Santosh Kumar Dubey, Jagdish Dubey And Subahdra Devi v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited
2007-12-13
R.K.MERATHIA
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.K. Merathia, J. 1. This writ petition was filed for a direction on the respondents to provide our employments to the petitioners against the acquisition of their three louses. 2. Mr. Tiwary, appearing for the petitioners, submitted that when employment was not provided, they filed a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3800 of 1995 (R), which was disposed of on 4.10.1996, in which the respondents said that they were ready to provide employment to the petitioners, if they vacate the houses and move to the alternative file. The said writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the petitioners to vacate the lands and premises and go to the alternative site and then pray for appointment with no objection certificates of other co-sharers and when such certificate is produced, respondent No. 1 was to provide employment. As per the said order, petitioners vacated the land but they have not been provided employment and therefore they had to file this writ petition. The office order dated 27.11.2001/3.12.2001 (Annexure-6) was referred to show that the employment of the petitioner-Santosh Kumar Dubey was in process. 3. Mr. Mehta, appearing for the respondents, submitted as follows. The acquisition was made in 1982-83 but petitioners did not vacate their houses in spite of receiving the awarded compensation in 1985. Only four decimals of land with house of each of the petitioners was acquired and against such small land they were not entitled to employment as per the scheme but even then the respondents offered employment if petitioners vacated the houses and the lands and moved to alternative site. Therefore, this Court clearly directed the petitioners to vacate the premises and move to alternative site first and then pray for employments. This order was passed as far back as on 4.10.1996 but Petitioners vacated/surrendered the premises only on 8.4.2002. They went on insisting that they should be given employment first and then they will vacate. Till filing of counter affidavit on 23.1.2004, the portion of land/houses were in occupation of the co-sharers of the petitioners, as stated in paragraph 11, which has not been denied by the petitioners in their rejoinder. Thus petitioners themselves did not comply with the said order dated 4.10.1996. In the meantime, a new policy has come in August, 2000.
Till filing of counter affidavit on 23.1.2004, the portion of land/houses were in occupation of the co-sharers of the petitioners, as stated in paragraph 11, which has not been denied by the petitioners in their rejoinder. Thus petitioners themselves did not comply with the said order dated 4.10.1996. In the meantime, a new policy has come in August, 2000. The respondents are not in a position to provide employment in lieu of the house Referring to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the affidavit filet on 27.11.2007, he further submitted that respondents are already having surplus man power and now the Company has become a sick Industry and is registered with the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). 4. From the facts and circumstances, noticed above, it is clear that by order dated 4.10.1996, the petitioners were directed to vacate the premises and move to alternative site and thereafter they could request for employment. According to the petitioners, they vacated the premises on 8.4.2002. There is nothing to show that the delay of more than six years was on the part of the respondents in providing the alternative site. From paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit filed on 23.1.2004, it appears that even up to January, 2004, the premises was not fully vacated, by the petitioners/their co-sharers, which position is not denied by the petitioners. It is also not disputed that after the said order was passed on 4.10.1996 the respondent, a Public Sector Undertaking, has become a sick industry und has been registered under (BIFR). 5. By order dated 1.11.2007, respondents were directed to file affidavit bringing on record the policy adopted for giving employment in lieu of acquisition of lands and houses as well as the letter No. 38011/3185 dated 12.2.1986, issued by the Central Government regarding the scheme framed for rehabilitation in the department of coal. Pursuant to the said order, an affidavit was filed on 27.11.2007. Annexure-B to the said affidavit is a Circular issued by die Coal India Limited to ail its subsidiary Companies in December 1984 regarding the guidelines for employment to land losers. There was no provision for giving employment against acquisition of houses and lands of four decimals Employment could be considered against 2-3 Acres of Land.
Annexure-B to the said affidavit is a Circular issued by die Coal India Limited to ail its subsidiary Companies in December 1984 regarding the guidelines for employment to land losers. There was no provision for giving employment against acquisition of houses and lands of four decimals Employment could be considered against 2-3 Acres of Land. Annexure-C is a Circular of the Central Government which provides that where homesteads have been acquired, alternative house sites should be provided to the displaced persons. There is no provision a for giving employment in the said Circular also. 6. The following portion of the judgment repented in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 225 Butu Prasad Kumbhar and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. is relevant: Needless to say that petitioners or their ancestors were not deprived of their land without following the procedure established in law. Their land was taken under the Land Acquisition Act. They were paid compensation for it. Therefore, the challenge raised on violation of Article 21 is devoid of any merit. Even otherwise the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of his livelihood does not extend to provide employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land. Rourkela Plant was established for the growth of the country. It is one of the prestigious steel plants. It was established in public sector. The Government has paid market value for the land acquired. Even if the Government or the steel plant would not have offered any employment to any person it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right. Yet considering the poverty of the persons who were displaced both the Central and the State Government took steps to ensure that each family was protected by giving employment to at least one member in the plant. We fail to appreciate how such a step by the Government is violative of Article 21. The claim of the petitioners that unless each adult member is given employment or the future generation is ensured of a preferential claim it would be arbitrary or contrary with the constitutional guarantee is indeed stretching Article 21 without any regard to its scope and ambit as explained by this Court. Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14. 7.
