R. M. S. KHANDEPARKAR, J. ( 1 ) HEARD. ADMIT. The learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents waive service. By consent, heard forthwith. ( 2 ) BY the present appeal, the order dated 4-5-2007 passed in Judges Order No. 146 of 2007 in Suit No. 1809 of 2006 is under challenge. By the impugned order, the Income-tax Department has been directed to deposit certain documents either in originals or the certified copies thereof in the Court and also to give the necessary information as directed under the impugned order. ( 3 ) THE challenge to the impugned order is on the ground that the learned Single judge had no jurisdiction to order production of the documents without ascertaining the relevancy of the documents for adjudication of the matter in dispute. It is further contention on behalf of the appellants that the impugned order is on par with the one in the nature of direction to the witness to produce the documents by issuing summons under the provisions of Order 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure hereinafter called as "the code", and the occasion for issuance of such summons can arise only when the issues are framed and settled and not at any stage earlier thereto and the same having been totally ignored, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. It is their contention that section 30 of the C. P. C. clearly provides that the exercise of power to order discovery and the production of documents is subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed and that therefore the same is subject to the provisions of Order 16 of the Code which has been totally ignored by the learned single Judge while passing the impugned order. It is their further contention that the impugned order forecloses the right of the appellants to object to the relevancy and/or admissibility of such documents and information in evidence as the production of the documents and the disclosure of information is ordered even without following the procedure prescribed for the same under the law and in that context the impugned order affects the valuable rights of the appellants. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection about the non-maintainability of the appeal in as much as that the impugned order is not a judgment within the meaning of the said expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It is their further contention that the the conditions and limitations which are prescribed for exercise of power under section 30 of the code are those enumerated under Order 11 of the Code and the same do not restrict the power of the Court to order the production of documents and/or disclosure of information even prior to the filing of the written statement by the defendant and there is no restriction that such an order can be passed only after framing of the issues. It is their further contention that the impugned order clearly discloses that the Court has clearly considered the relevancy of the documents and the production thereof at the stage at which the same are ordered to be produced. In any case, since the impugned order has been passed for further progress of the suit, it does not amount to a judgment and is purely an interlocutory order. ( 5 ) BOTH the Counsel in support of their rival contentions have relied upon the decision of the apex Court in the matter of (Shah babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and another), reported in 1983 (1) Bom. C. R. (S. C.)37 : 1981 DGLS 358 : (1981)4 S. C. C. 8. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants has further drawn our attention to section 138 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 to contend that nothing forbids the respondents from approaching the income-tax authorities for necessary information and since there is a specific provision and procedure laid down for obtaining the information from the income-tax authorities, the intervention of the Civil Court to obtain such information and the documents impliedly stands restricted to in that regard. Reliance is also placed in the decision in the matter of (M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall and another Vs. Trilok chand Jain and others), reported in 1992 dgls 116 : (1992)2 S. C. C. 13. Reliance is also placed in the decision in the matter of (M/s. Dagi Ram Pindi Lall and another Vs. Trilok chand Jain and others), reported in 1992 dgls 116 : (1992)2 S. C. C. 13. ( 6 ) AS there is a preliminary objection raised regarding the non-maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the impugned order is not a judgment within the meaning of the said expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, it is necessary to ascertain whether the impugned order finally determines any vital and valuable right or obligation of the parties concerned. ( 7 ) IN Shah Babulal Khimji's case (supra), the Apex Court after taking into consideration various earlier decisions and the definition of the term "judgment" has classified the judgments in three groups: (i) a final judgment; (ii) a preliminary judgment and (iii) an intermediary or an interlocutory judgment. As regards the final judgment, it is said that it is a judgment which decides all the issues and questions in controversy. The preliminary judgments are classified in two forms: (a) where the Court by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits and only on a preliminary objection on the ground of non-maintainability of the suit, and (b) the others are preliminary judgments whereby the Court passes orders after hearing the preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the suit i. e. on the ground of bar of jurisdiction, res judicata, manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under section 80 and the like but the suit is not terminated but continued and is tried on merits. However, the order rejecting the objection adversely affects the valuable right of the party raising the objection. The third kind of judgment i. e. the intermediary or the interlocutory judgments are those which comprise of interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality as specified in various clauses of Order 