ORDER Mohan Shantanagoudar, J. Petitioner has sought for quashing the order dated 29.7.2006, at Annexure-A, passed by the second respondent in Complaint No. SEC 2 CZP/2006, wherein the second respondent declared that the seat of the petitioner in Kolar Zilla Panchayat has become vacant. The petitioner being elected member of Avani Grama Panchayat, contested for the Membership of he Kolar Zilla Panchayat from Avani (Reserved Constituency). He was elected as a member of Zilla Panchayat on 27.12.2005. The State Election Commissioner issued gazette Notification notifying the elected members of Kolar Zilla Panchayat, including the petitioner, on 4.1.2006. Therefore, the petitioner ought to have resigned to the seat of the member of Grama Panchayat within 15 days from 4.1.2006, in view of Section 167(2) of Panchayat Raj Act (for short hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). According to respondents 3 and 4, the petitioner did not resign the membership of Grama Panchayat within the stipulated period and therefore they filed a joint complaint/representation to the Deputy commissioner, Kolar, 16.2.2006, seeking to declare that the seat of the petitioner in Kolar Zilla Panchayat (Avani Reserved constituency) vacant. The complaint was forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner to the State Election commissioner for necessary action . 2. The complaint was forwarded by the Deputy Commissioner to the State Election commissioner for necessary action . 2. According to the petitioner, he resigned the post of the member of Avani Grama Panchayat on 2.1.2006 by submitting the resignation letter to Adhyaksha of Avani Grama Panchayat and he did not attend any of the meetings of the Grama Panchayat thereafter; that the Adhyaksha in turn, on the same day, has issued an endorsement to the petitioner for having received the resignation letter from the petitioner; that the Adhyaksha of Avani Grama Panchayat accepted the resignation on 12.1.2006; that Avani Grama Panchayat convened the General Body Meeting of Grama Panchayat convened the General Body Meeting of Grama Panchayat on 17.1.2006 for discussion of several issues, however, the said meeting was postponed to 23.1.2006 in view of pooja activities in the Village; that the 4th respondent made an application to the Secretary of Avani Grama Panchayat on 18.1.2006, seeking clarification regarding the resignation of the petitioner to Avani Grama Panchayat membership and obtained an endorsement that the petitioner has not resigned the membership of Grama Panchayat; that the Grama Panchayat adhyaksha and Secretary vide letter dated 18.1.2006 requested the Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District to hold election to the membership of Gram Panchayat for the vacant seat caused by the resignation of the petitioner, that the Grama Panchayat meeting was held on 23.1.2006 and in the said meeting the resignation letter of the petitioner was discussed as Subject No.7 and he acceptance of the resignation was ratified. Per contra, it is the case of respondents 3 and 4 the petitioner has not resigned the membership of Avani Grama Panchayat within the stipulated period of fifteen days from 4.1.2006; that the resignation letter and other documents were created and got up subsequently after 20th of January, 2006, by the petitioner in collusion with the Adhyaksha and Secretary of Avani Grama Panchayat and no meeting was held by the Grama Panchayat on 23.1.2006. 3. The State Election Commissioner, after hearing concluded that the petitioner has not tendered his resignation to the membership of Grama Panchayat within the period of fifteen days from 4.1.2006, i.e., the date of gazette Notification and consequently the Election Commissioner held that the membership of petitioner to Avani Constituency of Kolar Zilla Panchayat has become vacant. 4. 3. The State Election Commissioner, after hearing concluded that the petitioner has not tendered his resignation to the membership of Grama Panchayat within the period of fifteen days from 4.1.2006, i.e., the date of gazette Notification and consequently the Election Commissioner held that the membership of petitioner to Avani Constituency of Kolar Zilla Panchayat has become vacant. 4. Sri Ravivarmakumar, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that: (A) The Election Commissioner does not get jurisdiction to proceed with the matter, until he receives an “official report” from some official sources. In other words, the report contemplated under Section 168(2) of the Act, according to him should be construed as an official report. In support of the said contention, he relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Gujarat & another vs. Acharya Shri Devendraprasadji Pande, reported in AIR 1969 SC 373 . (B) The power to administer oath and record evidence is not conferred expressly on the Election Commissioner under the Act and therefore the action of election commission in recording evidence and consequently the proceedings vitiate. (C) The Election Commissioner should have evaluated the material on record treating the proceedings as quasi-criminal in nature. In other words, he submitted that the Election Commissioner should have insisted that the Election Commissioner should have insisted on the complainants to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt and should not have decided the matter based on preponderance of probabilities. (D) Lastly he argued that the material on record clearly discloses that the petitioner has tendered his resignation within the period of fifteen days from 4.1.2006 and consequently the reasons assigned and the conclusion arrived at by the Election Commissioner are not just and proper. (D) Lastly he argued that the material on record clearly discloses that the petitioner has tendered his resignation within the period of fifteen days from 4.1.2006 and consequently the reasons assigned and the conclusion arrived at by