Judgment :- N. Paul Vasanthakumar, J. This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge made in W.P.No.11192 of 2000 dated 27. 2005 allowing the writ petition filed by the first respondent herein/writ petitioner. Second respondent herein is the first respondent in the writ petition and the appellants herein are respondents 2 to 6 in the writ petition. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties herein will be referred according to their ranks in the writ petition. .3. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the writ appeal are that the Larabsha Dharga, Panruti is a private Wakf – Wakf-Alal-Aulad and the representatives of the writ petitioner are the Hereditary Muthavallis of the Larabsha Dharga. The Muthavallis are performing religious, charitable and pious obligations as per the Hibba executed by their ancestors. The Dharga owns 1.19 acres of land with shop buildings and five ghories. The respondents 2 to 6 (appellants herein) calling themselves as Jamath Committee, have encroached upon the portion within Dharga premises and demolished two of the five ghories illegally and put up a thatched shed for the purpose of a mosque. The respondents 2 to 6 had not obtained any lease deed from the two Muthavallis viz., the writ petitioner and trespassed in the Dharga premises on 3. 1992 on the ground that one of the trustee viz., Heeralal gave lease for 11 months. Khaleel Basha, the other Muthavalli gave a complaint before the Superintendent of Police at Cuddalore and later sent a report to the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board on 13. 1992. The Dharga filed W.P.No.6440 of 1992 against the Tamil Nadu Wakf Board and Heeralal and respondents 2 to 6 and this Court by order dated 23. 1998 directed the Wakf Board to cosider the complaint of the petitioner therein/Dharga and pass final orders after issuing notice to the respondents in the case, in accordance with law on or before 23. 1998. Petitioner requested the Wakf Board to take immediate action against the respondents 2 to 6 as per the direction issued by this Court referred above. However, the Wakf Board passed an order on 22. 1999 and rejected the request of the petitioner and permitted the respondents 2 to 6 to keep the mosque within the Dharga premises. The said order of the Wakf Board dated 22. 1999 is challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No11192 of 2000. 4. However, the Wakf Board passed an order on 22. 1999 and rejected the request of the petitioner and permitted the respondents 2 to 6 to keep the mosque within the Dharga premises. The said order of the Wakf Board dated 22. 1999 is challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No11192 of 2000. 4. The main contentions raised in the writ petition are that Heeralal, one of the Muthavalli of the private Wakf has no authority to execute lease deed in favour of the respondents 2 to 6 without the consent, knowledge or authority of the other Muthavalli, namely Khaleel Basha, the other Muthavalli not ratified the alleged lease deed said to have been executed by Heeralal in favour of respondents 2 to 6; that even if the lease deed is considered as valid, it was granted only for 11 months; that the Wakf Board considered the said lease deed as a permanent lease; that the said stand taken by the Wakf Board is totally in violation of Section 36-F of the Wakf Act, 1954, correspondeing to Section 56 of the Wakf Act, 1995; and that, the Wakf Board also misconstrued the order of the Civil Courts. Allegations are also made against the then Chairman of the Wakf Board. .5. Respondents 2 to 6, who are the appellants herein filed counter affidavit in the writ petition and justified the order of the Wakf Board dated 22. 1999 by contending that the Larabsha Dharga is surveyed and notified as Public Wakf and it owns 2.25 acres of land in R.S.No.24 and 0.11 cents in R.S.No.23 in Panruti revenue village. The Dharga of the Saint Larabsha is located in the land bearing R.S.No.24. The muslim Jamath of Panruti town wanted to construct a mosque in order to save the sanctity of the Dharga and also to utilise the portion to remove the unauthorised encroachment made by the Public from destroying the sanctity of the Dharga. The Jamath people entered into an agreement with one of the Muthavalli viz., Heeralal. The lessor and lessee agreed to construct a mosque on the vacant site which were found unused, where there was an entrance gate available. Hence the said Muthavalli viz., Heeralal and the Jamath people had an idea of permanent tenancy for the construction of permanent mosque. The Jamath people entered into an agreement with one of the Muthavalli viz., Heeralal. The lessor and lessee agreed to construct a mosque on the vacant site which were found unused, where there was an entrance gate available. Hence the said Muthavalli viz., Heeralal and the Jamath people had an idea of permanent tenancy for the construction of permanent mosque. It is also contended in the counter affidavit that the other Muthavalli had the knowledge of the construction and the mosque having been constructed, it got its perpetuity. It is also contended in the counter affidavit that the Wakf being a public one, it cannot be termed as a Wakf–Alal-Aulath/Private Wakf. The Dharga and its properties are vested with the God. Even though the Muthavallis are Hereditary Muthavallis, they have no domain over the property and it is against the tenets of Islam, to seek to demolish the mosque. It is also stated that the mosque was constructed only to safeguard the Wakf property and there is no ground to demolish the mosque, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner consented to retain the mosque and prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 6. A reply affidavit was filed by the writ petitioner for which a rejoinder was filed by the respondents 2 to 4. 