District Munsif, on considering the evidence brought on record and on hearing Counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that 1st defendant accepted to the verdict given by the mediator-PW.1 and therefore, he cannot be permitted to withdraw his consent. The learned Principal District Munsif further held that since the sale deed standing in the name of 2nd defendant is not disturbed, non-obtaining of permission from the Court to enter into compromise on behalf of the minor/2nd defendant would not effect the settlement arrived at between the parties in the presence of mediator. With the above observations, the learned Principal District Munsif allowed I.A No. 1979 of 1996 and decreed the suit, in terms of the compromise by judgment-dated 26.12.1996. 8. With the above observations, the learned Principal District Munsif allowed I.A No. 1979 of 1996 and decreed the suit, in terms of the compromise by judgment-dated 26.12.1996. 8. The 1st defendant assailed the judgment and decree dated 26.12.1996 passed in O.S. No.1220 of 1990 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Vijayawada, as well as the order dated 26.12.1996 passed in I.A No.1979 of 1996 by filing AS. No.35 of 1997 on the file of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada. It was contended by the 1st defendant before the Additional Senior Civil Judge that decree based on EX.A2 award passed by the mediator-PW1 is not legal and that none represented the minor/2nd defendant before the mediator and thus, EX.A2 award suffers from serious infirmity. It was also contended before the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge that EX.A.2 cannot be looked into as the same does not come within the purview of the 'award' as defined in Arbitration Act and in which case, it cannot be relied on to arrive at a conclusion whether any settlement took place before the mediator-PW.1. Yet another contention was advanced that reference of the dispute to the mediator-PW.1 pending lis without the consent of the Court is not legal and therefore, the proceedings before the mediator-PW.1 are per se illegal. 9. Learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge formulated the following points for consideration : (I) Whether the appeal is maintainable? (2) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in pursuance of the order passed in IA No.1979 of 1996 is illegal and liable to be set aside ? (3) To what relief? 10. The learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, on re-appreciation of evidence brought on record and on hearing Counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that the award passed by the mediator cannot be based for recording compromise under Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC since the award had no consent of the first defendant/appellant. The learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge also observed that the award passed by the mediator suffers from legal infirmity since no leave has been obtained from the Court as contemplated under Order 32 Rule 7 CPC on behalf of the minor/2nd defendant for settlement of the dispute before the mediator. The learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge also observed that the award passed by the mediator suffers from legal infirmity since no leave has been obtained from the Court as contemplated under Order 32 Rule 7 CPC on behalf of the minor/2nd defendant for settlement of the dispute before the mediator. With the above observations, the learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge proceeded to allow the appeal and consequently, set aside the judgment and decree dated 26.12.1996 passed in O.S. No.1220 of 1990 as well as the order dated 26.12.1996 passed in I.A. No.1979 of 1996 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Vijayawada. The result of which is the suit has to be disposed of on merits. 11. The plaintiff filed the second appeal under Section 100 CPC assailing the judgment and decree dated 20.2.2003 passed in A.S. No.35 of 1997 on the file of I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Vijayawada. This Court, on hearing Counsel for the parties, came to the conclusion that neither the reference was made through the Court nor the reference which was answered under EX.A2 was accepted by 1st defendant. With the above observations, this Court allowed the second appeal and remanded the matter to the trial Court with a direction to decide the suit on merits by a judgment dated 2.11.2005. The first defendant carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by an order dated 14.12.2006 passed in Civil Appeal No.5818 of 2006 has set aside the judgment dated 2.11.2005 passed by this Court and directed to dispose of the second appeal in accordance with law. 12. The principal groJ.1nd on which the judgment dated 2.11.2005 passed by this Court came to be set aside by the Supreme Court was that this Court did not formulate any substantial question of law involved in the second appeal or that the second appeal was heard on a question of law, if any, so formulated. Hence, this second appeal is listed before me for consideration afresh. 