the Election Commissioner are not just and proper. Per contra, Sri Nanjunda Reddy, learned senior advocate and Sri Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 3 and 4 respectively submitted that the report, as mentioned in Section 168(2) of the Act means only the report and it cannot be read as an official report; that the Election Commissioner has got jurisdiction to record the statements of the parties while giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person concerned under Section 168(2) of the Act; that the proceedings in question are not quasi-criminal in nature and that therefore the Election Commissioner need not apply the theory of proving the fact beyond reasonable doubt while deciding such matters; even on merits they contended that no reliable material is found on record to show that the petitioner has resigned within the stipulated period of fifteen days; that as the State Election Commissioner has, on facts, found that the petitioner has not tendered his resignation to the membership of the Grama Panchayat within the stipulated period, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court, particularly when the finding recorded by the Election Commissioner is based on the material on record. They relied upon the judgments in the case of The Board of Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan vs. Radha Kishan & Others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 289 , in the case of S. Mohan Lal vs. R. Kondaiah, reported in AIR 1979 SE 1132 and in the case of Rameshwar S/o. Kalyan Singh vs. The State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR (39) 1952 SC 54. 5. Before proceeding further, it is advantageous to note the relevant portions of Sections 167 and 168 of the Act, which read thus:- “Section 167(1)... 5. Before proceeding further, it is advantageous to note the relevant portions of Sections 167 and 168 of the Act, which read thus:- “Section 167(1)... Section 167(2):- If a person who is chosen as a member of a Zilla Panchayat is or becomes a member of the House of the People, the Council of States, the State Legislative Assembly or the State Legislative Council, or is or becomes a Municipal Councillor or a Councillor of a Municipal Corporation or a Councillor of a Town Panchayat, or a member of a Taluk Panchayat or a Grama Panchayat then at the expiration of a period of fifteen days from the date of notification of the names of the members under Section 172, or as the case may be, within fifteen days from the date of commencement of term of office of a member of the House of the people, the Council of states, the State Legislative Assembly or State Legislative Council or a Municipal Councillor or a Councillor of a Municipal Corporation or a Councillor of a Town Panchayat or a member of a Taluk Panchayat or Grama Panchayat, his seat in the Zilla Panchayat shall become vacant unless he has previously resigned his seat in the House of the People, the Council of States, the State Legislative Assembly or the State Legislative Council or the Municipal Council or the Municipal Corporation or Town Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat or Grama Panchayat as the case may be. 168(1):- if any member of a Zilla Panchayat- (a) is or becomes subject to any of the disqualification specified in Section 167; or (b) .......................... (c) .......................... (d) .......................... Section 168(2):- The State Election Commission on a report made to it and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the person concerned of being heard shall declare whether the seat of the person concerned is or has become vacant.” From the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that in case if the member of Grama Panchayat, is subsequently elected as the member of the Zilla Panchayat, he has to tender his resignation to the membership of Grama Panchayat held by him, within fifteen days from the date of the Notification of the names of the members under Section 172 of the Act. If such elected member of Zilla Panchayat does not tender his resignation to the membership of the Grama Panchayat within fifteen days from the date of Notification, his seat in Zilla Panchayat becomes vacant. The State Election Commission, on a report made to it and after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to such person, shall decide as to whether the seat of the person concerned is or has become vacant or not. It is relevant to note Section 43 of the Act, which deals with resignation of the member. Section 43- Resignation of member: A member of a Grama Panchayat may resign his membership in writing under his hand addressed to the Adhyaksha and his seat shall become vacant on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of such resignation, unless within the said period of fifteen days he withdraws such resignation by writing under his hand addressed to the Adhyaksha. The Adhyaksha shall cause the letter of resignation to be placed in the next meeting of the Grama Panchayat.” The aforementioned provision clarifies that a members of Grama Panchayat may resign his membership in writing under his hand addressed to Adhyaksha and his seat shall become vacant on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of such resignation, unless he withdraws such resignation within the said period of fifteen days by writing under his hand addressed to Adhyaksha. Thereafter it is the duty of Adhyaksha to place the letter or resignation in the next meeting of Grama Panchayat. 6. Re-Point (A). Relating to Report.