VASANTHAKUMAR, J. ( 1 ) THE prayer in this writ petition is to quash the order of the deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai in W. C. No. 67 of 1991 dated 15. 3. 1994. ( 2 ) THE brief facts necessary for the disposal of the writ petition as stated in the affidavit are that the respondent No. 1 was appointed as a forest guard on 22. 10. 1979 and he worked as such till 7. 3. 1986. While he was working as the forest guard in My- ladumparai beat of Gandamanur Range of madurai Division from 27. 1. 1986, he had applied for medical leave on 8. 3. 1986 and 9. 3. 1986 and, thereafter, he extended his leave. The petitioner had referred his case to the Medical Board, Government Rajaji hospital, Madurai and on 11. 7. 1986, the medical Board has examined him and gave a certificate stating that respondent No. 1 was suffering from tuberculous meningitis and physically handicapped and also having defect in vision. The respondent No. 1 again applied for further medical leave up to 22. 9. 1987 and the Medical Board again examined him on 19. 9. 1987 and gave a certificate that there is no progress in his vision and, therefore, he is unfit to work as forest guard. Hence, respondent No. 1 was compulsorily retired from service by an order dated 22. 9. 1987, on medical grounds, with effect from 19. 9. 1987 as per rules 36 and 43 of the Tamil Nadu Pension Rules, 1978. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 1 was not eligible to get pension and, therefore, he was given D. C. R. G. , which was received by him and his request for reappointment was rejected as he was not physically fit. The respondent No. 1 submitted a claim petition before the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Madurai, impleading the District Forest Officer, madurai and District Collector, Madurai as respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively claiming compensation in W. C. No. 67 of 1991. ( 3 ) THE said case was contested by the petitioner herein. However, the Deputy commissioner of Labour, Madurai, passed an award granting payment of Rs. 95,789. The said amount was directed to be paid within 30 days, failing which, to pay 6 per cent interest per annum from the date of termination of service,. e. , 22. 9. 1987. ( 3 ) THE said case was contested by the petitioner herein. However, the Deputy commissioner of Labour, Madurai, passed an award granting payment of Rs. 95,789. The said amount was directed to be paid within 30 days, failing which, to pay 6 per cent interest per annum from the date of termination of service,. e. , 22. 9. 1987. The said award of respondent No. 2 made in w. C. No. 67 of 1991 dated 15. 3. 1994, was challenged before the Tamil Nadu State administrative Tribunal by the writ petitioner and obtained interim stay in O. A. No. 4689 of 1994. ( 4 ) THE main ground urged in this writ petition is that the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has no jurisdiction to award the compensation, after the formation of the tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal, on 12. 12. 1988, since respondent No. 1 was a government servant. The second ground of attack is that respondent No. 1 was not a workman as defined under the Industrial disputes Act, 1947, therefore, the petition filed by respondent No. 1 claiming compensation is not maintainable. Thirdly, it is contended that the High Court of Madras, in W. P. No. 6985 of 1986, held that the arignar Anna Zoological Park (Unit of forest Department) is not an industrial establishment and, therefore, respondent no. 1, who was a forest guard working in forest Department, cannot claim compensation as an industrial worker. ( 5 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 has filed counter- affidavit stating that the application filed by the petitioner before the Tamil Nadu state Administrative Tribunal is not maintainable, since there is an appeal remedy available under Workmen's Compensation act and only to avoid the pre-deposit, the petitioner has chosen to bypass the appeal remedy and filed this original application. In the counter-affidavit, it is also contended that while respondent No. 1 was employed as forest guard, he suffered from tuberculosis and loss of vision, pursuant to which, he was compulsorily retired from service, apart from the fact that respondent No. 1 is a handicapped person. Respondent No. 1 was having wife and children and was also having a widowed mother and only to claim the compensation, respondent No. 1 has filed the said claim petition and delay in preferring the claim petition was also condoned. After considering the oral and documentary evidence, respondent No. 2 by an order dated 15. 3. Respondent No. 1 was having wife and children and was also having a widowed mother and only to claim the compensation, respondent No. 1 has filed the said claim petition and delay in preferring the claim petition was also condoned. After considering the oral and documentary evidence, respondent No. 2 by an order dated 15. 3. 1994, has awarded compensation for a sum of Rs. 95,789, based on the calculation provided in the workmen's Compensation Act with a direction to deposit the same within a period of 30 days, failing which, to pay interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the petitioner's compulsory retirement. It is also stated in the counter-affidavit that the forest department is an industrial establishment because it not only protects the trees and animals in the forests, but, it is also involved in selling varieties of natural wealth from forests like trees, herbal and medicinal products, live animals, parts recovered from dead animals, etc. and it is also running factories of its own,. e. , rubber factories, sandalwood factories, eucalyptus, paper mills, apart from selling plants, honey, etc. , in both retail and large scale and, therefore, it is an establishment for the purpose of Industrial Disputes Act and respondent No. 1 being a workman, is entitled to claim compensation before the respondent No. 2. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondent No. 1 is not a workman and the petition filed before respondent No. 2 claiming compensation is not maintainable and he also cited the unreported judgment of this court made in w. P. No. 6985 of 1986, holding that the arignar Anna Zoological Park (Unit of forest Department), which is one of the units of the department of forest, is treated as a non-industrial establishment by this court and, therefore, the award passed by respondent No. 2 in favour of respondent no. 1, who was a forest guard, is unsustainable. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent nos. 3 to 7, who are legal representatives of the respondent No. 1 submits that the application filed before the Tamil Nadu state Administrative Tribunal is not maintainable, in view of the appeal remedy available under Workmen's Compensation act. 1, who was a forest guard, is unsustainable. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent nos. 3 to 7, who are legal representatives of the respondent No. 1 submits that the application filed before the Tamil Nadu state Administrative Tribunal is not maintainable, in view of the appeal remedy available under Workmen's Compensation act. The learned counsel for the respondents also cited four decisions, which are: state of Tamil Nadu v. P. Chellam, 2003 (3) LW 634 ; P. Mariappan v. Deputy Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, palayamkottai, 2003 ACJ 326 (Madras); state of Kerala v. Khadeeja Beevi, 1989 acj 332 (Kerala) and State of Gujarat v. Rajendra Khodabhai Deshdia, 1991 ACJ 638 (Gujarat), to support his claim that the respondent No. 1 is a workman and is entitled to get compensation. ( 8 ) I have considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for respondenl nos. 3 to 7. ( 9 ) THE respondent No. 1 had died on 3. 2. 1999, when the original application was pending and the legal heirs respondent nos. 3 to 7 are substituted, because they are the beneficiaries of the award and they are entitled to get the amount, if the writ petition is dismissed. ( 10 ) THE point in issue is whether the respondent No. 1 worked in an industrial establishment and whether he is a workman, entitled to get the compensation under workmen's Compensation Act. It is not in dispute that respondent No. 1 was employed as forest guard and he was retired due to medical invalidation. The question as to whether an employee of forest department is a workman or not under the Workmen's compensation Act came up for consideration before the Division Bench of Kerala high Court. In the decision in State of kerala v. Khadeeja Beevi, 1989 ACJ 332 (Kerala), the Division Bench held that the person employed as a mahout by the forest department is a workman and is entitled to file an application under the Workmen's compensation Act and entitled to get an award. The Division Bench of Gujarat High court in the decision in State of Gujarat v. Rajendra Khodabhai Deshdia, 1991 ACJ 638 (Gujarat), considered the claim of the forest guard, who is also a civil servant, and held that forest guard is a workman and is entitled to claim under Workmen's compensation Act. The Division Bench of Gujarat High court in the decision in State of Gujarat v. Rajendra Khodabhai Deshdia, 1991 ACJ 638 (Gujarat), considered the claim of the forest guard, who is also a civil servant, and held that forest guard is a workman and is entitled to claim under Workmen's compensation Act. The Division Bench in that judgment in paras 4 and 5 held as follows: "therefore, a person in employment cannot be excluded from the definition of the term 'workman' on the ground that the workman is a civil servant unless it is specifically so provided. To exclude a person from the scope of the definition of 'workman' two conditions are required to be fulfilled. They are: (1) the employment of the workman is of a casual nature; and (2) he is not employed for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. In this view of the matter once it is shown that the workman has been employed for the purposes of the trade or business of the employer, even though the employment be of a casual nature, the workman would fall within the definition of workman, provided, however, other requisite conditions are also satisfied. There is nothing in the Act to show that workmen holding the posts in civil services of the State would be excluded from the purview of the definition of the term workman. It is an admitted position that the respondent workman was employed as the forest guard. In Schedule II of the Act, list of persons, who, subject to the provisions of section 2 (1) (n) are included in the definition of 'workman' is given. Clause 23 of the list reads as follows: ' (xxiii) employed in the tapping of palm trees or the felling or logging of trees, or the transport of timber by inland waters, or the control or extinguishing of forest fires. ' the duty of the respondent workman as forest guard would be to see that the forest is properly preserved and no part of the forest catches fire and if it catches fire, the same is extinguished immediately. It will have to be presumed that a forest guard is also required to protect the forest wood and see that the wood is not cut and smuggled out of forest. It will have to be presumed that a forest guard is also required to protect the forest wood and see that the wood is not cut and smuggled out of forest. No contrary evidence is led to show that this was not the duty of the applicant workman who was employed as forest guard. Therefore, on the facts of the case, there is no substance in the point raised by the appellant that the applicant was not a 'workman' and was not covered by the provisions of the Act. " ( 11 ) A similar issue as to whether the road Inspector is coming within the definition of workman came up before the division Bench of this court. In the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Chellam, 2003 (3) LW 634 , the Division bench considered the issue and held that the Road Inspector, who is also a civil servant is a workman and is entitled to claim the compensation under the Workmen's compensation Act. While dismissing the appeal filed by the State, Division Bench had, in paras 7 and 8, held as follows: "it is the claim of the applicants that the deceased Pitchai, at the time of the accident, was a Road Inspector and drawing a salary of Rs. 2,900 per month. While he was in employment on 23. 