JUDGMENT:- The plaintiff in O.S.No.6 of 1986, in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Kadiri is the appellant. He filed the suit against the respondent, for the relief of specific performance of agreement, dated 5.7.1985, in relation to 0-75 cents of land, along with 1/4th share in a well. It was alleged that as against the total consideration of Rs.20,000/-, a sum of Rs.19,000/- was paid, on the date of agreement, and the balance of Rs.1,000/- was to be paid by 15.3.1986. After informing the respondent about his willingness to pay the balance, the appellant is said to have gone to the office of Sub-Registrar on 18.2.1986, and since the respondent did not turn up, he got issued a notice, and thereafter, filed this suit. The possession of the property is said to have been delivered, on the date of agreement itself. 2. The respondent filed a written statement, opposing the suit. Respondent pleaded that his eldest brother is the father of the appellant, and that the latter used to take signatures of the respondent and other brothers, for one purpose, or the other. He denied the execution of agreement of sale, as well as delivery of possession. The trial court dismissed the suit, through its judgment dated 30.7.1992. The appellant filed A.S.No.56 of 1992, in the Court of Additional District Judge, Anantapur. The appeal was also dismissed on 25.7.1996. Hence, this second appeal. 3. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that several substantial questions of law arise for consideration in this case, particularly, in the context of discharge of burden, once it was impliedly admitted by the respondent that he signed an agreement of sale, marked as Ex.A- 2. Learned counsel contends that the courts below have committed error in law, by not applying the relevant principles of appreciation of evidence, and denied the relief, even though the agreement of sale was proved, as required in law. 4. Sri B.Rajendra, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that no substantial questions of law arise for consideration, and that the concurrent findings of the courts below do not warrant interference. He submits that the stamp paper, on which Ex.A-2 was written, was purchased in the name of father of the appellant, who is none other than the eldest brother of the respondent, and that circumstance is sufficient to doubt the genuineness of the document. 5. He submits that the stamp paper, on which Ex.A-2 was written, was purchased in the name of father of the appellant, who is none other than the eldest brother of the respondent, and that circumstance is sufficient to doubt the genuineness of the document. 5. The trial court framed two issues in the suit, one touching upon the enforceability of agreement of sale, dated 5.7.1985, and the other, about the entitlement of the appellant for the relief of perpetual injunction. The appellant deposed as PW-1, and on his behalf, PWs-2 to 4 were also examined. The notes of partition, between the respondent and his brothers, including the father of the appellant, was marked as Ex.A-1, and the suit agreement of sale was marked as Ex.A-2. Ex.A-3 is an office copy of the notice and Ex.A-4 is said to be promissory note, under which the appellant borrowed a sum of Rs.10,000/- from one Sri Parvathaiah. The respondent deposed as DW-1 and no documentary evidence was adduced on his behalf. 6. The judgment of the trial court, dismissing the suit, was affirmed by the lower appellate court. 7. Had the respondent denied the execution of Ex.A-2 flatly, the nature of examination of the matter, and the principles that applied to the controversy, would have been different. By stating that he used to sign on blank papers, on the direction of the father of the appellant, the respondent had tacitly admitted his signature on Ex.A-2. Therefore, the burden shifts to him, to explain the circumstances, under which he put his signature on the document, and as to how it is not enforceable in law. 8. On his part, the appellant narrated the events, that led to the execution of Ex.A-1, by deposing as PW.1. PWs.2 and 4 are the witnesses to Ex.A-2. Out of them, PW-4 is none other than the brother of the respondent. PW-3 is a witness to Ex.A-1, under which the joint family properties were divided among respondent and his brothers, including the father of the appellant. The respondent, as DW-1, admitted that he signed upon Ex.A-1, which is dated 2.2.1976. The joint status of the family came to an end with Ex.A-1, in the year 1976. PW-3 is a witness to Ex.A-1, under which the joint family properties were divided among respondent and his brothers, including the father of the appellant. The respondent, as DW-1, admitted that he signed upon Ex.A-1, which is dated 2.2.1976. The joint status of the family came to an end with Ex.A-1, in the year 1976. Whatever may have been the justification, or necessity, for the respondent and his other brothers, to sign papers, blank or otherwise, on the instructions or directions of the karta of the joint family, up to the date of partition, such a situation does not continue, thereafter. At any rate, heavy burden lies upon the person pleading such facts in respect of the same. 9. The strong point urged on behalf of the respondent, through out, is that in obedience to the instructions to the eldest brother, he used to sign on the blank papers. Ex.A-2 is written on a stamp paper purchased on 24.6.1985, may be in the name of the father of the appellant. The partition of the family took place in the year 1976. Once the family was partitioned, each member was living separately, there did not exist any necessity for the one, to sign blank papers, at the instance of the other. The respondent failed to explain his signature on Ex.A-2, as the one, otherwise than in the process of the transaction. In contrast, the appellant proved the said document through cogent evidence, by examining two witnesses, out of whom, one is the brother of the respondent. 10. As observed earlier, PW-4 is one of the brothers of the respondent. He categorically stated that the respondent received a sum of Rs.19,000/- as consideration, under Ex.A-2, and signed it. PW-2 is an independent witness, who has neither enmity towards the respondent, nor any affection towards the appellant. He too stated that the respondent signed Ex.A-2 and received the consideration mentioned therein. 11. Therefore, it becomes clear that the courts below did not apply correct principles of evidence, in appreciating the issues that arise for consideration. 12. This court would have straight away allowed the Second Appeal, had the controversy been only as regards the specific performance of an agreement. However, the relief of perpetual injunction was also prayed for. Finding as to possession would have its own impact, upon the truth or otherwise of Ex.A-2, apart from the proof of execution thereof. 12. This court would have straight away allowed the Second Appeal, had the controversy been only as regards the specific performance of an agreement. However, the relief of perpetual injunction was also prayed for. Finding as to possession would have its own impact, upon the truth or otherwise of Ex.A-2, apart from the proof of execution thereof. Obviously, because the courts below found that execution of agreement of sale is not proved, they did not delve into the question of possession. Even the parties did not bestow their attention, on this aspect. The relief of perpetual injunction cannot be either granted or rejected, only on the basis of the finding in relation to Ex.A-2. A finding as to the physical possession over the suit land, becomes secondary. Therefore, it is a fit case for remand to the trial court for examination of the issue relating to the perpetual injunction. 13. Hence, the Second Appeal is allowed, and the judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial court for consideration, on the question of possession over the suit schedule property. It shall be open to the parties to adduce such evidence, as they intend to. The judgment of this court shall not be treated as pronouncement upon any aspect, including the proof of Ex.A-2. There shall be no order as to costs.