- The bare perusal of Sections 167(2) AND 168(2) of the Act would indicate that the State Election Commission, on a “report made to it, shall declare the seat of a person concerned is or has become vacant after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the person concerned. The word “report” found in the aforesaid Sections cannot be read as “official report” as contended by the petitioner. The Panchayat Raj Act, in my opinion, furnishes a complete machinery in itself for the better administration and supervision of Panchayats. The judgment of the Apex Court, relied upon on behalf of the petitioner in the case of State of Gujarat & another vs. Acharya Shri Devendraprasadji Pande, reported in AIR 1969 SC 373 , may not be of any help to the petitioner. The judgment of the Apex Court, relied upon on behalf of the petitioner in the case of State of Gujarat & another vs. Acharya Shri Devendraprasadji Pande, reported in AIR 1969 SC 373 , may not be of any help to the petitioner. The said matter arises out of Bombay Public Trust Act. Having regard to the context in which the word “report” has been used in Section 37(1)(c) of Bombay Public Trust Act, the said word has been interpreted by the Apex Court to mean, a formal report or some such report as the trustee may be required to make under the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. But in the matter on hand, having regard to the context in which the word “report” is used, this Court is unable to persuade itself to agree with the contention of the petitioner that the word “report” found in the Panchayat Raj Act, means “official report”. If the same was to be the intention of he legislature, it would not have omitted to use the word “official report” in the said Section. If a member of the Zilla Panchayat becomes subject to any disqualification under Section 167 of the Act, any person can make a report to the State Election Commissioner under Section 168(2) of the Act, praying for declaring the seat vacant. Viewed in this context, there need not be any official report by any of the officials of the Department of Panchayat of the Deputy Commissioner. 7. It is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act unless the two Acts are pari materia legislations and are cognate Acts. It is well known principle of construction that the meaning of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. When there is no ambiguity in the statute and the wordings used, it may not be permissible to refer to, for the purposes of its construction, any other legislation. The meaning of the word must be gleaned from the context in which it is used. Reference to the provision of other statute where the expression is used, cannot be of any assistance in determining its meaning under Section 168(2) of the Act. The meaning of the word must be gleaned from the context in which it is used. Reference to the provision of other statute where the expression is used, cannot be of any assistance in determining its meaning under Section 168(2) of the Act. (See judgments reported in AIR 1979 SC 289 and AIR 1979 SC 1132 ). As has been observed in the case of Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturing (Wvg) Co. Ltd., vs. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat & another reported in AIR 1990 SC 1974, in seeking legislative intention, Judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say. It is by now well settled that right to vote, right to elect or contest on election is a creature of statute and circumscribed by limitations contained therein. Therefore, as long as the Constitution or the Act indicates in clear terms as to what its policy is, it would not be open to a Court to interpret such a provision by trying to find out what the intent could be by ignoring the actual expressions used. If the word “report” is to be read as “official report”, then, the official before giving such report will have to conduct mini enquiry, inasmuch as he cannot send the report blindly without application of his mind and without hearing the parties. Such mini enquiry is not contemplated under the Act and the same is not the intention of the legislature also. The legislation consciously is silent about two tier enquiry. This Court will not legislate under the garb of interpreting the existing law. Therefore, the Court has to interpret the word “report” in its ordinary popular sense, consistent with the context. In this regard, it is relevant to note the various dictionary meanings of the word “report”. The “Encarta” Dictionary by Microsoft defines “report” as - Tell about what happened - to give information about something that has happened, etc. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “report” as a formal, oral or written presentation of facts or a recommen dation for action. Advanced Law Lexicon Dictionary defines the word “report” as verbal account or document that describes and explains a state of affairs or an incident that has taken place; something which gives information, etc. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “report” as a formal, oral or written presentation of facts or a recommen dation for action. Advanced Law Lexicon Dictionary defines the word “report” as verbal account or document that describes and explains a state of affairs or an incident that has taken place; something which gives information, etc. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “report as a formal, oral or written presentation of facts or a recommendation for action. Advanced Law Lexicon Dictionary defines the word “report” as verbal account that described and explain a state of affairs or an incident that has taken place; something which gives information, etc. Viewed from that popular sense of the term “report”, particularly in the context in which the said word used, it is clear that the report means report simplicitor, which means anybody can approach by filing petition or by reporting to the State Election Commission. In this matter, respondents 3 and 4 have filed a petition before the Deputy Commissioner by reporting him that the petitioner has not tendered his resignation within the prescribed period. The Deputy Commissioner, in turn, has sent the report/petition of the 3rd and 4th respondents to the State Election Commissioner. Thus, this Court does not find any error in the said aspect of the matter. 