5. 1992, a van driven by its driver negligently dashed against him and thereby he died instantaneously. There is no dispute that the applicants are his wife, minor children and mother. Let us now consider whether the deceased was a workman within the definition of section 2 (1) (n) of the Act. Section 2 (1) (n) (ii) of the act reads as under: (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule. Schedule II prescribes list of nerson workman within the meaning of section 2 (1) (n) of the Act. Among the sub- clauses, clause (viii) is relevant, which reads as follows: (viii) employed in the construction, maintenance, repair or demolition of - (c) any road, bridge, tunnel or canal; or' it is clear that any one employed in the construction, maintenance, repair of demolition of any road, bridge, tunnel or canal is a workman within the meaning of section 2 (1) (n) of the Act. We have already referred to the specific case of the applicants that at the time of the accident, the deceased was working as Road Inspector. Though in the counter statement, it is stated that the deceased was a government servant eligible to get all death-cum-retirement benefits, the fact that he was not an employee within the meaning of section 2 (1) (n) of the act has not been substantiated by placing acceptable evidence. In the absence of any oral or documentary evidence before the Deputy Commissioner, we hold that though they had taken a plea, the same has not been established by placing any materials. Considering the details furnished by the applicants and in the light of the clause (viii) (c) of schedule II, we are in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the Commissioner, viz. , that the deceased was a workman within the meaning of section 2 (1) (n) and inasmuch as he died in the course of his employment, the applicants are entitled to claim compensation under the provisions of Workmen's Compensation Act. There is no dispute with regard to the quantum of compensation arrived at by the Commissioner. Inasmuch as the Commissioner has considered the age, salary of the deceased and adopted a formula prescribed under the Act and arrived at the compensation, we are in agreement of the same. " ( 12 ) THE contention of the petitioner that after the formation of the Tamil Nadu State administrative Tribunal, respondent No. 2 has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition of a government servant, is also unsustainable, in view of the fact that section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals act, 1985, exempts the industrial tribunal, labour court or any other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force and by virtue of the said exemption, the application filed by respondent No. 1 before respondent No. 2 is maintainable and thus, the jurisdiction is vested with respondent No. 2 even after the constitution of the said Administrative tribunal on 12. 12. 1988. Hence, the said ground urged by the petitioner is also found against the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN this case, respondent No. 2 clearly gave a finding that respondent No. 1 while working as a forest guard suffered the occupational disease of tuberculous meningitis and considered that respondent no. 12. 1988. Hence, the said ground urged by the petitioner is also found against the petitioner. ( 13 ) IN this case, respondent No. 2 clearly gave a finding that respondent No. 1 while working as a forest guard suffered the occupational disease of tuberculous meningitis and considered that respondent no. 1 has lost his earning capacity and due to the said disease, respondent No. 1 is entitled to claim the compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The forest guard is a workman coming within the definition of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 2 (1) (n) of the Workmen's compensation Act, 1923 defined 'workman' as any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business ). Sub-section (2) of section 2, reads as follows: "the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of a local authority or of any department acting on behalf of the government shall for the purposes of this Act, unless a contrary intention appears, be deemed to be the trade or business of such authority or department. " Schedule II of the Act provides a list of persons who, subject to the provisions of section 2 (1) (n) of the Act are included in the definition of workman. Clauses 23 and 24 of Schedule II enumerate those persons who are employed in felling or logging of trees or the transport of timber by inland waters or the control or extinguishing of forest fires or employed in operations for the catching or hunting of elephants or other wild animals as workmen. ( 14 ) THE Division Bench of Gujarat High court, as referred above, firmly came to the conclusion that the forest guard is a workman coming within the definition of section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. ( 14 ) THE Division Bench of Gujarat High court, as referred above, firmly came to the conclusion that the forest guard is a workman coming within the definition of section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes act, reads as follows: " 'workman' means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison, or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercise, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested