JUDGMENT Rekha Sharma, J. (Oral)- The petitioner-Som Nath Manocha, joined as a clerk in Punjab and Sind Bank and retired from there on 31st May, 2006 as Scale-II Officer. On the eve of his retirement, i.e., on 12th April, 2006, a charge-sheet was slapped on him. It pertained to his conduct whereby he stood guarantor in respect of four loans sanctioned by the Bank in favour of J.P. Manocha, General Tyres House, Tyre Emporium and Olympic Tyres and Tubes. Although the memorandum of charge-sheet, the articles of charge and the statement of allegations do not refer to the dates when these loans were sanctioned but, it is not in dispute that these loans were a sanctioned between the year 1980-81. It is also not in dispute that two of the loan amounts have since been settled and in respect of two others, Civil Suits were filed by the Bank way back in the year 1984-85. Those suits are still pending. 2. The allegation against the petitioner is that being a Bank employee, b he could not stand guarantor for any person or entity to enable such person or entity to secure loans without prior permission of the competent authority. Admittedly, the petitioner obtained no such prior permission. 3. The grievance of the petitioner is that since 1980-81 or at least from 1984-85, when the Bank had filed civil suits, it was in the know of the fact that he had stood guarantor for the aforementioned parties yet it took no action against him and slept over the matter for as long as quarter of a century. It was only on April 12, 2006 that the Bank woke up from its slumber and served the charge-sheet on him when he was about to retire within about a month thereafter. 4. The short question which arises for consideration is whether the charge-sheet which has been served upon the petitioner after about 25 years of alleged violation of Bank Regulations should be quashed or should it be allowed to take its course by allowing the Bank to hold inquiry proceedings against him? 5. The Apex Court has time and again deprecated initiating of disciplinary proceedings against employees after long lapse of time. 5. The Apex Court has time and again deprecated initiating of disciplinary proceedings against employees after long lapse of time. My attention has been drawn to a judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Another, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1308 , wherein, the inquiry proceedings pertained to the irregularities between the year 1975-77 and in reference to which the proceedings were initiated in the year 1987. The Supreme Court observed that there was no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and, therefore, it was unfair to permit the inquiry to be proceeded with. Reference has also been made to another case reported in VII (2005) SLT 264=JT 2005 (7) SC 417 titled P. V. Mahadevan v. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board. In this case, a charge memo was issued in the year 2000 for charges of corruption pertaining to the year 1990. The Supreme Court quashed the charge-sheet on the ground that keeping a higher Government Official on the charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary inquiry against a Government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interest of Government employee but in public interest and also in the interest of inspiring confidence in the minds of the Government employees. 6. The case of the petitioner stands on a far better footing than the two judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. In those cases, delay was of 10 to 12 years. In the present case, the delay is of 25 years. There is no explanation as to why it has taken the Bank as many as 25 years to issue charge-sheet against the petitioner when it was known to it from 1981 or at least from the year 1984 that the petitioner stood guarantor for the aforesaid parties. Therefore, I am of the view that the charge-sheet is liable to be quashed. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent Bank states that the loan amount in the two civil suits runs into crores of rupees. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed on record copies of the plaint of the two suits. In one case, the principal amount to be recovered is Rs. 7,75,288.60 P and in the other, it is Rs. 2,03,100/ -. Learned Counsel for the respondent Bank states that the loan amount in the two civil suits runs into crores of rupees. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed on record copies of the plaint of the two suits. In one case, the principal amount to be recovered is Rs. 7,75,288.60 P and in the other, it is Rs. 2,03,100/ -. The submission, therefore, has no basis. In any case, the petitioner has mortgaged his own immovable property for securing the loan amounts and, therefore, assuming the two suits are ultimately decreed in favour of the bank, it will have with it the property of the petitioner to fall back upon to recover the decretal amount in case it is not able to recover the same from the borrowers. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that on May 27,2006, the petitioner had given an undertaking to the Bank that any loan/liability which are outstanding in his name may be appropriated/ set-off against his retiral benefits. In view of this undertaking, it is submitted that at least to the extent of the two suit amounts, the retiral benefits of the petitioner should not be released. 9. The loan amounts in respect of which the two suits are pending were not advanced to the petitioner. He merely stood guarantor. He has mortgaged his property with a view to secure those amounts. In any case, the undertaking to which reference has been made talks of loan/liability outstanding in the personal name of the petitioner. The loan amounts were not taken by the petitioner for himself. Therefore, there is no merit in the submission advanced by learned Counsel for the respondent. 10. For the foregoing reasons, I allow the writ petition. The show cause notice dated March 13, 2006 and charge-sheet dated April 12, 2006 are quashed and so also the consequent disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner shall be paid his retiral benefits within six weeks from the date of this order. Writ Petition allowed.