JUDGMENT M. M. DAS, J. — The appellant herein faced a trial for com¬mission of offence under Sections 498-A/304-B/306/34 IPC read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act along with his mother, Smt. Radhi¬ka Budek (since acquitted) in S.C. Case No.48-B of 2003. 2. The appellants got married to the deceased Smt. Prab¬hasini Budek on 27.4.1996. An FIR was lodged by the father of the deceased-Meghanad Disri (P.W.1) on 13.10.2001 alleging therein that his daughter married the accused-appellant about five years back as per their custom and at the time of marriage, he gave certain articles to his daughter and they lived peacefully for some time. Thereafter, the accused started torturing his daughter mentally and physically and demanded dowry of Rs.10,000/- and was assaulting his daughter. On complaint, a village meeting was held. When the matter stood thus, on 13.10.2001, getting informa¬tion from one Ganeswar Sa, he went to the house of his daughter and found her lying dead. 3. The prosecution examined as many as 16 (sixteen) witnesses in support its case and the defence was that of com¬plete denial. The learned Sessions Judge, Bolangir who tried the case in S.C. No.48-B of 2002, by his judgment dated 8.7.2003 recorded a conviction of the appellant under Sections 498-A/304-B IPC read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act, while acquitting the co-accused, who is the mother of the appellant. The learned Sessions Judge, thereafter, on hearing the parties on the question of sentence, sentenced the appellant to undergo R.I. for ten years for the offence committed under Section 304-B IPC and to undergo R.I. for three years for the offence under Section 498-A IPC as well as to undergo R.I. for two years under Section 4 of the D.P. Act, directing that the sentences are to run concurrently and to set off the period for which the accused-appellant was in custo¬dy. In the present appeal, the said order of conviction and sentence are under challenge. 4. The learned Sessions Judge has rested his finding of guilt of the appellant mainly on the evidence of P.W.1 (father of the deceased), P.W.11-Jagannath Sahani, P.W.13 - Dingar Bhoi, who stated themselves to be the village gentlemen, who attended the meeting wherein the deceased complained of assault and torture made by the accused-appellant. 5. Mr. 4. The learned Sessions Judge has rested his finding of guilt of the appellant mainly on the evidence of P.W.1 (father of the deceased), P.W.11-Jagannath Sahani, P.W.13 - Dingar Bhoi, who stated themselves to be the village gentlemen, who attended the meeting wherein the deceased complained of assault and torture made by the accused-appellant. 5. Mr. Dhal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant is innocent and the learned trial Court while analysing the evidence on record has committed an error in not taking into consideration the material contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1 and in not considering the evidence of P.Ws.10 and 16, who are relevant witnesses. He further contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, and, therefore, the learned trial Court has acted contrary to law in raising a presumption under Section 113(B) of the Evidence Act. 6. Learned counsel for the prosecution-State, on the contrary, urged that such crimes like dowry death are now in¬creasing in the society in spite of specific penal provisions being made for that purpose and, is a social malady which should be strongly dealt with. He further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge has analysed all the evidence adduced by the prosecution and has categorically found that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and no illegality whatso¬ever having been committed by the said Court, the impugned judgment calls for no interference of this Court, in the present appeal. 7. Before delving into the evidence adduced by the prose¬cution, it will be profitable to discuss the law on the point. In that respect, Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act are material. 8. Section 304-B IPC deals with dowry death, which reads as follows : “304.B. (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances with seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or har¬assment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation :- For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibi¬tion Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” Section 113 (B) of the Evidence Act reads as follows : “113.B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purpose of this Section, ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”. 9. Section 304-B I.P.C. is applicable when the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injuries or otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and the prosecution proves that soon before her death, she was sub¬jected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of the relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. 10. The ingredients of the aforementioned provisions are : (i) That the death of the woman was caused by any burns or bodily injury or in some circumstances which were not normal; (2) such death occurs within 7 years from the date of her marriage; (3) that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; (4) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and (5) it is established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before her death. 11. 11. A conjoint reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act gives rise to a legal fiction to the effect that if it is established that soon before the death, deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relatives for, or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such “hus¬band or his relatives” as the case may be, to have caused her death by drawing a presumption as available in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. (See (2006) 1 SCC 463 , Harjit Singh v. State of Punjab) 12. It is, therefore, to be seen, in the facts of the present case, as to whether the prosecution has proved its case that before the death of the deceased, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by the appellant for, or in connection with any demand of dowry and only if it is found that the prosecution has proved the above ingredients, it would be open for the Court to raise a presumption with regard to the guilt of the appellant under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. 13. From the materials produced by the prosecution in the present case, more specifically, the post-mortem report, and the chemical examination report, it is found that the prosecution has established that the deceased expired by consuming poison. Hence, the first ingredient of Section 304-B IPC that the death has been caused under the circumstances, which are not normal, has been established. It is also an admitted fact that the death occurred within seven years of the marriage of the deceased with the appellant, which satisfies the second ingredient. Now it is to be found out as to whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death. 