13. The second appeal came to be admitted on 16.7.2004 in view of the substantial questions of law raised in ground Nos.4, 5 and 6, which read as under : (1) Whether the appellate Court followed the dicta laid down by this Court in AIR 1973 AP Page 13 ? 13. The second appeal came to be admitted on 16.7.2004 in view of the substantial questions of law raised in ground Nos.4, 5 and 6, which read as under : (1) Whether the appellate Court followed the dicta laid down by this Court in AIR 1973 AP Page 13 ? (2) Whether in case of compromise between the parties, the provisions of Section 47 of the Arbitration Act are to be observed ? (3) Whether the facts and circumstances required under Order 32 Rule 7 has to be invoked in the present case ? 14. Heard learned Counsel appearing t for the appellant/plaintiff and learned I Counsel appearing for the respondent/first defendant. 15. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the respondent/ I st defendant consented to the terms of compromise arrived at between them before the mediator and signed on EX.A2 and therefore, the respondent/1st defendant cannot be permitted to withdraw his consent, in which case, there is no option to the trial Court except to record the terms of compromise in accordance with the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 C.P.C. A further submission has been made that the respondent/1st defendant subscribed his signature on EX.A.2 consenting to the award of the mediator-PW.1 and that itself is sufficient to record the compromise under the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC incorporating the settlement arrived at between the parties therein. Reliance has been placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in A.M.S. Church Society v. Sundramma, AIR 1973 AP 19 . By placing reliance on the said decision, the learned Counsel vehemently contends that no consent of the parties is required at the time of recording the compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC and the consent to the contents of EX.A2 itself is sufficient. 16. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/1st defendant submits that the respondent/1st defendant consented to the reference and not to the terms settled by the mediator-PW.1. He further submits that the mediator-PW.1 obtained the signature of the respondent/1st defendant on the reverse of EX.A1 letter, which has been subsequently made use of to fabricate EX.A2 and therefore, the terms of settlement incorporated in EX.A.2 cannot be based for recording compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. He further submits that the mediator-PW.1 obtained the signature of the respondent/1st defendant on the reverse of EX.A1 letter, which has been subsequently made use of to fabricate EX.A2 and therefore, the terms of settlement incorporated in EX.A.2 cannot be based for recording compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. To buttress his submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Zahoor Bux v. Fareed Bux, (2005) 13 SCC 383 and Ametshwar Anand v. Virender Mohan Singh, 2006 (1) ALD 84 (SC) = (2006) I SCC 148. 17. Before adverting to the rival contentions of the parties, I may quickly recapitulate the pleas of the respective parties in a nutshell. The appellant/plaintiff filed the suit for cancellation of the two registered sale deeds dated 21.12.1981, one standing in the name of the respondent/ 1 st defendant and another standing in the name of the 2nd defendant, who is the minor son of the first defendant, executed by his father. Each sale deed covers Ac.0.25 cents of land. The respondent/ 1st defendant took the plea that he purchased Ac.0.83 cents of land from the father of the plaintiff and the father of the plaintiff executed two registered sale deeds dated 21.12.1981 in respect of Ac.0.25 cents each, assuring him that he would execute the sale deed in respect of the balance of Ac.0.33 cents. The first defendant also took the plea that the father of the plaintiff admitted the sale of Ac.0.83 cents in his favour before the Urban Land Ceiling Authorities and also in the 'Will' executed by him. When the case was coming up for trial, the plaintiff and the first defendant consented for resolution of the disputes at the intervention of the mediator-PW.1. EX.A1 is the letter requesting PWI H.TM Rao to settle the disputes between them. It contains the signatures of the plaintiff and the respondent/1st defendant. For better appreciation, I may extract EX.A1 and it is thus: "Sri Patibanda Soma Sundar Rao filed O.S. No.1220/90 in the Court of PDMC, VJA, against Sri Ch. Mohan Rao and Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar (son of Ch. Mohan Rao) praying the Court to cancel the registration of two sale deeds (each for 25 cents area, total 50 cents) executed by Sri Patibanda Sundara Rao father of Sri P. Soma Sundara