8. Re-Point (B). Relating to power of administering oath and to record statements:- It is argued by the petitioner that the State Election Commissioner has no power to administer the oath and record evidence, inasmuch as the said power is not conferred expressly on him by the Act. 8. Re-Point (B). Relating to power of administering oath and to record statements:- It is argued by the petitioner that the State Election Commissioner has no power to administer the oath and record evidence, inasmuch as the said power is not conferred expressly on him by the Act. Sri Ravivarmakumar, by relying on various Articles of the Constitution, contended that neither the Constitution nor the Act confers jurisdiction to the State Election Commissioner to administer oath or to record the evidence; that whenever the power to administer oath is provided to a particular authority, it is specifically stated so in the Constitution and the Oaths Act; that as neither the Oaths Act nor the Constitution or the Panchayat Raj Act does confer the power to administer oath, the State Election Commissioner was not justified in administering oath; that even in the absence of Rules, the State Election Commissioner cannot record the evidence; that the provisions of Evidence Act are also inapplicable to the proceedings on hand, inasmuch as the Evidence Act applies to only the judicial proceedings before the Court; as the State Election Commissioner is not authorized to take evidence, he cannot be termed as Court. Thus, according to him, the State Election Commissioner should not have recorded the evidence of the parties. 9. It is not in dispute in this matter, that the State Election Commissioner has administered oath to the witnesses examined and has recorded their statements. It is true that the Constitution does not provide power to the State Election Commissioner to administer oath to the witnesses. The Karnataka Raj Panchayat Act also does not confer power on the State Election Commissioner to administer oath to the witnesses. But the question still remains in an to whether the Oaths Act has given such power to the State Election Commissioner or not. In other words, the question as to whether the action of the State Election Commissioner of administering oath in this case is protected or covered by the Oaths Act or not, is to be decided. But the question still remains in an to whether the Oaths Act has given such power to the State Election Commissioner or not. In other words, the question as to whether the action of the State Election Commissioner of administering oath in this case is protected or covered by the Oaths Act or not, is to be decided. At this Stage, it is relevant to note Section 3 of the Oaths Act (relevant portion), which reads thus:- “Section 3-Power to administer oaths-(1) The following Courts and persons shall have power to administer, by themselves or, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 6, by an officer empowered by them in this behalf, oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties imposed or in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by law, namely:- (a):- all Courts and persons having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence.” From the plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that all Courts and persons having by law or consent of the parties jurisdiction to receive evidence have got the power to administer oath. The main object of administering oath is to render persons who give false evidence liable to prosecution as is clear from Section 6 of the Oaths Act, 1969. Section 7 of the Oaths Act clarifies that the proceedings will not be invalidated or the evidence will not be rendered inadmissible even if the witness omits to take oath or make any affirmation or should there he any irregularity in whatsoever manner in administering oath or affirmation. Having regard to the scheme of oaths Act, more particularly oath, his action of administering oath would not vitiate the proceedings or vitiate the statements recorded by him. At the most, it may amount to irregularity and the persons whole statements are recorded would not liable to be prosecuted if ultimately their statements are found to be false. In the matter on hand, the parties to the litigation have consented before the State Election Commissioner for recording their statements on oath, inasmuch as, they have not objected before the State Election Commissioner contending that the Commissioner has no power to administer the oath. The parties have simply kept quiet and have given their statements on oath. Petitioner himself has voluntarily tendered his evidence in the examination-in-chief in the form of affidavit duly sworn to by him. The parties have simply kept quiet and have given their statements on oath. Petitioner himself has voluntarily tendered his evidence in the examination-in-chief in the form of affidavit duly sworn to by him. These facts go to show that the petitioner and respondents 3 and 4 have consented for recording their statements on oath before the State Election Commissioner. Hence, the petitioner cannot approbate or reprobate by advancing the arguments as aforementioned before this Court. Though express consent is not given by the parties it can be safely concluded that the parties have consented impliedly for recording their statements on oath. Hence, the action of the State Election Commissioner is covered by the provisions of Oath Act. Consequently it has to be concluded that the State Election Commissioner has got jurisdiction to record the statements on oath, based on the consent given by the parties. It is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of H.P. vs. Raj Mahendra Pal & Others, reported in (1999) 4 SCC 43 , wherein it is observed as under:- “Quasi-judicial acts are such acts which mandate an officer the duty of looking into certain facts out in a way which it specifically