Judgment S.K.SETH, J. ( 1. ) This is landlords appeal against the reversing judgment and decree - whereby the eviction decree passed by the trial Court was set aside and the suit was dismissed. ( 2. ) Plaintiff/appellant filed the eviction suit against the respondent/tenant seeking his eviction from the non-residential accommodation. It is situated in Neemuch. Plaintiff sought eviction on various grounds covered by Section 12 (1) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (herein after referred to as the Act). Claim was resisted by the appellant/defendant. As usual, tenant denied the grounds urged for eviction. Based upon pleadings, trial Court framed issues and allowed the parties to adduce evidence. Learned trial Judge on appreciation of evidence, decreed the suit under Section 12(1) (b) (c) and (f) of the Act and ordered eviction of the respondent herein. Matter was carried in first appeal by the respondent. Learned District Judge, Neemuch heard the appeal. By the impugned judgment and decree, appeal was allowed and the entire suit for eviction was dismissed. Aggrieved by judgment and decree of the trial Court, plaintiff has now preferred this second appeal. The appeal was admitted for final hearing on the following question of law:- "Has the first appellate Court reversed the decree for eviction granted under Section 12 (1) (f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on improper and irrelevant ground?" ( 3. ) In view of the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission, learned counsel "Confined their submission on that point, as a result, we do not have to tackle any other issue. ( 4. ) Now the question for our consideration is whether reversal of judgment and decree granted under section 12 (1) f) could be sustained in law. ( 5. ) Shri A.K.Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant contended that basically two factors affected the reasoning process of the Court below to non-suit the appellant under Section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. According to him, previous demand for enhanced rent made by the landlord, turned out to be fatal and secondly, the composite income of both husband and wife was more than adequate for the upkeep of the family and therefore, need set out by the plaintiff to start his own business is not genuine. According to him, previous demand for enhanced rent made by the landlord, turned out to be fatal and secondly, the composite income of both husband and wife was more than adequate for the upkeep of the family and therefore, need set out by the plaintiff to start his own business is not genuine. According to learned counsel, the entire approach of the learned lower appellate Court is unsustainable in law and fact, and if allowed to stand, would result in miscarriage of justice. In support of his contentions, he placed reliance on the following decisions, 1981 MPRCJ SN 38- M/s Bhopal Motors P. Ltd. And ors. Vs. B.P.Saradhy; and (2000) 9 SCC 329 - Ramjidas and another Vs. Rambabu and another. ( 6. ) On the other hand, Shri G.M.Chaphekar, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, while supporting the impugned judgment and decree submitted, that the findings recorded by the Court below are findings of fact and they are not open to interference in second appeal. He further submitted whether finding of fact reached by the courts below is against the weight of evidence is simply a question of appreciation of evidence and does not project any substantial question of law. He further submitted that finding regarding bonafide requirement is a pure question of fact and does give rise to any substantial question of law. Thus, according to htm, the question of law formulated at the time of admission is not a substantial question of law, and as such the appeal itself should be dismissed. In support of his contentions Shri Chaphekar placed reliance on three decisions of Supreme Court reported in AIR 1963 SC 382-VRamachandra Ayyar and another Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar; AIR 1999 SC 864 Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemde V. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, and AIR 1974 SC 1596 Mittulal V. Radhelal. ( 7. ) Facts emerging from record and which are no longer in dispute are that respondents are the tenant in suit shop. Appellant is landlord and owner of the suit shop and he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in Neemuch. Appellant is not an employee of the Bank but works only as a Pigmy Collection Agent getting commission at the fixed rate on the amount collected and deposited in the Bank. Wife of the appellant is teacher in a school. Appellant is not an employee of the Bank but works only as a Pigmy Collection Agent getting commission at the fixed rate on the amount collected and deposited in the Bank. Wife of the appellant is teacher in a school. Plaintiff set up the bonafide need of himself for starting his own grocery business in the suit shop and he has no other shop in his occupation in Neemuch. ( 8. ) There is no quarrel with the proposition of law on which Shri Chaphekar has placed reliance and drawn attention of the Court. We are very clear in our mind that jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC is now confined to substantial question of law, therefore, a finding of fact is not open to correction even if the appreciation of evidence is erroneous. Now a second appeal could be entertained if such an appeal gives rise to a substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission. However, it is equally true by catena of decisions that when there is no evidence at all or the finding of fact is based on misreading of evidence or suffers from any legal infirmity which materially prejudice the case of one of party such findings are perverse, and it would be open for this court to set aside such a finding and to take a different view See Neelakantan Vs. Mallika Begum - AIR 2002 SC 827 . ( 9. ) Now, we have to examine whether the substantial question of law formulated at the time of admission falls under which category. After having given our anxious consideration to material on records in the context of substantial question of law, we are inclined to think that the impugned judgment and decree falls under the later category and, therefore, this appeal deserves to be allowed. Previous demand for enhanced rent swayed the lower appellate Court to come to conclusion that past conduct of the appellant would destroy the subsequent requirement of the suit shop without taking into consideration the present need. It is the duty of the Courts to consider the bonafide of the need on the institution of suit. Previous demand for enhanced rent swayed the lower appellate Court to come to conclusion that past conduct of the appellant would destroy the subsequent requirement of the suit shop without taking into consideration the present need. It is the duty of the Courts to consider the bonafide of the need on the institution of suit. Similarly, the finding of the lower appellate Court that combined income of appellant and his wife is sufficient for the upkeep, therefore, appellant would not start and do the grocery business from the suit shop, to say the least, is based upon conjectures and surmises. There is no evidence to support this finding recorded by the lower appellate Court. These findings recorded by the first appellate Court are based upon misreading of evidence. Having regard to evidence adduced before it, the trial Judge rightly came to conclusion that appellant had established his claim for eviction on the banafide ground, the first appellate Court could not have reversed the said finding without recording sufficient and cogent reasons therefore. If such reversal the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is allowed to stand then instead of landlord, the Court would become the rationing authorities regarding the need of a landlord and this is impermissible in law and as such findings of the first appellate Court are unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. ( 10. ) In view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Judge is restored and the appeal is hereby allowed. Impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge Neemuch is hereby set aside without costs through out to be borne by the respondent. Counsels fee Rs.1000/- if certified. Appeal allowed.