Sudha Rani Ghose, Surendra Mohan Ghose, Pranav Ghose v. State Of Bihar
2007-05-21
L.P.SINGH
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. These two appeals have been heard together as they are directed against the common judgment passed in Sessions Case No. 124/90/180/90 by Shri Kanhaiya Prasad Verma, Additional Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur convicting the appellants Surendra Mohan Ghose and Pranav Ghose under sec. 304 B of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years each. They have been further convicted under sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code and have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each. So far as the appellant, Smt. Sudha Rani Ghose is concerned, she was convicted under sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo under section 498A of the Indian Penal Code simple imprisonment for two years. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Since these two appeals have been heard together this judgment will govern both of them. 2. Appellant Surendra Mohan Ghose is the father-in-law and Smt. Sudha Rani Ghose is the mother-in-law of the deceased Sujata Ghose. Appellant, Pranav Ghose alias Babloo is her husband. Sujata Ghose happened to be the daughter of Nitya Gopal Das (P.W.2). She was married to Pranav Ghosh on 14.5.1987. On 20.8.1998 between 1 P.M. to 2 P.M. Sujata Ghosh sustained serious burn injuries at the house of her inlaws. She was removed to the local Medical College Hospital, Bhagalpur where she died at 4.45 P.M. on the same day. The Fardbeyan (Ext.9) of Sujit Kumar Das (P.W. 11) was recorded on 20.8.1979 near bed no.6 of Casualty Ward of the aforesaid Hospital. 3. According to the case of the prosecution soon after her marriage on 14.5.1987 the appellants started torturing her for bringing a fridge and a Scooter from her parents. Sujata Ghosh used to narrate these facts to her parents. Appellant, Pranav Ghosh, the husband of Sujata Ghosh also tortured her for the demand of these articles. It is further alleged that on 20.8.1979 Susanto Rai (P.W.9) came to the house of P.W.11 at about 4 P.M. and informed him that Sujata Ghosh has sustained burn injuries for which she was admitted in the hospital. Getting this information P.W. 11 alongwith parents of Sujata Ghosh rushed to the hospital where they found the dead body of Sujata Ghosh which was severely burnt.
Getting this information P.W. 11 alongwith parents of Sujata Ghosh rushed to the hospital where they found the dead body of Sujata Ghosh which was severely burnt. They came to learn that Sujata Ghosh died at about 3.45 P.M. It further appears that her inlaws family performed last rites of Sujata Ghosh as they were allowed to do so by the parents of Sujata Ghosh. As stated above the Fardbeyan was recorded in the Hospital and the police after completing investigation submitted charge sheet. The case was tried by the learned court below which ended in the conviction of the appellants in the manner as indicated above. 4. On behalf of the appellants certain questions of law have been raised which requires to be properly discussed. 5. The appellants have been convicted under sec. 304B of the Indian Penal Code which runs as follows:- "304B. Dowry Death.- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any relative shall be deerried to have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in sec. 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." 6. In this connection a reference may also be made to sec. 113(A) of the Indian Evidence Act which runs as follows:- "113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as-in Sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code." (emphasis supplied). 7 From this section it would appear that it permits the court to presume that the suicide has been abetted by the husband or by the relative of the husband of the deceased. However, the language of this section is that the court may presume that this abetment was caused by them. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has drawn my attention to sec. 4 of the Indian Evidence Act (in short the Act) which runs as follows:- "4. May presume- Whenever it is provided by this Act that the Court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as provided, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it." 8. In view of the aforesaid provisions of law I will now proceed to examine the evidence on record to find our whether the expression "May Presume" will apply to the facts of the present case. In this connection I will firstly refer to paragraph 76 of the judgment of the learned court below which runs as follows: "76. So on considering the entire evidence of the defence side I came to the conclusion that the accused persons have not succeeded in rebutting the presumption of their guilt u/s 304B I.P.C. and have also failed to establish their innocence. That being the position, it is held that the prosecution has successfully proved the charge under section 304B against the accused persons." 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants has contended that this finding of the learned court below is presumptive and not warranted by law. As noticed above he has submitted that the words "may presume" and not" shall presume" or" conclusive proof" has been used in section 113A of the Act. This will mean that the presumption which may arise under this section is always a rebutable presumption and any such presumption can be rebutted on the evidence on record. In this connection he has drawn my attention to certain facts which has got a bearing on the matter. 10. It has come in the evidence that the deceased Sujata Ghose had appeared at a examination in which she failed.
