Sanjay Singh, Sanjay Kr. Singh v. Sharda Devi Tibrewal, Tekribal
2007-05-21
RAMESH KUMAR DATTA
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. I.A. No. 735 of 2006 has been filed for condoning the delay of nearly 15 months in filing the revision application. 2. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by the impugned order dated 21.7.2004 the court below has debarred the defendant-petitioner from filing the written statement but immediately thereafter on the very next date on 2.8.2004 the petitioner filed written statement along with a petition for recalling the said order which was heard also on that date and the matter was fixed for orders on 13.8.2004. However, no such order was passed until 7.10.2005 when another petition on the same lines filed on 17.8.2005 was rejected. It is submitted that around that time the petitioner was suffering from Hepatitis and thus could not contact his counsel and after recovering his health the revision application has been filed. 3. Learned counsel for the opposite party opposes the prayer for condonation of delay on the ground that no specific dates have been given regarding the petitioner felling ill nor any medical certificate has been produced. It is further submitted that financial hardship of the petitioner is no ground for condonation of delay. 4. On a consideration of the entire facts and circumstances and taking an appropriate view, of the matter there can hardly be any doubt that the court below after hearing the parties at the time of recall of the order regarding debarring from filing written statement and fixing the matter for orders on 13.8.2004, could not have developed amnesia about the matter and passed the order on 7.10.2005 and that is sufficient to provide the ground to the petitioner for having not moved this Court earlier. 5. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the prayer for condonation of delay is allowed and the delay in filing the revision application is condoned. 6. I.A. No. 735/2006 is accordingly disposed of. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. The short facts of the case are that the plaintiff-opposite parties had filed Eviction Suit No. 23/2002. In the said matter after service of notices, the defendant-petitioner appeared on 24.11.2003 and prayed for time for filing the written statement. The time was allowed.
6. I.A. No. 735/2006 is accordingly disposed of. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 8. The short facts of the case are that the plaintiff-opposite parties had filed Eviction Suit No. 23/2002. In the said matter after service of notices, the defendant-petitioner appeared on 24.11.2003 and prayed for time for filing the written statement. The time was allowed. Thereafter it is submitted that on several dates from 18.4.2004 onwards the Presiding Officer of the Court was absent and by formal orders time was granted for filing the written statement, lastly until 21.7.2004. It is submitted that the written statement had been kept prepared and singed by the defendant-opposite party also but on 21.7.2004 the same could not be filed because learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner did not appear on that date since three days prior to it on 18.7.2004 the father of .learned counsel for the defendant had died. In the said circumstances, the written statement was filed on the next date fixed on 2.8.2004 and a petition was also filed for recalling the said order on which the parties were also heard and matter was fixed for orders on 13.8.2004. However, no such formal order was passed upon the same until 7.10.2005 by which a similar petition dated 17.8.2005 was rejected. 9. In the aforesaid circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that so far as the earlier dates were concerned, the court already allowed the petitioner time to file the written statement and thus on the date the petitioner had been debarred from filing the written statement i.e. on 21.7.2004, the petitioner has explained that he had valid ground for not filing the written statement and the court belowought not have rejected the same without at least granting one more opportunity to the counsel for the petitioner to appear in the matter since otherwise the learned counsel for the petitioner had been appearing on all the dates on which the matter had been fixed.
It is further submitted that at least on 2.8.2005 just and reasonable grounds of absence on 21.7.2004 had been explained and the court below on the principles of justice, equity and fairness ought to have accepted the written statement, the same having not been done it amounts not only to irregularity of procedure but also failure of the court to exercise the jurisdiction which ought to be corrected in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by this Court. 10. In support of the aforesaid proposition learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mr. Shaikh Haji Abdul Khayumsab vs. Mr. Kumar & Ors.: 2006(1) PLKR 154 (SC), in paragraphs 10 and 20 of which it has been held as follows: "19. The matter can be looked at another angle. Undisputedly the trial court had granted time up to 19.2.2004 which undisputedly fell beyond the 90 days period. Since the 19.2.2004 happened to be a holiday, the written statement was filed on the next day. Had the written statement been filed on 19.2.2004, obviously the court could not have refused to accept the written statement as it was within the time granted by it. Merely because of a fortuitous circumstance the written statement came to be filed next day i.e. on account of the date fixed being a holiday that cannot make the written statement, filed, unacceptable. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the Court could not have granted time beyond 90 days. This plea is untenable in view of what has been stated in Kailashs case (supra) and Rani Kusums case (supra). Additionally a party cannot be made to suffer if the Court has committed a mistake if for the sake of argument it is held that the Court had mistakenly granted time." 11. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, submitted that the court below had rightly debarred the petitioner from filing the written statement since in terms of the amended provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is required that the defendants should file the written statement within 30 days from service of summons and in any case, it may not be extended beyond the period of 90 days on good grounds being shown.
It is further submitted that the court below has not committed any error of jurisdiction in debarring the petitioner from filing the written statement in view of the clear provisions which have been brought about to prevent the defendants particularly in cases of the present nature, i.e., eviction matter, from adopting dilatory tactics to prevent the disposal of the case within a given time-frame. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel for the opposite parties relies upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram Naresh Singh & Anr. vs. Smt. Indu Devi & Ors.: 2007(1) PLJR 496 , in which it has been laid down that the party must first satisfy the Court with respect to filing the written statement within 30 days and thereafter the second barrier which is within the period of 90 days and unless good cause is shown the period cannot, in any case, be extended beyond 90 days. 12. So far as the proposition laid down in the aforesaid case is concerned, the same must be read in terms of what has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the cases on which the said decision is based. It has been clearly held by the Apex Court that the provisions of Order 8 Rule 1 CPC are directory although worded in mandatory form. However, it has also been held that the fact that they are directory in nature does not mean that in any case without considering the true facts behind the delay the Court must extend the time for filing the wirtten statement in a routine manner. It has been held there that once the amendment has been brought about in order to prevent delay in disposal of cases, then clearly they should be followed subject to the rider that in the interest of justice and considering the cause shown, the period can be extended at the discretion of the Court. 13.
It has been held there that once the amendment has been brought about in order to prevent delay in disposal of cases, then clearly they should be followed subject to the rider that in the interest of justice and considering the cause shown, the period can be extended at the discretion of the Court. 13. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that this is one of the cases where substantial grounds existed in favour of the petitioner to have been permitted to file the written statement since on the previous dates the petitioners counsel was appearing and only on account of death of the father of the counsel for the petitioner three days prior to the date fixed, learned counsel had not appeared and on the next date itself both the written statement as well as the application for recall had been filed. 14. Thus, on a consideration of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the impugned order dated 21.7.2004 cannot stand as it would work grave injustice upon the petitioner. The said order is accordingly set aside and the court below is directed to accept the written statement of the petitioner and proceed further from that stage. However, it is made clear that the defendant-petitioner shall co-operate in the disposal of the matter preferably on day to day basis since the suit is of the year 2002 and sufficient delay has already been caused in the matter. The Court below is directed to dispose it of expeditiously. 15. The Civil Revision application is accordingly allowed.