Rao; whereas Ch. Mohan Rao and Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar (son of Ch. Mohan Rao) praying the Court to cancel the registration of two sale deeds (each for 25 cents area, total 50 cents) executed by Sri Patibanda Sundara Rao father of Sri P. Soma Sundara Rao; whereas Ch. Mohan Rao's contention is that apart from the 25 cents of two plots he is entitled for the remaining 33 cents as well, as per Will of late Sri P. Sundara Rao. Both the above parties approached Sri H T. Muralidhara Rao for arbitration in the above matter out of the Court and both the parties hereby agree that they will accept the decision of Sri H T.M. Rao as going to be written hereunder and accordingly both the parties will file compromise petition by taking all appropriate proceedings to get the decree passed by PDMC in terms of the compromise arrived at by the Arbitrator Sri HT.M. Rao." EX.A 1 contains the undertaking of both the parties that they will abide by the decision of H.T.M Rao. The said H.T.M. Rao who has been examined as PW.1 passed award on the reverse of EX.A 1 letter. The award reads as hereunder: "After hearing both the parties and going through the records shown to me, it is clearly evident that the dispute is only with regard to two sale deeds dated 21.12.1981 for 25 cents each and 33 cents as informed by Mr. Ch. Mohan Rao is not in dispute in the suit. As such for the convenience of both the parties, I hereby decide that, 25 cents plot registered in the name of Mr. Ch. Ravi Kumar shall stand good. The other sale deed in the name of Mr. Ch. Mohan Rao is cancelled and is given to Sri P.s. Sundara Rao. Both the parties are requested to file compromise petition accordingly in the Court. In acceptance of the above, both the parties to the Suit No.1220/90 in the Court of PDMC-VJA attest their signatures hereunder in the presence of two witnesses." 18. Ch. Mohan Rao is cancelled and is given to Sri P.s. Sundara Rao. Both the parties are requested to file compromise petition accordingly in the Court. In acceptance of the above, both the parties to the Suit No.1220/90 in the Court of PDMC-VJA attest their signatures hereunder in the presence of two witnesses." 18. Based on the rival contentions of the parties, the substantial question of law which is required to be resolved in this second appeal is : What is the effect of the settlement suggested by the mediator, who has been nominated by the parties without the intervention of the Court, in the event of one of the parties not consenting to the terms of the settlement ? 19. Indisputably both the parties approached the mediator-PW.1 for settlement of the dispute which is pending in the Court. Parties nominated the mediator-PW.1 without the intervention of the' Court. At this juncture, I deem it appropriate to refer Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, which reads as under : "3. Compromise of suit :-Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation :-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." 20. It should be remembered that under Arbitration Act there is no machinery provided for going into the validity of the awards passed in private references in the pending suits. It should be remembered that under Arbitration Act there is no machinery provided for going into the validity of the awards passed in private references in the pending suits. There is also no provision for the Court remitting the award for reconsideration. It can only either record it as adjustment or reject it. The parties to such award, therefore, have not the same rights with reference thereto as parties to the awards in the arbitration proceedings, which fall within the scope of the Act. It is also significant that the proviso requires the consent of the parties interested. If the consent contemplated by the proviso is merely to the agreement to refer to arbitration, then the word consent to the parties simply would have been sufficient and appropriate. If the consent required is for the award itself then the use of the words parties interested becomes apt and intelligible. Under proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, an arbitration award obtained otherwise than in proceedings taken in accordance with the Act cannot without more be recognized as a compromise or adjustment of suit, that no decree can be passed thereon under the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. But, if after award is made, the parties have agreed to accept it, that will be a compromise and the decree based thereon would be passed under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. 