directs but after a discretion, in its nature judicial. The exercise of power by such tribunal or authority contemplates the adjudication of rival claims of the persons by an act of the mind or judgment upon the proposed course of official action as to an object of the corporate power, for the consequences of which the official will not be liable, although his act was not judged. A quasi-judicial function has bee termed to be one which stands midway a judicial and an administrative function. The primary test is as to whether the authority alleged to be a quasi-judicial one, has any express statutory duty to act judicially in arriving at the decision in question. If the reply is in the affirmative, he authority would be deemed to be quasi-judicial, and if the reply is in the negative, it would not be. It follows, therefore, that an authority is described ad quasi-judicial when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all”. Under Section 168(2) of the Act, the State Election Commission is expected to adjudicate the rival claims in judicious manner after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard. It follows, therefore, that an authority is described ad quasi-judicial when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all”. Under Section 168(2) of the Act, the State Election Commission is expected to adjudicate the rival claims in judicious manner after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard. Hence the State Election Commission acts as a quasi-judicial authority while deciding such matters. The Election Commissioner while acting as Quasi-judicial Tribunal, does not possess all attributes of a Court, but possesses some. There is no machinery provided for summoning the witnesses or for compelling production of documents. Therefore, the State Election Commissi oner, though is required to adjudicate the disputes between the parties judiciously, he cannot be termed as Court for the purpose of Section 168(2) of the Act. It is difficult to lay down any definite or precise test for determining the character of a body, which is called upon to adjudicate upon matters brought before it. Sometimes in deciding such a question, Courts enquire whether the body or authority whose status or character is the subject matter of the enquiry, is clothed with the trappings of a Court, viz., can it compel witnesses to appear before it and is it expected to deal with the matters before it fairly, justly and on the merits and not be guided by subjective considerations and is it bound to comply with the rules of natural justice. As the State Election Commission does not have all trappings of Court, it is not a Court. 10. However this Court does not find any substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the State Election Commissioner has no jurisdiction to record the statements of the parties. The statements of the parties recorded by the State Election Commissioner though cannot be termed under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, they are the statements recorded for the purposes of Section 168(2) of the Act. Though the State Election Commission is not a Court, nevertheless it is vested with the power of superintendence, direction and control of the elections to the Panchayats in the State. Under the provisions of Section 168(2) of the Act, it is obligatory on the part of the State Election Commissioner to decide the question as to whether the seat of the person becomes vacant or not, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to him. Under the provisions of Section 168(2) of the Act, it is obligatory on the part of the State Election Commissioner to decide the question as to whether the seat of the person becomes vacant or not, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to him. The words “after giving” a reasonable opportunity of being heard” would necessarily means that the person concerned should be heard before passing any order. It is the minimum requirement of law. Right of being heard includes right of submission of written statements, petitions and giving oral statements. In this matter, the petitioner as well as respondents 3 and 4 have given their oral statements, which are reduced to writing by the State Election Commissioner. As aforementioned, the petitioner has even tendered his evidence through affidavit in support of his case. The action of the State Election Commissioner of recording the statement of the parties and of hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties are clearly within the jurisdiction of the State Election Commissioner under Section 168(2) of the Act, Had the State Election Commissioner not recorded the statements of the parties though prayed for, he would have, not only violated the principles of natural justice, but also violated the mandatory requirement of law as contemplated under Section 168(2) of the Act. This, the argument of the petitioner in this context fails. 11. Re-Point (c), relating to quasi criminal in nature:- As aforementioned, it is argued by Sri Ravivarma Kumar, that the proceedings in question are quasi-criminal an nature, inasmuch as the penalty of cessation of office is attached. Thus, according to him, the degree of proof required in such matters is beyond reasonable doubt and that the material on record should not be weighed based on preponderance of probabilities. In this regard, he relied upon the decisions in the case of Mullapudi Venkata Krishna Rao vs. Vedula Suryanarayana, reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 504, in the case of D. Venkata Reddy vs. Sultan & Others, reported in Nagjibhai Patel vs. Jashvant Singh Udesignh & Others, reported in (1978)3 SCC 142 . 12. In this regard, he relied upon the decisions in the case of Mullapudi Venkata Krishna Rao vs. Vedula Suryanarayana, reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 504, in the case of D. Venkata Reddy vs. Sultan & Others, reported in Nagjibhai Patel vs. Jashvant Singh Udesignh & Others, reported in (1978)3 SCC 142 . 