43, Rule 1 of the Code and also those which possesses the characteristics and trappings of finality in as much as that the orders may adversely affect the valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary proceedings. Having so classified the judgments, it has been clarified that though in terms of order 43, Rule 1 of the Code an order setting aside an exparte decree against the defendant is not appealable yet such an order puts the defendant to a great advantage and works serious injustice to the plaintiff because as a consequence of such order, the plaintiff has to contest the suit and is deprived of the fruits of the decree passed in his favour. It has been further held that in the course of the trial, number of orders are passed in respect of the various steps to be taken by the parties in prosecution of the suit which may be of a routine nature while other orders may cause some inconvenience to one party or the other and it was clarified that an order refusing adjournment, an order refusing to summon an additional witness or documents, an order refusing to condone the delay in filing documents, are some of such orders of routine nature. Such an order is purely interlocutory and cannot constitute a judgment because it will be always open to the aggrieved party to make grievance of such order in appeal against the final judgment. It was also held that: "every interlocutory order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. Similarly, orders passed by the trial Judge deciding question of admissibility or relevancy of a document also cannot be treated as judgments because the grievance on this score can be corrected by the Appellate Court in appeal against the final judgment. " (Emphasis supplied) The Apex Court has laid down certain guide-lines to ascertain whether an interlocutory order can be said to be a judgment within the meaning of the said expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and they read thus: " (1) That the Trial Judge being a Senior Court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders with due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or to some extent, prejudice to one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment otherwise the appellate Court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passes must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. (2) That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings. (3) The tests laid down by Sir White, C. J. as also by Sir Couch, C. J. as modified by later decisions of the Calcutta High Court itself which have been dealt with by us elaborately should be borne in mind. " ( 8 ) THE Apex Court in (Midnapore Peoples' co-op. Bank Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Chunilcd Nanda and Ors.), reported in 2006 DGLS 359 : 2006 a. I. R. S. C. W. 2766, after taking into consideration its various earlier judgments including the one in Shah Babulal Khimji's case, held that: "16. Interim orders/ interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties. The term judgment' occurring in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in section 2 (9), CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43, Rule 1 of CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, judgments' for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not 'judgments' for purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent. " ( 9 ) IN Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank's case the Apex Court had referred to its earlier decision in (Central Mine Planning and design Institute Ltd. Vs. Union of India), 2001 DGLS 135 : 2001 A. I. R. S. C. W. 527 : a. I. R. 2001 S. C. 883. In that case, one of the Industrial Tribunals directing reinstatement and payment of partial back wages was challenged by way of a writ petition in the High Court and the workman claimed interim relief under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The High court directed the employer to pay full back wages to the workman during the pendency of the writ petition. The same was challenged by way of letters patent before a division Bench. The letters patent appeal was held to be not maintainable as the order directing the payment under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not a judgment. The same was challenged by way of letters patent before a division Bench. The letters patent appeal was held to be not maintainable as the order directing the payment under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not a judgment. Reversing the said decision, the Apex Court held that an interlocutory order passed in a writ proceeding directing payment under section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was a final determination affecting the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties and, therefore, would fall under the category of intermediary or interlocutory judgment, as specified in the decision in Shah babulal Khimji's case and therefore the letters patent would lie. While holding so, it was observed that: "it is now well settled that the definition of "judgment" in section 2 (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to Letters Patent. . . . . . . . . , it follows that to determine the question whether an interlocutory order passed by one Judge of a High Court falls within the meaning of 'judgment' for purpose of Letters patent the test is: Whether the order is a final determination affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned. This has to be ascertained on the facts of each case. " (Emphasis supplied)Direction to pay full back wages during the pendency of the petition clearly affected the valuable right of the employer. Besides, in the course of grant of interim relief, the employee was granted almost the final relief in relation to the back wages, while the matter on merits was yet to be heard and decided. ( 10 ) REVERTING to the facts of the case in hand, the learned Single Judge, by the impugned order, has merely directed the production of certain documents and disclosure of certain information available with the income-tax department in relation to the matter in