21. The appellant/plaintiff pleads that there was a compromise before the mediator-PW.l with regard to the subject matter of the suit and in pursuance of the said compromise, the suit is to be decreed partly. In a way his contention is that the compromise arrived at before the mediator PW.1 is to be given effect by setting aside the sale deed standing in the name of the respondent/1st defendant. The compromise allegedly arrived at between the parties before the mediator-PW.1 is in dispute. According to the respondent/1st defendant, the mediator-PW.1 obtained his signature on the blank paper, which is on the reverse of Ex.A.1 and made use of the said blank paper to fabricate Ex.A2. The second ground is that he requested the mediator to settle the dispute in respect of total extent of land i.e. Ac.0.83 cents, but the mediator-PW.1 kept aside Ac.0.33 cents and proceeded to confine himself in respect of Ac.0.50 cents only. The second ground is that he requested the mediator to settle the dispute in respect of total extent of land i.e. Ac.0.83 cents, but the mediator-PW.1 kept aside Ac.0.33 cents and proceeded to confine himself in respect of Ac.0.50 cents only. As I stated above, both the parties approached PW.1 for mediation when the lis is pending and without the intervention of the Court. In such a situation, whether the decision given by the mediator-PW.1 can be given effect by the Court on an application moved under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC when one of the parties resiles from the terms of settlement. It is the contention of the appellant/plaintiff that the respondent/ 1st defendant has given consent to the terms of settlement, which are reduced into writing. Incidentally a question arises at what stage the consent of the parties is required. Whether the consent of the parties obtained prior to the reference of the dispute is sufficient? Or the consent of the parties is required for terms of the settlement as well as recording the compromise based on the terms of settlement arrived at between the parties. 22. This case involves the interpretation of the proviso to Section 47 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. It' may be pertinent to reduce the section itself, which is as follows : "Subject to the provisions of Section 46 and save insofar as is otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, the provisions of this Act shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings thereunder; provided that an arbitration award otherwise obtained may with the consent of all the parties interested be taken into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit by any Court before which the suit is pending". The above referred proviso fell for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Rahman v. Md. Siddig, AIR 1953 Mad. 781, wherein it has been held that consent to record award as compromise must be after the award. Para 11 of the said judgment needs to be noted and it is thus : "11. The above referred proviso fell for consideration before a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Abdul Rahman v. Md. Siddig, AIR 1953 Mad. 781, wherein it has been held that consent to record award as compromise must be after the award. Para 11 of the said judgment needs to be noted and it is thus : "11. We are accordingly of opinion that under the proviso to Section 47, an arbitration award obtained otherwise than in proceedings taken in accordance with the Act cannot without more be recognized as a compromise or adjustment of the suit; that no decree can be passed thereon under the provision of Order 23 Rule 3; and that the decision in - AIR 1945 Mad. 294 (B), should be overruled. But if, after an award is made, the parties thereto agree to accept it, that will be a compromise and a decree based thereon could be passed under Order 23 Rule 3." 23. A Division Bench of our High Court in A.US. Church Society v. Sundramma (supra), quoted the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court with approval. Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment need to be noted and they are thus : "10. In view of the above decision of the Full Bench, it is clear that, in considering whether an award can be treated as a compromise or adjustment of a suit under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code, what the Court has to see is whether there is a consent to the reference and also to the award. The Full Bench, though it considered the earlier case law on the subject till that time, did not say specifically that there should also be a consent on a third occasion i.e., consent to the compromise at the time of consideration of the application under Order 23 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code by the Court. We also feel that such a consent is not necessary because when once the award is treated as a compromise or adjustment of a dispute, that compromise or adjustment can be recorded under Order 23 Rule 3. If a party says that there is no such consent or that his consent was procured in evil or vicious circumstances, it is for him to establish that fact in a separate proceeding. If a party says that there is no such consent or that his consent was procured in evil or vicious circumstances, it is for him to establish that fact in a separate proceeding. The Court cannot insist upon the consent being there throughout till the order recording the compromise is effected. In matters arising under the proviso to Section 47, it is not necessary that there should be a consent till the date of recording the compromise under Order 23 Rule 3. We do not think that the Legislature had that view while enacting the proviso to Section 47. If that should be the effect of the proviso, it would be open to any party to resile from it and make any such compromise or adjustment ineffective or useless. We do not think that there is any necessity for proving any consent at the time of recording the compromise. 