Judgment :- These writ petitions are filed originally as Original Petitions before the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal assailing the correctness of the common order made in review applications in MTRA Nos.53 and 54 of 2002 pending appeal before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. After abolition of the Tribunal, the OPs were transferred and numbered as writ petitions and have come up for hearing for orders today. 2. The prayer in the writ petition is to call for the records relating to the order impugned in MTRA Nos.53 and 54 of 2002 dated 04.04.2003 passed by the fourth respondent Tamil Nadu Taxation Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Madurai and set aside the same and direct the respondent to furnish the xerox copy of D7 records without insisting on the petitioner to produce the accounts. 3. The facts as culled out from the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition is as follows : The petitioner was doing business in the name and style of Vishal Agencies, Madurai. The activities of the petitioner are bringing the ready-made garment sellers at Bombay and by other up-countries and the purchasers in Tamilnadu together. The respective parties negotiated themselves for purchase of goods, i.e., ready made garments and the mode and time of making payment for the purchases so made. The only part played by the petitioner in these transactions apart from making the parties to meet together, was to stand as a guarantor for the payment to be made by the Tamilnadu purchasers. Thus, according to the petitioner the petitioner cannot be regarded as a dealer as defined in the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. In view of the petitioners peculiar trading activities and on the bona fide impression that the petitioner is not a dealer, the petitioner has not registered himself as a dealer under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 or under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. While that being so, one of the dealers in Tamil Nadu M/s Mastex, Sundaram Arcade of Trichy, not satisfied with the quality of the goods purchased from the Bombay dealer, M/s Female Fashion at Bombay, returned the goods under the cover of Form XX delivery note No.043868 dated 07.02.1997 to the petitioner, being the guarantor for the transaction and introducer of the party. The goods were detained at Melur check post near Madurai and subsequently, the goods got released. Based on the report of the check post officer that the goods were returned to the petitioner at Madurai, the Enforcement Wing officers made an inspection of the petitioners premises at No.37, Mahal 4th street, Madurai and unearthed certain incriminating documents which are 191 in number under cover of D7 receipt on 12.03.1997. It appears that the Enforcement Wing officers after scrutinising the incriminating documents transferred the file to the jurisdictional assessing officer, the first respondent herein. The first respondent on the basis of the report submitted by the Enforcement Wing Officers sent summons requesting the petitioner to appear before him along with the relevant records, i.e., books of accounts maintained by the petitioner for the assessment years 1995-96 and 1996-97. As there was no response from the petitioner finally the first respondent issued pre-assessment notice. According to the petitioner, the petitioner being intermediary of the purchaser of Tamilnadu and seller of other States and up-countries, it is his obligation to collect the invoice amount from the purchaser of Tamilnadu and other States and remit the same to the sellers at Bombay. He was always touring from place to place to collect the sale consideration from the purchasers and to remit the same to sellers and hence, the petitioner was not able to heed to the calls from the first respondent. That made the first respondent to pass a best judgment assessment based on the incriminating documents recovered from the premises of the petitioner, by assessment order dated 20.10.1999. According to the petitioner the slips seized and secured from the petitioners premises pertain to the correspondence between the petitioner and the sellers at Bombay in respect of the arrears to be collected as per the invoices raised by the Bombay sellers. Aggrieved against the two assessment orders, the petitioner filed two appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in A.Ps.Nos.393 and 394 of 1999, Madurai which appeals came to be dismissed on 01.03.2000. The petitioner preferred second appeals before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Madurai in M.T. As. Nos.292 and 293 of 2000. Aggrieved against the two assessment orders, the petitioner filed two appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in A.Ps.Nos.393 and 394 of 1999, Madurai which appeals came to be dismissed on 01.03.2000. The petitioner preferred second appeals before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Madurai in M.T. As. Nos.292 and 293 of 2000. In order to put-forth its case the petitioner filed a petition before the Tribunal seeking for a direction directing the first respondent, the assessing officer to furnish the petitioner the copies of D7 records seized from the petitioners premises which formed the basis for assessment. The Tribunal by its order dated 23.07.2001 passed an order directing to furnish copy of D7 records at the cost of the petitioner. The respondent revenue filed review applications before the Tribunal in MTRA Nos.53 and 54 of 2002 and got the order of the Tribunal dated 23.07.2001 modified to the effect that the copies of D7 records shall be issued to the respondent on the respondent producing the relevant accounts. The correctness of the said order made in the review applications is canvassed before this Court by relying on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 26.08.2002 made in writ petition No.22433 and 22434 of 2002 in the case of Vijaya Oil Mills v. DCTO, Madurai. 4. I heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the materials available on record. 