14. P.W. 1- Meghanad Disri, the father of the deceased in his evidence stated that after about 3 or 4 months of the mar¬riage, the appellant started torturing his daughter for demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and he was assaulting her. This fact, according to P.W. 1, came to his knowledge when his daughter disclosed it before him. 14. P.W. 1- Meghanad Disri, the father of the deceased in his evidence stated that after about 3 or 4 months of the mar¬riage, the appellant started torturing his daughter for demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and he was assaulting her. This fact, according to P.W. 1, came to his knowledge when his daughter disclosed it before him. He further stated that a village Pan¬chayat was called regarding such torture and after amicable settlement by the relations of the accused-appellant, she was taken to the house of the accused-appellant. On 13.10.2001, on Ganeswar Sa, the uncle-in-law of the deceased, informed the P.W.1 that his daughter is suffering from diarrhoea. Hearing this, he went to the house of the accused and found his daughter dead and there was a box of poison lying near her. Thereafter, he lodged the F.I.R. (Ext.1/1). He also stated that seven days prior to the death of his daughter, his daughter came along with her husband and at that time also his daughter told him regarding torture on her for non-giving of Rs.10,000/- and there was also village Panchayat in the village of the accused-appellant. During cross-examination, P.W.1 on being confronted with his statement recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. with regard to the above statement, stated that “it is not a fact that I have also not stated before the I.O. that 7 days prior to the death of my daughter, my daughter came along with her husband and at that time also she told regarding torture on her for non-giving of Rs.10,000/-”. P.Ws. 11 and 12, on whose statement, the learned trial Court has placed reliance in holding that they have corroborated the statement of P.W.1, have, in fact, stated that they have attended several caste meetings between the accused persons and the de¬ceased as the deceased was being tortured by the accused persons who were demanding dowry. However, from the statement of P.W.11, it appears that in cross-examination he has stated that he was neither a Sarpanch nor a Ward Member of the village nor he be¬longs to the caste of the accused persons/deceased. He has also fend ignorance with regard to the date of such village meeting. Similarly, P.W.12 has also not been able to state the particulars of the period when such village meeting was held. He has also fend ignorance with regard to the date of such village meeting. Similarly, P.W.12 has also not been able to state the particulars of the period when such village meeting was held. Though P.W.1 has stated with regard to torture on the deceased, seven days prior to her death and that there was a village meeting regarding such torture, held in the village Hardatal, but P.W.12 has stated in his cross-examination that there was no meeting held at vil¬lage Hardatal. P.W.16, the Investigation Officer has categorically stated that P.W.1, when examined by him, did not state that seven days prior to the death of the deceased, she went to the house of P.W.1 and complained regarding the torture and harassment on account of demand of dowry P.Ws.4 to 8, in their statements, have stated that though they know the parties, but they did not know anything about the occurrence and being declared as hostile witnesses, were cross-examined by the prosecution. Nothing rele¬vant has been brought out from their statements. P.Ws.9 and 13 are the seizure witnesses, P.W.10 has also not stated anything regarding the occurrence. P.W.14 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem and P.Ws.15 and 16 are the Circle Inspector of Police and Sub-Inspector of Police, who conducted the investigation. 15. From the above analysis of evidence adduced by the prosecution, it transpires that except the statement of P.W.1, no other witnesses examined by the prosecution have supported the allegation of demand of dowry and torture or torture and harass¬ment for, or in connection with, any demand of dowry. Though there is some materials to show that the deceased complained of torture before some of the villagers and village meetings were held as nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that such meetings were held on account of torture for demand of dowry soon before the death of the deceased, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove the last and vital ingredient of Section 304-B IPC that soon before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty or torture for, or in connec¬tion with demand of dowry. Thus, the offence under the above Section 304-B IPC has not been proved against the appellant. Thus, the offence under the above Section 304-B IPC has not been proved against the appellant. This Court derives support for the above conclusion from the decision in the case of Kamesh Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 30 OCR (SC) 578, wherein the Supreme Court held that there must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effects of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 16. With regard to the offence under Section 498-A IPC, it is seen that except the statement of P.Ws. 1, 11 and 12 that the deceased complained of torture on account of demand of dowry of Rs.10,000/- to the father, P.W.1 and that some village meetings were held on the complaint of the deceased, there is no other material with regard to torture or demand of dowry as envisages under Section 498-A IPC. 17. Now on consideration of the statements of the aforemen¬tioned prosecution witnesses, it would be seen that neither P.W.1 himself has ever complained of such torture or demand of dowry alleged to have been made on his deceased daughter nor any spe¬cific allegation has been made by him as to who demanded such dowry from his daughter. The only statement given by him with regard to such demand is “ I came to know about the torture and demand of dowry from my deceased daughter when she was coming to my house.” 18. The prosecution has, therefore, not conclusively proved as to when and how such demand was made by the appellant, for dowry or as to when the deceased was tortured. Though P.Ws.11 and 12 have stated that several village meetings were held, neither anything has been brought out by the prosecution as to what was decided in such meetings nor any such decision was ever reduced to writing. 19. This Court, therefore, on considering the nature of materials produced by the prosecution, is of the firm view that the prosecution has also failed to prove the commission of of¬fence under Section 498-A IPC. In view of such nature of materials available in the record, no case is also made out under Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 20. 19. This Court, therefore, on considering the nature of materials produced by the prosecution, is of the firm view that the prosecution has also failed to prove the commission of of¬fence under Section 498-A IPC. In view of such nature of materials available in the record, no case is also made out under Section 4 of the D.P. Act. 20. In view of the above, the order of conviction and sentence passed thereon by the learned trial Court is set aside. The appellant is, therefore, acquitted of the charges levelled against him and he be set at liberty forthwith, if his presence is not required in connection with any other case. The Criminal Appeal is allowed. Crl. Appeal allowed.