11. The Full Bench decision in Abdul Rahman's case, AIR 1953 Mad. 781 (FE), has been followed by a Division Bench of this 'Court in Laxminarayana v. Venkata Subbaiah, AIR 1958 AP 679, consisting of Subba Rao, CJ., and Srinivasachari, J. We may also mention that this decision in its penultimate paragraph says as follows : "If the award is agreed to after it is given, it operates as an adjustment." The ratio decidendi of this case also supports our view. These two cases were followed by Umamaheswaram, J., in Salima Bibi v. Md. Ibrahim, AIR 1962 AP 123, who held as follows : "The proviso to Section 47 does not state when the consent of the parties should be obtained. If before the filing of the award, all parties signed on it the Court is entitled to take it into consideration as a compromise or adjustment of a suit within the meaning of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. 24. The proposition of law is well settled that once the parties consented to the settlement arrived at between them before the mediator, further consent for getting the compromise or adjustment of the suit recorded within the meaning of Order 2} Rule 3 CPC is not necessary. The crucial question is whether the respondent/1st defendant consented to the settlement suggested by the mediator-PW.1 on 16.7.1996. It is the consistent plea of the respondent/1st defendant that the mediator obtained his signature on a blank paper and made use of it to fabricate Ex.A2. The crucial question is whether the respondent/1st defendant consented to the settlement suggested by the mediator-PW.1 on 16.7.1996. It is the consistent plea of the respondent/1st defendant that the mediator obtained his signature on a blank paper and made use of it to fabricate Ex.A2. According to the mediator-PW.1, he reduced the proposed settlement into writing in the presence of the parties and read over the same and the parties subscribed their signatures thereon according their consent. While the mediator being examined as PW.1 admits that plaintiff is a partner along with him in the hotel business. He also admits of the two attestors to Ex.A2, one is the clerk of the plaintiff and another is the employee of him. These are the strong circumstances, which throw suspicion on the genuineness of Ex.A2. The respondent/1st defendant is able to prove the circumstances, which create any amount of doubt on the genuineness of Ex.A2 by placing on record cogent and convincing evidence. Ex. A7 is the notice dated 28.7.1996 issued to the plaintiff expressing his dissent to the terms of award-Ex.A2. The respondent/1st defendant expressed his dissent to the terms of compromise or adjustment incorporated in Ex.A2 at the earliest point of time. If it is the version of PW.1 that both the parties consented to the terms of settlement or compromise, nothing prevented him to serve the copies of Ex.A2 on both the parties and obtain their signatures thereon with specific endorsement of their consenting to the terms therein. Mere signature of the respondent/ 1st defendant appearing on Ex.A2 is not sufficient to infer his consent to the terms of compromise or adjustment incorporated therein. When once there is no consent to the terms of compromise or settlement or adjustment contained in Ex.A2, no compromise can be recorded based on Ex.A2 by invoking the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. The lower appellate Court considered the evidence brought on record in right perspective and came to the conclusion that the tem1S incorporated in Ex.A2 suffers want of consent of the respondent 1st defendant. When once there is no consent to the terms of compromise or adjustment recorded in Ex.A2, the same cannot be based for recording compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. When once there is no consent to the terms of compromise or adjustment recorded in Ex.A2, the same cannot be based for recording compromise under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. In view of the above discussion, I find that the compromise petition filed by the appellant plaintiff under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC deserves to be dismissed since the respondent/1st defendant has not consented to the terms of compromise or adjustment. 25. Accordingly, the second appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, the consequence of which is the trial Court has to proceed with the trial of the suit and dispose of the same on merits. No order as to costs.