5. It is not under dispute that as per the statutory provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act the enforcement authorities are empowered to inspect the business premises as well as office premises of the dealers and recover documents of incriminating nature, if any available at the time of inspection so as to find out whether the dealers have properly accounted for those documents in their accounts or they are maintaining double accounts - one for production before the authorities concerned for assessment purpose and another for their business dealings outside the accounts and were also empowered to verify the accounts with reference to the incriminating documents. If the incriminating documents recovered at the time of inspection are reflected in the regular accounts maintained by the dealers in the usual course of business, then there remains nothing on the part of the officials to proceed further. If the incriminating documents recovered at the time of inspection are reflected in the regular accounts maintained by the dealers in the usual course of business, then there remains nothing on the part of the officials to proceed further. They will have to accept the accounts maintained by the dealers and make the assessment as per the books of accounts with reference to the returns filed by them. On the other hand if the incriminating documents recovered at the time of inspection were not reflected in the books of accounts, then they will have to make an enquiry with reference to the incriminating documents and the assessment orders have to be passed based on the explanation offered by the assessee about the incriminating documents. In order to verify whether the incriminating documents are reflected in the books of accounts, it is the duty of the assessing officer, for which powers are also vested with him, to call for the accounts maintained by the petitioner and verify the same with reference to the incriminating documents recovered during inspection. 6. There is no doubt during the enquiry conducted the petitioner is entitled to have the copies of D7 records. If the copies of D7 records are furnished to the petitioner prior to the production and checking of accounts, it is obvious that the dealers would duly account for the incriminating documents in their accounts and place it before the authorities as if the entries corresponding to D7 documents were already made and are incorporated in the books of accounts, which have been maintained in the regular course of business. In order to avoid this sort of manipulation as and when the assessee applies for copies of D7 records, it is obligatory on the part of the assessee to produce the accounts before the authorities and have them checked with the D7 records and thereafter obtain the copies of D7 records for agitating the matter or explaining about the entries contained in D7 records to satisfy the authorities that those incriminating documents are already incorporated in the accounts or that those document have nothing to do with the business transaction. 7. Instances are aglore that as and when the inspection has been conducted and the documents have been recovered under D7 immediately the dealer applied for D7 copies and after obtaining the copies manipulated the accounts to suit the convenience. 7. Instances are aglore that as and when the inspection has been conducted and the documents have been recovered under D7 immediately the dealer applied for D7 copies and after obtaining the copies manipulated the accounts to suit the convenience. Hence, this Court as well as the Tribunal in ever so many cases have directed the authorities to furnish the copies of D7 records after verifying the accounts with reference to D7 records recovered. 8. In this case, it is obvious that the petitioner has never responded to the summons issued by the assessing officer to appear before him with relevant records to frame assessment. Even the pre-assessment notice issued by the assessing officer has not been responded by the petitioner. The petitioner never thought it fit to get the copies of D7 records pending assessment proceedings before the assessing officer or before the first appellate authority. When the matter was pending in second appeal before the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal the petitioner applied for copies of D7 records which were directed to be furnished without having any regard to the procedure for framing the assessment, by the Appellate Tribunal. When it was brought to the notice of the Appellate Tribunal by filing Review Applications Nos.53 and 54 of 2002, the Appellate Tribunal, after referring to the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal in OPs Nos.4092 of 1997 dated 012. 1997 which is binding on the STAT just modified the earlier order directing to furnish copies of D7 records after the petitioner producing the relevant accounts. 9. Before this Court no arguments have been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to the propriety of the petitioner in seeking D7 records without furnishing the accounts, but the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court as already stated and sought for a similar order. The order of the said Division Bench reads as follows : " What is complained of in these writ petitions is the condition imposed by the Tribunal/second respondent that D-7 records should be furnished to the petitioner on production of accounts. 2. When we asked learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, he submits that this is only to ensure that the records are not tampered. 3. 2. When we asked learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, he submits that this is only to ensure that the records are not tampered. 3. In the circumstances, the production of accounts as required by the Tribunal/second respondent is dispensed with, and instead we direct the first respondent to furnish D-7 records to the petitioners by taking xerox copies of the said records. This shall be complied within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." 4. With the above direction, the writ petitions are disposed of." 10. The Supreme Court has in more than one occasion has stated that even for summary disposal the Court should give reasons. In the case of Notified Area Committee v. Addl. Director, Consolidation, (2002) 10 SCC 87 the Supreme Court has observed : "Reasons are the flesh and blood of judicial adjudication and such reasons must be shown in the orders which are liable to be challenged in the superior court. That applies to the High Court also." 11. The Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat (1987) 1 SCC 213 observed: "The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. (See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathem), 1901 Appeal cases 495." 12. In the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless G.F. & I Co. Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1023 the apex Court held : "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place." 