12. In all the aforecited judgments of the Apex Court, the allegation against the elected candidate was of involvement in corrupt practice during elections, In that context, the Apex Court has observed that the allegation of corrupt practice being in the nature of quasi-criminal charge, the same must be proved beyond any shadow of doubt. But the matter on hand does not arise out of election petition. This matter has arisen before the State Election Commissioner, based on the complaint lodged by respondents 3 and 4 with the allegation that the petitioner has not resigned within the stipulated period from the date of Notification after getting himself elected as a member of Zill Panchayat. Thus, the simple question to be decided by the State Election Commissioner was as to whether the petitioner had in fact resigned the membership of Grama Panchayat within the stipulated period as contemplated under section 167(2) of the Act or not. There is neither the allegation of corrupt practice nor is there any other allegation in the nature of criminal charge against the petitioner. Hence, the proceeding on hand is not quasi-criminal in nature. The Election Commissioner is not expected to decide validity of the election of the petitioner, inasmuch as he is not expected to decide election petition. The election disputes are to be decided by the Civil Courts under the provisions of Section 15, 132, 171, as the case may be, of the Act. As the proceedings in question against the petitioner is not quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof required is not beyond reasonable doubt, but the matter has to be decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Therefore, this Cort is unable to agree with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard. But this Court hastens to mention that the onus lies heavity on the complainant to prove the allegations. 13. Re-Point (D): In our country election is fairly a costly and expensive venture. Therefore, this Cort is unable to agree with the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this regard. But this Court hastens to mention that the onus lies heavity on the complainant to prove the allegations. 13. Re-Point (D): In our country election is fairly a costly and expensive venture. The valuable verdict of the people at the polls must be given due respect and candour and should not be disregarded or set at naught on vague, indefinite, frivolous or fanciful allegations or on evidence which is of a shaky or prevaricating character. This, the onus lies heavily on the complainant to make out a strong case to succeed in such matters. Success of a winning candidate at election should not be highly interfered with. This is all the more so when the seat of successful candidate is sought to be set at naught for no fault of his, but of someone else. However, it is to be observed here itself that in a democracy such as ours, the purity, sobriety and sanctity of elections, the sacrosanct and sacred nature of the electoral process must be preserved and maintained. As the proceedings in question are quasi-judicial in nature, it is necessary that the Election Commissioner should arrive at a conclusion on the basis of come reliable evidence. That is to say, such evidence which, and that too, with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of he elected candidate and does not move the matter in suspicious state, as, mere suspicious material cannot take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries. The findings recorded by the election Commissioner in such matter can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any reliable material on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable man could have given to those findings on the basis of that evidence. Normally this Court would not interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the authority below. But when the finding is based on no evidence or is not supported by any reliable evidence, or beset with surmises or conjectures, it would be a perverse finding and thus the same would be subject to judicial verdict. With this background, this Court prefers to examine the matter on merits. 14. But when the finding is based on no evidence or is not supported by any reliable evidence, or beset with surmises or conjectures, it would be a perverse finding and thus the same would be subject to judicial verdict. With this background, this Court prefers to examine the matter on merits. 14. The advocates on both the parties have taken me though the material on record and the impugned order. It is unfortunate in this matter that majority of the documents produced on either side, more particularly, the relevant documents are unbelievable, inasmuch as the dates and other necessary ingredients are tampered. Sri K.N. Phanindra, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State Election Commissioner has made available the original records maintained by the State Election Commissioner, to the Court. 