7. The learned single Judge considered the following contentions raised by the writ petitioner, (i)The main dispute regarding the nature of the Wakf has been concluded by the High Court in favour of the petitioners in the second appeal and the Wakf has been held to be a private wakf and that the petitioners were Hereditary Muthavallis. (ii)The party respondents had high-handedly trespassed into the property on 3. 1992. In terms of the order of this Court in the earlier writ petition, it is the Chief Executive Officer who is the competent authority under Section 54 of the Act and it is the competent authority under Section 54 of the Act and it is not the Board or the Chairman who will be competent to deal with the issues. (iii)Khaleel Basha was not examined by the Board. Rules 17 and 18 of the Wakf Rules of 2000 were not properly complied with. (iv)A lease by one of the trustees will be invalid. (v)A permanent lease as construed by the Wakf Board cannot be a valid lease. (iii)Khaleel Basha was not examined by the Board. Rules 17 and 18 of the Wakf Rules of 2000 were not properly complied with. (iv)A lease by one of the trustees will be invalid. (v)A permanent lease as construed by the Wakf Board cannot be a valid lease. (vi)Alleged concession by the counsel is false and even if true, cannot bind the party unless the party had given any written instructions. The learned single Judge, after going through the orders of the Civil Court and the provisions of the Wakf Act, 1954 and 1995 and based on the decisions found that the wakf is a private wakf/Wakf-Alal-Aulad; the Muthavallies are hereditary and the Wakf Board has no jurisdiction to appoint the Muthavallis; one Muthavalli has no right to execute lease even for one year without the consent of the other Muthavalli and if a lease deed is to be executed beyond one year upto three years, consent of the Wakf Board is to be obtained; and therefore, the alleged lease deed claimed by the respondents 2 to 6 under which they constructed the mosque is void ab initio and also found that the learned counsel for the petitioner, who appeared before the Wakf consented for retaining the mosque cannot be accepted as there was no written instructions from the petitioner/hereditary Muthavallies and the respondents 2 to 6 are to be treated as encroachers who have no legal entity and the Jamath has no legal entity in the eye of law. After giving such a finding the learned single Judge gave a direction to the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board to take steps under section 54(3) of the Wakf Act, 1995, to remove the encroachment and hand over possession of the land and buildings to the Muthavallis within a period of three months. The learned single Judge also held that the enquiry under section 54(1) of the Act need not be conducted on the facts and circumstances of the case. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents 2 to 6 have preferred this writ appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants/respondents 2 to 6 in the writ petition contended that as against the order of the Wakf Board dated 29. 1999, an appeal remedy is available before the Tribunal under section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondents 2 to 6 have preferred this writ appeal. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants/respondents 2 to 6 in the writ petition contended that as against the order of the Wakf Board dated 29. 1999, an appeal remedy is available before the Tribunal under section 83 of the Wakf Act, 1995. The Wakf Board having not allowed the parties to adduce evidence due to the consent given by the counsel for the Muthavallis and the consent is not acceptable, the learned Judge should have remanded the matter to conduct enquiry under section 54 of the Act. The learned single Judge decided the disputed questions and also directed the Chief Executive Officer to exercise power under section 54(3) along with a direction not to exercise powers under section 54(1) and therefore the valuable rights of the respondents 2 to 6 are affected. The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of the Division Bench reported in 2005 (1) LW 676 (Salam Khan v. Tamil Nadu Wakf Board & Others). 