on him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. " ( 15 ) BY applying the said principles and having regard to the finding given by respondent No. 2 stating that respondent no. 1 was a workman, for the purpose of granting relief under the Workmen's Compensation Act, is sustainable and there is no illegality in entertaining the application filed by the respondent No. 1 and ordering payment of compensation. ( 16 ) THE respondent No. 2, after examination of oral and documentary evidence, including a doctor, PW 2, found that respondent No. 1 has lost his earning capacity and fixed the amount of compensation, which cannot be treated as perverse finding warranting interference by this court under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The amount awarded is also not exorbitant or excessive and it is just and proper. The amount awarded is also not exorbitant or excessive and it is just and proper. ( 17 ) THE next contention raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 is that the original application filed by the writ petitioner is not maintainable, in view of the availability of the alternative remedy under Workmen's Compensation Act. The same question arose before this court in the decision in P. Mariappan v. Deputy commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Palayamkottai, 2003 ACJ 326 (Madras ). In para 8 of the judgment a specific point was raised and taking note of section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (sic), enabling the party against whom the award was passed, provides for an appeal remedy, the Division Bench of this court in paras 10 and 11, held thus: "as per first proviso, unless a substantial question of law is involved, no appeal can be entertained by this court. Likewise, as per third proviso, in the case of an appeal by an employer, unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited the amount payable under the order appealed against, the appeal is liable to be rejected. It cannot be disputed that the order under challenge in this writ petition is an award passed by the deputy Commissioner in terms of section 30 (1) of the Act. If that is so, the proper course for the petitioner employer is to prefer an appeal to this court under section 30 of the Act, after depositing the entire amount awarded by the Commissioner and enclosing a certificate with the memorandum of appeal, I have already referred to that, unless a substantial question of law is involved in appeal the same cannot be entertained by this court. Further, as per sub-section (2) of section 30 of the Act, the period of limitation for an appeal is 60 days. As per subsection (3) of section 5 of the Limitation act is applicable to the appeals under this section. In the light of the specific provision for filing an appeal before this court, by complying certain conditions therein, the petitioner/employer, in order to avoid compulsory deposit and the period of limitation, has preferred the above writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained stay of all further proceedings as early as on 23. 12. 1993. In the light of the specific provision for filing an appeal before this court, by complying certain conditions therein, the petitioner/employer, in order to avoid compulsory deposit and the period of limitation, has preferred the above writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained stay of all further proceedings as early as on 23. 12. 1993. In view of the specific provision, namely, section 30 of the Act and the conditions therein, I hold that the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the impugned award is not maintainable, on this ground, the writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 2,000 payable to respondent No. 2, workman. Consequently, wmp is also dismissed. " ( 18 ) THIS court has specifically found that the writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner of labour, Madurai, passed under Workmen's compensation Act is not maintainable and the writ petition was dismissed with costs. ( 19 ) THE unreported judgment of this court made in W. P. No. 6985 of 1986; dated 11. 3. 1988, will be of no help to the petitioner as the person employed in the arignar Anna Zoological Park was one of casual employees and, Park was held as not an industrial establishment and, therefore, the said judgment is not applicable particularly to this case, in the light of the division Bench decision of Gujarat High court and the Division Bench decision of this court cited supra. ( 20 ) IN view of the said position, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 7, the application filed by the petitioner before the tribunal to quash the order of respondent no. 2 is not maintainable as it was filed to avoid the pre-deposit and no substantial question of law is also raised and the writ petition has been transferred from Tamil nadu State Administrative Tribunal and numbered as such. Hence, this writ petition is not maintainable. ( 21 ) HAVING regard to the factual finding of repondent No. 2 and the award passed as early as on 15. 3. 1994 and respondent no. 1 being no more, the writ petitioner is directed to pay the award amount with 6 per cent interest per annum from the date of compulsory retirement from service,. e. , 22. 9. 1987. 3. 1994 and respondent no. 1 being no more, the writ petitioner is directed to pay the award amount with 6 per cent interest per annum from the date of compulsory retirement from service,. e. , 22. 9. 1987. ( 22 ) THE writ petitioner is directed to pay the said award amount of Rs. 95,789 with 6 per cent interest from 22. 9. 1987,. e. , 19 years to the respondent Nos. 3 to 7 herein, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. ( 23 ) THE writ petition is dismissed with the above directions. No costs. Petition dismissed. - .