JUDGMENT J.M. Malik, J. - The trial Court vide its order dated 24th March, 2007, dismissed the applications under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151, CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Aggrieved by that order, the instant appeal has been preferred. The facts of the present case are these. On 12th January, 2006, none appeared on behalf of the appellant/ defendant. On the request of the respondent/plaintiff, the case was adjourned to 7th February, 2006. On 7th February, 2006, again, nobody appeared for the appellant but on that day the respondent filed his affidavit along with the documents. The appellant was proceeded against ex parte on the same day and the case was adjourned to 15th February, 2006, for ex parte evidence. On 15th February, 2006, the statement of PW-1 was partly recorded and the case was adjourned to 27th March, 2006. On 27th March, 2006, again the appellant did not appear and the case was adjourned to 5th April, 2006. On 5th April, 2006, also the appellant did not appear. The statement of PW-1 was recorded and the plaintiff/respondent closed its evidence. The arguments were heard and the case was adjourned to 10th April, 2006 for pronouncement of judgment. On 10th April, 2006, the respondent filed the written arguments and the judgment was pronounced at 4 p.m. on the same day. 2. Thereafter, an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151, CPC was filed for setting aside the ex parte order dated 7th February, 2006 and subsequent judgment and decree dated 10th April, 2006. The said application was accompanied by another application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is averred that the appellant came to know about the ex parte order only on 26th October, 2006. The appellant set up three grounds in the said application. Firstly, the lawyers were abstaining from appearing in Court due to on going strike regarding the bifurcation of Courts. The appellant contacted his Advocate Mr. Bhalerao in the month of January, 2006, who then informed him that due to lawyers strike nothing was happening in his case and it was simply being adjourned further. He further informed him that there was no change in circumstances and if and when the strike was over and work would commence, he would himself apprise him of the same. Secondly, Mr. He further informed him that there was no change in circumstances and if and when the strike was over and work would commence, he would himself apprise him of the same. Secondly, Mr. Devender Jain, appellants partner, contacted the Advocate in the month of June 2006, who informed him that the Courts are closed and he would find out about the status of the case once the Courts would reopen on 6th July, 2006. Last but not the least much emphasis was laid on para 6 of application under Order 9 Rule 7 and Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151, CPC, which is reproduced as hereunder: "6. That in the meanwhile the defendant got extremely busy with its business and same on-going financial crisis/ disputes with its various purchasers/buyers and as it was also already reeling under the pressure of recovering the losses suffered due to the torrential rains in Mumbai some time back, he lost track of the instant suit and was unable to call its Advocate in Delhi upto September 2006 as itwas order the bona fide impression that in case of any development it would be duly intimated as ever." In the month of September, 2006, appellant came to know from various market sources that the plaintiff had started making tall claims and boasting about fact that he was now the sole owner of trade mark in issue, that is, "Wonder" the meantime, Devender Singh, appellants partner told him over phone that the lawyers strike had come to an end. There was a communication gap between appellant and his Advocate. His Advocate was unable to give any particulars about the case to him and there was no news of any next date and/ or status of the instant case. Consequently, the appellant changed his Counsel and came to know that the suit was decreed ex parte on 10th April, 2006. It also transpired that his lawyer had stopped appearing in Court from January, 2006 onwards. It is pointed out that the appellant was thus prevented from appearing due to the abovesaid sufficient cause. The appellant is the resident of Mumbai. He should not suffer due to the negligence on the part of his Counsel. 3. It also transpired that his lawyer had stopped appearing in Court from January, 2006 onwards. It is pointed out that the appellant was thus prevented from appearing due to the abovesaid sufficient cause. The appellant is the resident of Mumbai. He should not suffer due to the negligence on the part of his Counsel. 3. The trial Court while relying upon the authorities reported in Mohini Mehra v. Mallbu Estate Pvt. Ltd., reported as 2006 IV AD (Delhi) 570, Gargya Research Instruments v. State Bank of India reported as 2006 IV AD (Delhi) 658; New Bank of India v. M/s. Marvels (India) and Others reported as 93 (2001) DLT 558=2001 VI AD (Delhi) 356, Kuldip Singh v. Oriental Bank of Commerce, reported as 110 (2004) DLT 516; Overseas Employment v. A.S. Bakshi, reported as 1986(1) All India Rent Control Journal 131, Mala Dang v. R.K. Cables and Others, reported as33 (1987) DLT 11; and Anil Sharma v. Wiezmani Consultants and Another, reported as 115 (2004) DLT 154=2005 I AD (DELHI) 467 = 115(2004) DLT 154 dismissed the application under Order 9 Rule 13, cre. 4. I have heard the Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the appellant has laid emphasis on para 6 of the application under Order 9 Rule 7 and Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151, CPC, detailed above. He stressed that reasons detailed in the said application speak for themselves and constitute sufficient cause. 5. The version given by the appellant does not just stack up. This is too feeble an excuse to be taken seriously. The appellant indulged in hubble-bubble and did not clarify the position. Lies are lies and nothing would raise them to the status of truth. 