9. The learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner submitted that the Civil Court has given a finding that Larabsha Dharga is a private Wakf and one of the Muthavalli has no right to execute lease in favour of the respondents 2 to 6 without the consent of the other Muthavalli and therefore the alleged lease deed executed by Heeralal in favour of the Jamath Committee is non-est and there cannot be any permanent lease of Wakf property as it is in violation of section 36-F of the Wakf Act, 1954 corresponding to Section 56 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and the alleged lease having been found by the learned Judge as void ab initio, the respondents 2 to 6 are rightly treated as encroachers and their act of constructing the mosque within the Dharga is rightly ordered to be removed as no further enquiry is necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. The learned counsel also submitted that the decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 6 reported in 2005 (1) LW 676 is factually distinguishable as the question in that case was whether there was actually a Wakf or not. Here the facts are not in dispute in view of the Judgments of the Civil Court made in S.A.No.1104 of 1983 dated 1. Here the facts are not in dispute in view of the Judgments of the Civil Court made in S.A.No.1104 of 1983 dated 1. 1990 and S.A.No.641 of 1996 dated 26. 2004. Therefore the learned counsel prayed for dismissing the writ appeal in view of the decision given by the learned single Judge on merits. 10. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the respective respondents. 11. The points for consideration in this writ appeal are, .(a) Whether the Larabsha Dharga, Panruti is a Private Wakf/Wakf-Alal-Aulad, .(b) Whether the representatives of the writ petitioner are Hereditary Muthavallis of the Wakf, .(c) Whether one of the Muthavalli is empowered to grant lease in favour of the respondents 2 to 6 for constructing mosque; .(d) Whether the Wakf property can be given on permanent lease; .(e) Whether the respondents 2 to 6 are encroachers and have any right to agitate their claim on the admitted facts of the case; and .(f) Whether the writ petition is not maintainable on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. 12. It is not in dispute that Larabsha Dharga, Panruti is a private Wakf as per the judgment of this Court made in S.A.No.1104 of 1993 dated 1. 1990. The contention raised by the writ petitioner that the Wakf properties are their personal properties was negatived. The question of law raised in the said second appeal were that whether the concurrent finding of the lower Court to say that there is a permanent dedication is not correct and whether the finding that the suit filed without notice as required under section 6(1) of the Wakf Act is not maintainable is not correct. This Court in S.A.No.1104 of 1993 gave a specific finding as follows, "..... I have no hesitation in holding that the concurrent finding of both the courts below that the suit property is a wakf property and it has been treated as such it is not a private trust property is perfectly legal and correct and that it is supported by acceptable evidence and convincing reasons. ....." The said order was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court in SLP No.2486 of 1990 which was also dismissed on 13. 1990. Thus, it is manifest that the property in question is a Wakf property. 13. ....." The said order was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court in SLP No.2486 of 1990 which was also dismissed on 13. 1990. Thus, it is manifest that the property in question is a Wakf property. 13. Again an issue was raised as to whether it is a private wakf or public wakf. The said issue was also concluded by this Court in S.A.No.641 of 1996 dated 26. 2004 and this Court in paragraph 22 held as follows, "22. After giving careful consideration to the rival submissions of the appellants and the respondent, it is made out from Ex.A-1 that there is no indication that the Wakf is a public wakf. The Hibba only indicates that certain things have got to be carried out in respect of pious, religious and charitable purpose and as a matter of fact, in the proforma, Ex.A-22, it has been remarked that the plaintiffs herein and their predecessors alone have been administering the dharga and ghori and at no point of time, the respondent appointed muthavalli and as such, the respondent is not entitled to interfere with the affairs and administration of suit property, which is a private wakf. Mere fact that the plaintiffs once applied to the wakf board to appoint them as Muthavallis, when the respondent took action for the appointment of Muthavallis would not take away the right of the plaintiffs, as they are the Muthavallis appointed by hereditary and custom. In the proforma also, it is stated that the Muthavallis have got to be appointed by hereditary and the wakf has got to be administered by custom and therefore, the respondent cannot interfere with the administration of the appellants." Thus, the character of the wakf is also finally concluded as Private Wakf, Wakf-alul-aulad. 14. The main contention now raised by the respondents 2 to 6 to be decided is whether one of the Muthavalli in a private wakf is entitled to execute lease deed for 11 months with an intention to continue the lease as a permanent lease as claimed by the respondents 2 to 6/appellants herein. 