13. In the case of State of UP v. Synthetics & Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139 , para 41. it was observed by the Supreme Court as under : "Does this principle extend and apply to a conclusion of law, which was neither raised nor preceded by any consideration. In other words can such conclusions be considered as declaration of law? Here again the English courts and jurists have carved out an exception to the rule of precedents. It has been explained as rule of sub-silentio. A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the court or present to its mind. (Salmond on Jurisprudence 12th Edn., p. 153). In Lancaster Motor Company (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd, (1941) 1 KB 675, the Court did not feel bound by earlier decision as it was rendered without any argument, without reference to the crucial words of the rule and without any citation of the authority?. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989)1 SCC 101 . The bench held that, precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment. It was approved by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989)1 SCC 101 . The bench held that, precedents sub-silentio and without argument are of no moment. The courts thus have taken recourse to this principle for relieving from injustice perpetrated by unjust precedents. A decision which is not express and is not founded on reasons nor it proceeds on consideration of issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. Uniformity and consistency are core of judicial discipline. But that which escapes in the judgment without any occasion is not ratio decidendi . In B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480 , it was observed, it is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles, laid down therein. Any declaration or conclusion arrived without application of mind or preceded without any reason cannot be deemed to be declaration of law or authority of a general nature binding as a precedent. Restraint in dissenting or overruling is for sake of stability and uniformity but rigidity beyond reasonable limits is inimical to the growth of law." (emphasis supplied) 14. In the case of Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 , at page 52 the Supreme Court held : "According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates: (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in the judgment. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there is not intended to be exposition of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. It would, therefore, be not profitable to extract a sentence here and there from the judgment and to build upon it because the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it, but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject-matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which, when it is clear what it was, is binding. It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi." (emphasis supplied) .15. The Supreme Court in the case of Government of India v. Workmen of State Trading Corporation (1997) 11 SCC 641 , while dealing with a case, wherein an earlier decision of the Supreme Court was sought to be relied upon, which did not set out the facts and circumstances in which the order came to be passed against the Government, nor did it set out any reasoning to pass such an order, held that such an order was not a binding precedent. The relevant portion of the order reads as under : ."The decision of this Court is virtually a non-speaking order which does not set out the facts and the circumstances in which the direction came to be issued against the Government. It is not clear as to what was the connection between the respondent-Corporation and the State Government. The relevant portion of the order reads as under : ."The decision of this Court is virtually a non-speaking order which does not set out the facts and the circumstances in which the direction came to be issued against the Government. It is not clear as to what was the connection between the respondent-Corporation and the State Government. In the present case the Government of India had clearly averred that it had nothing to do with the State Trading Corporation and there was no relationship of master and servant between the petitioners and the Government of India and, therefore, the Government of India was not in any manner concerned with the closure of the Leather Garment unit of the State Trading Corporation and the consequences thereof. Mr Usgaocar rightly emphasised that the decision on which the High Court had relied could not be treated as a precedent and in support of this contention he drew our attention to a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Krishena Kumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 207 . In paras 18 and 19 the question as to when a decision can have binding effect has been dealt with. We need say no more as it is obvious from the decision relied on that it does not set out the facts or the reason for the conclusion or direction given. It can, therefore, not be treated as a binding precedent." .16. In the case of Arnit Das v. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488 the Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 20 as under : ."A decision not expressed, not accompanied by reasons and not proceeding on a conscious consideration of an issue cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect as is contemplated by Article 141. That which has escaped in the judgment is not the ratio decidendi. This is the rule of sub silentio, in the technical sense when a particular point of law was not consciously determined. 17. Hence, in order to ensure that the accounts should not be manipulated or redressed with the help of copies of D7 records, the copies of D7 records can be directed to be furnished only after production of the books of accounts maintained by the petitioner before the authorities concerned. 17. Hence, in order to ensure that the accounts should not be manipulated or redressed with the help of copies of D7 records, the copies of D7 records can be directed to be furnished only after production of the books of accounts maintained by the petitioner before the authorities concerned. From the order dated 26.08.2002 which has been relied on by the petitioner it is evident that it has been passed as a concessional order without deciding the lis and giving no reasons ordering dispensation of production of accounts. 20. In view of the foregoing reasons, these writ petitions are dismissed as this Court finds no illegality or irregularity in the order impugned in these writ petition. No costs.