6. First of all, I will advert to the point of lawyers strike. It is now well settled that the lawyers are bound to appear in Court during the strike period. The Apex Court in a case reported in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and Another, VII (2002) SLT 229=2002 X AD (S.C.) 357 = 2003 (2) SCC 45 , has made the following observations. It is the duty of every Advocate who accepts brief from the client to attend trial even during strike. This was unprofessional and unethical to refuse to attend Court when strike is going on. It is the duty of every Advocate who accepts brief from the client to attend trial even during strike. This was unprofessional and unethical to refuse to attend Court when strike is going on. It was further held that the Courts are under obligation to hear and decide cases and not to adjourn matter on ground of lawyers strike. Again, participation of lawyers in strike is bad and they would be answerable for consequences suffered by their clients if nonappearance is solely on grounds of strike. 7. Similar view was taken by Apex Court regarding strike by a Government Department in State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co., III (2005) SLT 411=II (2005) CLT 40 (SC)=2005 IV AD (S.C.) 147= (2005) 11 SCC 197 , wherein it is held: "21. We have perused the impugned order whereby application seeking condonation of delay was rejected and the revision petition was dismissed as barred. The cause for the delay stated was long strike of Government employees. In the application seeking condonation of delay there was no mention as to when the strike commenced and terminated. The application was completely vague and the High Court committed no error in rejecting it. We find no ground to interfere with the said order. Civil Appeal No. 8053 of "2001 is, therefore, dismissed." 8. It is pertinent to mention here that no action was initiated against the Advocate for the reasons best known to the appellant. Apart from the ground of strike, the appellant submitted that he had asked his Advocate in the month of June, 2006 knowing very well that in the month of June the Courts generally remain closed. The plea set up by the appellant that the Courts would reopen on 6th July, 2006, is also false. In the year June 2006, the subordinate Courts were not closed for whole of the month and the regular work started on 1st July, 2006. The Court staff was available for whole of the month of June and fate of the case could have been easily known. 9. The appellant failed to produce even an iota of evidence that due to financial crisis he could not approach his Advocate as he was recovering from the losses suffered by him during the torrential rains in Mumbai some time back and, consequently, he lost track of this case till September, 2006. 9. The appellant failed to produce even an iota of evidence that due to financial crisis he could not approach his Advocate as he was recovering from the losses suffered by him during the torrential rains in Mumbai some time back and, consequently, he lost track of this case till September, 2006. No proof was adduced to show to the Court that the appellant had suffered losses. No documentary proof was produced. The appellant could have furnished balance sheet of accounts, income tax record, etc. to prove that the grounds taken by him are true. Such like stories can be minted at any time. 10. For the purpose of condonation of delay, there must be some cause which can be termed as "sufficient cause". Condonation of delay cannot be allowed only because the delay is unintentional and there are sufficient attending circumstances to bolster up the same. Crux of the problem is as to whether there is some plausible and reasonable explanation given by the appellant in his application for condonation of delay caused in preferring the appeal and that the impugned order is liable to be interfered with on the ground that it is perverse or patently erroneous. There should be some extenuating circumstances justifying the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some compelling reasons for the Court to condone the delay. 11. In an authority reported in Latika Industries and Others v. Mr. G.S. Arora, it is held that: "....For such type of people the Supreme Court of India in the judgment titled and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and Ors., reported in, opined as under- The principle of finality of litigation cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigations. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely, we have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely, we have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation." 12. In a recent authority reported in Writ Petition No. 2165 of 2006 titled as Sow. Kamalbai wlo Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya slo Sayanna Shrimal v. Ganpat Sio Vithalrao Gavare, Equivalent Citation of 2007(I)Mh LJ 807, it is held: "15. The expression "sufficient cause" cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such sufficient cause stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for." 13. Similar view was taken by the two Division Benches of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Vasudev Sharma, and Union of India v. Kameshwar Dubey, Another authority reported in Ran Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others, a Division Bench of this Court observed: "4. Both CM Nos. 5369, 6683/2005 are barred by time. In the application filed by the petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, no reason whatsoever has been stated which could be termed as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing these applications." 14. Further, in Raghunath Singh and Others v. Chander Krishan Mahajan and Another, 1993 (2) Rent Law Reporter, it was held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court that no indulgence can be shown as the party had been negligent and inactive in pursuing the matter. 15. The appeal is without merits. The same is, therefore, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.