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2007 DIGILAW 931 (MAD)

Rainbow Tanning Company Partner T. Venugopal, Gudiyatham Taluk v. Abdullah Basha, Gudiyatham Taluk

2007-03-14

R.BANUMATHI

body2007
Judgment :- Judgment Debtor has preferred this Civil Revision Petition challenging the order of dismissal of the Petition filed under Section 47 C.P.C dated 08.04.2004 passed by the District Munsif, Gudiyatham in E.A.No.22 of 2002 in E.P.No.82 of 2001 in O.S.No.135 of 1996. 2. Brief facts are as follows:- Respondent / Plaintiff has filed O.S.No.135 of 1996 on the file of District Munsif Court, Gudiyatham for recovery of a sum of Rs.7,500/-towards arrears of rent from 01.08.1995 till 312. 1995 and also for delivery of vacant possession. The Suit was decreed on 08.07.1997. For executing the Decree, the Respondent / Decree Holder has filed E.P.No.82 of 2001. Alleging that the Decree is in executable and that Decree obtained by the Respondent is null and void, Revision Petitioner filed Application under Section 47 C.P.C. That Application was dismissed by Execution Court, which is challenged in this Revision Petition. 3. Onbehalf of the Revision Petitioner, it was contended that the Decree is vitiated by material irregularity and illegality since the Decree does not disclose whether Judgment Debtor is a Partnership concern or Proprietorship. Further contention is that the Decree obtained by the Respondent is inexecutable since they have not complied with provisions under O.33 C.P.C and other Landlords, who are necessary and proper parties were not impleaded in the Suit and names of all partners ought to have been shown in the Suit. 4. On behalf of the Respondent, it was submitted that all contentions have been raised in the Suit stage by filing Written Statement and having allowed exparte decree to be passed, it is not open to the Petitioner to raise the same points. It was further submitted that the contentious points raised in the Written Statement cannot be permitted to be reopened and raised in the Petition filed under Sec.47 C.P.C. 5. First objection of Revision Petitioner is that no proper address was given in the Suit and summons was not served resulting in exparte decree being passed against the Revision Petitioner. By perusal of records, it is evident that Judgment Debtor had engaged the counsel and only thereafter, Suit was decreed exparte for his nonappearance. As observed by Execution Court, if really the suit summons was not received by Judgment Debtor, it is not explained as to how he has engaged his counsel on his behalf to contest the Suit. 6. By perusal of records, it is evident that Judgment Debtor had engaged the counsel and only thereafter, Suit was decreed exparte for his nonappearance. As observed by Execution Court, if really the suit summons was not received by Judgment Debtor, it is not explained as to how he has engaged his counsel on his behalf to contest the Suit. 6. Main contention of Revision Petitioner is that Decree was obtained only against M/s.Rainbow Tanning Company, but Execution Petition was filed against Managing Partner i.e., the Petitioner and so the Decree is inexecutable and the Suit was not maintainable without impleading other Partners. If the Suit was not maintainable for non-compliance of provisions under O.33 C.P.C and bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, the Petitioner ought to have raised objection in the Suit stage. Such points cannot be raised in the Application under Section 47 C.P.C. 7. Learned counsel for Revision Petitioner has submitted that the Suit was decreed exparte and other Partners having been not shown as Partners of the Firm, the Decree is inexecutable. The Suit was decreed exparte on 08.07.1997. The Petitioner had not taken any steps to set aside the exparte decree and he has allowed the exparte decree to become final. Another Partner by name – Shankar had filed I.A.No.958 of 1997 under 6.O.9 R.13 C.P.C to set aside the exparte decree passed on 08.07.1997. That Petition was adjourned for quite number of hearings and that Petition was also dismissed for default on 012. 1999. The contention of Revision Petitioner that other Partners were not impleaded and the exparte decree is inexecutable is unsustainable. From the factum of filing of I.A.No.958 of 1997, knowledge of other Partners of Suit and other proceedings would easily be inferred. The other parties were quite aware of the proceedings. The contention that other parties were not impleaded as parties could only be a technical objection, which cannot be raised in the Petition filed under Sec.47 C.P.C. 8. Under Sec.47 C.P.C, all questions arising between the parties to the Suit in which the Decree was passed or their representatives relating to execution discharge or satisfaction of Decree have got to be determined by the Court executing the Decree and not by separate Suit. The powers of Court under Sec.47 C.P.C are quite different and much narrower than the powers of Appeal, Revision or Review. .9. The powers of Court under Sec.47 C.P.C are quite different and much narrower than the powers of Appeal, Revision or Review. .9. The Execution Court cannot go behind the decree and go into its correctness or validity except when it is passed by a Court without jurisdiction. A question of fact and law cannot be raised for the first time in Execution Proceedings. Compliance of Provisions of O.33 C.P.C and impleading of all necessary and proper parties are mixed question of law and fact and it cannot be raised for the first time in the Execution Proceedings. It is not open to the Revision Petitioner to challenge Judgment and Decree which is sought to be enforced on the ground that the Judgment is based on incorrect conclusion or erroneous finding or non-compliance of O.33 C.P.C. .10. Holding that the powers of Court under Sec.47 C.P.C are quite different and much narrower, in the decision reported in Dhurandhar Prasad Singh Vs. Jai Prakash University (A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2552), the Supreme Court has held as under:- ."....Under Sec.47 all questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the Decree was passed or their representatives relating to the execution discharge or satisfaction of decree have got to be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. The powers of Court under Sec.47 are quite different and much narrower than its powers of Appeal Revision or Review. The exercise of powers under Sec.47 is microscopic and lies in a very narrow inspection hole. Thus, it is plain that Executing Court can allow objection under Sec.47 to the executability of the decree if it is found that the same is void ab inito and nullity apart from the ground that Decree is not capable of execution under law either because the same was passed in ignorance of such a provision of law or the law was promulgated making a decree inexecutable after its passing....." 11. In the decision reported in Food Corporation of India ..Vs.. S.N. Nagarkar (A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 808), the Supreme Court has held that Execution Court cannot go behind the Decree and the questions whether relief ought to have been granted in the main proceedings cannot be agitated in the Execution Proceedings. 12. In the decision reported in Food Corporation of India ..Vs.. S.N. Nagarkar (A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 808), the Supreme Court has held that Execution Court cannot go behind the Decree and the questions whether relief ought to have been granted in the main proceedings cannot be agitated in the Execution Proceedings. 12. Though the Revision Petitioner has appeared in the Suit, he has neither contested the Suit nor taken steps to set aside the Decree passed against him. Only when Execution Petition was filed, Judgment Debtor has raised objection regarding executability of Decree. The Execution Court cannot go behind the decree unless it is shown that it is passed by a Court having inherent lack of jurisdiction. The Executing Court cannot go into the question of compliance of O.33 C.P.C and other contentious points raised by the Judgment Debtor. In consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, the Execution Court has rightly dismissed Application filed under Sec.47 C.P.C and the Impugned Order does not suffer from any infirmity or jurisdictional error calling for interference. 13. For the foregoing reasons, the Impugned Order dated 08.04.2004 passed by the District Munsif, Gudiyatham in E.A.No.22 of 2002 in E.P.No.82 of 2001 in O.S.No.135 of 1996 is confirmed and this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P.No.18297 of 2004 is also dismissed.