JUDGMENT : S.R. DONGAONKAR, J. This is an application under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. The applicant, who has been aggrieved by the order dated 27.6.2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur, whereby the respondent – husband's Criminal Revision No.53/2006 was allowed , has preferred this application seeking quashing of that order. 2. Brief facts leading to this application can be stated thus. The applicant who is wife of the respondent had filed Miscellaneous Criminal Application No.74/2003 for grant of maintenance under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daryapur. When the matter was pending; there was amicable settlement between the parties and the applicant went to cohabit with the respondent. Pursis to that effect was filed on 9.3.2005. Matter remained pending, obviously, waiting for favourable out come. Thereafter, respondent's counsel filed another pursis on 1.10.2005 by which it was intimated to the court that the applicant and the respondent were living together at Akola and therefore, the application should be dismissed. It is to be noted that this pursis was filed by the “counsel for the respondent” and not by the applicant. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daryapur then dismissed that application for default for the absence of the applicant. The relevant order reads as under: “Order: 1] That on 13.8.2004, the evidence of applicant was recorded. At the time of cross-examination, the Court time was over and, therefore, her evidence was deferred till next date. Thereafter, the applicant remained absent on 3.6.2005, 29.6.2005, 6.8.2005, and 9.1.2005 and today. The non applicant filed pursis at Exh.24 stating therein that the applicant and non applicant are residing together at Akola from last 8 months, and therefore, the case be disposed off. The counsel for the applicant is absent when called out repeatedly. In such situation, it appears that the applicant does not want to proceed with this proceeding. In the result, I pass the following order. (1) The application filed by the applicant is dismissed for default. (2) No order as to cost. Dt.1.10.2005 sd/ T.V.Borse, J.M.F.C. Daryapur.” It is alleged that this was a trick played by the respondent and immediately after dismissal of this application, the applicant was driven out of the house. Then, she preferred an application bearing Application No.117/2005 to get her earlier proceedings restored. This application was filed on 15.11.2005. (2) No order as to cost. Dt.1.10.2005 sd/ T.V.Borse, J.M.F.C. Daryapur.” It is alleged that this was a trick played by the respondent and immediately after dismissal of this application, the applicant was driven out of the house. Then, she preferred an application bearing Application No.117/2005 to get her earlier proceedings restored. This application was filed on 15.11.2005. A specific prayer was made to get that application restored saying that after settlement, she had been to the respondent for matrimonial cohabitation, but still the respondent treated her with cruelty. He was demanding divorce and without taking any consent from her; respondent's counsel filed pursis to get dismissal of her application and that was a fraud played on the court, whereby the court had passed an order to dismiss her application for default. 3. The reply was filed by the respondent to this application. The main contention of the respondent was that as there was amicable settlement between the parties earlier, application for grant maintenance was dismissed. For want of enabling provisions in law, the earlier matter cannot be restored. It was also claimed that the said application was barred by limitation. It was specifically pleaded that the applicant could have filed fresh application for grant of maintenance in the circumstances of the case. 4. After considering the rival contentions of the parties, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the application of the applicant to get the earlier proceeding restored can be allowed because the pursis on which the said order of dismissal was passed; was neither signed by the applicant nor by her advocate. According to him, apparently the pursis filed by advocate for non applicant to dismiss the application of the applicant was illegal. Accordingly, he allowed that application and the impugned order i.e. the order to dismiss the criminal application no.74/2003 dated 1.10.2005 was set aside vide his order dated 3.4.2006. 5. Respondent then preferred Criminal Revision No. 57/2005 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur. After hearing the parties and on consideration of submissions he found that the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. in Misc. Criminal Application No.117/2005 dated 3.4.2006 was liable to be set aside as the same was not legal and proper. 5. Respondent then preferred Criminal Revision No. 57/2005 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur. After hearing the parties and on consideration of submissions he found that the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C. in Misc. Criminal Application No.117/2005 dated 3.4.2006 was liable to be set aside as the same was not legal and proper. According to him, once the order of dismissal was passed on account of settlement between the parties, the said order ended the proceedings and therefore, the proceedings again could not be restored. According to him, the said order should not have been passed by the learned Magistrate and therefore, he allowed that revision by his order dated 27.6.2007 and set aside the order dated 3.4.2006 of the learned Magistrate. 6. Hence this application before this court under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code to challenge the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant Shri Ghurde relied on 1993 Cri.L.J. 1506 [Smt. Aruna Kar ..vs.. Dr.Sarat Dash @ Nachhi ] and 2000 Cri.L.J. 3051 [Shabihul Hasan Jafari ..vs.. Zarin Fatma and another], to contend that the case could not have been dismissed by the learned trial Judge on the pursis of the learned counsel for the respondent. According to him, the wife i.e. the applicant was driven out of the matrimonial house immediately after the order of dismissal of her application was passed and therefore, this was a clear case of deception played on the wife as well as of fraud played on the court. He further contended that if the applicant is again required to file fresh application, her claim of maintenance would be protracted and she would not get maintenance in time. She would be again required to undergo ordeal of filing fresh application. It would be detrimental to her interest and peaceful living. According to him, the court can definitely restore the proceeding under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code under its exercise of implied inherent powers. He strongly relied on the observations of the Orissa High Court [Division Bench] in 1993 Cri.L.J. 1506 [Smt. Aruna Kar ..vs.. Dr.Sarat Dash @ Nachhi ]. According to him, in view of 2000 CRI. L.J. 3051 [Shabihul Hasan Jafari ..vs.. He strongly relied on the observations of the Orissa High Court [Division Bench] in 1993 Cri.L.J. 1506 [Smt. Aruna Kar ..vs.. Dr.Sarat Dash @ Nachhi ]. According to him, in view of 2000 CRI. L.J. 3051 [Shabihul Hasan Jafari ..vs.. Zarin Fatma and another], the court can restore the proceeding under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code dismissed for default and therefore, even though there was compromise between the parties, as it was not genuine; because of the immediate act of the respondent of driving out the applicant from the matrimonial house after passing of the order of dismissal of her application would technically call for interference with the said order under the provisions of Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. 