15. The Wakf having been declared as a private Wakf and the Muthavallis are hereditarily holding their office, are entitled to give lease jointly and no muthavalli has got any independent right to execute any lease deed even for 11 months. 15. The Wakf having been declared as a private Wakf and the Muthavallis are hereditarily holding their office, are entitled to give lease jointly and no muthavalli has got any independent right to execute any lease deed even for 11 months. The learned single Judge considered the said issue in paragraphs 20 and 21 of the order based on the judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court and the judgments of the High courts of Calcutta and Karnataka. The said portion of the finding is extracted hereunder. "20. I would take up the validity of the alleged lease first which would, to a large extent, be sufficient to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. 21. Point No.(iii): There was some challenge to the truth and veracity of the alleged lease deed and that the same was not produced before the Board. We may assume that the lease deed had been executed and signed by one of the mutawallis -Heeralal. I am inclined to hold that the lease deed is invalid due to various reasons as rightly contended on behalf of the petitioner: (a) Admittedly, one of the hereditary mutawallis alone had signed the deed. It has not been signed by the other mutawallis and there is neither pleading nor proof of the other trustees having endorsed or ratified the lease. It is settled proposition in the law of Trusts that any lease or sale of a trust property has to be signed or ratified by all the authorities. In JANAKIRAMA Iyer v. NILAKANTA IYER ( AIR 1962 SC 633 ) the Supreme Court held that if all the trustees do not join in the execution of the conveyance, the conveyance would be invalid. In IN RE: H.E.H. THE NIZAMS JEWELLERY TRUST ( AIR 1980 SC 17 ), the Supreme Court held that in the case of a private Trust where there are more trustees than one, all must join in the execution of the Trust. The concurrence of all is necessary in a transaction affecting the Trust property. It was held that in order to bind the Trust estate, the action must be an act of all Trustees. The concurrence of all is necessary in a transaction affecting the Trust property. It was held that in order to bind the Trust estate, the action must be an act of all Trustees. In ABDUL RAHAMAN v. ANGUR BALA (AIR 1974 Calcutta 16) learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that in a case of Trust, co-trustees cannot act singly and that the Managing Trustee alone has no power to create a lease without the concurrence of other trustees. In M/s. KARNATAKA TRADER, HUBLI v. HIREN SHAMJI (AIR 1987 Karnataka 204), learned single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that when the property of the Trust was managed by co-trustees, the lease of the property by only one of the trustees to the exclusion of the co-trustees would be bad in law and will not covey any right, title or interest to the transferee." We are in entire agreement with the issue decided by the learned single Judge and we also hold that one of the Muthavalli has no right to execute lease deed in favour of the respondents 2 to 6 in respect of the private wakf/Wakf-Alal-Aulad, as referred above. 16. The issue whether a permanent lease of a Wakf property could be granted can be considered in the light of Section 36-F of the Wakf Act, 1954. Section 36-F of the Wakf Act, 1954, reads as follows, "36-F. Restrictions on the powers to grant lease of wakf property.- .(1) A lease or sub-lease for any period exceeding three years of any immovable property which is wakf property shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the deed or instrument of wakf or in any other law for the time being in force, be void and of no effect. .(2) A lease or sub-lease for a period exceeding one year and not exceeding three years of any immovable property which is wakf property shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the deed or, instrument of wakf or in any other law for the time being in force, be void and of no effect unless it is made with the previous sanction of the Board. .(3) The Board shall, in granting sanction for the making or renewal of lease under this section review the terms and conditions on which the lease or sub-lease is proposed to be granted or renewed and make its approval subject to the revision of such terms and conditions in such manner as it may direct." Section 56 of the new Act, namely, the Wakf Act, 1995, is also having the same effect. The learned single Judge considered the said statutory provision and rightly held that there cannot be any permanent lease of Wakf property or a lease or sub-lease for any period exceeding three years of any immovable property, and any lease given contrary to the said statutory provision is void ab initio. Therefore the contention of the respondents 2 to 6 that one of the Muthavalli had given on lease initially for a period of 11 months with an intention to continue it as a permanent lease, is unsustainable in view of the statutory bar contained in Section 36-F of the Wakf Act, 1954, corresponding to Section 56 of the Wakf Act, 1995. 