15. As aforementioned, the petitioner being the member of Avani Gram Panchayat, was elected to Kolar Zilla Panchayat as a member from Avani (Reserved Constituency) on 27.12.2005. The State Election Commissioner issued gazette Notification electing the members of the Zilla Panchayat, including the petitioner on 4.1.2006. Thus, the petitioner was expected to tender his resignation to the membership of Avani Grama Panchayat within fifteen days from 4.1.2006, i.e., on or before 19.1.2006. According to respondents 3 and 4, the petitioner has not tendered his resignation within the period of fifteen days and whereas, it is the case of the petitioner that the has tendered his resignation on 2.1.2006 and the same is accepted by the Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat on 12.1.2006. Thus, the only question required to be decided by the State Election commissioner was, as to whether the petitioner had resigned his membership of Avani Grama Panchayat within 19.1.2006 or not. In support of their case, the complainants examined six witnesses including themselves, Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat as PW-2 and the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat as PW-3 and got marked the documents at Ex. P1 to P19(a), whereas the petitioner examined three witnesses including himself and got marked the documents at Ex.R1 to 16. Ex.P1 is the application dated 18.1.2007 filed by 4th respondent before Adhyaksha/Secretary of Grama Panchayat requesting them to give information as to whether the petitioner has resigned to the post of member of Grama Panchayat or not. P1 to P19(a), whereas the petitioner examined three witnesses including himself and got marked the documents at Ex.R1 to 16. Ex.P1 is the application dated 18.1.2007 filed by 4th respondent before Adhyaksha/Secretary of Grama Panchayat requesting them to give information as to whether the petitioner has resigned to the post of member of Grama Panchayat or not. According to the complainants, the Adhyaksha and Secretary of Grama Panchayat have given as endorsement as per Ex.P2, dated 20.1.2006 (tampered at various places) that the petitioner has not Complainants have heavity relied upon another document at Ex.P.4, dated 20.1.2006 i.e., an endorsement issued by the Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat that the petitioner has not tendered his resignation letter either to her or to her office till 20.1.2006. Ex.P10 is an endorsement issued by the Executive Officer of Taluk Panchayat, Mulbagal, dated 18.1.2006, that he has no information either from Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat or from Secretary that the petitioner has resigned membership of Grama Panchayat till 18.1.2006. Ex.P12 is issued by the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat, from 1.3.2005 to 21.1.2006 (the figure “21” appears to have been tampered). Ex.P17(a) is the resolution book maintained by the Grama Panchayat, which discloses that the resignation letter of the petitioner was discussed in the Grama Panchayat meeting held on 23.1.2006 (date “23” is tampered) and the resolution is signed by 10 members including the Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat. The said resolution is also signed by the Secretary of Grama Panchayat. Based on these documents, it is contended by respondents 3 and 4 that the petitioner has not resigned the membership of Avani Grama Panchayat till 20.1.2006; that had he resigned earlier to 20.1.2006, his name would not have been found in the list of members till 21.1.2006, vide Ex.P12. Said submissions are opposed by the petitioner contending that Ex.P2(a), P2(b), P2(c), P2(d), are all tampered, inasmuch as the original dates and other material particulars are erased by putting white ink and the fresh date is mentioned as 20.1.2006. As aforementioned, Ex.P2 is a joint endorsement allegedly issued by the Adhyaksha and Secretary of Grama Panchayat on 20.1.2006. But the date 20.1.2006 is tampered in all the four places, which is clear to the 4th respondent on 18.1.2006 in writing. Ex P2 and R6 are one and the same, i.e., carbon copies. As aforementioned, Ex.P2 is a joint endorsement allegedly issued by the Adhyaksha and Secretary of Grama Panchayat on 20.1.2006. But the date 20.1.2006 is tampered in all the four places, which is clear to the 4th respondent on 18.1.2006 in writing. Ex P2 and R6 are one and the same, i.e., carbon copies. However, certain additions are made in Ex.P2, such as seal and signature of Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat, dates are altered from 18.1.2006 to 20.1.2006. Even the interpolation is made in the main portion of the endorsement by inserting the word “Adhyaksha”. These insertions are visible to the naked eye. By tampering the document Ex.R6, respondents 3 and 4 have converted the document as Ex.P2. Based on this tampered document at Ex.P2, respondents 3 and 4 contend that the petitioner has not resigned till 20.1.2006. The said submission of respondents 3 and 4 cannot be accepted, inasmuch as respondents 3 and 4 cannot take advantage of the tampered documents in support of their case. The State Election Commissioner should not have relied upon Ex.P2. 17. Ex.P4 is another document, which according to the petitioner, is created by respondents 3 and 4 to suit their purpose. The said documents is an endorsement allegedly issued by Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat on 20.1.2006 to the effect that the petitioner has not resigned till 20.1.2006. The Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat, viz., Smt. Manjula was examined as the witness of the complainants before the State Election Commissioner as PW.2. She has categorically denied that she has issued the document at Ex.P4, dated 20.1.2006. She has denied her signature found in Ex.Pr. There is nothing in her evidence to disbelieve her version. On the other hand, she categorically states in her cross-examination that the petitioner has resigned on 2.1.2006. PW.3 (Secretary of the Grama Panchayat) has stated that only two seals are available in the Office of Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat and the seal found in Ex.P2(d) purporting to be that of the Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat is a different seal altogether. According to him, the seals of Adhyaksha as found in Ex.P17(b) and P17(c) are the only seals which are the real seals of Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat and that the seal found in Ex.P2(d) is a different seal altogether. Which means, the seal as found in Ex.P2(d) does not belong to Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat. According to him, the seals of Adhyaksha as found in Ex.P17(b) and P17(c) are the only seals which are the real seals of Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat and that the seal found in Ex.P2(d) is a different seal altogether. Which means, the seal as found in Ex.P2(d) does not belong to Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat. If the document at Ex.P2, in which tampering is found at various places and the document at Ex.P4, which is created, are excluded from consideration, then the only document that remains in support of the case of respondents 3 and 4 is Ex.P12. Unfortunately in Ex.P12 also, the crucial date, i.e., 21.1.2006 is again tampered from 1.1.2006. The same is also visible to the naked eye. Therefore, based on such tampered documents, the Election Commissioner should not have declared the membership of the petitioner to Zilla Panchayat, vacant. He should have rejected the complaint as the complainants have not approached the Commission with clean hands. 