JUDGMENT A.K. Shrivastava, J. This is defendants' appeal against the judgment and decree passed by learned First Appellate Court allowing the appeal of plaintiffs and thereby decreeing their suit. Plaintiffs are Khushilal, Pooran and Ramprasad, they have filed suit against defendants Bhagirath, Jatal Singh, Rai Singh and Narayan for declaration that the sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 Bhagirath in favour of defendants No. 2, 3 and 4, namely, Jatal Singh, Rai Singh and Narayan on 28-5-1982 is a sham transaction, without consideration, fraudulent, without any authority void ab initio and not binding on the plaintiffs. Further declaration has been sought that plaintiffs are 1/4th owner of the suit property shown in Annexure A filed along with the plaint and accordingly they are entitled to get their name mutated in the revenue record. In the alternative, it has also been prayed that plaintiffs are having 1/4th share each of the suit property shown in paras 4 and 5 of Annexure B of the plaint. A consequential relief has also been sought that defendants may not interfere in the possession of the plaintiffs. According to the plaint averments, defendant No. 1 Bhagirath is real elder brother of plaintiffs and defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 are the sons of defendant No. 1. The plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 were the members of the joint Hindu Family of deceased Bondaji. After the death of their father Bondaji, all the brothers (plaintiffs and defendant No. 1) were residing jointly and were carrying on joint business. After the birth of defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 they also became the members of HUF and joined their hands in HUF business. On account of the death of Bondaji, defendant No. 1 being the eldest brother became the Karta Khandan and was looking after the affairs of the HUF. 32 years prior to the date of tiling of the suit, (suit was filed on 28-6-1982) defendant No. 1 who was the Karta Khandan purchased the suit property shown in Annexure "A" to the plaint and got it mutated in his name in the revenue record though it was purchased from the joint funds of HUF and indeed it was also purchased for HUF. Near about 17 years prior to the filing of the suit, an oral partition took place between plaintiffs and defendants. Except Survey Nos. Near about 17 years prior to the filing of the suit, an oral partition took place between plaintiffs and defendants. Except Survey Nos. 435 (excluding one portion), 436, 437 and 440, rest of the property was partitioned into four equal divisions and all the three plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 became Bhumiswami excluding 1/4 portion with possession. In para 5 of the plaint, it has been pleaded that in Annexure B to the plaint the property which fell in the share of plaintiff has been separately shown in red, green and black hatches. The property which fell in the share of defendants has been shown in blue colour. According to plaintiffs, it was further settled between the parties that Survey Nos. 435 (excluding one portion), 436, 437 and 440 shall remain joint and will be enjoyed jointly and thereafter the parties are possessing the property fell in their respective share and are enjoying the same in their Bhumiswami right with possession. The defendant No. 1 Bhagirath executed sale deed in favour of his own sons who are defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 on 28-5-1982 but the same is sham transaction, indeed, the property shown in Annexure A to the plaint was never sold in favour of defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 by defendant No. 1. The said sale deed is also without consideration, fraudulent and void ab initio. Apart from this, defendant No. 1 was not having any right, title and interest to alienate the property of plaintiffs and for this additional reason also the sale deed is void and is not binding upon the plaintiffs and thus the present suit has been filed. In the suit defendant No. 5 of Madhya Pradesh is a formal party and has been joined according to the provision of Order 1, Rule 3A, CPC (State amendment) and no relief has been claimed against State of Madhya Pradesh. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 filed their joint written statement and admitted that Bondaji died near about 42 years prior to the date of the filing of the suit and at that juncture, the age of plaintiffs were 15, 8 and 3 years respectively and they were brought up by the defendant No. 1 who is their elder brother. Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 filed their joint written statement and admitted that Bondaji died near about 42 years prior to the date of the filing of the suit and at that juncture, the age of plaintiffs were 15, 8 and 3 years respectively and they were brought up by the defendant No. 1 who is their elder brother. However, according to defendants, Bondaji was not having any property at the time of his death and defendant No. 1 by his own skill and earnings not only brought up the plaintiffs but also purchased the land for them and for himself. The property which was purchased by defendant No. 1 for plaintiffs, the same was got mutated in their name and the property which he (defendant No. 1) bought for himself, the same was mutated in his name in the revenue record. According to the defendants, the lands shown in Annexure "A" to the plaint is exclusive property of defendant No. 1 which was purchased by him from his self-earnings and in that land plaintiffs are not having any right, title and interest. According to the defendants, the plaintiffs did not acquire any right, title and interest by virtue of any partition nor any partition was effected. According to the defendants, on the basis of mutual consent the parties, they are possessing the lands separately. The sale deed which has been effected by defendant No. 1 in favour of his sons on 28-5-1982 is not at all void and plaintiffs are not having any right on the disputed land nor they are having any right to challenge the alienation. On the basis of abovesaid pleadings, it has been prayed that the suit be dismissed. The learned trial Court framed necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties, came to hold that the case of plaintiffs is not proved and as such dismissed it. The appeal which was preferred by the plaintiffs has been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree and the suit has been decreed in terms of the impugned judgment passed by learned first Appellate Court. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by the defendants. The appeal which was preferred by the plaintiffs has been allowed by the impugned judgment and decree and the suit has been decreed in terms of the impugned judgment passed by learned first Appellate Court. In this manner, this second appeal has been filed by the defendants. While admitting the second appeal on 24-11-1993, following substantial questions of law were framed : (i) Whether the lower Appellate Court committed an error in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court and in decreeing the suit of the respondents No. 1 to 3 even after recording the finding that Bondaji, father of respondents 1 to 3 and deceased Bhagirath had left behind them no immovable property and that the suit property was purchased in the name of Bhagirath in the year 1954 i.e. after 10 or 12 years after the death of their father and after an year or two after the alleged family partition ? (ii) Whether in view of the provisions of the Benami Transactions Act also, the suit of the respondents would not be decreed ? It has been argued by Shri Rao, learned senior counsel that as per the plaint averments, Bondaji who was the father of plaintiffs and defendant No. 1, died in the year 1942. The disputed property was purchased by defendant No. 1 on 13-10-1954 vide registered sale deed Ex.D/1. By inviting my attention to the evidence of Pooran (plaintiff No. 2), it has been argued that after the death of Bondaji who died 45 years prior to the date of his deposition (this witness was examined on 6-10-1987) i.e. in the year 1942 all the brothers were residing jointly and all of them were cultivating the land. They remained joint upto 10 years which would mean that they were living jointly upto the year 1952 and the suit property was purchased by defendant No. 1 vide registered sale deed Ex.D/1 on 13-10-1954 i.e. two years after they were residing separately and therefore according to the learned senior counsel the plaintiffs are not having any right, title and interest in the suit property and it is the self-acquired property of defendant No. 1. By inviting my attention to the testimony of plaintiff No. 2 Pooran Singh (PW-1) para 2, it has been argued by learned senior counsel that according to this witness, their mother gave the money to purchase the suit property and the said fund was joint fund, but there is no pleading of plaintiffs in that regard. Again by inviting my attention to para 4 of the testimony of this witness, it has been argued by learned senior counsel that there was a partition 30 years prior to the date of deposition of this witness which would come to year 1957 and if that is the position why for a considerable long period of 17 years plaintiffs waited to file the present suit. By inviting my attention to para 222 of the Principles of Mulla on Hindu Law (17th Edition), it has been argued by learned senior counsel that defendant No. 1 could have purchased the suit property from his self-earnings though he may be a member of HUF and such property belong to him exclusively. No other member of the co-parcenery would acquire any interest in it. He may also sell it and the said property is not at all liable for partition. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel on the decision of this Court Gauribai w/o Narsingh and another vs. Padmanath and others, 1957 MPLJ 589. On these premised submissions, it has been contended by learned counsel that this appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree of first Appellate Court and to restore the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court. On the other hand Shri Munshi, learned senior counsel for respondents argued in support of the impugned judgment and by placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court Bharat Singh and Another Vs. Bhagirathi, has submitted that there is a strong presumption in favour of Hindu brothers constituting a joint family. It is for the person alleging severance of joint Hindu family to prove it. The mere fact that after the death of the father mutation entry was made in favour of three brothers and indicated the share of each to be one-third by itself could be no evidence of the severance of the joint family. It is for the person alleging severance of joint Hindu family to prove it. The mere fact that after the death of the father mutation entry was made in favour of three brothers and indicated the share of each to be one-third by itself could be no evidence of the severance of the joint family. Thus according to learned senior counsel for respondent even if the name of defendant No. 1 was mutated and continued in the revenue record would not dis-entitle plaintiffs from their share in the suit property. The contention of learned senior counsel is that it has come in the evidence of plaintiff No. 2 Pooran that all the brothers were the agricultural labourers and whatever they were earning, was accumulated in a common pool kept with their mother and from that fund the suit property was purchased in the year 1954 vide Ex.D/1 in the name of defendant No. 1 being the eldest member and Karta Khandan of the family. By inviting my attention to the pleadings of the parties, it has been submitted by learned senior counsel for respondents that issue No. 1 was specifically framed by the trial Court that whether plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 are having 1/4th share in the suit property and since there is evidence of plaintiffs that from the joint funds, collected in common pool, the suit property was purchased, therefore, plaintiffs are also having 1/4th share each in the suit property. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on two decisions of this Court they are Chandrabhaga vs. Anandrao and another, ILR 1939 Nag 293 and Sital Prasad and another vs. Ramprasad and another, ILR 1944 Nag 17. By placing reliance on another decision of Supreme Court Bhagwati Prasad Vs. Shri Chandramaul, , it has been contended by learned senior counsel for the respondent that if a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. By inviting my attention to the finding rendered in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment of learned First Appellate Court, it has been argued by Shri Munshi, learned senior counsel that if the evidence of Ram Singh who is the son of deceased defendant No. 1 (Bhagirath) and his maternal uncle (Mama) Rajaram is considered in proper perspective, it would reveal that the stand taken by the defendants is proved. By inviting my attention para 228 of Principles of Hindu Law by Mulla 17th Edition pages 336 and 337, it has been argued by Shri Munshi, learned senior counsel for the respondents that if the members of the joint Hindu family by their joint labour acquire some property it will be a joint Hindu family property. By inviting my attention to para 228-A of the said author, it has been contended that two or more members of an undivided family or even two members of different branches of the family, if purchase some property jointly, it will be their joint property. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the Single Bench decision of this Court Jainendra Kumar and others vs. Kailash Chand, 1985 JLJ 533 . The further contention of learned senior counsel for the respondents is that the learned First Appellate Court after appreciating and marshalling the evidence ultimately came to hold that the suit property was purchased by plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 Bhagirath jointly though in the name of defendant No, 1 and, therefore, the suit has been rightly decreed by the learned First Appellate Court and this appeal be dismissed. No other point has been pressed before me by learned senior counsel for the parties nor learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted any argument on substantial question of law No. 2. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1: On bare perusal of the sale deed Ex.D/1 dated 13th October, 1954 it is gathered that the same was purchased in the name of Bhagirath s/o Bondaji from one Aziz Alim. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. Regarding substantial question of law No. 1: On bare perusal of the sale deed Ex.D/1 dated 13th October, 1954 it is gathered that the same was purchased in the name of Bhagirath s/o Bondaji from one Aziz Alim. The question now would arise whether the suit property purchased by defendant No. 1 Bhagirath from his own funds and is his self-acquired property or it was purchased from the pool of the joint fund of plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 who are the real brothers. In this context, the specific pleading of plaintiffs is that earlier point of time the family of plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 was a joint Hindu family and after the death of their father, namely, Bondaji, they lived joint and family remained joint and were also doing joint business. Plaintiffs have further pleaded that even after the birth