17. The findings given by the learned single Judge is supported by the following decisions. .(a) In the decision reported in 1927 LW 202 (Andalam Hanumanthu v. Peruri Kristabrahmam) it is held that a permanent lease granted in a Wakf property by a Muthavalli is void. In that case, the learned Judge followed the earlier decision of the Privy Council reported in 1917 LW 222 (Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara Sannadhi). .(b) In the decision reported in (1978) 3 SCC 299 (Bibi Saddiqa Fatima v. Saiyed Mohd.Mahmood Hasan) in paragraph 16 the Honourable Supreme Court considered the status of Muthavalli of a Wakf, which reads as follows, "16. A Mutawalli is like a Manager rather than a trustee (see p. 498). The Mutawalli, so far as the waqf property is concerned, has to see that the beneficiaries got the advantage of usufruct. We have already pointed out that under the Shia law the property does not remain with the waqif. It is transferred to God or to the beneficiaries. At p. 554 of Tyabji’s famous book it is stated: “The support and maintenance of the waqif’s family, etc. would seem under the Art to be deemed a purpose recognized by the Muslim law as religious, pious or charitable : Section 2. It is transferred to God or to the beneficiaries. At p. 554 of Tyabji’s famous book it is stated: “The support and maintenance of the waqif’s family, etc. would seem under the Art to be deemed a purpose recognized by the Muslim law as religious, pious or charitable : Section 2. This view was put forward by Ameer Ali, J., with great learning in his dissenting judgment in Bikani Mia case.” Section 527 at p. 593 runs thus: “The Mutawalli has no ownership, right or estate in the waqf property : in that respect he is not a trustee in the technical sense : he holds the property as a manager for fulfilling the purpose of the waqf.” A contrary statement of law at p. 202 of Mulla Mahomedan Law seventeenth Edn. based on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Qamar Shah Khan v. Mohammad Salamat Ali Khan (AIR 1933 ALLahabad 407) to the effect that “the Mutawalli is not a mere superintendent or manager but is practically speaking the owner” is not a correct statement of law. In a later Full Bench decision of the same Court in Moattar Raza v. Joint-Director of Consolidation, U.P. Camp at Bareilly (AIR 1970 Allahabad 509) while over-ruling the earlier decision, it has been said at pages 513-14 : “the legal status and position of a Mutawalli under a waqf under the Musalman Law is that of a Manager or Superintendent.” The general powers of the Mutawalli as mentioned in Section 529 of Tyabji’s book are that he “may do all acts reasonable and proper for the protection of the waqf property, and for the administration of the waqf”. (c) In a recent decision reported in 2007 (3) SCALE 147 (Chhedi Lal Misra v. Civil Judge, Lucknow) the Honourable Supreme Court considered the question as to whether once the Wakf deed is created, the Wakif or Muthavalli had any right to transfer the property and in paragraphs 7 and 8 held thus, "7. ..... In our view, the law relating to the creation and continuation of wakfs has been correctly explained by the learned Judge in keeping with the well-established principles that once a wakf is created, the wakif stands divested of his title to the properties which after the creation of the wakf vests in the Almighty. ..... In our view, the law relating to the creation and continuation of wakfs has been correctly explained by the learned Judge in keeping with the well-established principles that once a wakf is created, the wakif stands divested of his title to the properties which after the creation of the wakf vests in the Almighty. It is no doubt true that in a given case the creation of a wakf may be questioned if it is shown that the wakif had no intention to create a wakf but had done so to avoid a liability. But in the instant case such a stand is not available to the Wakif or the Mutwalli since the wakf was created in 1926 and was registered under Section 38 of the 1936 Act and was also notified in the Official Gazette in January 1954. It was only thereafter in 1958, that is, after 32 years that the Wakif filed a collusive suit which was decreed on compromise. The Wakif did not, however, question the registration of the wakf under the provisions of the 1936 Act, nor did he challenge the gazette notification published in January, 1954. 8. Lastly, we do not also find any force in the submission that since the revenue records were altered to show the properties to be the secular properties of the appellant, the wakf character of the properties had been obliterated. The law is well settled that once a wakf if created it continues to retain such character which cannot be extinguished by any act of the Mutwalli or anyone claiming through him." 18. In the light of the above referred decisions, we are of the view that the findings given by the learned single Judge is perfectly legal and valid. 