Judgment ( 1. ) THIS civil revision has been filed under section 115 of the civil Procedure Code being aggrieved by the order dated 2-2-2005 passed by 3rd civil Judge Class II, Narsinghpur in Civil Suit No. 18a/04 whereby the application filed by respondent No. 1 has been rejected. ( 2. ) THE applicant instituted a civil suit for declaration of title regarding the disputed land situated at Mouja Kandeli and Khamaria and also for the decree of issuance of permanent injunction against respondent No. 1 for not to interfere in his peaceful possession and also to restrain him not to alienate the same. ( 3. ) THE respondent No. 1 submitted the written statement denying the most of the averments made in the plaint. The issues were framed. The evidence was being recorded. During the course of trial, the applicant and respondent No. 1 filed the compromise petition on 9-9-2004. Their statements were recorded on the same day. After hearing the arguments, the case was posted for orders on 11-9-2004 but the order could not be passed on that day. The case was adjourned for 27-9-2004. In the meantime, on 23-9-2004, the respondent No. 1 filed an application for cancellation of the compromise petition. ( 4. ) THE applicant filed its reply. The Court directed for an enquiry on application under Order 23, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code and also to adduce evidence of the parties. No any evidence was adduced by the parties. The arguments were heard on 24-1-2005 and the impugned order was passed on 2-2-2005 whereby the application filed by respondent on 23-9-2004 was allowed and the compromise petition was cancelled. Being aggrieved by that order, the instant revision has been filed under section 115, Civil Procedure Code on the grounds mentioned therein. ( 5. ) SHRI Pranay Verma, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the compromise petition was filed on 9-9-2004, the evidence of both the parties were recorded. Arguments were also heard. Nothing was to be done by the Court except to pass the order. Therefore, the trial Court failed to exercise jurisdiction in not passing the decree on the basis of compromise petition and also illegally exercised jurisdiction in allowing the application dated 23-9-2004 cancelling the compromise petition. ( 6. ) ON the other hand, Shri Sheel Nagu, learned counsel for the respondent no. Therefore, the trial Court failed to exercise jurisdiction in not passing the decree on the basis of compromise petition and also illegally exercised jurisdiction in allowing the application dated 23-9-2004 cancelling the compromise petition. ( 6. ) ON the other hand, Shri Sheel Nagu, learned counsel for the respondent no. 1 has submitted that the Court must be satisfied prior to passing the decree on the basis of compromise petition and this satisfaction should be continued from filing of the compromise petition till passing the order. The learned counsel has further submitted that after filing the compromise petition, respondent No. 1 came to know that fraud has been played, hence he filed application for cancellation of compromise petition. The trial Court has rightly allowed the application. There is no illegal exercise of jurisdiction by the trial Court. Hence, does not call for any interference. ( 7. ) THE main point for consideration in this revision petition is that whether the trial Court has committed any jurisdictional error in allowing the application of respondent No. 1 filed on 23-9-2004 and thereby cancelling the compromise petition filed by the parties. ( 8. ) THERE is no dispute that the compromise petition was filed by both the parties and the evidence were also recorded thereon but before passing the order, respondent No. 1 moved an application on 23-9-2004 wherein it is mentioned that he is not agree on the compromise because the compromise petition was entered with respect to the agricultural land but not to house and other movable property but the same has been included in the compromise petition, written by applicant and his counsel. The conspiracy has been done. The properties mentioned in para 1 of the compromise petition, have not yet been partitioned. If any decision is made, then he will suffer irreparable injury. It is also mentioned that no opportunity was provided to him to read this compromise exhaustively and applicants counsel got it signed at 5. 30 p. m. But when he read the copy of compromise petition, he found that the other properties have also been included in this compromise petition. Therefore, it is illegal and hence be rejected. ( 9. ) THE applicant filed reply as is reflected from the order sheet dated 1-10-2004 but the same is not traceable in the record. Concerned be directed to place on record. ( 10. Therefore, it is illegal and hence be rejected. ( 9. ) THE applicant filed reply as is reflected from the order sheet dated 1-10-2004 but the same is not traceable in the record. Concerned be directed to place on record. ( 10. ) THE trial Court found that no document has been produced regarding the house and other movable properties included in the compromise petition. The application was allowed and the compromise petition was cancelled. ( 11. ) ORDER 23, Rule 3 of Civil Procedure Code contains the provisions relating to compromise of suit which reads as follows :- "compromise of Suit.- Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit. Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question, but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. (Explanation - An agreement or compromise which is void or under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872) shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.)" Thus, the Court is required to satisfy itself whether there has been as a fact a completed adjustment of compromise of the suit between the parties embodying the terms of the compromise in the written document signed by the parties. (See Gurpreet Singh vs. Chatur Bhuj, 1988 MPLJ (SC) 1 = AIR 1988 SC 400 ). (See Gurpreet Singh vs. Chatur Bhuj, 1988 MPLJ (SC) 1 = AIR 1988 SC 400 ). The wording of the rule "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court" makes it clear that when a party alleges that a suit has been adjusted by a compromise and the other party denies it, the Court has power to decide whether the agreement had been effected. ( 12. ) THE trial Court made an enquiry and directed the parties to adduce the evidence but no any evidence was adduced. Therefore, the Court on the basis of objection raised by the respondent No. 1, cancelled the compromise petition. ( 13. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 1 has placed reliance on the judgment rendered in Chandrahasa Shetty vs. Jayaram Sasani, AIR 1970 Mysore 209 wherein it is held : "the words "proved to the satisfaction of the Court" in O. 23, R. 3 are comprehensive enough and indeed seem to have been intended to empower the Court to go into the merits of the allegations set up by the party denying or disagreeing with the terms of compromise or agreement and decide them, so that the parties get full justice in the suit in which a decree in terms of the compromise is to be passed under the rule. Where the Court finds during the course of the enquiry that the alleged agreement or compromise is vitiated by fraud, misrepresentation etc. it cannot be said legally that an agreement has been arrived at. The agreement contemplated under the rule envisages the two parties coming to certain terms voluntarily and of a free will so as to put an end to the litigation pending between them in the Court. If it decides that as the agreement or compromise is vitiated, it can reject it and proceed to dispose of the suit on merits. " The learned counsel also placed reliance in Misrilal vs. Sobhachand, AIR 1956 Bombay 569, wherein it is held that :- "the Court has power under R. 3, where an agreement or compromise is denied, to decide whether as a fact, the alleged agreement or compromise was made, and if it is satisfied that it was made, to record it. " The learned counsel also placed reliance in Misrilal vs. Sobhachand, AIR 1956 Bombay 569, wherein it is held that :- "the Court has power under R. 3, where an agreement or compromise is denied, to decide whether as a fact, the alleged agreement or compromise was made, and if it is satisfied that it was made, to record it. When the court is required to satisfy itself as to the existence of an agreement and is further required to satisfy itself that there is a lawful agreement adjusting the suit the Court must on an application record compromise consider, especially where a plea of undue influence is raised, whether the agreement is not vitiated on any such ground as illegality, fraud, misrepresentation etc. Therefore, the contention that the trial Judge while recording the compromise should not have recorded any finding on the question whether there was or was not any undue pressure or undue influence as set up by a party in his application is not acceptable. " The learned counsel also placed reliance on the judgment rendered in Smt. Sita Devi vs. Narain Singh and another, AIR 1976 Himachal Pradesh 39, wherein it is held that once the Court is satisfied that the parties have compromised the dispute, it must dismiss the suit. No further enquiry is necessary. ( 14. ) SO far as the present case is concerned, the trial Court was not satisfied that the lawful agreement or compromise has been entered between the parties, therefore, did not pass any decree on the basis of compromise petition, allowed the objections made by respondent No. 1 and cancelled the compromise petition. Therefore, no jurisdictional error appears to have been committed by the trial court. Hence, it does not call for interference in this revision. The revision deserves to be dismissed. ( 15. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the revision is dismissed accordingly. The parties shall bear their own cost. Revision dismissed.