In this connection he has drawn my attention to certain facts which has got a bearing on the matter. 10. It has come in the evidence that the deceased Sujata Ghose had appeared at a examination in which she failed. It has also come in the evidence that after it she was taken on a pilgrimage to various places including Delhi and other Cities by her inlaws to lighten the burden of her sorrow caused by her failure in passing the examination. This, by no stretch of imagination can be said to be an act of harrassment or torture or even cruelty to the deceased. 11. The alleged occurrence is said to have taken place in a room which was bolted from the inside and in which only the deceased was there. It was only after breaking open the door that the deceased could be taken out from the room and immediately taken to the local hospital for her treatment. According to the case of the prosecution it was her father-in-law and husband that had taken the deceased for treatment to the Hospital and at the time when P.W.11 reached there the treatment was still going on. It may also be noticed that the husband of the deceased had also suffered from burn injuries while trying to extinguish the fire. On behalf of the appellants it has been submitted that if really they wanted to kill the deceased they got ample opportunity for doing so when they had taken her to pilgrimage to different places of India. Where was the necessity for them to burn the deceased in their own house when there was ample opportunity to them to kill her and dispose of the dead body without anybody knowing about it. As noticed above the funeral rites of the deceased was performed by the husband and inlaws of the deceased as they were permitted to do so by the father and the mother of the deceased. Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code speaks of cruelty and harassment. Certainly these are not the incident of cruelty and harassment to the deceased. Hence the presumption under sec. 113A of the Act will not come to aid of the prosecution. There are sufficient materials on record to rebut to any presumption arising under this section as noticed above.
Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code speaks of cruelty and harassment. Certainly these are not the incident of cruelty and harassment to the deceased. Hence the presumption under sec. 113A of the Act will not come to aid of the prosecution. There are sufficient materials on record to rebut to any presumption arising under this section as noticed above. On behalf of the appellants it has been pointed out that this marriage was without any dowry. So far as the allegation is that the appellants were demanding a fridge and a Scooter. It has come in the evidence that these two articles were already with the appellants from before and there was no such demand for their supply to them as dowry. Even the father of the deceased, P.W.2 has admitted in paragraph 25 of his evidence that it is not a fact that accused used to put forward the claim of Scooter before the deceased and used to torture her on this account. 12. The appellants have also been convicted under sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code which also speaks of the cruetly or harassment. From the facts stated above it is clear that the prosecution has not been able to establish that the husband or relatives of the husband of the deceased had subjected her to any cruelty or harassment. Under this circumstances the provisions of sec. 498A of the Indian Penal Code are also not attracted. P.W.2 the father of the deceased has stated that the Mukhagani of the deceased was given by her husband and when he and others had reached at the hospital all the three accused persons were present there. Also P.W.s.6, 10 and 11 were also present. The inlaws of the family of the deceased were so considerate that after failure in the examination the deceased was taken to various places of India for pilgrimage. These facts have been admitted by nobody else than P.W.2 the father of the deceased who has stated that after she failed at her examination her inlaws family took her out for pilgrimage to various places. It is not in dispute that when the alleged occurrence had taken place the room where Sujata Ghose got burnt was bolted from inside and there was nobody else in the room.
It is not in dispute that when the alleged occurrence had taken place the room where Sujata Ghose got burnt was bolted from inside and there was nobody else in the room. The mother of the deceased (P.W.13) has stated that the marriage was performed without any dowry and both the parties were happy. From the aforesaid discussions made above it appears that there was (sic) cruelty or harassment shown to the deceased by her inlaws family. 13. From the judgment of the learned court below it appears that no case under 316/34 of the Indian Penal Code was made out. It also appears that no case under sec. 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code could be made out against the appellants for which they were charged. So far as sec. 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, the learned court below has not convicted the appellants of this charge. These are the circumstances to show that the prosecution could not prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts. 14. From the detailed discussions made above it becomes clear that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the appellants deserve the benefit of doubt. 15. In the result these two appeals are allowed and the appellants of these two appeals are acquitted of the charges framed against them. They are directed to be set at liberty.