18. It is contended on behalf of respondents 3 and 4 that had really the petitioner resigned on 2.1.2006, the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat, at least would have known about such resignation as he sits in the room of Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat and that he would not have issued Ex.R6 on 18.1.2006, intimating that the petitioner has not resigned till 18.1.2006. 19. The said submission also cannot be accepted. Section 43 of the Act makes clear that the person may resign from his membership in writing under has hand addressed to Adhyaksha and his seat will become vacant on the expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of such resignation, unless he withdraws the resignation letter within fifteen days. It is clear from the said Section that the Adhyaksha shall cause the letter of resignation to be placed in the next meeting of the Grama Panchayat. There is nothing, on record to show that the petitioner has withdrawn his resignation letter subsequent to 2.1.2006. Hence, the same is deemed to have been accepted after fifteen days. In this matter, admittedly, the meeting of Grama Panchayat was scheduled to be held on 17.1.2006. But on that day no meeting was held because of festival in the village and the meeting was adjourned to 23.1.2006. The resolution book at Ex.P17 goes to show that on 23.1.2006. meeting was held and the resignation of the petitioner was discussed. In this matter, admittedly, the meeting of Grama Panchayat was scheduled to be held on 17.1.2006. But on that day no meeting was held because of festival in the village and the meeting was adjourned to 23.1.2006. The resolution book at Ex.P17 goes to show that on 23.1.2006. meeting was held and the resignation of the petitioner was discussed. But the date 23.1.2006 is tampered in Ex.P17. Thus, it cannot definitely be said that the meeting was held on 23.1.2006. Even assuming that the meeting was not held on 23.1.2006, the petitioner cannot be blamed in that regard, inasmuch as he is not expected to attend any meeting from the date of acceptance of his resignation. If, the Adhyaksha has not placed resignation letter of the member before the next meeting of Grama Panchayat, the same cannot be said to be fault of the member, but it may be the fault of the Adhyaksha or the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat. Once, the petitioner tenders his resignation letter to the Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat, he becomes functions officio. If he has not withdrawn his letter of resignation, the same is deemed to have been accepted and the seat of the Grama Panchayat becomes vacant automatically. 20. The contention of the petitioner that he has resigned on 2.1.2006 is fully supported by the conduct of the petitioner in not attending any of the meetings after 2.1.2006. Ex.R1 R1(a), R1(b), would go to show that the petitioner has resigned and the resignation letter was accepted by the Adhyaksha of Grama Panchayat, Ex.Rs is the letter dated 18.1.2006 duly signed by the Adhyaksha and Secretary of he Grama Panchayat, which is sent to the Deputy Commission, Kolar, intimating him that the petitioner has resigned the membership of the Grama Panchayat on 2.1.2006 and that his resignation letter was accepted on 12.1.2006. The said letter of the Adhyaksha and the secretary of Grama Panchayat was received by the Deputy Commissioner’s Office on 19.1.2006 as is clear from the seal of the Deputy Commissioner’s Office. This document goes to show that the Adhyaksha and the Secretary of Grama Panchayath have intimated the Deputy Commissioner on 19.1.2006 itself that the petitioner has resigned the membership of the Grama Panchayat on 2.1.2006 and the same is accepted on 12.1.2006. This document goes to show that the Adhyaksha and the Secretary of Grama Panchayath have intimated the Deputy Commissioner on 19.1.2006 itself that the petitioner has resigned the membership of the Grama Panchayat on 2.1.2006 and the same is accepted on 12.1.2006. PWs2 and 3, the Chairman and the Secretary of Grama Panchayat have unequivocally state that they have signed and sent the letter Ex.R2 to the Deputy Commissioner. This it is clear that at least as on 19.1.2006 the petitioner had vacated his seat of member of Grama Panchayat. Hence, it is to be held that the petitioner has vacated his office as a member of Grama Panchayat within fifteen days from 4.1.2006 as prescribed under law. The enquiry which the State Election Commission has to make under Section 168(2) of the Act is a summary in character. The burden of proof heavily lies on the one who files a petition for declaring the seat vacant. If the complainant adduces evidence, which is faulty in nature, such as production of tempered documents, etc., it is the complainant who fails. These facts are overlooked by the State Election Commissioner. The order of the State Election Commissioner is not based on actual facts, but is based on assumptions and surmises. In view of the same is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the same stands quashed. Writ petition is allowed.