of defendants No. 2, 3 and 4 who are the sons of defendant No. 1, the family remained joint and the business was also carried jointly. After the death of Bondaji, since defendant No. 1 was the eldest brother, he became Karta Khandan and as such he was discharging all the obligations owed to the joint Hindu family. In para 4 of the plaint, the specific pleading of plaintiffs is that the consideration to purchase the suit property was paid from the funds of the joint Hindu family and though the suit property was purchased in the name of defendant No. 1 Bhagirath, but, indeed the same is joint Hindu family property. True, there is no specific pleading of the plaintiffs that after the death of their father Bondaji in the year 1942, the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 were doing the labour work and the earnings were being given by them to their mother, but, there is specific pleading of plaintiffs that from the funds of the HUF the suit property was purchased in the name of defendant No. 1 being the eldest male member of the family as he is the eldest brother of the parties. I am not at all impressed by the submission of Shri Rao, learned senior counsel for appellant that since there is no specific pleading of the plaintiffs that plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 were giving their daily earnings to their mother and from that pool the suit property was purchased, therefore, the story which has been put forth in the testimony of plaintiff Pooran Singh (PW-1) is to be ignored. True, there is no specific pleading as such but the foundation of the pleading if considered in proper perspective would reveal that the suit property was purchased from the funds of the HUF though in the name of defendant No. 1 and the evidence of plaintiff Pooran (PW-1) is nothing but to substantiate the said pleading. Under Order VI, Rule 2, CPC statement in a concise form of the material facts is to be pleaded, but, not the evidence by which they are to be proved. To me, the concise statement of material facts of the plaintiffs are very much there in the plaint and in order to prove those pleadings, the evidence which the plaintiff Pooran has adduced that all the brothers including defendant No. 1 were giving their daily earnings to the mother and from that fund the suit property was purchased is only the evidence which is not at all required to be pleaded. In order to determine the real controversy, according to me, the entire pleading should be taken for consideration and not the stray or loose expression which is inartistically drafted in the plaint. The real substance of the pleading is to be gathered by construing the pleadings as a whole. I may further add that in construing a pleading, the Court should not look merely to its form, or pick out from it isolated words or sentences; the entire pleading is to be read in order to gather the real intention of the party and reach at the substance of the matter. Thus after going through the plaint averments paras 1 to 4, the only inference, which is gathered is that after the death of Bondaji in the year 1942, who was the father of plaintiff and defendant No. 1, the family remain joint and from the funds of the HUF the suit property was purchased. Thus after going through the plaint averments paras 1 to 4, the only inference, which is gathered is that after the death of Bondaji in the year 1942, who was the father of plaintiff and defendant No. 1, the family remain joint and from the funds of the HUF the suit property was purchased. True these pleadings are emphatically denied by the defendants and, therefore, specific issue No. 1 was framed by the trial Court that whether the suit property is a joint Hindu family property of plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 in which they are having 1/4th share each. To me, if plaintiff Pooran in para 2 of his statement has stated that the amount of consideration was given by their mother which was earned jointly is only the evidence and is not the material fact required to be pleaded under Order VI, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code. The decision of Bhagwati Prasad (supra) placed reliance by learned senior counsel for the respondents is quite relevant on the point in controversy wherein in para 10 the Apex Court has specifically held that if a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. It would be germane to quote that part of para 10 of the decision of Bhagwati Prasad (supra) which reads as under: If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication, and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that the particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is; did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it? If it appears that the parties did not know that the matter was in issue at the trial and one of them has had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect of it, that undoubtedly would be a different matter. To allow one party to rely upon a matter in respect of which the other party did not lead evidence and has had no opportunity to lead evidence, would introduce considerations of prejudice, and in doing justice to one party, the