19. In the light of the above findings, now we have to consider whether the entry of the respondents 2 to 6 in the wakf property and constructing a mosque is authorised or not. 20. The entry of the respondents 2 to 6 in the wakf property is clearly unauthorised as they have no leasehold right. Therefore the learned single Judge rightly held that they are encroachers and they have no right to continue in possession of the wakf property. 20. The entry of the respondents 2 to 6 in the wakf property is clearly unauthorised as they have no leasehold right. Therefore the learned single Judge rightly held that they are encroachers and they have no right to continue in possession of the wakf property. In view of the said finding only the learned single Judge thought fit that no further enquiry under section 54(2) is necessary as to whether they are really encroachers or not. Since there is a clear finding based on the statutory provision that the respondents 2 to 6 are encroachers, they are liable to be evicted. Hence the learned single Judge thought fit that there is no purpose in either remanding the matter to the Wakf Board or directing the writ petitioner to file appeal before the Tribunal for deciding the issue. In view of the statutory provisions and the decisions of this Court made in second appeals referred above, the learned single Judge is right in giving a direction to the Chief Executive officer to take steps under section 54(3) of the Wakf Act, 1995, to remove the encroachment and hand over possession of the land and building to the Muthavallis, within a period of three months by specifically stating that there is no need to comply with the provision under section 54(1) of the Act. 21. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 6/appellants that if the writ petitioners are aggrieved, they can challenge the order of the Wakf Board only before the Tribunal, also cannot be sustained in view of the fact that the writ petition was admitted in the year 1999 and the learned single Judge decided the issues on merits. The existence of alternate remedy is not a bar in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in various decisions. (a) In the decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh) the Honourable Supreme Court observed thus, " ..... ..... It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. (a) In the decision reported in AIR 1958 SC 86 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh) the Honourable Supreme Court observed thus, " ..... ..... It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. After referring to a few cases in which the existence of an alternative remedy had been held not to bar the issue of a prerogative writ, the learned Chief Justice added: "It has also been held that a litigant who has lost his right of appeal or has failed to perfect an appeal by no fault of his own may in a proper case obtain a review by certiorari." In the result this Court held that the existence of other legal remedies was not per se a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and that the Court was not bound to relegate the petitioner to the other legal remedies available to him." (b) In the Constitution Bench decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 1506 (A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhwani) in paragraph 10, the Honourable Supreme Court held as follows, "10. The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor-General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court." .(c) In Sales Tax Officer, Navgaon v. Timber & Fuel Corpn., (1973) 2 SCC 292 = AIR 1973 SC 2350 , in paragraph 3, it is held thus, ."3. The High Court came to the conclusion that though it was open to the assessee to proceed under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act as against the impugned order, under the circumstances of the case it was appropriate for it to interfere with the impugned order at that stage itself and quash the proceedings. The question whether the petition should have been entertained or not was entirely within the discretion of the High Court. It is true that it was open to the High Court to decline to interfere with the proceedings at that stage. It could have directed the assessee to proceed under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act. But in our opinion the High Court rightly, on the facts and circumstances of the case, thought that this was a fit case where it should interfere with the order made by the Sales Tax Officer. Hence, we see no reasons to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court." .(d) In State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 724 = AIR 1977 SC 1132 in paragrapoh4, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus, ."4.......... Hence, we see no reasons to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court." .