Truly speaking it is just the other way. Acceptance of such a demand would be against Article 14. 7. The said judgment was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited, Bokaro Steel Plant v. Jamuna Prasad Mahto and analogous cases of the judgment reads as follows: This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the Bokaro Steel Plant was established for the growth of one of the steel industries of the nation. It was dedicated to the nation and it is a prestigious Steel Plant. It was established in public sector. Land had to be acquired by the State under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for which the Government paid huge amounts of compensation to the displaced persons and even went to the extent of providing employment in the manner described in this writ application. Therefore, the Government cannot be obliged to go on keeping alive the claim of every "Tom, Dick and Harry" for appointment nor can the Government or the Authority be called upon to answer a charge that they are playing "ducks and drakes" with the Orders of the High Court because the obligation of the State to ensure that no citizen is deprived of its livelihood cannot be stretched to such an extent that they arc obliged to provide employment to every member of each family displaced in consequence of acquisition of land. This Court draws inspiration for the aforementioned proposition from the judgment of the Supreme Court of India passed in the case of Butu Prasad Kumbhar v. SAIL reported in 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 225 at 229, (parar-6). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while dealing with the Rourkella Steel Plant and while taking the aforementioned view, have gone to the extent of saying that even if the Government or the Steel Plant would not have offered any employment to any person, it would not have resulted in violation of any fundamental right. On the contrary, their Lordships have said that acceptance of demand for employment would run counter to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This for is constrained to observe that Bokaro Steel Plant was depicted to the nation and not to the District of Bokaro only.
On the contrary, their Lordships have said that acceptance of demand for employment would run counter to Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This for is constrained to observe that Bokaro Steel Plant was depicted to the nation and not to the District of Bokaro only. It is a prestigious Plant of the country and repeated claims for appointment based on compassion must now be deprecated thoroughly and completely. Such considerations have deprived the Management of the opportunity to appoint people through open advertisement from across the country and because of Judicial Orders, they have been prevented from making such appointments and even today, claim after claim is being put forth demanding the benefits of displacement notwithstanding they having received substantial amounts of compensation. This must stop now. The Government cannot be said to be at fault and any such claim made before the Management should be frowned upon as bringing illegal pressure on the Government amounting to upsetting constitutional safeguards of Public Sector Undertakings to get and appoint the best of hands through open advertisements from all over the country. Consequently, this Court has no option but to hold that the writ petition is totally devoid of merit and accordingly proceeds to dismiss writ petition (Service) No. 1628 of 2003 filed by the 20 persons claiming appointment. 8. Mr. Tiwary, appearing for the petitioners, relied on the order dated 28.6.20C2, passed by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 676 of 2002 Phanindra Singh v. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Ors. 9. Mr. Mehta submitted that the said order is of no help to the petitioners as in that case there was a package deal for acquisition of land of a entire village. Pursuant thereto, the petitioners therein along with other villagers vacated premises but some of the villagers did not vacate the land. In that situation, it was said that merely because some of the villagers have not vacated the land, the other villagers cannot be deprived of their right to get employment in terms of the agreement. Moreover, the judgment of Supreme Court, in the case of Butu Prasad (supra) and the relevant circulars, were not brought to the notice of the Court. I find force in the submission of Mehta. In the present case, petitioners themselves did not comply with the order dated 4.10.1996, passed by this Court for about 8 years.
Moreover, the judgment of Supreme Court, in the case of Butu Prasad (supra) and the relevant circulars, were not brought to the notice of the Court. I find force in the submission of Mehta. In the present case, petitioners themselves did not comply with the order dated 4.10.1996, passed by this Court for about 8 years. In the meantime, the respondent Company became a sick industry and it has been registered under BIFR. It is also not disputed that respondent is already having surplus man power. In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Butu Prasad Kumbhar v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (supra) and the subsequent Division Bench Judgment in the case of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (Supra), now it is not possible to direct the respondents to give employment to the petitioners. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. However, no costs.