Court cannot do injustice to another. According to me, since the specific issue No. 1 was framed that whether the suit property is the property of joint ownership of plaintiffs and defendants in which they are having 1/4th share each and, therefore, the parties were very well aware that what trial they have to face and it cannot be said that defendants were taken in surprise and they did not know that what is the matter in issue in trial and they had no opportunity to lead evidence in respect to the said issue. The decision of this Court Jainendra Kumar (supra) is also squarely applicable in the present case. The decision of Gauribai (supra) placed reliance by learned counsel for the appellants is not applicable though the principle cannot be disputed that if the member of the joint Hindu family are in possession of property, there cannot be any presumption that it is joint family property but in the present case the situation is altogether different. In the present case, specific pleading of the plaintiffs which they have substantiated and proved by their evidence that the disputed property was purchased from the joint fund of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1. In the present case, specific pleading of the plaintiffs which they have substantiated and proved by their evidence that the disputed property was purchased from the joint fund of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1. I am not at all impressed by the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellants that in the year 1942 when the father of plaintiff and defendant No. 1 died the age of plaintiff No. 1 Khushilal was 17 years, Pooran Singh was having the age of 10 years while plaintiff No. 3 Ram Prasad was only five years old and as all of them were minors, they were unable to perform any labour work. It is a matter of common parlance that in the remote village area and that too in the year between 1940 and 1950 even the innocent child was employed as labourer and thus it cannot be said that the plaintiffs being minor were not able to earn the money and, therefore, it was only plaintiff who purchased the suit property from his own funds. Even if it is held, as argued by learned senior counsel for appellants, that according to plaint averments the parties remained joint upto the year 1952 which would mean that plaintiff No. 1 Khushilal was 27 years old, plaintiff No. 2 Pooran was having age of 20 years and plaintiff No. 3 Ram Prasad was aged about 15 years, therefore, they were quite able to earn. I have also gone through the reasons assigned by the learned First Appellate Court from para 12 onwards. The learned First Appellate Court after appreciating and marshalling the evidence in para 17 has come to the conclusion that the suit property was purchased from the joint fund of the plaintiffs and defendants. The findings arrived at by the learned First Appellate Court are pure findings of facts and I do not find any perversity in it. The learned First Appellate Court after appreciating and marshalling the evidence in para 17 has come to the conclusion that the suit property was purchased from the joint fund of the plaintiffs and defendants. The findings arrived at by the learned First Appellate Court are pure findings of facts and I do not find any perversity in it. The substantial question of law No. 1 is thus answered that the learned First Appellate Court did not commit any error in reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court in decreeing the suit of respondents No. 1 to 3 though it is borne out from the record that Bondaji was the father of respondent No. 1 to 3 and deceased Bondaji left behind no immovable property and the suit property was purchased in the name of Bhagirath (defendant No. 1) in the year 1954 i.e. after 10 to 12 years, after the death of their father and after an year or two after the alleged family partition. Regarding substantial question of law No. 2 : No argument has been advanced by learned senior counsel for the appellant on the substantial question of law No. 2. Perhaps the said substantial question of law was framed when the decision of Mithilesh Kumar and Another Vs. Prem Behari Khare, was existing which was later on overruled in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy and Others (deceased by legal representatives) Vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan (deceased by legal representatives), in which it has been held that section 3 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 is not having retrospective operation but it is operative only prospectively, therefore, the learned senior counsel for appellants did not submit any argument to press this substantial question of law since the law is very clear and, therefore, the substantial question of law No. 2 is thus answered that the resent suit is not barred in view of section 3 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Resultantly, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, the judgment and decree passed by learned First Appellate Court is hereby affirmed, the appellant shall bear the costs of the respondents/plaintiffs. Counsel fee Rs.2000/- if pre-certified. Final Result : Dismissed