(d) In State of U.P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 724 = AIR 1977 SC 1132 in paragrapoh4, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus, ."4.......... there is no rule of law that the High Court should not entertain a writ petition where an alternative remedy is available to a party. It is always a matter of discretion with the Court and if the discretion has been exercised by the High Court not unreasonably or perversely, it is the settled practice of this Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High Court. The High Court in the present case entertained the writ petition and decided the question of law arising in it and in our opinion rightly. In these circumstances, therefore, we would not be justified in the interest of justice in interfering in our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution to quash the order of the High Court merely on this ground after having found that the order is legally correct. We are, therefore, unable to accept this contention." .(e) In AIR 1985 SC 1147 (Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana) in paragraph 9 it is held as follows, ."9. .......... Ordinarily it is true that the court has imposed a restraint in its own wisdom on its exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 where the party invoking the jurisdiction has an effective, adequate alternative remedy. More often, it has been expressly stated that the rule which requires the exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of convenience and discretion rather than rule of law. At any rate it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court. In fact in the very decision relied upon by the High Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh 1958 SCR 595 : ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) it is observed that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It should be made specifically clear that where the order complained against is alleged to be illegal or invalid as being contrary to law, a petition at the instance of person adversely affected by it, would lie to the High Court under Art.226 and such a petition cannot be rejected on the ground that an appeal lies to the higher officer or the State Government. An appeal in all cases cannot be said to provide in all situations an alternative effective remedy keeping aside the nice distinction between jurisdiction and merits. ........." .(f) In the decisions reported in AIR 1999 SC 1786 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raja Mahendra Pal) in para 6 the Honourable Supreme Court held that availability of alternate remedy does not debar Court from granting appropriate relief to the citizen under peculiar and special facts. .(g) In 2005 (5) Supreme 161 (State of H.P. & Others v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. & Another) in para 19, the Honourable Supreme Court held thus, "19. We shall first deal with the plea regarding alternative remedy as raised by the appellant-State. Except for a period when Article 226 was amended by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, the power relating to alternative remedy has been considered to be a rule of self imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion and never a rule of law. Despite the existence of an alternative remedy it is within the jurisdiction of discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. At the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that though the matter relating to an alternative remedy has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the case, normally the High Court should not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy. If somebody approaches the High Court without availing the alternative remedy provided the High Court should ensure that he has made out a strong case or that there exist good grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction." 22. The learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 6 and the Wakf Board contended that the mosque once constructed cannot be demolished. Since the respondents 2 to 6 are found to be encroachers, they have no right to be in possession of the mosque. The learned counsel for the respondents 2 to 6 and the Wakf Board contended that the mosque once constructed cannot be demolished. Since the respondents 2 to 6 are found to be encroachers, they have no right to be in possession of the mosque. However, as both the parties are Muslims, if the respondents 2 to 6 are really interested in retaining the mosque without demolision, it is open to them to hand over possession of the mosque to the Muthavallis of the Wakf within four weeks, and it is entirely upto the Muthavallis to decide as to whether to retain the mosque or not. No other direction, except the above observation, can be given by us. It is made clear that if the respondents 2 to 6 are not handing over possession to the writ petitioner/Muthavallis of the Private Wakf within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order, the Chief Executive Officer is directed to comply with the direction issued by the learned single Judge in paragraph 30 of his order dated 27. 2005 in W.P.No.11192 of 2000, within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. The writ appeal is dismissed with the above observation. No costs.