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2007 DIGILAW 991 (ALL)

COMMISSIONER, TRADE TAX, U. P. , LUCKNOW v. MOHD. AZAM KHAN.

2007-04-16

PRAKASH KRISHNA

body2007
JUDGMENT PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. - A partnership firm was formed under the name and style of M/s. Khan Sugar Works, Ladomazri, Muzaffarnagar. At the time of obtaining the registration under the U.P. Trade Tax Act, 1948 the constitution of the aforesaid firm was disclosed as follows : 1. Sri Hikamatullah Khan son of Sri Habibullah Khan. 2. Smt. Datul Khanam wife of Sri Habibullah Khan. 3. Smt. Masuda Khanam wife of Sri Jafar Khan. 4. Smt. Saheeda Khanam wife of Sri Jareef Khan. 5. Smt. Norrani Begum daughter of Sri Habibullah Khan. 6. Sri Mohd. Azam Khan son of Sri Habibullah Khan. The trade tax liability of the aforesaid firm was assessed by the Trade Tax Officer subsequently. When a recovery was pressed to recover the tax liability against Shri Azam Khan, one of the partners of the aforesaid firm, an objection was filed to the effect that on the date, i.e., on September 23, 1986, when the registration was applied for, he was minor as he was born in the year 1972. It was submitted that as Shri Azam Khan was minor, a partnership agreement could not have been entered into. In other words, it was stated that the said partnership was void. It was objected by the present opposite party Azam Khan that the amount cannot be recovered from him as the said partnership was illegal and void. The said objection was not accepted either by the assessing authority or by the first appellate authority. The Tribunal in Second Appeal No. 123 of 1998 by the impugned order dated September 5, 2000 accepted the contention of the opposite party and held that he was minor on September 23, 1986, and therefore, the amount cannot be recovered from him. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order the present revision has been filed. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record. Shri K. M. Sahai, the learned Standing Counsel for the department, submitted that the finding of the Tribunal is vitiated. He submits that a civil suit was filed by the opposite party before the Civil Judge, Kairana to cancel his age as mentioned in Khatauni. In the said suit a relief was sought for that it may be declared that he is not a partner in the said suit being minor at the time when the partnership was entered into. He submits that a civil suit was filed by the opposite party before the Civil Judge, Kairana to cancel his age as mentioned in Khatauni. In the said suit a relief was sought for that it may be declared that he is not a partner in the said suit being minor at the time when the partnership was entered into. It is not controverted that the said suit was dismissed and it was held by the civil court that the opposite party was major on the date when the said partnership was entered into. However, when the judgment of the civil court was placed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal has held that the judgment of the civil court is not binding as the question of date of birth has to be decided by the Tribunal in exercise of the power conferred upon it under the provisions of the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The Tribunal has further found that any finding or judgment given by any other court on a matter which is to be decided under the provisions of the U.P. Trade Tax Act, the civil court is not a competent authority to decide such questions. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, it is difficult to agree with the aforesaid broad proposition of the Tribunal. The Tribunal lost sight of the fact that it is the opposite party who invited decision from a civil court. He having lost from the civil court, is estopped to say that the said judgment or order is illegal or is not binding on it. Moreover, the question of date of birth cannot be adjudicated upon by an authority constituted or established under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. In exercise of ancillary power, such an authority may adjudicate upon the date of birth of a person in some cases. But to say that such jurisdiction of civil court is barred is not a correct proposition of law in view of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Therefore, the Tribunal has committed illegality in not giving due regard to the judgment passed by the civil court. The Tribunal also taken into consideration the fact that the applicant has disclosed his age in the primary school as December 11, 1972. Therefore, the Tribunal has committed illegality in not giving due regard to the judgment passed by the civil court. The Tribunal also taken into consideration the fact that the applicant has disclosed his age in the primary school as December 11, 1972. The certificate given by the primary school is on the basis of the information which was furnished by the dealer - opposite party or his parents at the time of the admission in the school. The said evidence is of very weak nature and loses its efficacy in view of the decree of the civil court. The other evidences such as ration card and driving licence are of little consequence. It may be noted here that in the said partnership, besides the opposite party, mother, brother and sisters are also partners. There is absolutely no reason for not duly and correctly disclosing the age of the opposite party by them at the time of the filing of the application for registration. The Supreme Court in the case of S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by Lrs v. Jagannath (dead) by Lrs AIR 1994 SC 853 has held that the law courts are meant for law abiding persons and the law courts should not extend its help to a person who has come with mala fide intention to avoid payment of tax. Obviously the plea that the objector (opposite party) was minor was taken by the opposite party is with a view to avoid tax liability which was ultimately fastened upon the firm. The Tribunal has ignored the relevant aspect of the case and thus has committed illegality in allowing the appeal filed by the opposite party. The revision, therefore, succeeds. The impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal is set aside and it is held that the opposite party is liable to pay the dues of the firm in which he was partner jointly and severally. The revision is allowed. No order as to costs.