8. As against this, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the order impugned in the revision application by the respondent was not a plain order of dismissal in default. The matter was dismissed after considering the fact of amicable settlement between the parties and therefore, the order of restoration of the earlier criminal proceedings could not have been passed, though the applicant could have filed fresh proceedings for grant of maintenance under section 125 of Cr.P.C. In fact she was not prevented from filing the same. According to him, the applicant had left the matrimonial house herself and therefore, she would not be entitled for maintenance. It is also his submission that there is no provision for restoration of proceedings under section 125 of Cr.P.C. in Criminal Procedure Code and and as such in no case, those proceedings can be restored. In this behalf he has relied on the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 2004 ALT (Cri)-1-341[C.Subramanyam ..vs.. C.Sumathi] and also in 1986 All Cri LJ-0- [Maj.Genl. A.S.Gauraya ..vs.. S.N.Thakur]. of the Apex Court. 9. On careful consideration of the submissions, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where exercise of powers under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code are called for. I would indicate the reasons below. C.Sumathi] and also in 1986 All Cri LJ-0- [Maj.Genl. A.S.Gauraya ..vs.. S.N.Thakur]. of the Apex Court. 9. On careful consideration of the submissions, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case where exercise of powers under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code are called for. I would indicate the reasons below. 10] The provisions of section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code read thus: “482-Saving of inherent power of High Court:-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.” Needless to say that this court can exercise the powers under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code to secure the 'ends of justice'. 11. The facts of this case will clearly show that there was some amicable settlement between the parties and therefore, the applicant had gone to cohabit with the husband – respondent and as such the pursis was filed on 9.3.2005. Thereafter, the respondent's counsel filed pursis to get the application dismissed on 1.10.2005 saying that since about 4 months prior to that, the applicant and non applicant were living together at Akola and thereafter, the order of dismissal of that application was passed by the learned J.M.F.C. Daryapur, which is quoted above, on 15.11.2005. It is to be noted that relevant pursis was not filed by applicant or her counsel. Thereafter, the applicant filed an application to get her application restored saying that since Dipawali the non applicant had refused to maintain her and her daughter was taken away by the respondent, for which she has lodged report to Police Station Daryapur and Police Station Akola. It is not pointed out by the respondent that there was any fault of the applicant for which she was not entitled to move an application for restoration of her application. It can not be disputed that the applicant can file a fresh application for grant of maintenance. It is not pointed out by the respondent that there was any fault of the applicant for which she was not entitled to move an application for restoration of her application. It can not be disputed that the applicant can file a fresh application for grant of maintenance. No doubt the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent support his case that when there was amicable settlement between the parties to the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. and if fresh cause of action arises, the wife has to file fresh application and once the application is dismissed for default for any reason, court would not have any power to restore, but revision can be filed to challenge that order. However, in the present case, apparently it seems that there is possibility of trick played by the respondent/husband. No doubt the respondent has raised arguable points particularly a technical point saying that there is no provision for restoration of the application which was dismissed in default in the Criminal Procedure Code and as the provision of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable, the court of J.M.F.C.'s are not empowered to exercise inherent powers, the application for setting aside the order of dismissal could not have been entertained. Without entering to academic discussion, I find that this is a fit case where the exercise of powers under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code is called for to do substantial justice and therefore, taking overall view of the matter and in view of the decision of Apex Court in 2007 AIR SCW 7411 Didigam Bikshapathi ..vs.. State of A.P., wherein it has been observed that : “7-Section 482 does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliauid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine guo res ipsae esse non potest” (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex-debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice, in exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation /continuance of it amounts to 'abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.” the order passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Daryapur dated 3.4.2006 needs to be restored setting aside the impugned order. 12. As such the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur dated 27.6.2007 in Criminal Revision No. 57/2006 is hereby set aside and the order passed by the J.M.F.C. Daryapur dated 3.4.2006 in Misc. Criminal Application no.74/2003 is hereby restored. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Daryapur on 11.2.2008. 12. As such the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Achalpur dated 27.6.2007 in Criminal Revision No. 57/2006 is hereby set aside and the order passed by the J.M.F.C. Daryapur dated 3.4.2006 in Misc. Criminal Application no.74/2003 is hereby restored. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Daryapur on 11.2.2008. Learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Daryapur is further directed to dispose of the said proceeding as early as possible and in any case within a period of 6 months from the date of appearance of both the parties before him. Application stands disposed of in the above terms. Ordered accordingy.