issue. Undisputedly, the suit arises out of family arrangement which pertains to various family business wherein the defendants to the suit had some shares. Whether their right, title and interest to the said shares still continues or had come to an end is the main controversy in the matter. Undisputedly, the suit arises out of family arrangement which pertains to various family business wherein the defendants to the suit had some shares. Whether their right, title and interest to the said shares still continues or had come to an end is the main controversy in the matter. The documents, the production of which is sought for, as well as the information which is called for, relate to the business activity and the information furnished by the party to the income-tax department in that regard. Being so, it cannot be said that the production of such documents or disclosure of information by itself would affect the valuable rights of any of the parties to the suit. Similarly, the impugned order does not determine any of the rights or obligations of the parties, in any manner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, it cannot be said to be a judgment within the meaning of the said expression under Clause 15 of the letters patent. ( 11 ) AS already observed above, the Apex court in Shah Babulal Khimji's case had clearly held that an order refusing to summon an additional witness or documents would be purely an interlocutory order passed in routine nature and would not constitute a judgment. As also, the orders passed on the point of relevancy or admissibility of documents are not the judgments within the meaning of the said expression under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Undoubtedly, therefore, the order directing production of documents without deciding any right of any of the parties arising out of or in relation to the contents of the documents or based on the documents cannot be said to be an order amounting to final determination of any issue or controversy affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties concerned. ( 12 ) AS rightly submitted by the Senior counsel for the respondents, the Order XI, rules 15 and 18 of the Code clearly empower the Court to order production of documents for inspection when such documents are either referred in the pleadings or affidavits of the party and the fact that these documents which are ordered to be produced, are referred by the appellants in their pleadings and affidavit is not in dispute. ( 13 ) IT was sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants that production of documents and disclosure of information can vitally affect the rights of the appellants in as much as that once the documents are produced and the information is disclosed, though technically there would be opportunity to the party to challenge the impugned order while assailing the final judgment if it goes against the appellants, yet by that time the contents of the documents and the information asked for would stand revealed to the respondents and their purpose would stand satisfied to the prejudice of the appellants and practically the right of the appellants would be rendered nugatory and would virtually stand defeated. The contention is devoid of substance. Unless the appellants are able to show that the information contained in the documents, which is called to be disclosed, is a 'privileged' information or there is any statutory prohibition for disclosure of such information, merely because such information would stand revealed to the opposite party, that itself cannot be construed as 'prejudicial' to the appellants. ( 14 ) THE section 138 of the Income-Tax act undoubtedly provides a procedure for any person to obtain information regarding the income-tax returns filed by the tax payers. However, such an information can be obtained in public interest. At the same time, the said provision does not bar the court from exercising its power to order production of documents. The Apex Court in fact in Dagi Ram Pindi Lall's case (supra)has clearly held that under the C. P. C. the courts of law have always possessed the jurisdiction to call for the production of the documents relevant for the case before the court from anybody having custody of those documents. It is also pertinent to note that section 137 of the Income-Tax Act under which certain fetters were imposed on exercise of such jurisdiction by the courts in respect of specified documents, has also been repealed since 1964. It has been further ruled that the finality which has been attached to the order of the Commissioner under section 138 (l) (b) of the income-Tax Act is applicable only in cases where the application is made to the Commissioner by a party or any other person for receiving document or information and it has nothing to do with the powers of the court to summon the production of the records. Being so, the contention that the order amounts to final determination affecting the vital rights of the appellants is totally devoid of substance. ( 15 ) AS regards the other points which are sought to be raised, it is not necessary to deal with those points as we are of the considered opinion that the appeal is not maintainable against the impugned order which is not the judgment within the meaning of the said expression under the Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. However, suffice to observe that the production of the documents and the information pursuant to the said order would not by itself transform and constitute the documents and the information to be part of the evidence in the matter unless the provisions applicable thereto under the Code as well as under the Evidence act are complied with. Mere placing of certain documents before the Court or levealing an information to the Court is different from production of such documents and information on. record to form part of the evidence in the suit for the purpose of consideration thereof in the process of adjudication of the dispute between the parties. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed on the limited ground as stated above. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.